What is property?

Economics Political Theory
21

Because read the links.

So that I search through dozens of pages of posts to find your answer to a question which you could easily provide right now? No thanks.

The whole point is nothing you say (i.e. promise) prevents you from simply deciding to not do what you are ordered.

That’s true. Likewise, when I sign a loan contract agreeing to repay the lender in the future, does that prevent me from deciding later not to repay him? No. Does that fact mean that the loan contract is invalid? No. The ability to change your mind about a contract does not make the contract invalid. I suppose your idea is that what the contract purports to transfer ownership over (the will) is not actually transferred, evidenced by the slave’s ability to change his mind later. And such a contract would indeed be invalid (though not quite for the reason you cite, but no matter). HOWEVER, that is not what a VS slavery contract is. A VS contract transfers ownership over the body. That is not the same as control over the body. The fact that the slave can later change his mind indicates he never transferred control over the body, it is no way demonstrates that he never transferred ownership.

Basically you’re alleging that one can surrender control of (i.e. alienate) something that is inalienable from him…control over his own will and person.

No pro-voluntary-slavery (VS) libertarian is “alleging that one can surrender control of…[one’s] own will and person.” We are alleging that you can sell your own body: transfer ownership of it. Control has nothing to do with ownership, except in the case of initial appropriation through homesteading, but that has no bearing on the question of VS.

You cannot “sell” (that is, transfer ownership of) your will

Correct.

because you cannot alienate yourself from it.

No, because the will is not property, and cannot be owned: and cannot therefore be sold. No non-physical thing can be property.

The new “owner” of your will doesn’t really own anything

Who said anything about owning the will? VS is about owning the body.

He isn’t controlling you. You are still in complete control.

Correct.

You’re just voluntarily choosing to obey orders. This is not slavery.

You are confusing voluntary choice in the ethical sense with voluntary choice in the physical-metaphysical sense. A slave picking cotton in the antebellum south is making voluntary choices in the physical-metaphysical sense (i.e. he is not an automaton which the master can move at will), but he is not making voluntary choices in the ethical sense (because he is acting under coercion: e.g. the threat of the whip).

But not all violence is aggression. When is violence not aggression? Violence against one’s own property is obviously not aggression (e.g. beating my dog), nor is violence against the property of another when one is in the pursuit of one’s own property (e.g. breaking down the door of a thief to retrieve my stolen TV set).

It is certainly violence for the master to whip the slave, but is it aggression? First, to clarify, “whip the slave” means “whip the slave’s body.” The master is whipping a piece of matter, he is not whipping a will or a mind or a soul or any other non-physical thing. Now, if the slave’s body is the property of the master, then the master is not aggressing. That is the claim of pro-VS libertarians: the slave’s body is the property of the master, and so any violence or threat of violence against that body is nothing but the master using his own property: it cannot be aggression. The slave can no more object to the master whipping the body than I can object to you beating your dog: it’s not my property, it’s yours, to do with as you please.

The minute you decide to not obey an order, you have illustrated the fact that was true all along…it is in fact you who is owner and controller of your will and person.

Again, you conflate control of the body and ownership of the body. This is wrong. The former concerns physical reality. The latter concerns ethics and law.

It’s my assumption that if you are presented with a logically sound reasoning, you will not deny it’s validity. Evidently I assume too much.

You do, namely that what you present is logically sound reasoning.

N.B. Perhaps some of the problem here is that when anti-VS libertarians think of “the body” they think of it in first-person perspective, whereas pro-VS libertarians are talking about “the body” from the third-person perspective: i.e. as one piece of matter in the world, which is capable of being owned and sold like any other.

22

I’m actually trying to figure out how you expect a piece of paper representing an opinion a person had in the past to literally sever the relationship between mind and body…perhaps its related to the inalienability of the will? Hmmmmmmmmm

If we are methodological dualists, and metaphysical materialists, then this distinction is impossibke because materialists necessarily believe that the mind has no existence apart from the body. Correct me if I am wrong, because it follows from that that to even make this argument you must be a spiritualist, meaning believe that a meaningful nonmaterial world exists.

also note that “ownership” does constitute control, either personally or through an intermediary. Your notion of enforcing the agreement does not constitute control in any sense of the word, merely negative incentive. The will of the individual is the only known way to control the body. Come back when technology catches up to the point where you can actually control someone and we will talk.

23

The links are there because, as I said, this is of course not the first time this ridiculous notion has been raised.

Inalienability of the self

Punishing non-violent actions with violence

Fraud in Libertarianism

Deterrence in Libertarianism

Alternative to intellectual property

What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Every single one of those links directs to a specific post, each offering the answer to your question. You seem to have a real problem doing any sort of outside investigation of your own.

24

@ John James

Fair enough, I assumed you just linked the entire threads, which it would be absurd to ask me to read through when you could simply respond here.

Now, I have read through those posts, and what I found is you repeating and linking to Rothbard’s position.

I am familiar with his position, and I disagree with it.

He says no title transfer occurs through a VS contract, therefore the contract is invalid, therefore violence used to enforce the contract is aggression.

If no title transfer occurred, then the rest of his argument would follow.

But I say title transfer did occur: title to the body of the slave. See last post.

25

I’m actually trying to figure out how you expect a piece of paper representing an opinion a person had in the past to literally sever the relationship between mind and body

I’m not suggesting that a VS slave contract severs the relationship between body and mind.

If we are methodological dualists, and metaphysical materialists, then this distinction is impossibke because materialists necessarily believe that the mind has no existence apart from the body. Correct me if I am wrong, because it follows from that that to even make this argument you must be a spiritualist, meaning believe that a meaningful nonmaterial world exists.

…huh? If you are a “metaphysical materialist” that means you believe that only physical reality exists: no mind et al. I have no idea what you mean by a methodological dualist. Method for what? You believe in dualism for the purpose of…? But you are at the same time a materialist? I also have no idea what this has to do with my argument, or how it makes me a “spiritualist.”

also note that “ownership” does constitute control

Think about what you mean by “control.” Ownership has something to do with posession (on the far ends: i.e. homesteading and abandonment), but nothing to do with control in the sense you mean. By control you seem to mean the ability to will the limbs of the slave into motion (i.e. the same kind of control the salve has over his own body). But I don’t have that kind of control over my car, or any property (except my own body). Control thus defined is not a condition for property ownership.

Your notion of enforcing the agreement does not constitute control in any sense of the word, merely negative incentive

Correct

The will of the individual is the only known way to control the body.

Correct

Come back when technology catches up to the point where you can actually control someone and we will talk.

When technology allows one person to control another (i.e. will their body into motion), then it will be possible for one person to control another. It is already possible to own other people’s body, as ownership has nothing to do with control in the sense you mean.

26

Minarchist,

In the other thread, I made this very polite post that you never responded to. Since you hate reading threads, I will repost it for your own ease:

But for some reason, you decided that this post lacked substance, as you have stated that you would only respond to my posts if they were “substantive”. So, you can continue to argue only against Rothbard’s arguments, or you could broaden your horizons and read other arguments against “voluntary” slavery. I won’t hold my breath.

27

@gotlucky

Kinsella’s criticism of Rothbard is essentially the same as my own.

The problem with this view is that it assumes that a person’s will has to be transferred in order for him to become a slave, or for others to have the right to control his body. But this is not necessary. Rather, the slave owner need only have the right to use force against the recalcitrant slave. It is true that one cannot alienate direct control of his body; one person can have only indirect control of another’s body. Yet, we own animals, even though the animals retain direct control over their actions. The owner exerts indirect control over the animal’s actions, e.g., by coercing or otherwise manipulating the animal to get the animal to do what the owner desires.

But then Kinsella makes this new argument trying to justify inalienability of the body.

Because the body is not some unowned resource that an already existing individual chooses to acquire, it makes little sense to say that it can be abandoned by its owner. And since alienation of property derives from the power to abandon it, the body is inalienable. A manifestation of intent to “sell” the body is without effect because a person cannot, merely by an act of will, abandon his or her body. Title to one’s body is inalienable, and it is not subject to transfer by contract.

Does it really? So I cannot sell anything that I cannot physically separate myself from? Why is that?

28

well then you must acknowledge that the will cannot be transferred and then so neither can the body.

well, its obvious you need to read more austrians. Methodological dualism considers the abstract things like the mind to be separate from the physical for purposes of discussion, but makes no statement on metaphysics. Rather than saying “no mind et al” materialists assert that the mind and thoughts are patterns of neurons firing and chemical interactions in the human sensorium. Thus, if you were a materialist you certainly wouldnt assert that whipping a (actual, nonconsenting) slave did not constitute an assault on someone’s mind. Meaning you must somehow believe that the mind/will can be divorced from the body. Explain yourself.

you think about it. Ownership contains the control over an asset, meaning that one can permit and deny possession to other people. I can let someone borrow my car, it still belongs to me, I still have nominal control over it. I can tell that person not to go over to the east side of town, or to return my property at 3 pm sharp. Insofar as my dictates are respected, I have control over the car. As soon as the possessor of the car ceases to follow my instructions, it becomes one or more crimes and/or torts. That is, as soon as I lose control, while I have title, it becomes a crime.

But cars are alienable, living human beings are not, because the cognitive element that exercises control cannot be separated from the corpus. You can only transfer possession of the body, not ownership, because if and when the current occupant changes his mind, enforcement of the agreement becomes a libertarian crime. And call me crazy, but being against nonconsensual torture seems like a good litmus test for a theory of ethics.

It is certainly true that slavery exists, although its not as prolific as it was several hundred years ago. The libertarian argument is that it is wrong. if you have a piece of paper that represents an individual’s prior consent to slavery, dated three years ago, and you beat that individual against his or her will, today, you have done wrong, legally and morally.

29

I think gotlucky’s post provides a perfect illustration of Minarchist’s MO, that I kind of described earlier. You do not seem to be actually interested in learning anything or progressing in discussion, so much as just spouting your own fallacious notions again and again, attempting to indirectly proclaim everyone else is just wrong.

I think this was made evident in the very first thread you created after joining this forum.

30

because if you change your mind and want to leave then we have to coerce you into staying, which constitutes aggressive violence which is wrong.

31

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ytCEuuW2_A

32

Obviously, depending upon the legal system, you can sell whatever you want to sell. What Kinsella is doing is demonstrating that the title to the body cannot be alienated as the body cannot be abandoned (well, at least so long as you are alive). Again, you can alienate body parts, as you can cut them off or out of you (though I advise having a professional surgeon do it :p).

What Kinsella is saying is that transferability is derived from abandonment. So, we should see why that is. Consider:

You are going to buy an apple from me for $5. How do I come to possess the $5 and how do you come to possess the apple? Well, let’s look at the definition of the word abandon:

Well, the most relevant definition is the fourth one. So, abandon may sound like a funky word to use, but given the definition, it makes sense. So, in what manner can you cease to exercise a right, title, or interest in your body? You cannot. You can pick some berries from a bush, and you can claim ownership over it. And then you can relinquish ownership over it. But you cannot relinquish ownership over your body.

Now, I imagine your criticism will be, “Even if I cannot relinquish ownership of my body, I can still trade ownership”. But relinquishing ownership is what you do when you trade.

Back to the apple. When you give me the $5, you relinquish ownership of the $5, and I claim ownership over it. I relinquish ownership of the apple and you claim ownership over the apple.

But you cannot relinquish ownership over your body. You cannot say to the world, “I cease to own myself”. Okay, well you can. But you still own yourself. But you can say to the world, “I relinquish ownership of this blueberry plant”. Someone else is free to come along and claim ownership over the blueberry plant.

33

@Minarchist

I have a post pending moderation the specifically addresses:

But, until it gets approved, I have some other things for you to read. Here is a post I made to Autolykos quoting some of Kinsella’s comments from elsewhere (okay, some of them are reposts of Conza88 posting the quotes).

34

well then you must acknowledge that the will cannot be transferred

I do. It cannot be physically transferred. Nor can ownership of it be transferred: namely, because it is not property and cannot be owned in the first place.

and then so neither can the body.

This is where we have problems. Why does the fact that the will cannot be physically or legally transferred have any bearing on whether the body can be? Consider this. I cannot sell some land and at the same time not sell some part of that land. That is a contradiction: I cannot both sell and not sell the same piece of property. But why can’t I sell my body and not sell my will? The will is not a part of the property that I am selling: because it is not property at all. Or, if it is property, then it can be sold. Either way, it in no way prevents the sale of the body.

Methodological dualism considers the abstract things like the mind to be separate from the physical for purposes of discussion, but makes no statement on metaphysics.

Ok.

Rather than saying “no mind et al” materialists assert that the mind and thoughts are patterns of neurons firing and chemical interactions in the human sensorium.

That means no mind at all. Identity theory = pure eliminative materialism.

Thus, if you were a materialist you certainly wouldnt assert that whipping a (actual, nonconsenting) slave did not constitute an assault on someone’s mind.

So If I’m a materialist, I think mind=body, and so whipping a slave is an assault on someone’s mind. Ok, and?

Meaning you must somehow believe that the mind/will can be divorced from the body. Explain yourself

You first. None of this has any bearing on what I’m talking about.

Ownership contains the control over an asset, meaning that one can permit and deny possession to other people.

Do I have control over my stock in Coca Cola? I have ownership of it. I have no physical connection to it in any way whatsoever.

I can let someone borrow my car, it still belongs to me,

Yes it does.

I still have nominal control over it.

And this nominal control has nothing to do with physically controlling it - someone else is driving it.What you have is ownership, which has nothing to do with physical control.

I can tell that person not to go over to the east side of town, or to return my property at 3 pm sharp. Insofar as my dictates are respected, I have control over the car.

Kind of like how the slave-master can tell the slave to do something, but doesn’t have actual control over whether he does it?

As soon as the possessor of the car ceases to follow my instructions, it becomes one or more crimes and/or torts. That is, as soon as I lose control, while I have title, it becomes a crime.

The guy who is using your car violates your property rights by using your car in ways contrary to your wishes…kind of like how slave uses his body contrary to the wishes of the master and therefore violates his property rights?

living human beings are not [alienable], because the cognitive element that exercises control cannot be separated from the corpus

If you’re claiming that the will is part of the body [which is property], then the will must be property. And if you’re claiming that the will is distinct from the body, then the will plays no role in the sale of the body. Either way, there’s no reason to disallow sale of the body (with or without the will).

35

because if you change your mind and want to leave then we have to coerce you into staying

To what does “you” refer in this sentence? To my body? My body is not my property anymore, it is the master’s. It is not aggression for the master to use violence against his own property. To my will? How can one use violence against the will? Is that like punching ghosts?

36

Identity theory is not eliminative materialism.

Identity theory =df S is in mental state X if and only if S is in brain state Y.

Eliminative materialism ‘eliminates’ discussion of folk psychology or mental states altogether and prefers we adopt some sort of neuroscientific vocabulariy. I, for one, think EM is self-refuting. Identity theory isn’t very plausible either, given that it can’t account for the thought experiment of non-carbon based life forms exhibiting the signs associated with something like pain. Even though the non-carbon based life form might exhibit the typical signs of being in pain, the identity theorist would have to completely deny this, since the non-carbon based life form lacks C-fibers.

37

@gotlucky

I think what Rothbard was getting at is this: in the normal, default situation, each person IS a selfowner BECAUSE he has a will: i.e., a direct control over his body. THis direct control is the natural position, and gives the person a better claim to his body than anyone else. Thati s WHY he is a selfowner.

I certainly agree. Every person is the original owner of their body. I would characterize it as a special case of the homesteading principle.

Now Rothbard is implicitly recognizing that the slave who promises to be slave still has his will, as he did not literally alienate it. Therefore, he still has the best link to his body, and thus he is still its owner.

The underlined passage is a problem. Suppose I homestead a piece of land. I spend years improving it and living on it. I decide to sell it to a man living 3000 miles away, while I am still living on it. Who has the “best link” to this property? I do, obviously. Yet I don’t own it anymore, the man I sold it to owns it.

Now it is true that iti s possible for someone to alienate their rights to their body, despite still having a will: by committing aggression. When you commit aggression you overcome the default presumption that you have the best right to control your body; now your victim has a better right to your body, despite your having the direct link to and direct control over it.

So the special link between myself and my body cannot be broken voluntarily by myself, the owner of my body, but it can be broken if I commit aggression. This distinction seems both arbitrary and intuitively unjust. What’s the reasoning behind this?

38

John James:

Of course you can be physically forced or coerced into obedience, but by definition this means this is obviously not voluntary on your part. This is when it becomes “slavery”.

So then taxation is not coercion in and of itself. You must first refuse to pay the tax and have the threat of jail brought as a means to influence you to pay. The mere existence of law does not mean coercion? In the example at hand, the mere existence of the contract does not amount to coercion?

39

Identity theory is not eliminative materialism.

The ontology of identity theory is the same as the ontology of eliminative materialism: i.e. purely physicalistic.

P and M are not actually identified. What they’re saying is that Ms are a subset of Ps.

40

because people change with the passage of time and so a contract, which conveys intent, cannot declare someone’s intent for all of time. So the inalienability of the will has a direct bearing on your control, and therefore potential ownership, of the body. Do you not see a problem with owning someone else’s body? Like they might one day change their mind and decide to leave?

actually you can

I imagine thats because you prefer to accept additional risk in exchange for convenience and leave the shares with a broker. Although I cant imagine a person who actually owns stock saying this. As for the rest of your post, you seem to relish the idea of owning live human bodies. I didnt see anything worth responding to, since you cherry picked two statements and decided to ask rhetorical questions that made no point, please explain to me how you can justify the idea of assaulting someone for failing to follow your dictates for the rest of his or her life. What theory of contracts justifies this?

As I said before:::

you think about it. Ownership contains the control over an asset, meaning that one can permit and deny possession to other people. I can let someone borrow my car, it still belongs to me, I still have nominal control over it. I can tell that person not to go over to the east side of town, or to return my property at 3 pm sharp. Insofar as my dictates are respected, I have control over the car. As soon as the possessor of the car ceases to follow my instructions, it becomes one or more crimes and/or torts. That is, as soon as I lose control, while I have title, it becomes a crime. But cars are alienable, living human beings are not, because the cognitive element that exercises control cannot be separated from the corpus. You can only transfer possession of the body, not ownership, because if and when the current occupant changes his mind, enforcement of the agreement becomes a libertarian crime. And call me crazy, but being against nonconsensual torture seems like a good litmus test for a theory of ethics.