a community is a society or culture confined to a specific geographic region that defines and enforces certain norms. A libertarian community wouldnt try to sneak anything in one someone without them knowing it, but they might prohibit certain behaviors/activities such as slavery or domestic violence or polyamory. A legal fiction such as a municipality is the most formal type of community, these are basically city-states under a hegemony. Other communitities like in rural appalachia are less formal but they do the same things, like enforce norms.
ok, I see what you are saying here
this may be a historical consideration that has little bearing to me because I, personally, consider dispute resolution to be a means of reducing viokence and increasing cooperation in a social system. Perhaps I cannot get outside myself to see why else we would want to settle disputes without violence, except that our aim is to settle disputes without violence.
because if people can sign away rights that the lack of would preclude their seeking of legal remedy, then they will seek violent remedy, whereas if those rights couldnt be legally signed away they could seek legal remedy. And we both agree that violence tends to destroy wealth.
As I see it, B alienating his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A (for example) in no way involves B alienating his body. He’s simply alienating a right that he’s considered to possess.
Would you agree with me that ownership = exclusive right to use?
If so, then isn’t B’s “right to not be hurt by A” just a part of B’s ownership over his own body? That is, if B has an exclusive right to his body, then any harm which A does to B’s body (to which B does not consent) is a property rights violation. One could say that the following rights follow from B’s ownership over his own body:
B’s right to not be hurt by A
B’s right to not be hurt by C
B’s right to not be hurt by D
…etc
You could specify every single way in which B’s property rights in his own body could conceivably be violated and call that a right.
Is there some important implication of your claim that the VS contract trades a right in general rather than property right in particular?
What kind of (libertarian-recognized) right is there which is not a property right?
But, you see, the will is part of the body. A human being is not just the body. I mean, he is, but he is a living body. If a human is not exercising his will, as I stated above, he is either dead or on a vegetative state.
That leads me to a thought. If Bob agrees to be Alice’s slave by contract, he is giving himself completely to her. I mean, the two parts that make him a living being, the body and the will. The body is clearly material property, but the will itself is not, as you said. So he is giving property and non property in the same package to Alice. Since the will cannot be taken out of the body, and since contracts can only be over property titles, I guess that’s why you can’t have a voluntary slavery contract. You can only have contracts over “full” properties, not a mix of property and non property like a human being is. I’ll make an analogy; let’s say I capture a man on the street and lock him in a cage inside my house that is virtually impossible to open or break (this is impossible of course, but lets pretend for the sake of the analogy). Then I sell my house to you. Did the man became your property? In the analogy above, of course, the house is the body and the man caged is the will. I don’t know if that’s a good analogy, but that’s what I could think about now. EDIT: [Thinking about it, I don’t think that this is a perfect analogy because the caged man can’t control de house, but I think that this makes the case against voluntary slavery stronger, rather than weaker.] What do you think?
Of course, that leads me to animals, and animals are an exception to this rule. Why? Well, I am not completely sure why, but I have so guesses (and there are topics and articles about that, like this and this (I didn’t read them yet)). One thought that I have is: humans evolved eating meat, for example, and this is a natural process, and nature just is.
So we arrive at this:
True. As I said above, humans and the rest of the animals are different from several reasons, but my argument was “if a car could will itself into motion”, and a horse clearly can. I take that back.
And Kinsella has pointed out that honoring a “voluntary” slave contract because it is a contract is question begging - assuming it is a valid contract because it is a valid contract.
I’m not suggesting that we honor the contract because it’s a contract. I’m suggesting that we honor the property rights which the contract assigns: i.e. the master’s ownership over the slave’s body. It’s a valid contract because it involves a voluntary exchange of property.
Enforcing a “voluntary” slave contract is not reciprocal. It is aggression. It violates the NAP.
Could you define what a (non)reciprocal contract is?
We must look at why contracts are considered valid, and they are valid only in that people respect them. And why do people respect them? Because of an expectation of reciprocity. But the only reciprocation in a “voluntary” slave contract is: If I don’t respect your claim to own my body, then you won’t respect my claim to own yours.
This doesn’t make sense to me on several levels:
The underlined passage reads like you think the “If I…then you…” statement is somehow insufficient, like there’s not “enough” reciprocity. Huh?
What does it mean for reciprocity to be “in” a VS contract? A contract is a transfer of title, period. I don’t see how a contract transferring title can be insufficiently reciprocal (whatever that means), and therefore invalid.
Reciprocity, to my mind, is not “in” a contract: the principle of reciprocity is what (we hope) governs what happens in the event that one party ignores the property rights of the other (with or without any contract being involved: e.g. reciprocity also governs torts, as you know).
The “if I…then you…” statement you made sounds perfectly good to me, what’s the problem? How is that deficient in some way, as you imply?
I’m not sure. It seems to me that, by that definition, a person doesn’t own a house if someone’s renting it from him. This is why I think the “all rights are property rights” notion has caused confusion. Many people think the term “property” implies absolute ownership.
If B alienates his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A, then there’s no property-rights violation against B if he later disobeys A and A subsequently hurts him. One must presume that rights in one’s body are inalienable.
Basically the idea is that, if you alienate a right to someone else, then you can’t legitimately take it back whenever you want, because it no longer belongs to you. The person you alienated it to has to give it back to you.
See the first part of this response. Otherwise, I think the key is that, since rights concern actions, and actions involve one or more physical objects, then rights are always over one or more physical objects. That doesn’t mean any/all of those objects are absolute owned, however.
Okay. So going with that definition, it’s impossible to literally enforce obedience, because a person can’t exercise his will directly against another person’s will.
If a person owns land within such a community, and let’s say he’s practicing polyamory on his land, do you think the community can legitimately kick him off of his own land? If so, then how is that different from the state? If not, then how can the community actually prohibit such an activity within its territory?
Okay good.
Well, like I said, violence is simply more economically destructive than non-violence. Take the ultimate expression of violence among humans - warfare. Even the winning side in a war loses overall in economic terms.
Not only would their remedy be violent, it would be aggressive, as they’re trying to exercise rights that they’re no longer considered to possess. This is why I think that it would probably be very rare for people to willingly put themselves into conditions of indefinite servitude, if it would happen at all (in spite of it being legal to do so).
To try to answer the OP’s original question, property is a behavior. It is a way that an animal behaves with regard to other animals or objects in the world. Furthermore, anything can be considerred property (someone or something can act like they own something) so long as they have the ability to enforce it.
For example, we are all owned by the government because at a whim, they can force or compel us to do anything, even die.
Whether you agree that IP SHOULD exist or not, IP is real property not neccesarily in any objective sense, but simply because there stands an army ready to enforce it.
There may be a voluntary exchange at first, but the question is whether or not this is still compatible with the NAP and reciprocity. We cannot assume that it is compatible just because there was an exchange.
The point I’m making about reciprocity is that it is the foundation of (NAP) libertarianism. If I poke out your eye, reciprocal justice is that you poke mine out. Of course, most people would prefer restitution over retribution in most cases, but reciprocal and retributive justice is the foundation for restitution.
Anyway, if I poke out your eye, reciprocal justice is that you poke mine out. If I don’t respect your claim to your house, reciprocal justice is that you don’t respect my claim in the same way. For example, if I burn your house down, reciprocal justice is that you burn mine down.
When we apply reciprocal justice to “voluntary” slave contracts, we have, “If I don’t respect your claim to own me, reciprocal justice is that you don’t respect my own to own you.” But, as Papirius has pointed out, I’m not claiming to own you, you are the only one claiming to own someone. “Voluntary” slave contracts cannot be enforced in the way we have been talking about in these threads, which is forcing the slave to go back to the owner, as this is not reciprocal justice. It is jumping straight to restitution, which is not reciprocal justice.
I’m not sure I follow.
I’m talking about when someone breaks from a contract. When someone breaks a contract, what they are saying is that they don’t respect the contract. Why do we respect property? There are two reasons. The first, I respect you and what you consider yours, and you show me the same courtesy. That is sufficient for most of the population. The problem is what happens when you and I cannot agree as to what belongs to whom, or if someone blatantly shows disrespect for another’s property (i.e. criminal). So the second reason is law, the realm of coercive force.
Suppose we have an agreement that I will not insult you, and you will not insult me, and suppose we sign it and notarize it. And for the sake of argument, let’s say that it is a legal and valid contract according to whatever country we are in. What happens if I insult you? If I violate this contract? Well, since it is legal, we can assume that you are allowed to use coercive force against me in order to “enforce” the contract (maybe receive restitution?). But let’s look at it from a reciprocal justice viewpoint. If I insult you, reciprocity would be that you may insult me, not hit me or imprison me or steal from me.
Now let’s try to make this contract similar to the “voluntary” slave contract. Let’s say that you and I sign and notarize a contract stating that I will not insult you for the rest of my life. I transfer this “right” to not be insulted by me, and you transfer nothing to me. What happens if I break the contract and insult you? Let’s just skip to the reciprocal justice part. If I insult you, reciprocal justice is that you may insult me. If we take the NAP as our premise, and I break the contract, then if you try to “enforce” the contract by hitting me or taking money from me, you would be guilty of aggression.
Now, Rothbard has talked about a way to attempt to legitimize these contracts by contracting a transfer of title to money in the case that someone breaks the contract. So, you might pay me to show up somewhere at some time, but if I fail to show up, then I’ll pay you. He legitimizes this through title-transfer. I transfer title to you on the condition that I don’t show up, so if I want to retain title to my money (and get paid for showing up), then I’ll keep the contract and show up.
However, if I break the contract, reciprocal justice would not entail that I pay you for my failure to show up. So, I suppose that I disagree with Rothbard on this point in one way. However, there are certain ways that I think we could alter the scenario to make it in line with the NAP:
First, if the title to the money has been transferred, then if I don’t pay you, I am holding onto your property without your consent. It would not be your property if you could not use force to take it, so you are of course allowed to use force to take back your property. However, do not confuse this with reciprocal justice, as it is not.
Second, it is my belief that in a free society, we would have more organizations like the Better Business Bureau that would keep track of who honors contracts and who renegs. People who reneg on contracts would develop a bad reputation and their business would suffer. Unfortunately, people want to rely on the government instead of voluntary cooperation in order to enforce these contracts.
But, you might object and say, if I am allowed to take back money by force if it is my property, why can’t I take back my slave? Well, this is where we have to look back at the NAP. Walter Block states it rather well:
Taking your money back does not constitute aggression, and anyone who takes action to prevent you from doing so is violating the NAP. But in the case of “voluntary” slavery, we have a contradiction with the NAP. If you attempt to take back your slave, while you could make the argument that you are taking back rightful property, you are still aggressing against his person. So, in order for Walter Block to maintain his rationalization of “voluntary” slavery, he would have to change his explanation of the NAP. But I don’t think it would really be the NAP if he did.
Also, we could do away with the first part and just state:
First, as I said, this is not the commonly understood meaning of the NAP (in the opening of Property and Criminality, Rothbard states, “WE MAY DEFINE ANYONE who aggresses against the person or other produced property of another as acriminal. A criminal is anyone who initiates violence against another man and his property: anyone who uses the coercive “political means” for the acquisition of goods and services.”) So, in order for this to work, we would have to change the very meaning of the NAP.
Second, this change causes the problem of what rightful property is. As I explained previously, property arises in two ways. The first is that we make claims to own things, and we respect (or not) those claims. The other is through law, but law is not good enough for libertarians, as we want the law to be just. So, in order to talk about property, we have to talk about individuals. If we just skip to property, we miss the entire point of what property is.
So, I do not think we can just rewrite the NAP in order to allow for “voluntary” slavery. Firstly, this causes the problem of libertarians no longer agreeing on what the NAP even means. You might talk about the NAP in terms of property only, whereas I and Malachi might talk about it as including people. Neither is “correct”. We would just be having different premises. Secondly, I don’t believe it makes much sense to talk about property without understanding what causes property.
Exactly. If A burns B’s house down, B may burn A’s house down. That is reciprocal justice. If A doesn’t respect B’s claim to own A, then B doesn’t respect A’s claim to own B. That is reciprocal justice. The problem, as stated above, is that A doesn’t claim to own B, so there really isn’t anything B can do to A in terms of reciprocal justice. Enforcing the contract would constitute aggression against A.
See above, as I don’t mean to imply that it is deficient. I am trying to show how reciprocal justice regarding “voluntary” slave contracts does not equal enforcing the contract.
I agree that its impossible to enforce obedience, obedience can only be coerced or voluntarily performed.
I agree that violence destroys wealth, while catallacty creates it. This is why I believe that nonviolent dispute resolution was invented.
in that case, eviction/reappropriation of the propery would only be legitimate if the individual had agreed to the ban on polyamory prior to, and as a necessary condition of, ownership of the land, furthermore the parties to the contract must necessarily agree on the penalties. Otherwise its not libertarian.
this isnt entirely true, they themselves evidently believe they possess those rights. There is a dispute between two parties. I think this dispute should be solved using nonviolent means, no differently from other disputes.
it took me a while to respond, because I was thinking. Now I think I am an egalitarian before I am a propertarian.
I’m not sure. It seems to me that, by that definition, a person doesn’t own a house if someone’s renting it from him. This is why I think the “all rights are property rights” notion has caused confusion. Many people think the term “property” implies absolute ownership.
Two degrees of ownership:
To have unlimited ownership of X is to have the exclusive right to use X in any way one pleases.
To have limited ownership of X is to have the exclusive right to use X in certain ways only.
Suppose that A “owns” a house, but B rents that house from A.
A and B both have only limited ownership, with the limits for each of them defined by the rental agreement. B’s ownership in the house may be limited either temporally (as, for example, in the case of a lease with a fixed expiration-date), or in some other respect (as, for example, with rules preventing B from changing the appearance of the exterior of the house).
If B alienates his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A, then there’s no property-rights violation against B if he later disobeys A and A subsequently hurts him.
Agreed. To put this in the language of property rights, either:
(1) B gives to A limited ownership over B’s body; in other words, A has acquired the exclusive right to use B’s body in a particular way (as opposed to: in any way he pleases). In what way is A entitled to use B’s body? In the way you described: i.e. if B disobeys A, then A may inflict harm on B’s body. That is the only right which A has acquired: the right to use B’s body within these limits.
(2) B gives A unlimited ownership over B’s body; in other words, A has acquired the exclusive right to use B’s body in any way he pleases. If this has occurred, A may still inflict harm on B’s body if B disobeys, but he may also inflict harm on B at any time he likes, or do anything else to/with B’s body that he pleases - hence his right to use B’s body is unlimited.
Basically the idea is that, if you alienate a right to someone else, then you can’t legitimately take it back whenever you want, because it no longer belongs to you. The person you alienated it to has to give it back to you.
Agreed.
since rights concern actions, and actions involve one or more physical objects, then rights are always over one or more physical objects. That doesn’t mean any/all of those objects are absolute owned, however.
There may be a voluntary exchange at first, but the question is whether or not this is still compatible with the NAP and reciprocity. We cannot assume that it is compatible just because there was an exchange.
If a VS contract affects an exchange of property, such that B acquires ownership over the body of A, and if we agree that a property owner has the right to do as he pleases with his property, then it necessarily follows that B can do whatever he likes with A’s body. I assume we are in agreement that a property owner can do whatever he likes with his own property? So our only disagreement is about whether or not a VS contract affects an exchange of property such that A’s body becomes B’s property.
If you argue that no such exchange was affected through the VS contract, that A’s body did not become B’s property, because the enforcement of the contract requires aggression, you are simply begging the question: i.e. enforcement of the contract only requires aggression if you already assume that A’s body is not B’s property (as, if it were, nothing B does to A’s body could be aggression), but it is that very assumption which you are trying to prove. It is a circular argument.
A VS slavery contract is invalid because its enforcement would require aggression.
And that which its enforcement requires (for example, B whipping A’s body) is aggression because the VS contract was invalid.
…circular.
“Voluntary” slave contracts cannot be enforced in the way we have been talking about in these threads, which is forcing the slave to go back to the owner, as this is not reciprocal justice.
The slave runs away from the master i.e. the slave steals the master’s property). The master has the right to retake his own property (the slave). This as of yet has nothing to do with the doctrine of reciprocation. The master’s right to retake his slave derives from the fundamental right of property owners to exclude others from the use of their property. It is his slave, the slave running away did not change that. This is only the first tooth in Rothbard’s “two teeth for a tooth” dictum. At the point where the master retakes possession of the slave, he has only taken one tooth: i.e. retaken his rightful property. He is yet to take the second tooth, and the second tooth is where the doctrine of reciprocation enters into the equation.
And that doctrine states that the victim has the right to violates the property rights of the aggressor to the same extent that the aggressor violates the property rights of the victim. To take this literally, would mean that the master has the right to steal a slave belonging to the slave (which is what the slave did to the master: i.e. steal his slave). Assuming the slave has no slaves of his own, this is impossible - but so what? If you steal my car, I take the first tooth by retaking my car. But suppose you don’t have a car: well then I cannot literally violate your property rights to the extent you violated mine, I can’t take your car because you don’t have one, I can’t take the second tooth. So what happens? We look for an equivalence. That is, we look for some piece of property of yours which is equivalent in value to my car, and I have the right to appropriate that.
So the master has taken the first tooth (retaken the slave), and now has the right to take a second tooth: i.e. take from the slave a piece of property equivalent to a slave. Presumably the slave has no property at all, in which case the master must resort (like any other victim of a tort) to enslaving the tortfeasor to work off the debt (say, market value for a slave). Obviously, the tortfeasor is already the slave of the master, and so the master cannot very well enslave him again. But, again, so what? That’s tough luck for the master. He is entitled to take compensation, but if it is impossible to do so, oh well. There are other cases where this might occur. If you steal my car, and then die without heirs or property, I can take the first tooth (retake my car), but I have no possible way of extracting the second tooth from you: ah well, tough luck for me.
It is jumping straight to restitution, which is not reciprocal justice
But reciprocation is not always possible, and in many many cases other than voluntary slavery. Again, if you steal my car, and you have no car, then strict reciprocation is impossible. Does it follow that I have no right to anything? No, of course not. If I cannot violate your property rights in exactly the same way as you violated mine, then I am entitled to violate your property rights in some roughly equivalent fashion.
Re contracts in general:
There are not contract rights and property rights. There are just property rights. Contracts are just indications that transfers of property have occurred..
A and B make an agreement (whether verbally, implicitly, or by contract makes no difference except when it comes to proving something in the event of a dispute) whereby A will transfer ownership of $100 to B if B transfers ownership of a bike to A, and B will transfer ownership of the bike to A if A transfers to B ownership of the $100. Each transfer of property is conditional on the other. Suppose A gives B the $100, but B fails to give A the bike. What happens? Firstly, talking about “enforcing the contract” is confusing. You aren’t really enforcing the contract, you are simply enforcing property rights. Since A giving the $100 to B was conditional on B giving the bike to A, and since B did not give the bike to A, then the $100 (though in B’s possession) is still A’s property. In other words, what has happened as a result of B failing to meet his obligation is that no transfer of property has taken place. Neither A nor B has any new rights/obligations through the contract, they simply have the property rights they started out with. the attempt to reassign property rights through the contract failed, because the conditions for the exchange were not met. So A has the right to his $100. If B possesses that $100, A has the right to take in back from him, by force if necessary. If B were to resist, then he would be guilty of theft, and A would gain additional rights as the victim of that very tort. But supposing B gives A back the money without delay, then no tort has been committed, no aggression has occurred, all that happened was that an exchange of property was attempted but failed.
Now, let’s take you insult example.
Suppose we make an agreement where I promise not to insult you and you promise not to insult me. That alone is nothing but a set of promises, no property has changed hands. However, we could achieve the desired result if we changed the nature of the agreement. Suppose we agree that I will pay you $1000 today, and you will pay me $10k if/when you insult me at any time in the future. Now an exchange of property has taken place. You have become the new owner of $1000 right now, and I will become the owner of $10k of yours if/when the condition we established for that transfer of ownership is met. So what happens if you do insult me a few years after we made this property exchange? Well, now the $10k of your property becomes my property. I demand it from you, maybe you hand it over. If you don’t, I have the right to take it from you (it is my property) by force if necessary. And if you withhold it from me, you are guilty of theft.
I’ll explain it differently, as most of our points have totally missed the main issue. In my previous post, I pointed to the various definitions of the NAP, all of which include prohibiting agression to the person as well as to rightful property. Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that A legitimately sold his body to B, if B uses violence against A, he is initiating violence against A. This does not change just because we are using the phrase “A is B’s rightful property”. B is still initiating the use of violence against A’s person.
And to make it really clear, let’s pretend that A follows B’s instructions to the letter, so we cannot even claim that A is somehow denying B his property by taking a nap when he is not allowed to. He always follows B’s instructions exactly. So, when B hits A, he is most definitely initiating violence against A’s person. After all, it’s not like A took a break when not allowed and “stole” B’s property.
Now let’s make it less clear. B orders A to shovel snow, and A refuses and just stands in place. What can B do? Can B torture or execute A? Well, this defies proportionality competely. Remember the bubblegum thief? The shopkeeper can’t just shoot the thief, as the aggression done by the shopkeeper would greatly dwarf the aggression done by the bubblegum thief. So, in the case of slave owner B coercing A, if he uses more aggression than A, then he is the aggressor.
But this is totally silly in terms of slavery. Suddenly there must be all these rules that the slave owner must follow regarding his property. Furthermore, what level of violence would B be allowed before he would be aggressing against A? If A refuses to work, virtually any amount of violence against him would be aggression. In the case of the bubblegum thief, the shopkeeper can use just enough coercion to keep the thief there and return the property. In other words, he can lock the door, stand in front of the door, basically just prevent the bubblegum thief from leaving. Maybe he can physically restrain the bubblegum thief in order to get his property back.
In short, even if we assumed that a person could be another’s rightful property, using violence against the person would still constitute aggression and thus violate the NAP.
Retaking the slave is aggression in the same way that shooting the bubblegum thief is aggression. Beating the bubblegum thief is aggression too. So is stabbing him, kicking him, slapping him, etc. What the shopkeeper can do is prevent the thief from leaving the premises. He can wait the thief out. If the thief tries to force his way out, the shopkeeper can respond with appropriate force. The important thing is that the bubblegum thief has aggressed so little against the shopkeeper that virtually any violence against the thief would constitute aggression. Unless, of course, the thief starts using violence against the shopkeeper or the property in the store.
Using any amount of force against the slave in order to reclaim him, that is aggression.
Regarding equivalence, I agree with you. If there is an exact equivalence, we must go with that, but otherwise we must go with something similar. But just because we say the words “A is a slave of B” does not mean that somehow B may now initiate violence against A’s person whenever he wants. Aggression is aggression.
And this is where the history of the NAP is quite useful. In my previous post, I mentioned the wikipedia article on the NAP. I have never edited that article, and what’s interesting to note is that the NAP can be traced the golden rule. So I am not the only person making this connection. Anyway, one of the most interesting things you will note about the golden rule is that it is always about respecting someone’s person. Maybe someone had previously added in property as well. Maybe. From what I’ve seen, the only people who have added in property were people like Rothbard, Block, and Rand.
There has always been an importance on the person more than property, and while that does not mean that you must also place a similar importance, I should remind you that most people typically consider violence to the person to be worse than violence to external property. Nevermind the fact that external property cannot exist without respecting individuals in the first place.
Feel free to respond, but I’m not sure I will, as I don’t have much else to say. We have mostly been just repeating things we have said for a while. Obviously, you don’t consider beating or executing a slave to be aggression, and your reasons thus far have been because the slave is the rightful property of the slave owner. But this completely neglects the firstand most important part of the NAP/golden rule: Don’t aggress against someone’s person. Life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe. Interestingly, in the wiki article on Eye for an eye:
Note that if the slave owner seriously injures his slave, the slave goes free. Just because historically the golden rule has been interpreted this way doesn’t make it right. But I hope you pause to consider that the emphasis has always been on injuries to the person first, before any consideration of damage to external property.
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that A legitimately sold his body to B, if B uses violence against A, he is initiating violence against A.
I’m trying to understand what you mean here.
As you accepted for the sake of argument the premise that A’s body is the property of B, you cannot be claiming that B’s violence against A is aggression because it is a violation of A’s property rights in his own body: you admit he has none. You can only be saying that B’s violence against A is aggression because the has literally initiated violence, i.e. A did not use violence against the person of B, but B used violence against the person of A. But if we extrapolate from this concept of aggression that you have put forth, unacceptable results follow.
For example, suppose you stole my car in the middle of the night, and did not use violence against my person. I discover what you did, and use violence against your person to retrieve my stolen property. I have literally initiated violence (used violence against you when you did not use violence against me), and so by you reasoning, I am an aggressor. The flaw is this analysis is that it ignores the question of whether or not I had a right to initiate violence. And I did have such a right, because the car is my property, and as its owner I have a right to forcibly exclude others from its unauthorized use: that is the very essence of what it means to own property.
Aggression is not the “initiation of violence” in the sense you mean. Aggression is the violation of property rights.
And to make it really clear, let’s pretend that A follows B’s instructions to the letter, so we cannot even claim that A is somehow denying B his property by taking a nap when he is not allowed to. He always follows B’s instructions exactly. So, when B hits A, he is most definitely initiating violence against A’s person. After all, it’s not like A took a break when not allowed and “stole” B’s property.
There are two possibilities here:
On the one hand, A may have obligated himself to performing certain services for B, but he is not a chattel slave. In this case, B can only justly use violence against A in order to compel A to perform those services. More precisely, B is has limited and conditional ownership in A’s body. B has the right to use A’s body, but only to make it perform the service in question, and only on the condition that A fails to perform that service at the time or in the manner that he agreed he would.
On the other hand, A may have sold himself to B (i.e. B has unlimited and unconditional ownership over A’s body), in which case B is within his rights as owner of A’s body to do whatever he pleases with it, and the question of whether or not A is obeying B is irrelevant.
B orders A to shovel snow, and A refuses and just stands in place. What can B do?
See above.
Well, this defies proportionality competely. Remember the bubblegum thief? The shopkeeper can’t just shoot the thief, as the aggression done by the shopkeeper would greatly dwarf the aggression done by the bubblegum thief.
If A’s body is the property of B, then nothing B might do to A’s body is a tort. Whatever B does is just B exercising his property rights.
Or if B has only limited and conditional ownership in A’s body (A has obligated himself to perform some service for B), then B is within his rights to use force against A, but only so much as is necessary to compel A to perform the service. Again, B is simply exercising his property rights, no tort is involved as of yet. Now, you could argue that if A resists B’s attempt to use his body to perform the service (i.e. force him to perform the service), then A is violating B’s property rights, and that is a tort. But this is a separate issue. Whatever rights B may acquire as a consequence of this tort committed by A are something over and above B’s right to exercise his property right in A’s body in the first place.
Retaking the slave is aggression in the same way that shooting the bubblegum thief is aggression
The victim of the bubblegum thief first has the right to retrieve his stolen property, by force if necessary. This is the first tooth. He then has a right to proportional retribution: taking something equivalent to the bubblegum from the thief. This is the second tooth.
The master first has the right to retrieve his stolen property. This is the first tooth. He then has a right to proportional retribution: taking something from the thief equivalent to the stolen slave. This is the second tooth.
The victim of the tort may use whatever amount of force is necessary to retrieve the first tooth, no proportionality is operative here. If when the victim of the bubblegum thief comes to get back his stolen bubblegum, the thief puts up a violence resistance, the victim can use any amount of violence necessary to win the contest, up to and including killing the thief if that’s the only way to retrieve his stolen property. This is just because it’s entirely up to the thief. The same with, for example, trespassing. I do not have a right to kill you because you trespassed. But I do have a right to remove you from my property by force: what amount of force is required to do that is entirely up to you. The same with a master retrieving his stolen slave.
Proportionality comes into play only with respect to the second tooth. The victim acquires new property equivalent to that of which he was deprived by the tortfeasor. Put another way, proportionality concerns the exchange of property caused by a tort, proportionality does not limit how much force any any property owner can use to exclude others from using his property (remove a trespasser, retake possession of stolen property, etc).
I should remind you that most people typically consider violence to the person to be worse than violence to external property.
Libertarians are not against violence. We are against aggression. Violence toward the person is not necessarily aggression toward the person.
Obviously, you don’t consider beating or executing a slave to be aggression, and your reasons thus far have been because the slave is the rightful property of the slave owner. But this completely neglects the firstand most important part of the NAP/golden rule: Don’t aggress against someone’s person
I am not talking about A’s “property rights in his own body”. I am talking about actual violence or the threat thereof to his actual body. Note how the NAP, whether it is Rothbard, Block, or one of its golden rule incarnations, is about the person, not the property in the person. It is not, “Thou shalt not aggress against a person’s property rights in himself or his external just property”. It is, “Do not aggress against a person or his just property”. You can read my previous posts for how Rothbard and Block actually put it, but they never say “property in the person” when they state the NAP.
So, when B beats A, there is a contradiction. On the one hand, A is his rightful property, so he may do what he wishes, but on the other hand, in order to beat A, he must aggress against A’s person. It is a contradiction. The only way around this is for you to start redefining the NAP. But then it’s not the NAP, at least not one that I am familiar with.
Let’s look at the bubblegum example one more time before looking at this one. In the case of the bubblegum thief, bubblegum can fit in his pocket. Now, the thing is, you are entitled to retrieve your just property, but they problem is that you cannot aggress against other people in order to do this, even if it is the thief. This does not mean that you cannot use force/coercion/violence against the thief, it just means that you must use proportionate force. The problem is that the thief has done very little to you, so it is very easy to go beyond proportion.
So, like I said before, you can always wait the thief out. After all, you can legitimately block him from leaving. And he has to sleep eventually. When he collapses from exhaustion, take the bubblegum out of his pocket. Now, I can almost guarantee you that the thief will return the damn bubblegum long before this, as being trapped in the store for hours really isn’t worth the trouble.
Now, I might be willing to say that you could tackle and restrain the thief in order to regain your property. I am slightly hesitant, only because it is very easy for people to start saying that they can just beat up someone. But, if the shopkeeper could tackle the thief and restrain him without much damage to the bubblegum thief, then I could get behind this.
Now let’s look at the car thief. Well, you may retrieve your car from the thief, I agree with that. But what can you do in order to do this? Can you burn his house down? That does not seem to be proportionate. Can you break his garage door down? Well, that seems to be far more proportionate to what he has done to you. And there is the added bonus that it is directly related to the purpose of regaining the stolen car. But what about violence to the thief’s person? Well, I only agree to the amount necessary to regaining the bubblegum. The problem is defining “necessary”.
In the case of the bubblegum thief, you could just shoot him and be done with it. But I don’t agree that this would be necessary, unless the thief has escalated the situation to deadly force. And I see it as the same way in the example of the car thief. If you have broken down his garage door and gotten into your car, what do you do if he is standing in front of the car so as to prevent you from leaving? Well, if he isn’t threatening you (e.g. pointing a gun at you), then you probably shouldn’t be able to drive over him. That does not seem proportionate. You could probably get out of the car and shove him aside, and then get back in and drive off. But what if he has a knife? Sure, while you are in the car it isn’t a problem, but if you were to get out of the car, it becomes a very real problem. Well, in this case I’d say you could drive over him, and then even sue him for damages to the car.
But look, all of this is just becoming speculation as to what is necessary, what is proportionate, etc. It is all very interesting, but it is rather silly. The fact of the matter is that we don’t really know what is proportionate or necessary for most disputes. We can have general rules that guide us. But in the end, the people involved in the dispute are the ones who must settle it. There is a difference between what we might consider to be proper libertarian law and what might actually occur in a decentralized system of law. One person might say that violence is never an option, and another might say that shooting thieves is legitimate. But in the end, third party opinions matter very little in a decentralized system of law.
Back to the topic at hand. The problem is, even if you could say that the slave owner may retrieve his slave with the minimum violence/force/coercion necessary, the problem is that at the same time he must also aggress against the slave. It is a contradiction. You cannot wish it away by saying that so long as the slave is legitimately owned, the owner can never actually aggress against his slave’s person. It’s pretty obvious that it is aggression. After all, the slave owner must initiate violence against the slave’sbody. Not his “property right in his body”. His actual body. His living, breathing body.
Well feel free to define aggression however you want. But if we are going to talk about aggression in the context of the NAP, then we really ought to go by the definition of aggression that is stated in the NAP. In a previous post, I actually quoted both Rothbard and Block, and those are the two most common understandings of the NAP. I will quote them one more time.
First, Block:
Second, Rothbard:
Both Rothbard and Block define aggression as “the initiation of violence (or the threat thereof) against another man and/or his property”. They do not define it as “violating property rights”. Now, Rothbard and Block reached different conclusions on occassion (VS for instance), but they both define initiating violence against another person as aggression. Neither mention property in the person for the purpose of the NAP.
This can only be true if you do not use the NAP as your premise. After all, we are not talking about whether or not beating a “rightfully” owned slave is a tort. As long as you take the standard definition of the NAP as your premise, you will have a contradiction if you beat your “rightfully” owned slave (against his will).
Well, I disagree with that. You may only use the amount of violence necessary and no more. If the thief escalates the situation to Mortal Kombat (FINISH HIM), then you may kill the thief. But just because the thief runs faster than you and can run circles around you until you puke does not give you the right to execute him. Now, sure, this might mean that you go without your property, but just because you might go without your bubblegum doesn’t give you the right to execute people.
This is true, but it is not really what I am getting at. The point is that if a thief beats you and takes your wallet, we typically think that the crime of beating you up is somehow worse than the crime of stealing your wallet. Or, if a thief steals your bubblegum, that you beating him up is actually worse than what he has done to you. This tends to be the case most of the time. There may be some outliers, but I never claimed it was 100% true all the time.
Well, insert the NAP definition of aggression, and you get, “Thou shalt not initiate violence or the threat thereof against someone’s person.”
I am not talking about A’s “property rights in his own body”. I am talking about actual violence or the threat thereof to his actual body. Note how the NAP, whether it is Rothbard, Block, or one of its golden rule incarnations, is about the person, not the property in the person. It is not, “Thou shalt not aggress against a person’s property rights in himself or his external just property”. It is, “Do not aggress against a person or his just property”. You can read my previous posts for how Rothbard and Block actually put it, but they never say “property in the person” when they state the NAP.
Again, that violence against the body is agression is not axiomatic. Violence against the body is aggression only if it is a violation of property rights.
So, when B beats A, there is a contradiction. On the one hand, A is his rightful property, so he may do what he wishes, but on the other hand, in order to beat A, he must aggress against A’s person.
No, he must use violence against A’s person. Violence is not necessarily aggression. If you disagree, then explain why self-defense is not aggression, and why killing a murderer is not aggression, as both of them involve violence?
This does not mean that you cannot use force/coercion/violence against the thief, it just means that you must use proportionate force. The problem is that the thief has done very little to you, so it is very easy to go beyond proportion.
No, you do not have to use proportional force. You may use whatever amount of force is necessary to retrieve your stolen property. I repeat, whatever amount of force is necessary, and what is necessary is determined by the thief himself (will he give it up or will he fight for it). Proportionality has nothing to do with retrieving stolen property, or otherwise exercising property rights. Proportionality only concerns retribution. That is, the victim may violate the property rights of the tortfeasor the same extent that his own property right were violated by the tortfeasor.
Now let’s look at the car thief. Well, you may retrieve your car from the thief, I agree with that. But what can you do in order to do this? Can you burn his house down? That does not seem to be proportionate.
Again, proportionality has nothing to do with it, as we are not talking about retribution.
Well, I only agree to the amount necessary to regaining the bubblegum. The problem is defining “necessary”.
I don’t really see it as a problem. Consider something analogous:
If I point a gun to your head, and pull the trigger, am I the cause of your death? Or is the bullet the cause of your death, or is the man who gave me the gun the cause of your death? A common standard for determining who is the cause is the following: an action is considered the cause of an event if and only if the action was a necessary condition for that event to occur, and if the actor knew or reasonably should have known that it would in fact cause that event.
What does it mean that he “reasonably should have known”? How do we define reasonable? It’s normative, pure and simple. It’s up to the people making the decision, the arbitrator or the judge. There’s no cleat way, nor any need, to try to define “reasonable” a priori - the same with “necessary.” The judge will decide whether or not the use of force in question seemed excessive, or only what was necessary.
Of course there’s another analogy to self-defense.
The problem is, even if you could say that the slave owner may retrieve his slave with the minimum violence/force/coercion necessary, the problem is that at the same time he must also aggress against the slave.
A master can no more aggress against his slave than can the owner of a horse aggress against his horse. The situation of a master retaking his slave is quite different from the case of someone retrieving a stolen car, as in the latter case, the person must be careful of not unnecessarily violating the rights of the thief, but in the former case, there is no other person at all - as with recovering a horse.
It’s pretty obvious that it is aggression.
I fail to see how that’s so obvious.
After all, the slave owner must initiate violence against the slave’sbody. Not his “property right in his body”. His actual body. His living, breathing body.
Violence is only aggression if it is a violation of property rights.
Well feel free to define aggression however you want. But if we are going to talk about aggression in the context of the NAP, then we really ought to go by the definition of aggression that is stated in the NAP. In a previous post, I actually quoted both Rothbard and Block, and those are the two most common understandings of the NAP. I will quote them one more time.
Appeal to authority fallacy.
First, Block:
The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another. [Emphasis added]
Block views the body (“person” in the statement above) as property like any other. Block shares my view, or I share his, on voluntary slavery.
Well, insert the NAP definition of aggression, and you get, “Thou shalt not initiate violence or the threat thereof against someone’s person.”
And so it follows, “thou shalt not kill a murderer, since to do so involves an initiation of violence.”
And I mean,
violence against the…body. Not his “property right in his body”. His actual body. His living, breathing body.
So why is it that killing a murderer (or taking violent retribution of any kind) is just? Could it be…because whether violence is just or not depends entirely on whether or not it involves a violation of property rights?
As a general point, I would also say that the NAP is not the basis of libertarian ethics. The concept of property is the basis of libertarian ethics, and is presupposed by the NAP. It makes no sense to talk about aggression prior to a concept of property.