A quasi-action is a process which seems to involve purpose (like a leaf’s “purpose” of synthesizing energy for a tree) but does not really. The only way we can even conceptualize such structure-function systems is by analogy to our understanding of true purposiveness, as is experienced in our own minds, and as it is interpreted in the actions of other humans (and, as I think, higher animals).
How could it seem to involve purpose but really not?
Because it has some similarities to processes that involve actual purpose, like “conatus” (the tendency of an entity to preserve and extend itself) and the “innovation” that emerges from natural selection. But at the same time (unless you’re a deist) it obviously does not involve forethought, technological ideas, choice, opportunity cost, psychic profit/loss, and all the other universal categories of action.
Presumably the idea is that the leaf is not conscious, but its physical mechanisms are set up so that they do something that helps the plant grow. The key seems to be whether the “actor” is deemed conscious, so that it could/couldn’t have subjective experience and make decisions.
It all seems a matter of usefulness: we could say that a sponge absorbs water in order to gain weight, change color, or get used by its owner, but that doesn’t seem to add any utility to the analysis of sponges. It does for leaves perhaps, and for humans definitely.
I think this is it. I vaguely remember reading something in a book by either Richard Dawkins or Steven Pinker that explained that the mind has evolved to analyse objects from three distinct perspectives: 1) purpose, 2) design and 3) structure.
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We can analyse objects as having a purpose. This works very well for humans, and it also works for animals. When a saber tooth tiger is running towards you, a quick analysis is required. The analysis is: ‘that tiger intends to eat me’. We think of the tiger as having intent. There is no time to analysis the design or structure of the tiger. In theory, there is no reason that we can’t view plants or rocks as having a purpose, except that it is not useful for us to do so.
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We can analyse objects as having a design. This can be useful, for example, when trying to understand a leaf. We analyse it as the part of a plant designed to capture light. We think of the leaf as having a function. We can understand a leaf better by taking the design perspective than any other. It is not useful to think of a leaf as “wanting” or “intending” to capture light. We also analyse human-produced objects from the design perspective, thinking of them in terms of their function.
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We can analyse the structure, the physical properties of all objects. In some cases, where the above two perspectives are not useful at all, it is our only way of getting an understanding of the object. To understand a rock means to understand its structure; there is no additional usefulness from thinking of the rock from either the design perspective or the purpose perspective.
I see no reason why we can’t analyse animals from the purpose perspective. That is, apply praxeology to animals. It may be useful.
This is the type of knee jerk response Rothbard warned about. Since vegetative humans cannot act purposfully. This is similar to the example of when a person sneezes. A person doesn’t value a sneeze in his value scale, so why does he sneeze? We have just debunked praxeology! But the truth is, this type of action is irrelvent to praxeology. Praxeology deals with purposeful action(i.e. using value scale to achieve certin ends). There does not need to be any adjustments to this axiom, like you claim. Everything in it is logical.
I answer this in my blog. But to simplfy: Believing in the market has nothing to do with faith, it has to do with reason. Faith simply means to believe in something that cannot be proven. But all logical implications deduced from praxeology can be proven.
Well you go right ahead and find your proof, but like I said before, it would be useless since we already know such laws… Again, praxeology doesnt ignore empirical evidence at all, it uses empirical evidence to illustrate the laws. Many of the criticisms towards praxeology is that it ignores empirical evidence, but that is fallacy towards the critic’s line of reasoning.
Praxeological laws apply wherever there is action. If “most” behaviour is purposeful, then praxeological laws apply “most” of the time. We can imagine a human (or an animal) for whom most behaviour is non-purposeful (i.e. mostly reflex-driven). Here praxeological laws would simply cover less behaviour, merely applying to those behaviours that are purposeful.
The empirical observation that most human behaviours are in fact actions implies that praxeology is a very useful way of thinking about human behaviour.
Can we define “purpose” for this discussion?
It seems to me, based on the context used so far in this thread, that what differentiates something without purpose and something with purpose is predictability. If you, a single human without the aid of a computer, can reliably (99.99%) predict the actions of some object then it is said to have no purpose. If you can not reliably predict (<99.99%) it’s action then it is said to have purpose.
The example of a leaf versus a charging tiger meets this definition since we can predict the actions of a leaf with near 100% accuracy but we cannot predict the actions of a tiger with near 100% accuracy. It also seems that the more unpredictable the object’s actions are, the more purpose it has so purpose is a spectrum.
This means that an ant has more purpose than a leaf and a bacteria but less purpose than a fish or a bear. rock > leaf > bacteria > ant > fish > bear > human
“There are no meaningful truths that can be logically derived from it. It’s just a bunch of gibberish with no semblance of verifiability.”
That’s because it is unfalsifiable. Just because something is unfalsifiable doesn’t mean that it is incorrect. There are no squares with three sides, this needs no empirical proof, whether or not there are squares is another thing entirely. Rational human action (in the Austrian sense) is action which has a goal in mind, now attempt to prove that humans are not rational. In doing so you have proven that you are rational, and you can find a lot of evidence that other people are rational.
As for the meaningful truths that can be logically derived from it I do believe that there are a good number of them, there have been books written about the things which can be derived from the idea that humans act rationally (see human action).
The fact that a lot of people who are against a priori examination overlook is the fact that everything is a priori. The minute that I have determined, as a scientific fact, that when heated up to 1 degree Celsius a sample of ice will begin to melt, then I can derive that this will happen in all cases everywhere. If you then predict that ice will melt if you take ice and stick it in a cabinet that is 1 degree Celsius then this is still an a priori statement, but it is based upon principles which you have determined as true, and you can reason out the implications in an a priori manner.
How the principle is arrived at does not matter, what matters is that we can then derive what must happen under the set of circumstances, giving us huge economic insights, not just into economic tenancy, which is what most empirical economists derive, but instead into economic law based upon the action axiom.
“The very fact that you can’t refute it without contradicting yourself should show you that it’s nothing more than a rhetorical tool.”
If you were attempting to prove that people cannot communicate, and you were trying to tell this to another person then would this mean that the contradiction you were necessarily performing was irrelevant? The fact that you cannot attempt to disprove something without proving it does not mean that it is a trick, it is a totally evident case of the statement’s truth.
If I try with all my might to command the sun to turn blue, and I am unable, does this really not refute the idea that I can turn the sun blue just by glaring at it? No, it proves that I cannot simply turn the sun blue by willing it. So too does the fact that one cannot refute the action axiom prove that they, at least, are rational.
I dunno, Micah. Human beings do lots of predicatble things, probably most of what they do is predictable.
I think purpose means in this context “towards a goal the actor wants to acheive”. You can ask me what goal means, and so on ad infinitum, but that doesn’t do anything.
Actually that is an interesting question in a way: what is a goal? Or what does it mean to want something? Or what is “felt uneasiness”/pain? Answering any of them would answer them all, so let’s just take the easiest one in its rawest form:
What is pain?
It seems like the most obvious question possible, but it is interesting because I cannot seem to identify pain in my subjective experience. My feet are freezing right now because I left my heater off, and I would say it is “painful.” But as soon as I try to actually single out the pain all I find is bluish cold sensations that aren’t in themselves unpleasant. Where is the pain?
A purposeful behaviour (i.e. an action) is a behaviour that has been deliberated about and chosen over other behaviours. I have a clear conception that my own behaviours can be categorized into those undertaken with a purpose (e.g. typing on my keyboard), and those that are reflexes (e.g. sneezing). I then extrapolate this personal insight about me onto you and other human beings. I am assuming that your behaviours are not all reflexes. I am assuming you are behaving with a purpose, i.e. with intent, i.e. that you are an acting being. Its more useful for me to think of you as an acting being, rather than a purely reflexive being.
In other words, my own consiousness is self-evident to me, and it’s useful for me to consider you as consious, i.e. acting, i.e. purposeful, as well.
Is a saber tooth tiger consious? Well, I don’t actually know for sure that YOU are consious, and this philosophical problem is presumably unsolveable. It may be useful for me to ascribe the characteristics of consiousness (purpose, intent, desire) to the tiger just as it is useful for me to ascribe the characteristics of consiousness to you.
This is the type of knee jerk response Rothbard warned about. Since vegetative humans cannot act purposfully. This is similar to the example of when a person sneezes. A person doesn’t value a sneeze in his value scale, so why does he sneeze? We have just debunked praxeology! But the truth is, this type of action is irrelvent to praxeology. Praxeology deals with purposeful action(i.e. using value scale to achieve certin ends). There does not need to be any adjustments to this axiom, like you claim. Everything in it is logical.
The proverbial vegetative human was just an allusion to the larger point, which is a priori can only discuss how we discuss things, but can never discuss the things themselves. There are truths that can be derived, but if they are a priori truths they cannot be verified and are, therefore, meaningless.
Take for example the idea that a group is only made up of the actors involved. That is a priori truth. But it cannot be verified, it has no real conclusive meaning. It is merely a tool to be used to discuss how to discuss things, in this case groups.
On the point of this specific a prior “truth,” the action axiom, it seems to be saying, when you break down the language, nothing mroe than “acting actors act.” Not to be sophomoric, but… duh.
Well you go right ahead and find your proof, but like I said before, it would be useless since we already know such laws… Again, praxeology doesnt ignore empirical evidence at all, it uses empirical evidence to illustrate the laws. Many of the criticisms towards praxeology is that it ignores empirical evidence, but that is fallacy towards the critic’s line of reasoning
How can we verify that those laws are, in fact, laws? If something agrees with the law you would say “there is an illustration of the law in action.” But if something contradicts it you either have to say “there had to be other variables involved” or admit that it was not in fact a law. THere may be other variables involved, for sure. But as I said, you are creating a theory and searching for evidence (and then tacitly blaming the stupidity of everyone else for not getting it… no offense, but that’s what cranks do), rather than searching for evidence and using it to create your theory.
A prior knowledge cannot be avoided, for sure. But it also cannot be verified empirically and is therefore no means of establishing the truth, but is rather a means of discussing established truths.
As you have stated, it is useful for you to think of some things as being concious and others not (i.e.: tiger/me) even though you can’t “prove” one way or the other. Would you say that predictability directly correlates to your decision on what is concious and what is not? It may not be causational, but it seems that the correlation is there. Can you think of an example of some macroscopic object that is unpredictable and yet you wouldn’t care about it’s actions (not concious)?
Predictable, sure. 99.99% predictable, no. I’m not talking about predicting that I will probably go to work/school/grocery store on a given day. Sure, for the most part you can predict that with some degree of accuracy but it doesn’t always happen (barring some quantum phenomenon). Sometimes people break their routine, sometimes they do not respond in the way predicted. This is very much unlike a rock which always does exactly what you expect it to.
Rather than ask what goals mean I would be inclined to ask what “want” means. How do you define what objects are capable of “wanting” and what objects aren’t? From a scientific standpoint a bacteria has wants the same as a human does, my wants are just far more complex than those of a bacteria. You could even argue that atoms “want” a certain number of electrons and their desire for electrons is what drives them to “act” by working with other atoms through “trade” by bonding to form “social networks” called molecules.
The only difference is complexity. The complexity of an atom is very simplistic. It wants one thing and there are only a couple ways to get it. Humans on the other hand are far more complex, they want many things and there are many ways to get them. Everything lies on such a spectrum so the question is where do we choose to draw the line and why. I personally have no problem just grouping humans together and calling it a day because it’s simple and, for the time being, well defined.
Unpredictable macroscopic object: dice.
Sort of. Predictability is related but only in the following sense: when I say useful, I mean useful for me to be able to make better predictions about an objects behaviour. I select a mode of analysis because I expect that mode to be the most useful for me to use to make good predictions.
There is certainly no causation; my choice of mode of analysis is prior to my knowledge about the object. If there is a correlation, for example if it so happens that I am good at predicting objects that I have analysed from the structural perspective but bad at predicting objects that I have analysed from the purpose perspective, say, than that is merely an artifact of the nature of modes involved, or a statement about my own mental abilities.
Yes. The Earth. Natural disasters are unpredictable, and yet we do not get any new insights by ascribing the characteristics of consiousness to the Earth. To do so would be misguided. Taking the structural perspective towards natural disasters is quite new to humans: earlier in our evolution, we probably would have explained earthquakes in terms of one of the Gods being angry, that is, taking the purpose perspective. By taking a different (more appropriate) perspective, we have learned a great deal about predicting natural disasters.
Do you believe that their “actions” (what face they show) should not be taken into consideration in economic discussion? In just about all situations where dice are used (gambling, games, etc.) their “actions” are a deciding force behind how the humans interacting with them act.
Why is the same not true for humans? Psychology and neuroscience have allowed us to start looking at humans from the structural perspective and because of that we can better predict human action. Should we not try to do away with our purposeful view of humans much like we did away with our purposeful view of the earth?
But human beings are purposeful, and the earth is not. Also psychological occurences are not universal and they do not make irrelevant the insights that the model of rational human action does.