“This axiom, the propositions that humans act, fulfills the requirements precisely for a true synthetic a priori proposition. It cannot be denied that this proposition is true since such denial would have to be categorized as an action.”
I don’t understand how the second part is a disqualifier.
If someone subscribed to determinism and categorized all action as cause and affect at the molecular level, you may say that by stating this he has committed an action (a purposful behavior), but the speaker may simply state, no, it was an impulse. I had no choice but to tell you this based on cause and affect.
That has puzzled me in the past. I am a little uneasy with the term “action axiom,” a term Mises never employed, which makes his epistemology seem a lot more cookie cutter straightforward than it actually is.
Nevertheless, I think Hoppe is just pointing out how the above is a case of a self contradictory and self refuting argument. Just like me saying “I don’t think”, or “Nothing is true.”
Various doctrines have been advanced to explain the relation be- tween mind and bodv. They are mere surmises without any reference to observed facts. All that can be said with certainty is that there are relations between mental and physiological processes. With regard to the nature and operation of this connection we know Iittle if any- thing. Concrete value judgments and definite human actions are not open to further analysis. We may fairly assume or believe that they are absolutcly dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. But as long as we do not know how external facts-physical and phvsio- logical-produce in a human mind definite thoughts and volitions resulting in concrcte acts, we have to face an insurmountable method- ological dualism.
In thc present state of our knowledge the funda- mental statements of positivism, monism and panphysicaIism are mere metaphysical postulates devoid of any scientific foundation and both meaningless and useIess for scientific research. Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the external world of physi- cal, chemical, and physiological phenomena and the internal world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action. No bridge con- nects-as far as we can see today-these two spheres. Identical ex- ternal events result sometimes in different human responses, and different external events produce sometimes the same human response. We do not know why.
In the face of this state of affairs we cannot help withholding judg- ment on the essential statements of monism and materialism. We may or may not believe that the natural sciences will succeed one day in explaining the production of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions in the same way in which they explain the production of a chemical compound as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a certain combination of elements. In the meantime we are bound to acquiesce in a methodological dualism.
So bottom line, he seems to be saying he’s going to dismiss the determinism hypothsis as unproven, and useless for research as well.
In other words he has no refutation of it, but for the reasons stated is going to assume it’s wrong.
And indeed the context [if you look it up] of that quote seems to be that accepting determinism denies the action axiom.
Abstract: Metaphysical libertarianism (hereafter ML) is the doctrine that human beings possess free will, that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is false. In this paper, I argue that the philosophical viability of political and economic libertarianism (hereafter PEL) depends on the viability of ML. Compatibilism is the doctrine that determinism is compatible with free will, and hence possibly also with PEL. I attempt to undermine this contention by exploring the relationship between compatibilism and prepunishment – i.e., the practice of punishing people before their commission of a crime. I make a claim that considerations of prepunishment, as well as related advance actions, which I collectively call “preactions”, not so much reveal and underscore the radical consequences of compatibilism, but rather, firstly, threaten its collapse into hard determinism, and secondly, cast a shadow of suspicion on determinism itself, thus opening some new, promising avenues for ML, and, by implication, securing the philosophical foundations of PEL.
To do that, one would have to admit to emotionalism, and thus undermine the premise that as emotional creatures, logically consistent behavior may be a biological impossibility. And absolutists simply cannot allow for biological reality to interrupt objective moral perfection.
So everything you do could be excused as temporary insanity if we assume the metaphysical hypothesis of determinism? If so, I think you’re stretching the word insanity beyond meaningless, though perhaps that was your intention(or determined impulse). Or is the fact that one would make such a defense equate to the court figuring you insane by default. In either case, it’s hilarious for different reasons. Good shout.
I think the confusion may be in part with confusing “Purposeful action”, with an action with is done “on purpose”. Denying one acts is a purposeful action because it the use of means to achieve an end.
While it may not be done “on purpose”. You may have an end but not know why, or use a means and not know why. But this is psychology, not praxeology. Praxeology deals with action “as such”. Givin the fact there is action, is the basis for praxeology.
Hypothetically, my denial that any human (other than myself) acts is my action, and no one else’s. Hence, I can perform the action of denying that other humans act without contradicting myself. The fact the I am human does not automatically imply that every true proposition about myself (e.g. action, in this case) must also be true for all other humans.
Hypothetically, my denial that any human (other than myself) acts is my action, and no one else’s. Hence, I can perform the action of denying that other humans act without contradicting myself. The fact the I am human does not automatically imply that every true proposition about myself (e.g. action, in this case) must also be true for all other humans.
Who argues against that in defense of the action axiom?
Apparently Hoppe does, by proposing that my denial of human action must always be a performative contradiction.
Only if you aren’t human.
It only proves the axiom that I act. What’s “muddled with definitions games”?
Yes, thats all it is meant to do, as the action is self-referential, what you say about others isn’t relevant. One could play around with the definition of “human” to try and evade the proposition, looking back that doesn’t look like what you were trying to do.
Assuming you’re correct, do you think this disproves the action axiom? In other words, does this have deeper implications, other than disputing Hoppe’s assertion that to deny the action axiom is a performative contradiction? Just wondering.
Let A be a member of set X. Does that imply equivalence between A and all non-A members of set X?
Z.
If the question is asked with regard to the characteristic that defines the set X, of course yes. With regard to others we can’t say. Mises refers to human not in a physiological sense, but in distinguishing animals that do engage in conscious purposive behaviour(perhaps not exclusively).Confusion inevitably arises since the two are confused. Perhaps it is high time the construct of human as utilised in praxeology was realised as the catallactic function it actually is.
Fair enough. That being said, I’m not sure I find your argument convincing. If the extent of your argument is simply that you don’t contradict yourself when you say “humans [other than me] do not act”, I don’t see that as presenting much of a problem for advocates of the action axiom.
By avoiding a performative contradiction you avoid immediately proving your statement false, but you don’t prove it as true either. Therefore I think we can safely ignore it.
If there denial is purposeless, a mere deterministic reaction, it is as good as saying “agh” or uttering some other mere sound. It is empty. Meaningless.