I have two questions: one general and one specific. Both questions are asked from natural rights perspective, not economics perspective.
- In the exchange with Bryan Caplan on fractional-reserve banking, Walter Block argued quite strongly that under libertarian rights, there is no such thing as joint ownership. My question is: a) does everyone in the libertarian community agree with him? b) why does that make sense?
For instance:
Caplan:
You’re just being difficult, Walter. If you asked a married couple “Who owns your car?” many people would say “We both own it. Fully.” You can either berate them for self-contradiction, or interpret their statement charitably through the usual lens of marital property.
Block:
It is merely “vague” when two different people have full property rights over the same identical thing? I don’t think so. Look, you and I can both be PART owners of a car: you use it on odd days, me on even ones. But we both (logically) cannot be FULL owners of one and the same car. That is a logical contradiction, an utter impossibility.
But why can’t two people be full owners? If ownership = ability to deny others use of the property, then both are in a position of a denier.
It seems like the wife should be able to deny the husband to make any alterations to the car that she doesn’t agree with. For instance, if the wife is an anarchist, and the husband is a minarchist, she should be able to veto his adding a “Ron Paul 2012” bumper sticker to the car. If the husband did that without her permission, arguing that “it was his turn to own a car”, that would be very strange.
Also, what about parenthood? Isn’t that a case of joint ownership (or parental rights)? What about a corporation?
- Specific question:
If we assume that joint ownership (in some form) is ok, then imagine the following scenario:
A group of people leaves main civilization and settles on an uninhabited island (or creates a colony on a different planet). They create a corporation called New Earth. Each member owns the piece of property he homesteaded and his own stuff (e.g., clothes, tools, etc.), but the corporation, of which each settler is a member, owns some land: e.g., the land between the houses (the “road”), the wall that encircles the settlement, etc. The members decide how to create a governing board for the corporation: maybe they will elect a CEO whose position will be passed down to his children, or maybe they will elect a board whose membership will change every few years.
Would there be a problem with such a setup from natural rights point of view?
Next, imagine the same scenario, but in this case, the members decided that the corporation owns everything: including the people themselves (i.e., they sold themselves to slavery to the corporation), their clothes, their houses, etc. I.e., all member cast all their possessions in a common pot.
Then the corporation votes that for economic reasons, it makes sense to re-institute the idea of private property. In the sense that everyone still gets “rights” (granted by the corporation) for everything he owned before the “casting in the common pot” event, and people may not steal from each other, etc.
So, this colony behaves in a way identical to the first colony, with one exception: when the whole corporation (or its CEO or the governing board) decides that, for instance, all houses in the colony must be painted blue, then all the members must comply, since they don’t really own the houses. If the corporation decides that a house must be destroyed to build a granary, the owner of the house must comply, since the corporation owns the house.
Again: would such a situation be problematic from natural rights point of view?
A friend of mine claims that the second scenario is what a society is. The whole society owns all the land and everything on it, but for utilitarian/economic reasons, a particular society may agree to people having “rights”, but such rights are not natural rights, they are rights granted by the society to individuals to avoid the tragedy of the commons, the calculation problem, etc., etc. But, if the society decides to exercise eminent domain over someone’s “property”, it may.
Besides the problem from historic point of view (i.e., we have to point to a moment at which the “casting into the pot” event happened for a particular community, where every single member agreed to the casting of his own property), I was wondering if there is a problem with such a set up in principle from natural rights morality.