I am not sure why you believe that my feelings are relevant.
Everyone, keep it clean.
I get it, all “Hayekians” purposely take him out of context in order to legitimize their statist proposals (like a free banking system for example), right? Unbelievable. Also, TMC is more ambiguous than anything Hayek has ever written, part three at least.
So you are not a distraught Hayekian?
It’s not easy being Misesian.
No, I am not. Mises has influenced me most. But, to respond to the most egregious error of that post, your comment that Hayek was “clearly merely an economist”, I will say that you should definitely read, among other works, “The Sensory Order”.
Marko:
I don’t see it that way. I think Mises was the system builder (praxeology), and Rothbard was a man who held several different theories (systems), some of which were incompatible with one another.
Rothbard held a natural-law/natural-rights theory, a welfare economics theory, and a theory of praxeology. He was one man who subscribed to several systems. To me, this is not systematic, but something different. If Rothbard also supports and subscribes to the argumentation ethics, would that then make his ‘system’ even more comprehensive ? Or would it mean that he subscribes to various social theories depending on the social phenomena at hand: Lockean theory in one case, Austrian theory in another, Hoppean in another…
Your assertion that Mises is subsumed by Rothbard is not accurate according to Rothbard himself. Rothbard explicitly claimed that praxeology was not appropriate for ethics (The Ethics of Liberty, p.12). Mises held that praxeology was a general science applicable to all human acts. Mises believed that science might one day “develop a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization that would place a theoretical science by the side of the purely historical discipline of political science.” (Ulitmate Foundation, p.98)
Thus, Mises believed that praxeology was a science that would be extended to comprehend social-political phenomena above and beyond purely market phenomena, whereas Rothbard held that this was wrong, and that for the social-political sphere of human action, a positive ethics based on natural-law/natural-rights was needed.
Thus, Rothbard did not subsume Mises as Rothbardians believe. It would be much more accurate to hold that, especially during the time Rothbard wrote MES, there was overlap between himself and Mises on the question of the validity (but not the exact form) of praxeology. As Rothbard’s career progressed, he became less enthusiastic about praxeology as a general science (a concept he refers to in MES), until finally, he disavowed this idea altogether, claiming essentially that praxeology did not apply beyond the realm of market phenomena.
One of the primary conclusions of Rothbard’s long career in libertarian social thought is that praxeology is confined to a method of economc (market phenomena) analysis, and that once we pass beyond market phenomena, we change our theoretical system to natural-law/natural rights.
But if praxeology can study ethical actions (coercion) and “psychological actions” (trying to figure something out, trying to overcome one’s fears), then I consider that Mises was a system builder (praxeology), while Rothbard subscribed to numerous systems on a pragmatic basis.
This is not meant to sound petty, as I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Rothbard, but I would argue that Mises was more of a system builder than Rothbard was. First and foremost, economics, moreover, praxeology, of which economics is only a part, is a HUGE system. And Mises actually did himself personally build HUGELY important keystones of that edifice: reconciling monetary theory with subjective value theory, proving the non-neutrality of money, developing purchasing power theory, establishing price theory and economic calculation theory on a sound non-Wieserian-imputation basis, proving the impossibility of socialism, formulating the business cycle theory, establishing the praxeological basis of economics, and more. Rothbard did a masterful job describing the edifice in MES, but afaik, he himself provided few, if any, keystones. And if Mr. Knott is right, Rothbard may have also made some unsound departures in praxeological theory. (But I don’t know enough about this in particular to form an opinion yet.)
In terms of philosophy, I would note that…
- the limited amount of philosophical content that Mises did write about in Human Action and elsewhere is, in my opinion, far sounder than much of the philosophical content that Rothbard wrote
- Rothbard, as might be surprising to many here, as he himself admitted, did not write much at all to establish natural rights theory. He made a few arguments for it in the opening content of the Ethics of Liberty, but as he himself said in that text, the aim of the book was to spin out the implications of natural rights theory, given that it’s true, not making the case that it is true.
- With the above two points considered, it should be noted that, if Rothbard’s philosophical edifice was built on a house of sand (as I think it was), then calling him a system builder regarding philosophy in particular would be a dubious if, strictly speaking, true distinction.
All this being said, Rothbard may very well have been the greatest economic historian who ever lived, and a masterful cultural historian as well. And his ardent advocacy for liberty makes him, in my estimation as a moral agent, one of the greatest human beings who ever lived too, even if I don’t agree with the meta-ethics he tried to formulate in order to justify that advocacy.
That is nice. I did not know about this work. But is the information contained within it a part of Hayekianism?
Did I say all “Hayekians” or did I say “purposely”?
And that should be “free banking” as oppose to free banking.
Adam & Grayson, you could well be right. I will allow for that possibility as I do not feel competent to argue that you are not.
But at the same time I must point out that what I wrote is the prevailing perception. So it is immaterial if it is not true if the question we are trying to answer is why are there relatively few Misesians. If this perception is indeed the prevailing one as I think it is, then it is reason enough why.
PS, Just to elaborate on what I meant earlier with Misesianism as subsumed under Rothbardianism. This in the sense that Rothbardianism = Misesian economics + a bunch of other stuff. On the assumption (here challenged) that outside economics the contribution of Mises was not that great.
No idea. The labels “Hayekian” and “Misesian” are quite ambiguous. But, as you already alluded to, the label “Rothbardian” is less ambiguous. For it usually denotes a subscription to the policies that he advocates, “anarcho-capitalism”. To claim to be (a) a “Misesian” and (b) an “anarchist” would seem, to all besides Poptech, to be entirely non-contradictory and even almost expected, atleast 'round here. But to claim to be (a) a “Rothbardian” and (b) a “minarchist” or a “statist” would be quite confusing.
So the reason, I think, why many more people label themselves “Rothbardian” than “Hayekian” or “Misesian” is merely that the former one, “Rothbardian”, is less ambiguous and therefore more useful than the latter two, “Hayekian” and “Misesian”.
I will, because it is related and probably of interest, also say that Hoppe, at one point, in a lecture, referred to Mises as “our intellectual master”.
Aha! As I already alluded to. So you are now saying my post was not a complete mass of non-sense.
Yeah, basically.
That makes complete sense.
I’ve never read Hayek but Block,Kinsella,Rothbard and Hoppe Etc put me off ever wanting too.
Hayek never even had the guts to call himself a libertarian.
I’m pretty sure that attitude is antithetical to the spirit of those four scholars, and that they would would be most disappointed to hear that they’ve inadvertently inspired anyone to put on ideological blinders.
The analogous word current in his time was “liberal”. And he wrote extensively in promotion of liberalism.
Marko:
I agree with your overall sentiment here.
I would phrase it this way:
Mises was a trained economist who realized that economics was only the best elaborated part of a more general or universal science, but who was not able in his lifetime to revise or extend this more universal science beyond market or catallactic phenomena. He laid the foundation for doing so, but he himself did not do so.
The realm of human action that lies outside of market or catallactic human actions, and that from a libertarian point of view is/was most in need of scientific or rational comprehension, is the ethical realm of human action—the realm of interpersonal actions which are the basis of politics and political organization. Mises undoubtedly did not know how to extend praxeology to treat this subject realm. He could only suggest that this realm of human action be approached in similar fashion to the economic (market) realm of human action:
“There is an important sense in which the subject-matter of political science can be conceived to come within the scope of our definition of the economic. Systems of government, property relationships, and the like, can be conceived as the result of choice. It is desirable that this conception should be further explored on lines analogous to better known analysis.”
(Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science, p.134)
"Economic theory has traditionally dealt with the phenomena of the market, prices, production, and monetary calculation. In these spheres of human activity, theorists have developed constructions that help to explain the regularities these phenomena evince and to bring into clear focus the tendencies for change in these phenomena consequent upon given autonomous changes in the data…
…The subject matter of economics came to be connected with the material things that are the objects of traffic in the market; it can to be linked peculiarly with the use of money in market transactions or with the specific social relationships that characterize the market system. Where writers came closest to recognizing that these criteria were only accidental characteristics of the affairs upon which economic analysis could be brought to bear, where they were able to glimpse the congenerousness of the specifically economic type of analysis with the underlying actions of men, they were unable to follow this clue to the conclusions to which it pointed…
… Precisely because those features in action that made it susceptible of economic analysis seemed common to all human activities, these writers were driven back to look for some other defining characteristic. And this meant again the search for some arbitrary quality to justify selecting the particular slice of pie that made up economic theory…
…but it meant in addition the relegation yet further into the background of the true recipe of that larger pie from which their conception of economics was being arbitrarily hacked…
…In finding the economic aspect of activities in general to consist in concern with the ends-means relationship, this conception…includes within its scope kinds of actions with which economics has had traditionally little to do…"
(Kirzner, The Economic Point of View, p. 182-183)
Both of these passages were written by authors in consultation with Mises.
Thus, Mises had in mind a general science of human action (praxeology) based on an analysis of the means/ends relationship. The most pressing realm of human action in need of praxeological analysis aside from the market-related realm of human action, is/was the social-political realm of human action; that realm having to do with “Systems of government, property relationships, and the like…” This realm of human action ultimately concerns the ethical side of man, the ways and means of treating and interacting with one’s fellow citizens. But Mises did not know how to apply praxeology to the social-political realm of human action, and he admitted it.
And thus there existed/exists a huge void in the science of human action. Libertarians demanded and demand to know the rational basis for their intuition that libertarian ethics somehow is inherent in or is consistent with, man’s nature… Mises did not and could not provide this information.
Enter Rothbard, and enter Rand.
This is the void Rothbard and Rand filled. And this is why what you write is correct. Because libertarians want and wanted more than the laws of economics, understood as the laws of market phenomena. Libertarians wanted to know the rational basis for their social-political program and views. This is something Mises could not provide in the scientific sense (as part of praxeology). He could only argue for liberalism as a value choice, not as part of value-free science. He did not know how to describe the social-political acts of individuals as actions, conceivable by a praxeological science in terms of the ends sought and the means utilized.
Thus, as you write, in the strictly scientific, value-free sense, Mises is/was only economics, since he only elaborated the branch of praxeology that is economics.
What Rothbard and Rand claimed, in essence, was to have provided a scientific basis for libertarian ethics as well. And so when you write that Rothbard is perceived as providing more than Mises, or perceived as subsuming Mises, and providing information that is Misesian economics + a bunch of other stuff, this is accurate. Rothbard provided, roughly speaking, both Misesian economics + Natural-law/Natural-rights ethics, and he furthermore conceived that his natural-law ethics was scientific (i.e., not merely based on, and not merely reducible to, the desires of the particular natural-law theorist).
But there is a huge problem here if it turns out that Rothbard’s natural-law ethics isn’t really scientific. If that is the case, then this means not only that the scientific basis of libertarian ethics has not been provided as promised by Rothbard and Rand, but it also means that roughly fifty years of libertarian scholarship has been diverted down a dead-end path in seeking to find the basis of libertarian ethics in natural-law and objective ethics, rather than in praxeology.
And this is the debate and controversy I believe the libertarian scholarly community is going through to some extent. Hoppe disavowed Rothbard’s natural-law and proposed his own argumentation ethics in its place. Long apparently wants to construct an Aristotelian virtue ethics (the Aristotelian source being common to Randian and Rothbardian ethics) that begins with a critique of Mises and utilitarianism, and generally bypasses Austrian School social theory.
I personally believe that it is implicitly if not explicitly admitted by most libertarian scholars that the Randian and Rothbardian ethical theories ultimately fail. Rand and Rothbard were instrumental in inaugurating the modern American libertarian movement, but their theories do not overcome the notion that the source of moral and ethical values is subjective (the individual moral/ethical subject). O’Neil won the debate:
But it’s taking twenty five years or more to come to terms with this, and to come to terms with the implications of this.
Mises argued that praxeology was a general science of human action that ultimately studies all acts of the individual, and this includes man’s “ethical acts.” . Rand and Rothbard essentially argued that this approach was not appropriate for the subject realm of ethics, and that only an objective ethics can inform our ethical actions.
Fifty years later we are now re-examining whether the path that was chosen—Randian and Rothbardian objective ethics—was, in retrospect, the correct path.
This is bullshit, plain and simple. I’m not even an Austrian, but this claim is just ridiculous on its face. Not only was Hayek the most important economist of the 20th century (and the only Austrian to be taken seriously by the mainstream), he was decades ahead of his time in neuroscience, made important contributions to the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought, and is the only libertarian political philosopher (besides Nozick) that you are likely to encounter in graduate political philosophy course.
Knott,
How are defining what is and isn’t a science in terms of saying Rothbardian ethics isn’t a science? Mises ‘utilitarianism’ is perhaps the greatest flaw of Mises’ work even though he assumes broad value statement concerning the positive well-being of individuals. Thing such a wealth, life, abundance. I think Long’s work on ethics is actually more of a cross between extreme deontological concerns in Rothbard and extreme consequential concerns with Rand. It’s a nice balance between the two in my mind.