Why are there so few Misesians?

Economics Political Theory
141

Laughing Man:

You are making the case for what thymology IS, by using Long’s definition of what thymology is.

My point is not that Long’s definition is necessarily wrong, incorrect, or inconsistent. I believe that would have to be established separately, on the merits of Long’s definition and conception of thymology.

You, as a Long supporter and follower, are simply taking Long’s definition and conception of thymology, and making the existential or ontological argument that thymology IS…(insert Long’s definition here).

I’m saying that Long’s definition and conception is not identical to Mises’s definition and conception. So while you are perfectly at liberty to assert unconditionally that thymology is what Long says it is, I’m simply going to point out that Mises said it was something else. Also, Mises was the one who coined the term thymology, so reference to his conception, as distinct from Long’s conception, would seem reasonable.

Here is Long’s own account of Mises’s conception of thymology:

“Ludwig von Mises introduced into Austrian theory a distinction between praxeology, the method of economic theory, and thymology, the method of economic history. Praxeology comprises a set of a priori insights into the nature and implications of human action; thymology involves identifying, via the hermeneutical method of verstehen, the particular means and ends chosen in particular cases. Thus praxeology, for example, states the laws governing monetary exchange, while thymology determines whether a particular interaction is in fact a case of monetary exchange. For Mises, thymology presupposes praxeology, since one must possess such concepts as means and ends before one can apply them. Praxeology, by contrast, does not presuppose thymology: Mises maintains, in Kantian terms, that we derive our praxeological categories not from experience but from the innate structure of the human mind.” (Long, “Rule Following, Praxeology, and Anarchy” New Perspectives on Political Economy, p.41)

With respect to the underlined passage, then Long goes on to propose his own revised conception of the relationship between praxeology and thymology:

“It further follows that the relation of dependence between praxeology and thymology must be two-way rather than one-way…In that sense, Rothbard and Lavoie are correct in holding, against Mises, that praxeological insight requires some sort of experience…”

Thus, as I read Long, he is saying that Mises’s conception is wrong, and he is proposing a revision to Mises’s conception of thymology. The Longian conception of thymology and the Misesian conception of praxeology are distinctly different. When we speak of thymology, I suggest we clarify whether we are referring to the Long conception or the Mises conception.

One note I would like to make about Long’s concept(s) that I think may be helpful.

In describing his own conception of the relationship of praxeology and thymology, Long concludes:

“Praxeological and thymological understanding arise together; they are simply aspects—not separable components—of the single indissoluble whole which is intelligent human experience.” (Ibid., p. 43)

I believe this conception of Long’s is intimately connected to his concept of “constitutive means,” which is also a concept in which the means are aspects—not separable components—of a single indissoluble whole.

Besides the fact that Long’s concept of constitutive means fails his own test of what is a constitutive means (in his own description of what a constitutive means is, he provides a test for it, then neglects to apply that test to the entity he asserts is a constitutive means. see: A Short Critique of Long's Theory of Constitutive Means ), the concept of an indissoluble whole is problematic in the context of a theory of human action for the following general reason:

When we conceive that an object is already constituted (the object and its aspects already constitute the whole in question), then a problem arises as to how any action can take place with respect to constituting the whole that the actor desires to constitute.

In other words, the problem of human action is how an actor can constitute a desired whole, or, given one whole, how an actor can attain or obtain a different one.

The statement that [wholes] are constituted by [their aspects] does not solve that problem.

In this formulation reference to human action is absent.

142

Well this makes me recall the quote I think by Mises in which a praxeologist can sit in an armchair with their eyes closed and deduce whole economies. Now you would need thymology to take that theory and apply it to the real world. Now whether praxeology or thymology is first needed wasn’t the point I was addressing. The point was that you do need both to apply it to the reality of human behavior. Real world application. Praxeology would stay in the abstract if not for thymology. Now you have been saying that you have discovered an ethical system through praxeology. Yet everything in praxeology is apoditically certain. Therefore either you discovered objective ethics that are apoditically certain or something was faulty.

143

"

Laughing Man:

Thank you for your willingness to discuss these issues. Not everyone is willing to.

The main point I’m trying to stress is that Mises had a distinct conception of the relationship between praxeology and thymology which is approximately equivalent to the distinction between form and content. Praxeology deals with the universal aspects of human action, and thymology with the concrete, individual, and accidental aspects of human action. This is the Misesian conception, at least as I understand it.

This doesn’t mean that other scholars such as Long can’t propose their own conceptions which are more amenable to the ends they wish to pursue. Some scholars may want to achieve a synthesis of Randian objective ethics and Misesian praxeology, and to do so, they will have to change essential aspects of Misesian praxeology. Some scholars may be primarily interested in establishing universal, concrete, ethical values, but with the backing of “praxeology,” and again, if this is the goal, it is very likely that they will have to change essential aspects of Misesian praxeology.

If this is what professor Long is intending, then he is not alone. Israel M. Kirzner argued for another category or aspect to be appended to that of purposeful behavior (human action); the role of entrepreneurial discovery. Rothbard (in his post-Mises-student phase) conceived praxeology as only a reasoning method used for Austrian economics (market study), and not as a general science of all human purposeful behavior (which he did conceive in his Mises-student phase while writing MES).

Thus, we can probably identify and differentiate various scholar’s conceptions of praxeology that depart from Mises’s conception of it in significant ways. As I believe my last post shows, Long’s himself views his conception of thymology as an improvement over what he considers to be Mises’s faulty conception of it. I believe that is conclusive evidence that Long’s conception is significantly different than Mises’s.

Mises provides his conception of Thymology on the very first written page of Human Action (3rd rev.ed.) in the Forward:

“… in the last decades the meaning of the term “psychology” has been more and more restricted to the field of experimental psychology, a discipline that resorts to the research methods of the natural sciences. On the other hand, it has become usual to dismiss those studies that previously had been called psychological as “literary psychology” and as an unscientific way of reasoning. Whenever reference is made to “psychology” in economic studies, one has in mind precisely this literary psychology, and therefore it seems advisable to introduce a special term for it. I suggested in my book Theory and History (New Haven, 1957, pp. 264-274) the term “thymology,” and I used this term also in my recently published essay The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (Princeton, 1962).”

So here, Mises provides an explicit definition or conception of what he means by thymology. By the term thymology, he means literary psychology, the discipline that in academia has been replaced by experimental psychology.

I interpret literary psychology to be something like the verbally expressed reasons we give for the motivations of specific actions, or the reasons people hold the values they do. Thymology answers questions such as: “why did he do that?” or “what will he do?” “why does he like that?” “what will he like?”

These questions are asked and answered, I assume, with reference to the known or assumed character of the individual concerned. As Mises writes, “The concept of a human character is a thymological concept. Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience.”

Mises explains in The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science that:

“Thymology is a branch of history..” (p.48)

“This specific understanding of the sciences of human action aims at establishing the facts that men attach a definite meaning to the state of their environment, that they value this state and, motivated by these judgments of value, resort to definite means in order to preserve or to attain a definite state of affairs different from that which would prevail if they abstained from any purposeful reaction. Understanding deals with judgments of value, with the choice of ends and of the means resorted to for the attainment of these ends, and with the valuation of the outcome of actions performed.”(p.49)(underline added)

Here, when Mises writes about understanding (where underlined), I interpret this to mean: actor A’s attempt to “understand” actor B’s judgments of value, choice of ends, choice of means…and, actor A’s valuation of the action performed by actor B.

In other words, actor A’s appraisement of, or ascertainment of, the various aspects of B’s action: B’s motivation, B’s judgment of value, B’s choice of ends, B’s choice of means, etc…

Thus, actor A uses the method of understanding (verstehen) to try to answer such questions as:

What was (or is, or will be) B’s judgment of value? (Elvis Presley was the most important singer of the twentieth century)

Why did (does, or will) B value Elvis Presley? (B’s father was/is a minister in the south and exposed B to gospel music)

What was (is or will be) B’s goal? (to catalogue every song ever performed by Elvis Presley)

How did (does, or will) B do that? (embark on an ambitious discography)

“Understanding does not deal with the praxeological side of human action. It refers to value judgments and the choice of ends and of means on the part of our fellow men. It refers not to the field of praxeology and economics, but to the field of history. It is a thymological category. The concept of a human character is a thymological concept. Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience.” (p.51)

“The subject of the historical understanding is the mental grasp of phenomena which cannot be totally elucidated by logic, mathematics, praxeology, and the natural sciences and as far as they cannot be elucidated by science and reason. It establishes the fact that scientific inquiry has reached a point beyond which it cannot go further, and tries to fill the gap by Verstehen. One may, if one likes, qualify the Verstehen as irrational because it involves individual judgments not amenable to criticism by purely rational methods. However, the method of understanding is not a free charter to deviate from the certified results obtained from the documentary evidence and from its interpretation through the teachings of the natural sciences and of praxeology. The Verstehen oversteps its due limits if it ventures to contradict physics, physiology, logic, mathematics, or economics.” (Money, Method, and the Market Process. p.30)(underline added)

In the underlined, I interpret Mises as meaning that A’s individual “Verstehen account” (A’s individual judgment) about the various aspects of B’s action, is “not amenable to criticism by purely rational methods.”

This means that A, C, and D may give varying “Verstehen accounts” of aspects of B’s action(s), and the discrepancies between these various accounts, providing these accounts do not contradict established scientific principles, cannot be conclusively resolved by logical reasoning.

“Praxeology deals with choice and actions and with their outcome. Psychology (what Mises says he means by thymology) deals with the internal processes determining the various choices in their concreteness. It may be left undecided whether psychology can succeed in explaining why a man in a concrete case preferred red to blue or bread to lyrics. At any rate such an explanation has nothing to do with a branch of knowledge for which the concrete choices are the data not needing further explanation or analysis. Not what a man choses, but that he chooses counts for praxeology.” (Money, Method, and the Market Process. p. 21)(parenthasized comment added)

“Now you have been saying that you have discovered an ethical system through praxeology. Yet everything in praxeology is apoditically certain. Therefore either you discovered objective ethics that are apoditically certain or something was faulty.”

You are misunderstanding my points about praxeology and ethics.

My argument is:

  1. That there are human actions of an ethical nature: lying to someone, coercing someone, assisting someone, obstructing someone.

  2. That praxeology is a general science studying all forms of human action.

  3. That, as there are ethical actions, then praxeology studies these ethical actions.

  4. That, as praxeology is an “exact science” of human action, that therefore, praxeology is an exact science of ethical actions as well.

  5. Praxeology is concerned with laws of human action, be they economic/catallactic, ethical, or psychological forms of action.

  6. Thus, praxeology is concerned with laws of ethical action.

“Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome of various modes of action.” (HA, 3rd. rev. p.117)

My main point is that there are laws of ethical action which it is the task of praxeology to discover and conceive.