Monopsony? but that is predicated on the assumption of perfect competition which is flawed.
Something to do with reswitching -how does this work?
And finally efficiency wages? Still though, wouldn’t high wages tend to just bid people away from other parts of the economy, where they are more needed?
The only arguments that I have heard about wage controls increasing prices is in the case of wage-caps because of the backward-bending supply curve for labor, and this argument is theoretically sound assuming that the government knows at which wage rate workers will begin to work less (which is a bad assumption, though). Myself, I have never heard of anybody advocating that minimum wages would increase employment, and not even Paul Krugman, though the link proves he has been a good thinker in the past though his current work is pretty much rubbish, would make such a mistake.
Well I did a quick read on “real and nominal real wicksell effects” and basically to understand why a wage increase could build employment, you have to throw out marginalist theory.
Honestly, its basic supply and demand analysis, open up a basic macroeconomics text book and read it in depth. No “quick read” will be able to prove this principle wrong, a technical essay would be required to say the least. Nor does it throw out marginalist theory because it is Neoclassical theory, and the Neoclassicals are true marginalists.
As far as the analysis goes: the supply curve of labor is backwards bending, so it follows that if a wage cap is placed at the point at which individuals begin working less due to their salary that they would work more. As a result, it is theoretically possible that a wage-cap can increase the amount of labor in the economy.
Furthermore, how does this theory “throw out marginalist theory”?
To be fair, recently Krugman made a point which I considered a very good one. He argued that removing the minimum wage would not have as dramatic of an effect as many free-market economist seem to suggest (for example, Murphy suggested that if minimum wage was repealed unemployment would be solved within six months). Most jobs are above the minimum wage.
It was a good point, although admittedly there is still much wrong with it. For example, he doesn’t consider that many unemployed workers who were making wages above minimum wage, but under what can be considered “professional” wages (this is an arbitrary figure, but it’s meant to allow me to make my point; from $7.51 to $25), are willing to take low-paying jobs, even if beforehand they were technically making over the minimum wage. Also, he doesn’t consider job prices which were bid up starting at the minimum wage, and not at whatever the market price would be (although, then again, theoretically at that point the company’s marginal revenue probably allows that wage to be given, and so maybe this part of my argument does not stand).
Nevertheless, a lot of what Krugman writes is rubbish, but one out of every thousand blog posts gives a valuable lesson. It’s better than what I can say for Brad DeLong, that’s for sure.
Marginalism perhaps: At the “now” they would be bid away to another sector (assuming of course that the minimum wage at that sector was substantially higher than the wages at other areas). But if they would be more needed “later” so they would later, offer higher wages. I would argue that unless some consumption preferences altered, then this min. wage would lead to an economic downturn.
supposedly one of the conditions for the wicksell effect is that an increase in interest rates causes an increase in capital. Which is wierd since a decrease in interest is supposed to cause that only.
P.S. I never heard about your backward sloping theory -very impressed.
Hence the fact I qualified my statement with “pretty much”.
Honestly, I do not see how this proves the demand and supply analysis I gave wrong. In addition, I am discussing maximum wages, not minimum wages, which your analysis seems to forget when it discusses firms offering higher wages.
A request: could you provide me the source that you had read.
However, I’m not discussing either, I am discussing wages, and wage-caps.
Its a basic result of the Slutsky equation, and both the income and substitution effect. In no way is it my theory, but it is a basic tenet of the vast majority of modern, economic labor-analysis.
Card and Krueger wrote an error-filled paper and subsequent book (Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage) stating that the negative effects of minimum wage laws are nonexistent. Even though their work has been disproved by several sources, minimum wage advocates continue to use their paper as “proof” of the goodness of a minimum wage increase.
However, I have never heard of anyone stating that minimum wage increases will increase employment.
Oh yeah? It seems to be a common phenomenon for me when I see online debates. The guy in favor of min.wage will say something like “stateA raised minimum wages and stateB didn’t but employment increased in state A” or something like that. And then, conclude min. wages boost employment. I also thought that the card/krueger paper said this too but I guess I’m wrong.
I have myself said that the concept of the minimum wage necessarily reducing employment is an assumption that holds true only in the crude textbook model of the labor market, and is not suited to actual reality. As noted, monopsony power (and more broadly, oligopsonistic conditions in labor markets) complicates matters. Firms are confronted with an upward sloping labor supply curve rather than an infinitely elastic labor supply curve. So what are effectively the imperfections of labor markets make matters far more complicated than is immediately evident, and claiming that minimum wages increase unemployment is not so cut and dry, considering that the absence of infinite elasticity (few would argue that cutting wages by a cent would result in worker resignation, for example) is an element in the general deficiencies of labor markets. This is why we’ve encountered empirical research into the effects of the minimum wage on employment that is in sharp contrast with textbook theories.
“On April 1, 1992 New Jersey’s minimum wage increased from $4.25 to $5.05 per hour. To evaluate the impact of the law we surveyed 410 fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the rise in the minimum. Comparisons of the changes in wages, employment, and prices at stores in New Jersey relative to stores in Pennsylvania (where the minimum wage remained fixed at $4.25 per hour) yield simple estimates of the effect of the higher minimum wage. Our empirical findings challenge the prediction that a rise in the minimum reduces employment. Relative to stores in Pennsylvania, fast food restaurants in New Jersey increased employment by 13 percent. We also compare employment growth at stores in New Jersey that were initially paying high wages (and were unaffected by the new law) to employment changes at lower-wage stores. Stores that were unaffected by the minimum wage had the same employment growth as stores in Pennsylvania, while stores that had to increase their wages increased their employment.”
“Recent work on the economic effects of minimum wages has stressed that the standard economic model, where increases in minimum wages depress employment, is not supported by empirical work in some labor markets. We present a general theoretical model whereby employers have some degree of monopsony power, which allows minimum wages to have the conventional negative impact on employment but which also allows for a neutral or positive impact. Studying the industry‐based British Wages Councils between 1975 and 1992, we find that minimum wages significantly compress the distribution of earnings but do not have a negative impact on employment.”
So we’ve noted that the heterogenous nature of labor markets allows for negative employment effects in a monopsony model, while the orthodox model does not allow for any broad positive employment effects. More importantly, it’s likely that there are additional heterogeneities in employment trends that render textbook analysis deficient, as evidenced by an empirical source such as Dube, Lester, and Reich’s Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties:
“Local case studies of minimum wages typically find no significant employment effects, while studies using national data find some negative effects for teenagers. We argue that heterogeneity in spatial employment trends generates biased estimates in national analyses and causes overstatement of precision in local and national studies. We propose two new local estimators that compare all contiguous counties or metro areas in the U.S. that straddle a state-based minimum wage gradient. We find that the negative elasticities in national fixed-effects models are generated by unobserved heterogeneities in employment trends. Our local estimators are more robust and show no employment effects.”
"This paper examines the impact of minimum wages on earnings and employment in selected branches of the retail-trade sector, 1990–2005, using county-level data on employment and a panel regression framework that allows for county-specific trends in sectoral outcomes. We focus on specific subsectors within retail trade that are identified as particularly low-wage. We find little evidence of disemployment effects once we allow for geographic-specific trends. Indeed, in many sectors the evidence points to modest (but robust) positive employment effects."
We can also consider the effects of increased human capital acquisition induced by minimum wage legislation, as observed in Cahuc and Michel’s Minimum wage unemployment and growth:
“This paper shows that, in an overlapping generations, model with endogenous growth, minimum wage legislation does not necessarily has negative consequences on economic performance. Such legislation can have positive effects on growth by inducing more human capital accumulation. More precisely, a low demand for unskilled labor, induced by a minimum wage, may create an incentive for workers to accumulate human capital. Moreover, it is possible that a decrease in the minimum wage lowers the welfare of each agent in the economy.”
Even aside from formal legislation, we can refer to the effects of union activity promoting incentives for human capital acquisition in apprenticeship training and the like through the establishment of minimum wages, which is supported by Dustmann and Schönberg’s Training and Union Wages:
“This paper investigates whether unions, through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training. Our analysis focuses on Germany. Based on a model of unions and firm-financed training, we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms. We test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data. We find support for the hypothesis that union recognition, via imposing minimum wages and wage compression, increases training in apprenticeship programs.”
For a more direct and straightforward analysis of the minimum wage’s ability to provide efficiency benefits (as some do not conceptualize increased employment as increased static efficiency), we could consult Kass and Madden’s Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage:
“We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.”
To confirm the aforementioned claim that minimum wages may shift activity to high-wage labor and away from unskilled, low-wage labor (which would also build on our earlier points about human capital acquisition), consider Acemoglu’s Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs:
“This article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high‐wage (good) and low‐wage (bad) jobs coexist. Minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high‐wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez‐faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low‐wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare.”
“The debate around minimum wage regulations, in the aftermath of recent regulatory changes in the United States, continues to grow. This article contributes to present literature by engaging the minimum wage controversy from the resource-based view theoretical perspective. Based on literature review, we find that minimum wage regulations appear to exhibit different impacts in different countries. Using meta-analysis of the related literature, we propose a conceptual framework that highlights the relationship between national resource base and minimum wage regulatory impact. Specifically, we posit that minimum wage impact on a country, such as the United States, is moderated by the national resource base. Further, we identify opportunity cost associated with inadequate minimum wage regulations, as consisting of education, entrepreneurial propensity, and cost divergence. Our conclusions point to the positive effects of the minimum wage controls, including increased education, more productive operating practices, and the emphasis on skill development and high value activities.”
So all in all, we actually have rather substantial empirical evidence of the minimum wage’s benefits for employment, human capital acquisition, productivity, which constitute efficiency improvements or aids to such. The static orthodox model honestly appears rather naive and incomplete in comparison.
There have been attempts at Austrian criticism of the monopsony model of the labor market, such as Walter Block’s An Austrian Critique of Neo-Classical Monopsony Theory. As with so much of his work, there seems to be little but an attempt to attack a strawman, with this one being a case of a criticism of more dated static monopsony models rather than the more contemporary concept of “dynamic monopsony” explored by Card and Krueger, Burdett and Mortensen, or by Alan Manning in his Monopsony in Motion. The same is true of Don Bellante’s The Non-Sequitur in the Revival of Monopsony Theory, which contains little more than his disgruntlement at the usage of the term “monopsony” to describe conditions of upward sloping labor supply curves as opposed to traditional single-buyer conditions, is a repetition of previous criticism he’s offered of the “old” model, with copy-and-paste of commentary from more insightful criticism of Peter Kuhn (which itself claims that the model is “not sufficiently precisely defined for empirical testing” and therefore does not address the studies among the numerous ones mentioned above).
It seems standard ignorance of the difference between textbook theory and reality. It’s parallel to the fact that many are happy to chant that price floors cause surpluses and price ceilings cause shortages without considering the fact that the existence of numerous equilibrium prices above and below the respective floors and ceilings set will mean that there is no disruption.
There have certainly been attempts to offer “rebuttals” of Card and Krueger’s work (alongside mere declarations of its falsity, such as that offered by James Buchanan), but has that “disproved” the model as a whole? Much of that speculation seems to be related to the misconception that Card and Krueger simply vanished under a bombardment of economic consensus. For example, Block, Westley, and Padilla’s Internal vs. external explanations: a new perspective on the history of economic thought states that “the most recent article to make this claim [the minimum wage does not increase unemployment] (Card and Krueger, 1994), was overwhelmed with a plethora of publications to the contrary, and since CK have not since replied to any of them they are wrong.” That is openly and demonstrably false. In response to Neumark and Wascher’s comment on their original article, for example, they issued a very prompt reply. What did you refer to?
Well, I didn’t bother waiting for approval; I just posted a short note and then edited the post. What I actually had trouble with was an error caused by quote code mismatches, though there weren’t any. I got around it by eliminating the usernames of the people I was quoting.