I had a few emails back and forth with Tom Woods about epistemology in economics and he pointed me to the wonderful “Economic Science and the Austrian Method” by Hans-Hermann Hoppe (available free here at Mises. Link posted at end of question).
It’s a study of how empiricism as an over-riding epistemology has failed due to it’s self refuting nature, and how Keynsianism is built off of this flawed epistemology. It details how Keynsianism is not concerned with unseen consequences of actions because it cannot observe and measure them mathematically and so it simply disgards them.
Here is a good example from the book:
"Now let us turn to some typical economic propositions. Consider the validation process of a proposition such as the following: Whenever two people A and B engage in a voluntary exchange, they must both expect to profit from it. And they must have reverse preference orders for the goods and services exchanged so that A values what he receives from B more highly than what he gives to him, and B must evaluate the same things the other way around…
…Considering such propositions, is the validation process involved in establishing them as true or false of the same type as that involved in establishing a proposition in the natural sciences? Are these propositions hypothetical in the same sense as a proposition regarding the effects of mixing two types of natural materials? Do we have to test these economic propositions continuously against observations? And does it require a never-ending trial and error process in order to find out the range of application for these propositions and to gradually improve our knowledge, such as we have seen to be the case in the natural sciences?
It seems quite evident except to most economists for the last forty years that the answer to these questions is a clear and unambiguous NO. That A and B must expect to profit and have reverse preference orders follows from our understanding of what an exchange is"
It seems modern economics fail because they exclude a priori logic from their systems as invalid. This is all leading to a question I promise!!!
While watching Freedom Watch, Daniel Hannon made the remark that the further away from the impact of a decision the decision makers are, the worse the decision will be. This seems to be the kind of a priori logic rejected by Keynesians that justify large scale centralized planning based on mathematical models. Is there a similar exposition of logic/empiricism related to political theory? Tom didn’t know on this one and I would love to hear a good example.
Here’s Hoppe’s Book here at the institute:
~Wesley Mitchell