- A discussion pointed a critical flaw in my understanding of the axiom “Humans Act”. A person who is in a coma does not act, yet they are still a human. But if all humans act, this contradicts that statement. How do you explain this cognitive dissonance.
Because it doesn’t contradict the statement at all. Being in a coma is a well-defined condition, and when/if the person comes out of the coma, the person will act. And the person acted before the coma. Further, there’s the small matter of the human genome aka DNA.
KOB is right, when you are in a condition such as comatose you do not cease to be human, such is also the case when you sleep, yo udo not necessarily act when you sleep, does this mean that you are not human unless you act in your sleep?
There is a difference with brain death, and vegetative states like such, where brain function stops, this is also a sign that maybe despite being comatose there is still action taking place. Human action is choosing, thought is action, so long as there is thought, despite the lacking ability to communicate these thoughts to others, you are still “Acting” as described in Human Action (this is where the axiom is referenced to).
That only tells us how we shouldn’t interpret the proposition ‘humans act’, viz. as ‘all humans act all the time’. Why not interpret it as ‘there exists at least one human H, and at least one instance in time T, such that H acts at T’?
Surely human action isn’t an ineluctalby vague notion, is it?
So in that brief period between consciousness the comatose are all non-humans?
Ummm…did you actually read what I wrote?
Yes.
You addressed pre compa and post coma, but not the state of the coma itself. He acted before, he acts after. OK. So is it like a “praxeology baptist” thing? Once an actor always an actors? I thin the original poster raises a fine point. If we are to take it that all men act, then what about those that do not act?
Did not bother to read what I said though…
Hrmmmmmmmmmm
Further more we can divide humans into two groups, those who act, and those who don’t act, eg vegetables. Vegetables, because of their differences with acting humans, have a dimished state of self ownership and are appointed guardians.
This was the addition I put on KOB’s statement…
In Human Action, Chapter 1, Section 2, Mises wrote:
Beings of human descent who either from birth or from acquired defects are unchangeably unfit for any action (in the strict sense of the term and not merely in the legal sense) are practically not human.
Therefore, I believe Mises would characterize a person in a coma (at least one in a permanent coma) as not being practically human.
Mises’s definition of human seems to be “that which acts”; the action axiom seems to be a tautology.
We must distinguish between the biological term “Human” (homo Sapian) and the praxeologic term “Human” (acting being). The two are differnent and usin them interchangably will reasult in error and confusion.
This. Also, the action axiom applies to other hypothetical sapient beings.
In my opinion, people concern themselves far too much with the action axiom. The whole of praxeology is hypothetical in any case, meaning, catallactics is hypothetical, it assumes that those who the analysis concerns are acting human beings. The whole point of the action axiom was to provide a solid basis from which economic analysis could proceed, and it acheived that. Even if one could find an obscure situation in which the action axiom did not apply, I daresay it would not have too much of an impact on the Austrian analysis of the economy. I’ve yet to see many economists devote huge amounts of time to the role of vegetables in the business cycle, so I don’t see why Austrians should.
Actually he says those who are unchangeably unfit for action. It is reasonable to assume that a person in a coma can recover and continue to act.
It does not say “Humans are always acting,” it says that humans do act. A person who has acted before the coma and will act after is by definition a being who does act. He just does not happen to be acting at that exact moment. It is the same for a sleeping person.
Yes, that’s why I wrote, “at least one in a permanent coma”.
Actually, I did. Re-read the part about DNA. Helps to read the whole post, y’know.
People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis.
The action axiom is the starting point. If we act, then such and such is logically consequent. And if you deny that we act, your denial is an action and you are in a performative contradiction. No one in a coma is going to deny that he acts.
Because people in a coma do not act, choices concerning them must be made by next-of-kin or by way of a written will.
So a child born into a coma - something that occurs - and never acts or who never will act, is he a human being?
I’m saying that there are serious flaws I can see and that having to rely on grammar to patch up the holes isn’t going to work out too well in real debates.
You mentioned DNA as an afterthought. Your previous argument didn’t really concern it, but if you’re now saying that DNA is the qualifier for being human, then that’s pretty good. I agree that biology does tend to make a human being.
That said, however, I find that the definition of human is usually more about what others perceive than what actually is, seeing as the thing in itself is more or less unknowable - at least according to Kant.