I’ve read several books by Rothbard, but all of them seem to concentrate on non-aggressive action (~economics or, as Rothbard himself puts it, Crusoe economics + catallactics). The only kind of aggression investigated seems to come from the state, and looks isolated from the treatment of economics.
I would really appreciate any pointers to (preferrably free) texts that integrate hostile action into a theory of economics. Excuse me if this is some kind of a FAQ.
He talks about it in the government chapter of Man Economy State.
I asked this same question not too long ago. Adam Knott has some essays on the praxeology of coercion, here:
http://www.praxeology.com/prax.htm
That’s the best I’ve found thus far.
I think that economics does encompass a theory of coercion. Man “acts”, in the words of Mises. He acts by using means to achieve ends. His ends are to reduce his suffering and, what is the same, increase his satisfaction with his state of affairs. One means by which he can alleviate his suffering and increase his satisfaction with his state of affairs is to improve the state of nature, that is, to produce. When other individuals engage in production, however, there arises an alternative means to alleviate suffering and increase satisfaction and that is to simply steal the produce of others. Of course, built into the word “steal” is an implicit theory of property and what it means for something to belong to one person but not another.
Clayton -
I agree with you that all kind of human action is the subject of praxeology (by definition).
However, according to Rothbard’s definition of “economics” (as witnessed in http://mises.org/rothbard/schuller.pdf, page 946), economics is the part of praxeology concerned with single person cases and voluntary interpersonal exchange, thus explicitly excluding any aggresive action (including coercion).
The beginning of the paper looked promising… Thanks for the pointer, I will study it in details later.
I can’t think at the moment how it would be worded, but you’re right that economic action requires peace.
“Economic action requires peace, the exclusion of violence.” Mises; Socialism
Mises discusses that in length that was just a handy quote from a fuller write-up of his. Mises also asserts numerous times that private property (an axiom) is the starting point of economic action.
I think Praxeology is the genus to the potential identification of numerous species. Cattallatics is more in line with monetary exchange economics. Yet all human action, including politics, ethics, etc… are humans in action and therefore would not be outside the scope of the formal theory.
Abirkmanis:
Good insights.
I’ve been arguing that in Austrian social thought there has been a tendency to equate human action with market-directed action—action directed toward various aspects of the market economy.
But there are obviously other kinds of actions. Mises writes that thinking itself is an action. Coercing another person is an action, and so is lying to another person. Both coercion and dishonesty are phenomena falling within the domain of traditional ethics. Both of these refer to acts that one person takes toward another. And thus there are things we may refer to as “ethical actions.” Simply, actions directed toward another person.
If in general, or in principle, there is an inescapable logic of action, it follows that there must be a logic of these other kinds of actions as well—not merely a logic of “market directed” action, or catallactics.
So the question for Austrian school social thought is:
Is there an inescapable logic of human action? Mises and Rothbard say yes.
Are there other forms of action aside from actions directed toward the market economy and actions involving monetary exchange?
If the answer to #2 is no, then why aren’t there other forms of action aside from market-directed action and action conducted with the aid of monetary exchange ?
If the answer to #2 is yes, then why isn’t there an inescapable logic to these other forms of human action?
Mises understood this situation, and that is why he repeatedly wrote that economics is the best elaborated part of praxeology. The idea is that economics or catallactics is sub-set or sub-realm of of human actions. Study of the market-related aspects of human action is not a comprehensive treatment of human action, but only the study of one aspect of human action.
Praxeology is the formal-logical science of human action in all its forms.
How praxeology might be extended to treat other forms of human action besides catallactics is an important question which you bring to light in your post.
This brings up some interesting ideas. I think fundamentally you have to take into consideration the means of threats and violence, which are fear and power. It may also be interesting to note that this sort of dominance can be considered an end in itself, in addition to being a means to other ends.
Also, it seems that catallactics covers a civilized form of human behavior - one driven and restricted by logic. Thus, the participants purposefully restrict their actions to ones that satisfy private-property, market-based principles, which allows prices to be formed and calculation to ensue.
Hostile action often assumes that the participants have higher ends (such as victory) than the honor of their opponents or third parties. There is less regularity and reasonable expectation of any form of conduct. Hostile action is considered uncivilized, and in many ways it can be considered irrational. Decivilized behavior is often marked by very high time preferences, which have no use for long term planning.
I don’t think the tools useful for analyzing hostile behavior are so much different than the tools for analyzing cooperative behavior. I find propertarianism to be a helpful analytical framework in this matter. Man prefers more to less, better to worse, etc. So, he acts in whatever way he finds available to him to satisfy these psychological demands. If that happens to be killing or stealing, he kills or steals. But immoral acts should not be seen as any kind of exception to the means-ends framework of human action. A more interesting question is how it is that human language and culture has evolved to categorize some acts as moral and others as immoral and how this interplays with the emergence of customary law in enforcing “rules of the game” that make cooperative (moral) behavior the norm when aggressive (immoral) behavior would do just as well in achieving any particular individual’s ends.
Clayton -
Coercing another person is an action, and so is lying to another person.
Even before we come to coercion and lying, which both require communication and mutual comprehension, there is a case of brute force aggression - just taking whatever is desired disregarding the victim completely (killing, if need be). I am pondering on whether this case still belongs to human action proper, or rather to “subhuman” - as it can be applied to animals as well.
My current position on this is to consider subhuman action a subset of human action, with the non-empty difference between these sets being the phenomena requiring communication (including in time), culture, mores, etc.
It well may be that this separation into lower and higher action features can be refined, leading to more than two sets (e.g., coercion can be performed with less sophisticated language than lying, e.g., using gestures). The whole idea behind this stratification of human action is a hypothesis that it may simplify the theory by breaking it into manageable chunks. For example, by separating subhuman action, one can appeal to the proof by the existence of predators that aggression may be sustainable and profitable in long run (so at least without advanced communication non-aggression principle is not unconditionally superiour from utility point of view of aggressors).
abirkmanis:
I agree with the general idea that we can classify various types of action.
Because the attempt to take, effect, or move some object or the attempt to attack an animal, be it a homo sapiens or another kind, is still an action.
What you are referring to as brute force aggression is, I believe, addressing another person absent social interaction. Meaning, addressing another person without addressing his thoughts, mind, consciousness, etc…
But as I see it, this is still action. In one case the actor addresses the mind of the object before him. In the other case, the actor doesn’t address the mind before him. So I would classify the actions on this basis.
Simple action is an action (for example, the attempt to move an object)
Social interaction is an action (for example, the attempt to change another person’s mind)
Thinking is an action (the attempt to change, or effect a change in, one’s own mind)
Thus, as a starting point, we can classify various types of action based on recognizable objects of action.
And as you write:
“The whole idea behind this stratification of human action is a hypothesis that it may simplify the theory by breaking it into manageable chunks.”
So now what we have is:
The realm of ethics, our dealings with other people, is the realm of action directed toward another mind.
The realm of psychology, our dealings with our own mind, is the realm of action directed toward our own mind.
And this is how we can begin to conceive praxeology as a discipline that can approach the fields of ethics and psychology.
We conceive various types of action such as “ethical action” (action directed toward another mind), or “psychological action” (action directed toward our own mind).
This really needs clarified because psychology is the ‘study of the psyche (mind)’. Psychology deals with the mind not only by one individual by in accord with social behavior too. The psychological profile of any one individual includes how they direct their psyche towards other people.
**
Wilderness:
I’m only arguing how praxeology can be conceived and extented to treat psychological phenomena. I’m not addressing how psychology may be approached by the mainstream, or, how psychology may be defined in terms of objective-realism or the physical sciences.
My argument is that praxeology is the formal/logical science of human goal-directed activity. Thinking and contemplating are actions. So are “trying to control my emotions” or “trying to overcome my fears” actions. These are actions that I direct toward myself, but more importantly, toward my own mind.
Thus, a praxeological treatment of psychological phenomena would be to treat psychological phenomena as aspects of action (purposive activity).
It would begin by looking at the end sought (the end of contemplation, the end of thinking, the end of trying to control one’s emotions, etc…, and at the means utilized toward these ends.
I am not arguing that mainstream psychologists or objective-realists or physical scientists become praxeologists.
I am arguing that for those interested in praxeology, this is how praxeology could be extended and applied to psychological phenomena.
Adam Knott,
Would you please refrain from using “objective-realist” in this inappropiate manner that excludes it from praxeology. It is an unfounded assertion. This had already been settled in the Praxeology-Evolution thread. I suggest going back to that thread in the discussion between I. Ryan and myself to ascertain a knowledgeable response next time. It would only be adhering to the essense of what philosophy is: truth-finding. Now if you’re not doing philosophy/science, then let it be known.