No, I don’t think this is the correct answer because it takes an overly narrow view of the circumstances in which conflicts can arise. In the Friedmanite model (as best I understand it), for any two people who get into a conflict, they are either members of the same PDA (in which case, their dispute is resolved according to the “law” of that PDA) or they are members of different PDAs, in which case, the dispute is resolved according to the rules of the “binding” contract between those two PDAs.
I have a theoretical beef with this model because it introduces the division of labor into the situation before analyzing the matter prior to division-of-labor. What happens when somebody with a PDA gets into a dispute with someone without a PDA? Perhaps the lone individual is better armed than the PDA itself or is just “hard to kill”. The problem is that rights have been “decontextualized” to borrow a term introduced by another poster, though I’ve forgotten the nic.
And what makes something “binding”?? To me, it just means that one party claims that they will physically fight for it - a claim that may or may not be true! Bindingness is extremely fuzzy because it’s actually game-theoretic. How binding something is depends on the threats attached to it, and the bindingness of those threats depends on their credibility, which is not just a function of funding, manpower, etc. but basically of “everything.” A white man living in an all-white and highly racially-sensitive neighborhood might commit a crime against a black man that he could never get away with under the rules of his PDA or the PDA of the black man but is counting on his “buddies” throughout the community to watch his back. The “binding” agreements between the PDAs become moot at this point. In fact, the fuzziness of what it means for something to be binding can be thought of as the space in which politics resides.
My view is that a free market in law is a market in which voluntary producers of dispute-resolution services compete on reputability and effectiveness without the need for “binding”, which is costly. Obviously, this won’t work for international gold shipments… the two parties can’t exactly go to “marriage counseling” over a multi-hundred-million dollar shipment of gold disappearing mid-ocean. So, for large-cap stuff, you need more “binding” in the agreement. Perhaps the CEOs of the respective partners each travel to the other’s site to be held as surety for the shipment until it has completed its voyage and the check for the shipment has cleared. But this is just a security question, there’s really no “ought/should” aspect to it, which is where law comes in.
Introducing guns into a transaction in order to secure it definitely makes sense. Basically, I want to buy a million dollars of gold from you and you want to sell a million dollars of gold to me. So, I go over to your side and your PDA holds me at gunpoint and you come to my side and my PDA holds you at gunpoint until the transaction has cleared. But I don’t think this describes the world we live in at all. We live in what I term a “threat-based social order”. Division-of-labor itself is dictated by command. This is a problem for obvious economic reasons. But more importantly, people constantly confuse this with securitized transacting, which it is not. If we both live under an extremely powerful State, that is not the same thing as you and I independently securing our respective ends of a risky transaction.
Where this becomes obvious is when you look at the political component. If you’re the governor’s son, all of a sudden, the entire dynamic has shifted… I’m actually helpless and you have all the guns. But even if you’re not the governor’s son, you could be buddies with his son. And so on. So the incentive is for everyone to clamber over each other in a mad rush to get closer to the Leviathan so they are better secured in transacting with anyone else. This is madness, not social order.
By eliminating PDAs from the first analysis, I think you get a cleaner analysis. Sure, there will be PDAs, of course. Large-cap transactions require more guns to make sure nothing goes wrong or that things can be handled tactically if they do go wrong. But not everything will necessarily involve a PDA. In fact, PDAs are costly (so are public defense agencies, i.e. States) so those are poor or who have very little capital will generally do without them or find other ways (e.g. employment contracts) to get the benefits of PDAs without paying for them directly. And it is precisely in this “social substrate” or “pre-law” where most social norms arise.
I guess it all just depends on how you look at it. I prefer to analyze PDAs and law as “unbundled” services not because I believe they can’t be bundled but because I believe they would likely exist in both bundled and unbundled forms in an unhampered law/security market and, therefore, the most general analysis is the unbundled case. Basically, if you steal my TV, I’ll send you a letter saying, “You have stolen my TV. I have security video footage showing you stole it. You must return the TV with a check for $X (the customary amount) by such-and-such date (the customary time for making whole) or appear for arbitration of the matter. If you choose not to respond at all, I will ask my defense agency to recover the funds forcibly. This action is justifiable in a court of law, please see case John Doe vs. Joe Blow.”
If you don’t respond in the allotted time, I will call my defense agency and explain to them that you stole my TV and would they please go recover the appropriate amount of property to cover the awards that would have been given in a court-of-law (perhaps by seizing your car or something). The “binding” is in the bullets of my defense agency (that is, in my own bullets which I have delegated to the defense agency). All security begins and ends with the self, with your own fists and your own brain. All else is just delegation thereof.
Clayton -