We’ve had quite a few threads lately that call Natural Rights into question. I stumbled onto this brilliant critique of this skeptical position by Stephan N. Kinsella, which I had read before and forgotten about.
And in hilarious footnote 14
I still don’t see why the rights skeptic can’t object simply because he doesn’t like being shot.
From the rights skeptic position it’s not different from a non religious person (which I believe Stephan is) complaining about Christians/ Muslims/ Jews going around and enforcing their religious law on them. It doesn’t need to be anything other than personal preference.
He can, but what’s the reason behind it?
There doesn’t need to be. Kinsella’s argument is, as I understand it that the rights skeptic can’t deny rights because even if he does he can’t take issue with people enforcing them. But that by no means implies that the rights skeptic has to have any more reason than that it’s annoying.
Yes there does, as you admit.
Which raises the question: so what. If the rights-skeptic thinks it’s annoying–who cares? What’s that matter?
Intriguingly, should a bad-tempered rights-skeptic shoot a rights-advocate, the advocate’s right to life hardly protects him. While the enforcement of punishment against the skeptic depends entirely on the perception of rights and justice among his peers.
How inconvenient for Mr. Kinsella’s logical puzzle.
How’s that? Kinsella never says that rights are some automatic shield.
Brilliant, Knight. You get it. No offense, Giles_Stratton.
Stephen, your signoff tag is “Dumb dumb dumb. I feel like a big fish in a small pond that is the world. – Stephan Kinsella --”
Is that a quote from me? I love it, but don’t remember it. Where’d you get that from?
We’ve got Hoppeans. Rothbardians. Misesians. Hayekians. Blockeans.
And now, KinselloritesTM
Obviously, “it’s annoying” is not a good reason in argumentation, since anyone could simply verbally decree any other proposition to be “annoying.” GilesStratton/universalizability FAIL.
Right, but it is still only a logical puzzle.
My dad always told me “Kinsella” meant, in Ireland, “king of the island.” But my google-fu indicates it means “unclean head.” Woe unto ye, Dirty-Headers!
AE is all about chains of logical reasoning…
More common-sensically, this demonstration points out the inconsistency on the part of a rights-skeptic who engages in discourse about the propriety of rights at all. If there are no rights, then there is no such thing as the justifiable or legitimate use of force, but neither is there such a thing as the unjust use of force. But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about? If individuals delude themselves into thinking that they have natural rights, and, acting on this assumption, go about enforcing these rights as if they are true, the skeptic has no grounds to complain. To the extent the sceptic complains about people enforcing these illusory rights, he begins to attribute rights to those having force used against them. Any rights-skeptic can only shut up, because he contradicts himself the moment he objects to others’ acting as if they have rights.
In regards to the use of force as to where the justice lies and to who has rights is relative upon the individual or the situation: YOU (the individual) are the right, the justification, and the morality to the extant the individual is capabal or allows himslef to be. Force is just or unjust so long as one lets it be so. This, of course, does not take theological arguments into consideration.
Indeed, another way to respond to a rights-skeptic would be to shoot him. If there are no rights, as he maintains, then he cannot object to being shot. So, presumably, any rights-skeptic would change his position and admit there were rights (if only so as to be able to object to being shot), or we would soon have no more rights-skeptics left alive to give us rights-advocates any trouble.
This should read a negative rights-skeptic, and I think this would help clarify the opposition much better. If one is insistint on ignoring consequentialist arguments, perhaps a more teleological “virtue ethics” would probably be a better way to go about the morality business. Rights seem to be one of those curious things that started with the Reformation and are now one of the many things that essentially evolved to Protestant Secularism.
Very interesting points Dr. Kinsella. I believe Wilderness and I have been stating a proto form of this argument on the boards here. If morality [ the code of conduct for humanity, ie. natural rights ] is utterly subjective then what will naturally evolve is merely a world of pseudo ‘might makes right’. Say I greet people by punching them in the face. An odd quirk but I walk up to person B and greet them in my face punching manner. If morality is completely subjective then what I just did to them is perhaps wrong to them but right for me. Why must I stop punching people in the face if it pleases me? It quickly becomes a constant battle of me either gaining the ability to punch person B in the face or person B using some form of offensive or defensive coercion against me. The winner of this ‘duel’ is the individual who has the greater amount or ability of coercion. Thus a form of ‘might makes right’ assumes.
For the rights skeptic this is true, just as certain types of music may be annoying according to their subjective evaluation so might your coercion. In fact, from the perspective of the rights skeptic that’s the only valid reason there is disliking certain things. Since rights skepticism should be the initial position and because the burden of proof is on you, I don’t think the argument establishes what you want it to.
In fact, it doesn’t get you there. You’re assuming various forms of property ownership etc. are legitimate from the go.
Which forms?
Stephan is using the same sort of argumentation Hoppe does. Performative contradiction.
Your argument is based on a sort of aesthetics.