Against Rights-Skepticism

[Lilburne]

@nskinsella

Obviously, “it’s annoying” is not a good reason in argumentation, since anyone could simply verbally decree any other proposition to be “annoying.” GilesStratton/universalizability FAIL.

Hi Stephan,

Thanks for all your great work (especially your paradigm-shifting work on intellectual property and excellent criticisms of left-libertarianism).

I must disagree with you on meta-ethics however. I don’t think purely rational argumentation is necessarily the be-all for ethical relations.

“It’s annoying” might be a bit weak. But “I don’t deserve to be shot” makes perfect sense in a paradigm of inter-subjective ethics. What determines “deserving of being shot” is for the human psyche a matter of the heart and not the mind. A potential murderer may very well feel deep down inside that his potential victim doesn’t deserve to be shot. But his conscience may for a time be overridden by his bloodlust. A potential victim who objects does not try to “refute” the potential murderer’s right to kill him by some legal argument. He tries to invoke the potential murderer’s temporarily submerged sense decency.

[Lilburne]

@Laughing Man

Very interesting points Dr. Kinsella. I believe Wilderness and I have been stating a proto form of this argument on the boards here. If morality [ the code of conduct for humanity, ie. natural rights ] is utterly subjective then what will naturally evolve is merely a world of pseudo ‘might makes right’. Say I greet people by punching them in the face. An odd quirk but I walk up to person B and greet them in my face punching manner. If morality is completely subjective then what I just did to them is perhaps wrong to them but right for me. Why must I stop punching people in the face if it pleases me? It quickly becomes a constant battle of me either gaining the ability to punch person B in the face or person B using some form of offensive or defensive coercion against me. The winner of this ‘duel’ is the individual who has the greater amount or ability of coercion. Thus a form of ‘might makes right’ assumes.

Even if what you say were true (which I don’t believe), argumentum ad consequentiam is no basis for the epistemology of ethics.

Or are you trying to get people to accept a Platonic “noble lie”?

[nirgrahamUK]

@Lilburne

decency.

i dont think you can appeal to decency without falling into the stolen concept fallacy.

[Lilburne]

@AJ

Kinsella starts with the notion of legitimacy (presumably, “objective” rightness or wrongness), then instead of sticking with that word he for some reason switches to justifiable and just/unjust. Now we can only assume he still means objective rightness/wrongness when he says just/unjust. But this clarification does not jive well with his challenge:

@Kinsella

But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?

Plugging in from above, the reader can scarcely be faulted for interpreting this as, “But if there is no objectively wrong use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?” This is no challenge for anyone who does not accept the notion of objective ethics. Kinsella implicitly assumes objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, when that is precisely the underlying issue.

He again assumes objective rightness and wrongness with his usage of the word object (verb):

@Kinsella

If there are no rights, as he maintains, then he cannot object to being shot.

Since when did objecting require the implicit assumption of objective (a priori) right and wrong? For Kinsella’s purposes, “object” has to mean something other than merely demanding not to be shot and/or providing reasons why pulling the trigger would have consequences the shooter would probably not desire. For Kinsella’s purposes only objections appealing to objective moral truths count as objections, but anyone who rejects the notion of objective moral truth would reject this narrow definition.

In short, Kinsella’s critique presupposes the existence of objective or a priori moral truth, which is itself the hardest-to-swallow aspect of natural rights theories. If he wishes to defend natural rights, he would do better to try to defend - or even just clearly define - the underlying concept of objective or a priori ethics he takes as given here.

This.

[Lilburne]

I’m not referring to some objective/cosmic decency. I’m referring to an individual’s inner sense of right and wrong, which, because of our similar pscyches, tend to agree, whether we abide by that inner sense or not.

[nirgrahamUK]

i think you confuse an inner sense of right and wrong (which supposedly bears no relation to the non-existant concepts of right and wrong) with an inner sense of like and dislike.

[Lilburne]

@nskinsella

@liberty student

Yeah, but GAP has a point. Kinsella’s argumentation works, as long as some basic premises are already in place. This style of argumentation doesn’t prove objective rights, it only proves rights, when both parties agree that some sort of rights exist.

Which is enough. How could more be expeced of an argument? Should it appeal even to a criminal determined to harm you? Even the best argument conceivable is not self-executable.

How is it enough if it presupposes something (the existence of any sort of rights outside of subjective valuations) that the rights skeptic may very well deny?

[Lilburne]

@nirgrahamUK

i think you confuse an inner sense of right and wrong (which supposedly bears no relation to the non-existant concepts of right and wrong) with an inner sense of like and dislike.

That inner sense does bear no relation to non-existent concepts of right and wrong outside of subjective valuation. There are no Stolen Concepts implied in that.

How am I confusing those two senses?

[nirgrahamUK]

sorry, i did not phrase well. i meant that i cant understand the words right and wrong when they are divorced from objective notions.

the closest i can get is to suppose that you are telling me about your preferences, what you like and dislike and that you have no sense of right and wrong, (which would be a sense of what is objectively right or wrong)

[Lilburne]

@nirgrahamUK

i meant that i cant understand the words right and wrong when they are divorced from objective notions.

Can you understand the words “beautiful” and “ugly” when they are divorced from objective notions?

@nirgrahamUK

no sense of right and wrong, (which would be a sense of what is objectively right or wrong)

You can’t win an argument by trying to define the other person’s position out of existence.

[nirgrahamUK]

@Lilburne

Can you understand the words “beautiful” and “ugly” when they are divorced from objective notions?

yes. can you understand the words ‘true and false’ when they are divorced from objective notions?

@Lilburne

You can’t win an argument by trying to define the other person’s position out of existence.

i was explaining what i could and couldnt do. i wasnt ‘winning’

[Lilburne]

@nirgrahamUK

yes. can you understand the words ‘true and false’ when they are divorced from objective notions?

It is true that I deem J.S. Bach’s music beautiful and the bombing of Dresden evil. That is an objective recognition of subjective valuations.

[Juan]

’

You can’t win an argument by trying to define the other person’s position out of existence.

Except when the other person’s position is just skeptical fantasy.

[wilderness]

@Lilburne

That is an objective recognition of subjective valuations.

maybe you’re able to be lucid now? don’t know I’ll see.

[nirgrahamUK]

@Lilburne

@nirgrahamUK

yes. can you understand the words ‘true and false’ when they are divorced from objective notions?

It is true that I deem J.S. Bach’s music beautiful and the bombing of Dresden evil. That is an objective recognition of subjective valuations.

yes, but try saying that there is no truth about what exists and what does not, but only truth in what exists to you subjectively. if you find that hard to do, that should allow you to at least sympathise with me as i struggle to comprehend how right and wrong might be severed from objectivity.

[Lilburne]

@wilderness

maybe you’re able to be lucid now? don’t know I’ll see.

This from Mr. Stream of Consciousness.

[wilderness]

Are you name-calling? Are you getting over-emotional that quickly? Any rational person would be able to discuss before name-calling beastly mannerisms.

edit: whether intentional or not I find it name calling cause I don’t go by that name. not decent. not decent at all of you. and obviously you answered my question. you are not lucid.

[Knight_of_BAAWA]

@Knight_of_BAAWA

So what? I could dislike your disliking. Now what do you do?

@GilesStratton

Whatever my subjective preferences dictate

And where will that get you? What do you open yourself up to?

@GilesStratton

what sort of a question is that?

A valid one.

@GilesStratton

Since rights skepticism should be the initial position

@Knight_of_BAAWA

Justify that

@GilesStratton

Are you actually denying that the burden of proof is one the one claiming rights exist.

Are you actually suggesting that the burden of proof is on the one who asks to not have force initiated against?

[I_Ryan]

@Lilburne

argumentum ad consequentiam is no basis for the epistemology of ethics.

Why?

[Lilburne]

@I. Ryan

@Lilburne

argumentum ad consequentiam is no basis for the epistemology of ethics.

Why?

Whether the existence of something would be fortuitous for a happy society or not has no bearing on whether it actually exists or not.