Part 1: The issue
Some though question are posed time after time to us anarchists. Some have been answered, unsatisfactorily according to myself. A fuller answer is what I’ll try to provide here.
*How could anarchistic be conquered by the statists Britons if anarchy is so much superior to statism?
*Why wasn’t in the middle ages the most advanced society in ?
*Why , which if not anarchy, is at the very least a community of competing and non-territorial States, is the poorest area of , while the statist north is richer?
*, in a mere 20 years, managed to do this:
Likewise Hong-Kong has grown, form a village to a world-class city in less than 30 years. Yet anarchistic in 20 years has managed to go form bad to slightly less bad, and is still regarded as dirt-poor. Why development, although clearly there, is so contained?
But by far most importantly,
*How could the first States conquer vast territories living under anarchy, if anarchy is so superior?
These are important questions, which transcend the realm of economical praxeology and begin to mount into political economics.
To start understanding what possible answers could there be, we must begin by facing a simple but overlooked truth: every society we know to have been anarchistic has been a tribal society, the very first kind of human society. Recently this thread came up with an important question: do the economics of humanity at its tribal stage differ from our own? I believe that an answer to that question can imply so much for the debate above. I here present a theory I’ve formed recently. The theory is still only a few days old, but I believe it makes some sense. The post is long, but the issue at hand well deserves a good analysis.
Part 2: The clues
I recently fell in love with my own country’s tribal societies, ’s highlanders. Among these tribes, organized in villages, no State has ever risen and no foreigner has ever succeeded in setting up one. The very concept of a state is alien to these people, and I regard them as the most convinced anarchists alive today. The community functions by a set of norms known as the Kanuni, a blindingly complex but logical set of rules. Allow me to forward a description of such a society, along with a few big questions that such tribes pose. I believe that the basic structure of this society is universally valid for every human society at that stage of development, form native Americans, to anarchists and , even modern-day , and most of sub-Saharan . Let us begin.
1) Property. Albanian tribes live of agriculture and, more importantly, herding. This would make land, both arable and pasture, by far the most important asset. Yet, the curious thing is that land is never privately held. It is either held by the family as a whole (arable land), or by the village as a whole (pastures). It the thread I linked it has been said here that communal property emerges when assets are abundant, as air, and need not be economized. This is not the case here. Pastures are not overabundant by any standard, as many a feuds between families has erupted precisely over herding times__. How is it than, that this property is not private? (Clue #1)__
Yet more puzzling, the societal norms regulating the sale of arable land are quite clear: land is in no case to be sold to outsiders, while selling to villagers is allowed, yet rare. Pastoral land is never sold, and at most can be rented away to other villages, not Outsiders. Why this strictures? (Clue #2).
Almost everything else, besides land, is held by the family. The only exception are personal effects, property of individuals, and weapons, again individual property. How is it than, hat although private property is known, most assets are held by some sort on unbreakable community (family, in most cases)? (clue #3)
2) Trade and division of labor. The division of labor is almost inexistent beyond the family. Every family is supposed to provide for its own food, works its own land, graze its own herd, build it’s own house, shortly do everything at all by itself. Trade within the village is non-existent. The very same goes for inta-village trade. Why don’t these communities trade among themselves? (Clue #4)
Trade in general, with the “outside world” does exist, but is set at a minimum. Some surplus meat might be sold in nearby cities, every now and than, and single-time purchases, as working tools and of course weapons might be made. Why don’t these communities trade extensively with developed cities, although they well know trade? (Clue #5)
3) Savings. It would be easy for the villagers to “save”. All they’d have to do is expand the irrigations networks in arable lands (they already use irrigation), or expand their herds. It is clear that should such savings be implemented, the average standard of living would be much improved. So, why is it that no such improvements are actuated? (Clue #6)
4) The law. The Kanuni is the embodiment, in nature, not in norms, of what one would except form norms developed under anarchy. It is decentralized, no one promulgated it or has the power to change it arbitrarily. It is clear, logical to remember, unwritten, defers (sometime substantially) among different villages. It can be changed by the elders of the village, or applied with increased severity or leniency, according to the situation. It contains no provision for jail-time, but metes out punishments of (in increasing severity): social dishonor, monetary payment (the crushing majority of times), ousting form the community and, in extremis, execution. When execution is allowed, there’s no executioner: only the offended party may proceed. There’s no single judge, police force, appeal. Decisions are taken by elders and are subjected to the opinion of all. The parties are free to disagree with the sentence, but this rarely happens. Sentences loose value if one party leaves the village, and are unenforceable outside the village borders.
It must be said that most norms are clearly designed to minimize violence, and that such violence in practice often arises form contest regarding pastures or the division of property when a family separates. (Clue #7)
Part 3: The theory
Let’s recapitulate the clues we collected.
i)scarce means of production are held communally, with no opt-out or transfer clauses possible.
ii) the sale of the most important asset, land, in strictly regulated: outsiders can never rent or buy it, guys from other villages can only rent it, and only villagers can buy arable land under certain conditions.
iii) Consumption goods are individually owned.
iv) the division of labor within the community is inexistent.
v) trade with nearby cities is practiced on minimal levels.
vi) saving is possible, but no labor-saving measure is implemented
vii) law specifically designed to check violence arising out of property-related contents.
Now, we know that if there’s no divison of labor, there should be no society at all in here, just a war of all-against-all. Still, communities are not only existent, but share a common world-view to the extent that no law-enforcing agency has ever been created: everyone just understands and accepts the law. How can we reconcile this with what we know form Mises?
And more importantly, it is patently clear that the low standard of living of these communities could be easily improved. Free-time is abundant, and most of the day is ozzed away. Yet saving is not implemented.
Even the division of labor, both within the village and with the outside world, if implemented, could massively increase everyone’s wellbeing, with no need to save at all. No “inter-village” wars happen, so trade could flow unhampered. Why do such simple yet vital reform remain unimplemented?
Finally, how could scarce property, pastures, be held communally with no opt-outs, if so many cases of property-related violence arise? Why selling and renting are so strictly regulated? No-one stands to gain form such norms.
Clearly, such a society is impossible under praxeological theory. But praxeologic logic can’t be wronk. Hence, we must check out the assumptions.
Mises made assumptions when erecting the building of praxeology, assumptions that seem perfectly sensible. Positive time-preferences, non-utility of work, human action and longing for a better life. Making such assumptions we’d end up with the economic and social dynamics that Austrian scholars often point out. But perhaps, people have not always wanted a better life.
As strange as it might seem, it’s not unconceivable. After all, after a human has satisfied his most immediate biological needs to survive (food, clothing, shelter, reproduction) the doors of the future lie wide open to him. He is now free to do what he like with whatever spare time and energies he has. Should he seek still more food, a better shelter, faster reproduction rate, or should he proceed to enjoy his pare time? We know this choice will be made according to individual preference scales.
But assuming that an improvement in material life is everybody’s preference would not appear clear from here. Au contraire, most animals after quenching their thirst just waste away their spare time. Whenever they’re not hunting, drinking, fighting intruders, asserting themselves in the herd, lions just sleep. They do nothing at all. And if we must have come form the animal kingdom it would only appear possible that we too might display such a tendency. At the very least, it would be more probable than to assume that further material wants would be what we’d long for.
Now assume you live in a social system that faithfully translates your preferences into action, i.e. anarchy. All you want is to survive and have a minimum level of comfort, and nothing else. Everyone who might want a better life is to be discouraged in pursuing it, as that would imply change in your society, and change you dislike. What norms would you come up with?
Well, to discourage a bettering of life conditions you must discourage savings (check), than you must discourage private property (check). Even what property is privately held, must be subject to strictures in transactions(check). Land-holding from outsiders should be absolutely forbidden(check), as that could induce massive changes in the community. Finally, although most people prefer a static life, not everybody might. As anyone wanting a better life will find himself arguing over the proper use of communal propriety, or the strict laws of sales. Thus, a comprehensive body of norms regulating violent clashes must be developed(check).
Such people bond together in small societies due to the need to fend of aggressors and/or deal with forces of nature. Society is also an insurance pool: when one family is facing hardships, others help. But such a society has no division-of-labor goal in mind, just ensuring the survival of all community members.
One must understand that, without doing away with the assumption that “people prefer more to less”, the practical structure of anarcho-communist tribes in inexplicable.
Part 4: The State
Now, it is safe to assume that people do not always share preferences. Even if in small communities most prefer a static existence, a few might long for more. Perhaps just a few more square meters of land, or just a few more hours of grazing time. Normally such people are held in check by the others who ostracize them if the status quo is challenged.
But assume that a single such individual in endowed with extraordinary leader skills and commes to lead the community when an outside raiding party attacks. He might receive a fee for doing so. If such outside attack persist, he will get a steady source of income.
Or else assume that it is an outside raiding party that is contracted to protect the community against more violent aggressors. The protection fee is paid and, since changes are disagreeable form most people, it shall likely remain a static fee. But if in the protecting party a man of exceptional leader skills and at the same time an uncommon need for more material wellbeing emerges, it shall not be long before he sees that even if the fee is increased, the protected community shall continue to pay it. After all they have no need for surplus product, and to them it makes almost no difference at all whether the protectors take form them more or less: as long as they survive, all is well. But thus the State is born: the monopoly provider of protection.
Yet, as long as most still prefer a static life to a bettering of life conditions, the State is seen as a natural thing. It bothers no one, it is almost a mutual-benefit agency. (this doesn’t mean that, if given the chance to do so cheaply, the community won’t overthrow the State, or that a State must, at each times, emerge)
When such a state expands no one offers a determined resistance. Even if they do, the Invader has an ace up his sleeve: his love form more over less has taught him to save, and the accumulation of capital he invest in increasing his capital yet again: he conquers. He is, shortly, far better equipped that whichever tribe is defending form his attack.
And than again those who, like him prefer more over less in the invaded tribe will certainly join his war, and undermine the defending tribe efforts from within. He is their only chance to live a life unhampered by the preferences of others. They become his vassals.
Yet, since we now know that rulers are set apart form the ruled because they do actually prefer more over less, this being their whole motivation, it would be sane to assume that the rulers ask for an ever-increasing tribute, pushing the population below substinence.
To avoid starvation, the population is forced to implement all the reforms they’ve so much disliked until now: they begin to trade more often in order to pay tributes, to appropriate for individual use plots of commonly held land, to work longer and save.
Thus, out of the thirst of the rulers for more tribute, they now start to feel themselves the need to produce more. At the beginning just to achieve a minimal living standard again, then more and more begin to prefer more to less per se. The division of labor, private property and saving thus begins to spread. Cities are born. The moment that the largest part of the population lives in cities, we can reasonably assume that in a society the majority has come to prefer more over less, and hence the Misesian analysis can be used.
Precisely these circumstances provided Mises with his “empirically visible” assumptions. But he was witnessing a process that had just begun, and mistakenly elevated it to an eternal characteristic of humans.
The dissolution of the state rests in the very factor that brought its rise: as more “tribute” is asked, more people come to appreciate material well-being. But those who prefer more over less do mind the state, a lot actually. As long as they can be bribed out of secession from the State, by democratizing and expanding civil service, things are good.
But when such people become too many to bribe, the end of the state is not far. I believe we’re very near that point. Western administrations have expanded as much as they can. Scantly more can be taxed form the few to give to the many. Almost everyone in western societies, and an increasing number of those living in the east, now longs for a better life. The end, the triumph of the “economic means” over the ”political means” is near.
Thus every tribal society until now ahs seeked a static existence. Only a few in , , ancient villages, northern and actually try to improve their lives beyond mere survival. The only society of people that long for material well-being, and are free to pursue this end, is the society of Politicians, Business leaders and high-time Mobsters. As long as the rest can be bribed into submission, the State will exist.
When not, the state will have served its purpose.