Are all deontological ethics inherently utilitarian?

Miscellaneous General
1

Are all deontological ethics inherently utilitarian? By this I mean: when presented with an “ought” command, isn’t the answer to why I ought to do anything ultimately a utilitarian argument?

So if we take the near universal (maybe absolute?) ethical principal of “thou shalt not kill” or “you ought not murder,” the natural question should arise “why not?” Common answers might be that God said you shouldn’t, or it is against man’s nature, or that the repercussions would be bad (karma, the law, etc.). Already we have run into one utilitarian argument–“Don’t murder if you don’t want bad karma, or end up in jail, etc.” But the god or natural law responses once again trigger another question: why ought I do what god commands? Why ought I act according to my nature?

Even though these ethical prescriptions are deontological in description, they are utilitarian in the realm of human action. The ethical man acts as such because he believes it will remove current discomfort or avoid future discomfort. The “why” behind the “ought” never even needs to be discovered because we know action is always aimed at an end, that ex ante the actor must necessarily believe that he will be better off acting “ethical” than acting contrary.

(Criticisms? Comments?)

2

Yes, exactly. Note that some would call this consequentialism, rather than utilitarianism, because there have been many kinds of utilitarianism historically. Another way to designate it more clearly is to call it Misesean utilitarianism or Mises’s utilitarianism. I just call it “obvious,” but apparently it isn’t to everyone.

But also, nice insight in the final sentence: praxeology dictates that all attempts to follow a deontology are, necessarily, ultimately utilitarian/consequentialist (since every action is aimed at achieving a better state of affairs). This does not mean we cannot have moral codes, but it does mean that everyone is ultimately a utilitarian in the Misesean sense, whether they use the term or not.

3

Yes, ultimately deontology is based on utility, unless you are saying the rules come from God*. But there is a big difference between having fixed ethical rules that are based on utility and improvised utilitarian (consequentialist) decision making. The latter is always prone to relativism; in the situation where you want something bad/immoral it is easy to come up with a rationale why it is a good idea. That’s because our judgment of how much utility an action provides is highly subjective and warped by what we want at the moment. That is based on biology: Water is very valuable when you’re thirsty, shelter is very valuable when you’re cold. Therefore, something we want at the moment will always be justifiable on utilitarian grounds. So consequentialism often means doing whatever you feel like. In a way that’s the problem with the left, they are always trading immediate destruction off against some fictional future good. I see deontology is like a constitution of utilitarian rules; you make up those rules for utilitarian reasons, but by having fixed rules you actually follow them. Consequentialist ethics amount to having no ethics. That’s how I see it.

*In that case the only utilitarian rule a person has to accept is that it is good to follow Gods rules, and bad not to do so. Which is why monotheism is based on the notion of free will and generally has a libertarian influence.

4

I think claiming that deontological ethics are inherently utilitarian is putting the cart before the horse. While following a given deontological ethical code can be explained in utilitarian terms, holding that code over any other cannot be. Saying that “I follow X because I would feel bad if I didn’t” doesn’t answer the question of why you would feel bad if you didn’t follow it.

Ultimately, just as we have instincts for hunger and thirst, I think we have instincts for certain moral precepts. These instincts precede reason and therefore precede action.

5

AJ,

Thanks for the input. I definately meant Misesian Ultilitarianism.

Nero,

I believe that the difference is illusory and exists mostly in description but not reality. Even the most pious and devout will err from their moral code and when they do, it is because they believed that it would make them better off (in some way) than they would have been if they didn’t act that way.

6

Yes.

Morality is that set of principles of action that state that you cannot hurt other agents, or their property, who participate in society; for doing so must be detrimental to society.

From: Morality, From a Societal Perspective

7

“Are all deontological ethics inherently utilitarian?”

Nope. And I’d infact suggest the exact opposite. (This is just for libertarianism btw… so if you’re not indirectly referring to that - I apologise).

"For if myself and the retailer are indeed to be free to trade the dollar for the hula hoop without coercive interference by third parties, then this can only be done if these economists will proclaim the justice and the propriety of my original ownership of the dollar and the retailer’s ownership of the hula hoop.

In short, for an economist to say that X and Y should be free to trade Good A for Good B unmolested by third parties, he must also say that X legitimately and properly owns Good A and that Y legitimately owns Good B. But this means that the freemarket economist must have some sort of theory of justice in property rights; he can scarcely say that X properly owns Good A without asserting some sort of theory of justice on behalf of such ownership.

Suppose, for example, that as I am about to purchase the hula hoop, the information arrives that the retailer had really stolen the hoop from Z. Surely not even the supposedly wertfrei economist can continue to blithely endorse the proposed exchange of ownership titles between myself and the retailer. For now we find that the retailer’s, Y’s, title of ownership is improper and unjust, and that he must be forced to return the hoop to Z, the original owner. The economist can then only endorse the proposed exchange between myself and Z, rather than Y, for the hula hoop, since he has to acknowledge Z as the proper owner of title to the hoop.

In short, we have two mutually exclusive claimants to the ownership of the hoop. If the economist agrees to endorse only Z’s sale of the hoop, then he is implicitly agreeing that Z has the just, and Y the unjust, claim to the hoop. And even if he continues to endorse the sale by Y, then he is implicitly maintaining another theory of property titles: namely, that theft is justified. Whichever way he decides, the economist cannot escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property. Furthermore, the economist is not really finished when he proclaims the injustice or theft and endorses Z’s proper title. For what is the justification for Z’s title to the hoop? Is it only because he is a nonthief?" - Justice and Property Rights, Egalitarianism a Revolt Against Nature

“If an economist does not have an ethical system, but only subjective and arbitrary values, then it is incumbent upon him as a scientist ruthlessly to keep them out of his work. In short, the economist who lacks an ethical system must refrain from any and all value-loaded or political conclusions. (This statement, of course, is itself a value judgment stemming from an ethical system which holds that science must confine itself strictly to the search for, and the exposition of, truth.)” ~ Value judgments, Praxeology, and Public Policy

“By this I mean: when presented with an “ought” command, isn’t the answer to why I ought to do anything ultimately a utilitarian argument?”

Libertarianism is meta-normative. It deals with rights not “oughts” or “shoulds”.

"We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for “Smith” - the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat - to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5] ~ Lifeboat scenario - Rothbard

8

Libertarianism is derived from a deontological normative ethical system.

9

“Libertarianism is derived from a deontological normative ethical system.”

Libertarianism is different from other normative ethical systems in that it doesn’t say what you “ought” or “should” do - only what you have a right to do. What actions are justified & what are not. It remains within the political philosophical sphere, it is not a world view. A libertarian qua libertarian has nothing to say in terms of personal ethical questions.

"I’ll extend this quote with the example, so you can see it’s application. An it outlines the concept better.

"The error here on the part of the “…” libertarians is to confuse the question of the moral course of action for the person in such a tragic situation with the totally separate question of whether or not his seizing of lifeboat or plank space by force constitutes an invasion of someone else’s property right. For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not here with concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for “Smith” — the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat — to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.

The crucial point is that even if the “…” libertarian may say that, given the tragic context, Smith should throw someone else out of the lifeboat to save his own life, he is still committing, at the very least, invasion of property rights, and probably also murder of the person thrown out. So that even if one says that he should try to save his life by forcibly grabbing a seat in the lifeboat, he is still, in our view, liable to prosecution as a criminal invader of property right, and perhaps as a murderer as well. After he is convicted, it would be the right of the lifeboat owner or the heir of the person tossed out to forgive Smith, to pardon him because of the unusual circumstances; but it would also be their right not to pardon and to proceed with the full force of their legal right to punish.

Once again, we are concerned in this theory with the rights of the case, not with whether or not a person chooses voluntarily to exercise his rights. In our view, the property owner or the heir of the killed would have a right to prosecute and to exact proper punishment upon the aggressor. The fallacy of the “…” is to confuse considerations of individual, personal morality (what should Smith do?) with the question of the rights of the case. The right of property continues, then, to be absolute, even in the tragic lifeboat situation…

To sum up the application of our theory to extreme situations: if a man aggresses against another’s person or property to save his own life, he may or may not be acting morally in so doing. That is none of our particular concern in this work. Regardless of whether his action is moral or immoral, by any criterion, he is still a criminal aggressor against the property of another, and the victim is within his right to repel that aggression by force, and to prosecute the aggressor afterward for his crime."

~ MNR, TEOL CHp. 20

And here is Block who agrees with Rothbard (also known as Mr. Libertarian):

"Libertarianism is limited to political philosophy; it does not include [personal] ethics. It takes no view whatsoever as to the moralitv of pornography, prostitution, homosexuality, gambling, drugs, etc. It states only that, given that these acts take place between consenting adults, they should not be proscribed by law. When prohibited they are victimless crimes, and thus should be legalized [decriminalized].

…

“Even more narrowly, libertarianism may properly be construed solely as a theory of punishment. If someone uses coercion, then it is proper to utilize physical force against him, with the goal of rectifying the injustice, compensating the victim, as much as possible7. A side order claim of libertarianism, something not intrinsic to it, is that it will in some sense lead to the ''greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” In other words, this philosophy claims a compatibility with utilitarianism. But not a direct one. Were libertarianism a mere branch of utilitarianism, it would ask of every contemplated action in order to determine its legitimacy, not whether it constitutes an invasion of person or property, but rather whether it will maximize utility’. That there is nevertheless an important connection is a pretty reasonable claim."

So essentially, if you don’t want to get punished - then you probably shouldn’t violate my rights. This isn’t being said libertarian qua libertarian though. You can choose to violate them, libertarianism says nothing about that - only that you have a right to be punished & the use of violence in doing so would be justified.

Rothbard’s libertarianism is a form of axiomatic-deductive objective ethics which shows the praxeological absurdity of the alternatives.

In the same vein but from a different starting point:

"Here the praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought” from an “is.” ~ Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p345.

“My entire argument, then, claims to be an impossibility proof. But not, as the mentioned critics seem to think, a proof that means to show the impossibility of certain empirical events, so that it could be refuted by empirical evidence [such as the existence of non-libertarian societies-RPM and GC]. Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to justify non-libertarian property principles without falling into contradictions . . . empirical evidence has absolutely no bearing on it.” (Hoppe 1988, p. 53)

10

Just a small point: the fact that there are more kinds of utilitarianism is not the reason people call it consequentialism. Actually, utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism. Consequentialists ethics looks at the consequences of an action, not the action in itself. When the utilitarians look at an action they look at the consequences of an action based on which one brings the most happiness to most involved parties. Hedonism is also a type of consequentialism.

And to answer OP, The difference is that utilitarianism look at the consequences of an action and deontological ethics look at the action in itself. Deontological ethics may justify their beliefs based on utility, but the justification of an ethic is called meta-ethics. So no, deontological ethics isn’t utilitarian, but their justification can be based on utility.

11

Libertarianism is different from other normative ethical systems in that it doesn’t say what you “ought” or “should” do - only what you have a right to do.

Just to clarify, you surely meant liberty right, not claim right, as the latter creates obligation, while the former does not (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claim_rights_and_liberty_rights). I personally prefer to use words like “liberty” or “free” when discussing liberty rights. E.g., “only what you have a liberty to do” or “only what you are free to do”.

Otherwise, +1.