Are Deontologists confused?

I’m wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially. If you have certain things that are your duty to perform regardless of the consequences, you must at some point have differentiated what is “duty.” Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?

Because God said so.

Twisted:

In other words, at some point, wasn’t there a reason given or arrived at in terms of consequences, why one performs one’s duty?

I.e., either: If you do not do your duty, then X negative consequence will occur. Or, if you do your duty, X positive consequence will occur?

This point has been made before, but is a valid (and effective) criticism of secular deontology.

Well I guess the god issue could muddy up the water. Effectively I guess deontology must be an appeal to authority otherwise it is just consequentialism.

Yea, exactly.

The only system-builder I know among living philosophers to attempt to deal with this question is Butchvarov. He says his goal is to provide ethics for atheists. I can’t do justice to his ideas, but you might consider looking at his books.

Yes, of course! People who support individual rights believe, for instance, that the ‘consequence’ of firebombing cities is that people in those cities die. So supporters of individual rights tend to frown upon firebombing…because of the ‘consequences’ of the action…

OK perhaps I am missing something but really the point is that you are not looking at consequence, ultimately. Let me tweak the scenario slightly. Lets say that I can kill one innocent man to prevent the fire bombing of one million. Lets also suppose I am a deontologist so I will follow my “duty” and NOT commit this murder. One million perish. The “consequence” of my (in)action is greater because I have acted out of duty (and not out of consequences). Obviously the consequentialist will murder the one innocent man to save the one million. Now, if my sense of duty is derived from consequences , then how can the difference in outcomes in this scenario between the deontologist and consequentialist be reconciled?

Its not. Its derived from actions in and of themselves.

Not many people are strict deontologists.

You don’t kill people on principle, no matter what. Not even if you are being threatened by nuclear annihilation. If everyone dies because you didn’t kill bobby, you didn’t do anything wrong by deontologic standards. For one reason or another, you can’t be held accountable for the consequences of your actions and/or the consequences don’t matter at all/as much as the action in and of itself.

Its kind of hard to talk about deontology without a specific deontologic moral theory (like the categorical imperative), since the justifications for the CI are very specific and esoteric, hence all the slashes above.

Yeah I would venture to say that no one is a deontologist anymore.

The point being that deontology requires an external obligation or duty. This is essentially an appeal to authority (God, Nature, whatever) hence why secular deontologists are committing an intellectual error. A moral fictionalist who follows the NAP is still a consequentialist because he is choosing the moral framework (NAP) based on whatever criteria suits him, but not as an obligation external to him. Strict Rule Utilitarianism can be seen as deontological moral fictionalism.

Categorical Imperative. Unless you count pure rationalism as “nature”.

the king of the skeptics is still preaching ?

The Categorical Imperative is begging the question. Yes, if there is an action that is always and everywhere necessary (for what end? Why?) that is an end in and of itself then it can be construed as a duty. Of course, Kant was never able (in my mind) to formulate a single cogent example. He developed a system of meta-ethics (his Categorical Imperative) that has no relation to the secular world-view.

One question:

What is an end in itself? Why? If justified by a further value, it is no longer an end in and of itself. If it isn’t justified by a further value, then what? If nothing, it is an unjustified premise and nothing more; if circular, it loses its validity.

The king of quack philosophy still trolling?

Can you define “duty” ?

Thanks.

What question?

Wiki “According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: “It is permissible to steal” would result in a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself.”

Why not?

Its not that I’m a kantian, or a deontologist, I just think the NAP is a very strongly deontological.

To avoid contradictions (negative consequence X), do not act by such and such maxim (do not engage in action Y).

In order to achieve a logical contradiction (desired consequence X), act by such and such maxim (engage in action Y).

OP:

“Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?”

(also, propositions do not act. Thus, they cannot negate themselves)

The Categorical Imperative postulates that universality is a moral obligation, that specific characteristics do not enter into the equation. One, this is an unwarranted assertion. It is a normative claim regarding rationality that, although commonly, perhaps universally accepted, is still logically unjustified.

Secondly, any statement or proposition can be framed to meet the criteria of universality.

IE “All Caucasian males above the age of 20 with the username zefreak including a certain genetic makeup and combination of bodily features can own property”

It is arbitrary in the same way, albeit to a greater degree, as the “first use principle” that Kinsella proposes. Why isn’t the “second” user or “third” user the legitimate owner of property? Because of practical difficulties. Social institutions from law to morals are subject to evolutionary processes just like everything else.

This is not a good example of a Categorical Imperative (although it is persuasive to those that don’t know better). It is a logical contradiction, but does not actually clarify anything.

If stealing is defined as the immoral (illegitimate) use or possession of an object, then of course it is a contradiction to say that stealing is moral.

Of course, this does not exclude me from taking your car and claiming that it is not stealing or theft because it has not been shown that my possession is immoral, nor that your possession signified exclusive use.

In other words, he is framing the issue in language that results in a logical contradiction based on definitions alone, but this does not actually restrict any action. There is no logical contradiction in the proposition “It is permissible to possess and use material that was or is currently possessed or used by another”.

I hope I have given you an idea of why I find the Categorical Imperative to be problematic. I have not run into an example of a Categorical Imperative that can actually hold its own under critical scrutiny. It may be a logically consistent theory, but without the existence of “ends within themselves” it has no relevance.

Right, justificationism is normative philosophy in itself. People may like to be logical but it has certainly not been shown to be a moral obligation.