Well yes I agree that there is nothing special about rationalism that it might have the power to bestow objective moral goodness on whoever uses it, but Kant was saying that if something is right in one circumstance it had to be right in other circumstances otherwise it wouldn’t be objectively ethical.
Imo, this begins by assuming that ethics has to be objective. Maybe this is kant’s definition of ethics. But using that particular definition doesn’t mean anything. Objective ethics might by an oxymoron, might not make sense, etc etc.
Any action can be made to be universal by being really, really specific. Universability cannot be used to critique any action or position, even if one agrees with the principle. All it means is that any particular action, in a particular place and moment and circumstance, if moral, will always be moral. You cannot logically extrapolate that such action is or must be moral in other places, moments or circumstances.
No relevance to the secular world-view, which I consider largely synonymous with Occam’s Razor and skepticism.
Justificationism. I haven’t heard that before. Is that your term Zefreak?
I would probably hold that justificationism (if we’re talking about the same thing), ultimately collapses into utilitarianism (consequentialism, instrumentalism, etc…)
One could argue that this approach is based on an initial separation of the thought realm from the physical realm. The idea of contradiction then perhaps being conceived as something happening in the thought realm, and thus, not a “consequence” in the physical sense. (i.e., the idea that “consequences” are things that happen out there in the physical realm) Thus, when justificationism speaks about someone contradicting themselves, by this view, this isn’t consequentialism, because “consequences” are physical things (external things) whereas contradictions are mental things…
But consequentialism is introduced when we provide instructions on how to avoid a contradiction, regardless of whether a contradiction is conceived to be physical, mental, or something else. The “justification” ethics theories I am familiar with are theories on how to avoid contradictions. They are utilitarian or instrumental constructs that instruct libertarians on how to avoid contradicting themselves, with the obvious but usually implicit notion that contradictions are negative consequences.
It is not my term, although it has probably fallen out of use, and should not be confused with the justificationism of logical positivism which is a theory of justification. I used it loosely to describe an individual who is interested or involved in the normative side of epistemology, or Theory of Justification.
I would agree with you that justificationism ultimately collapses into consequentialism, as do all normative propositions.
Well its not actions actually… An action is something that you do, like driving a car or blowing your nose. Kant said to act with universal maxim, which is not an action in and of itself but rather a category of actions. So telling the truth is a maxim that encompasses many actions such as “the sky is blue” and “I cheated on my test”.
You don’t universalize actions, that would be stupid. Its maxims, the general underlying principles you base your ethics on.
Why not? Isn’t this what objective ethics means?
Well the categorical imperative is pretty simple and based on rationalism, which would seem to meet the standards set forth by Occam’s Razor. Unless your skeptical about rationality then idk how you can have any problems with it.
I personally attack the CI on its assumptions about rationalism, and its use thereof. The definitions Kant uses to get from rationality to ethics are not tautologic and therefore arational.
I think this might be the answer to the question. Deontology is concerned with consequence, it is not concerned with circumstance. I’ll have to think about this.
Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo. Not the consequence of the action. Actions are categorized into Maxims! I explained all this above…
Example: Telling a lie is a maxim. An example “action” of this is saying that the sky is blue. The consequences don’t matter. The circumstance doesn’t matter.
It is concerned with neither. That’s why “Because god said so” is the best response to your post. It would mean that lying is bad in all circumstances and contexts, no exceptions, ever. Lying would always be bad no matter the consequence.
it seems “because god said so” also can confuse the issue as it had to be pointed out in this thread that it can be rationalized without appeal to a god. it seems to bring that quote back up devolves the thread (not the idea, the idea can be an evolvement, but the thread), instead of the evolving conversation/thread. i wouldn’t count out what has been said in each post
What differentiates an action from a maxim? Cannot any action be categorized as a maxim? If “telling the truth” is a maxim, why can’t “beating up the skinny kid on the playground” or “kidnapping people with red hair”? These can be construed as classes of action, as the former can be considered to encapsulate all actions regarding physical abuse of skinny kids on playgrounds.
I do not think the differentiation of “action” from “maxim” is very useful.
As for your response to my second part (i’m too tired to go through the work of quoting properly), I’ll give you an example. (BTW I love reason, in fact it is Hume’s critique of Kant’s ethics using reason that inspires me)
I shoot someone with red hair. (I do not have red hair). A naive Kantian might posit that “if you can shoot someone, then I can shoot you!”
However, that only holds if the ‘universality’ is very general, which it does not have to be. I could respond that “It would be wrong for you to shoot me, because red hair is a relevant particular of my universal principle. The action of my shooting the redhead is encapsulated by the maxim that it is ok to shoot redheads and passes the test of universability. It does not logically follow that the above maxim also justifies the shooting of me, as I do not have red hair”
The Categorical Imperative may be rational in the sense that its maxims are derived using reason (I still have not heard some such maxim that is ‘necessarily’ universal), but the whole structure of the Categorical Imperative is non-rational in nature. The universality principle is a foundational principle, and necessarily unjustified, just as libertarian ethics is largely derived, using reason, from the NAP and self ownership axioms. Rothbardian ethics is rational given the stated axioms, but the axioms themselves are unjustified (the status of said axioms being self-evident is another topic).
If a maxim can be of any specificity, then it is a worthless concept, indistinguishable from simply talking about action. Any specific action (me killing Colonel Mustard in the library with the candlestick) can be reasonably considered a class of action (all actions consisting of those attributes) and therefore a maxim. The concept gets us nowhere. If all (non-contradictory, see the “theft is morally ok” argument where the statement is logically contradictory) maxims are universal, then there is no progression towards an objective morality.
Because the latter two are actions. If you put them into their maxim categories it would be violence in both cases.
Well that’s what he does.
Shooting someone with red hair is not a maxim. Even if it were, and you had maxims for people with different colored hair, they would all be equivalent and you could just express them all under “don’t hurt people”.
So, “don’t hurt people with red hair” + “dont hurt ppl with blue hair” + sum[dont hurt people with hair type J] over all J = don’t hurt people → hair color has been eliminated because the maxim doesn’t depend on it.
Not if you’re trying to advance objective ethics. If you are, then the universality principle follows from the definition of objective ethics.
I’m not really a fan of ethics… I guess the only reason I’m participating in this discussion is because I hate it when people are wrong as much as I hate it when people are right for the wrong reasons.
There’s the category and then there is the action. Where the term/proposition fits into (what category) and then there’s the application. There’s the argument and then there’s the act without dialogue.
edit: I haven’t really studied category imperatives, but it seemed easy enough to understand what Snowflake said.
Is theft universally ok? We take from each other? When do I get to keep anything as everything is taken and I thereby possess nothing. So how can anybody steal from me when I never possess anything as it is ok to steal and not ok to have property? Universally speaking.
hope I didn’t mess up in my interpretation Snowflake.
Category requires a categorizor right? What is his method for categorizing actions if it is not some form of the consequence of performing those actions. If a category is random actions, then it can’t really be what is normally called a category. At least not a useful category in any way. Even the bible is not purely categorical, if it was it wouldn’t mention heaven and hell the consequences of disobedience and obedience to those rules.
By the way what happened to your completely deranged ‘opinion’ that everything is ultimately based of faith ? There was a trilemma, a quintilemma or something ?
Hah, we discussed it and then moved on. Do you want a link?
edit: Snowflake, I think you are missing my point, or we are using different definitions of objective ethics. I will respond to your post more thoroughly, but i’m going to play a game first. Priorities, you know
