I am currently reading David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom. On page 88 Friedman criticizes natural rights theory by saying “the usual statements of libertarian principle imply conclusions that almost nobody, libertarian or otherwise, believes in.” He gives an example of a situation that illustrates this:
Consider the following example. A madman is about to open fire on a crowd; if he does so numerous innocent people will die. The only way to prevent him is to shoot him with a rifle that is within reach of several members of the crowd. The rifle is on the private property of its legitimate owner. He is a well known misanthrope who has publicly stated on numerous occasions that he is opposed to letting anyone use his rifle without his permission, even if it would save hundreds of lives.
Two questions now arise. The first is whether members of the crowd have a right to take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman. The answer of libertarian rights theory, as I understand it, is no. The owner of the rifle is not responsible for the existence of the madman, and the fact that his rifle is, temporarily, of enormous value to other people does not give them a right to take it.
The second question is whether it is desirable that someone take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman—whether, to put it more personally, I wish that someone do so, or whether I would rather see the members of the crowd stand there and be shot down. The answer to this question seems equally unambiguous. If someone takes the rifle, there is a relatively minor violation of the legitimate rights of its owner; if no one does, there is a major violation of the legitimate rights (not to be killed) of a large number of victims— plus a substantial cost in human life and human pain. If asked which of these outcomes I would prefer to see, the answer is obviously the first.
This result is not, in any strict sense, paradoxical. An outcome may be desirable even though there is no morally legitimate way of achieving it. Indeed, this possibility is implied by the idea (due to Nozick) of viewing libertarian rights as ‘side constraints’ within which we seek to achieve some objective; the constraints would be irrelevant unless there were some circumstances in which we could better achieve the objective by ignoring them.
While not in any strict sense paradoxical, the result is, at least to me, an uncomfortable one. It puts me in the position of saying that I very much hope someone grabs the gun, but that I disapprove of whoever does so.
When libertarians debate questions of rights–or justice, or political morality, or political ethics, or whatever you want to call it–they are debating whether certain uses of physical force are legitimate–or rightful or non-aggressive or whatever you want to call it–uses of force or whether such uses of physical force are illegitimate–or rights-violating or aggressive–uses of force.
There is a different kind of morality (a non-political kind) that some people talk about that is distinct from the concept of justice.
David Friedman strongly desires to say that using the rifle to stop the madman from committing mass murder is a very “moral” thing to do in this non-political moral sense. Friedman feels uncomfortable saying that it is “moral” to perform this act because this act involves violating the rights of the rifle owner. He suggests that his non-political moral convictions about this situation make him reject the conclusion of libertarian principles that the use of the rifle owner’s rifle against his will is unjust.
I have felt uncomfortable calling certain “moral” actions l (i.e. certain actions that I strongly hope occur and that I believe will be “good” if they occur) unjust as well. I too have been hesitatant to accept the conclusions of libertarian principles in these extreme situations. I understand that it clear that it is unjust to take and use the rifle owner’s rifle against his will according to the libertarian principles, but I have not wanted to accept this because of my moral convictions that it would be “good” to do this to save all the people from the gunman. Rather, I have been more inclined to say that the libertarian principles are flawed, that they do not always lead to the correct conclusions about justice, and that some actions that are unjust according to libertarian principles may actually be justified in my opinion do to the wonderfully amazing consequences.
Recently (now) I am considering the possibility that actions can be both unjust and moral, just as actions can be both just and immoral.
I am perfectly okay with accepting that there are actions that are just and immoral, as are most people. For example, I have every right not to take care of my parents in their old age, yet I would also say that I have a non-political moral obligation to take care of them since they were so kind to me and deserve some reciprocal treatment from me. I am perfectly fine with saying that it would be just, yet immoral for me to be a jerk and not love and care for my parents in their old age. I think most people would agree with me: an action can be just yet immoral.
So why are Friedman and I uncomfortable with the opposite situation? Why are we not fine with saying that certain actions are unjust yet moral? Can an action be both unjust and moral? Can it be moral to use the rifle to stop the gunman, yet unjust to do so?
I am beginning to think the answer is yes. If the answer is yes, would that mean that someone could be a libertarian while maintaining (both in actions and words) that it is perfectly “okay” (non-politically moral) to murder people or commit other acts of aggression?
What does it mean to be a libertarian? Must a libertarian always be “opposed” to aggression? What does it mean to “oppose” aggression? Believing that aggression is unjust and wishing that aggression doesn’t occur are two different things. I think that libertarians must believe that aggression is unjust, but perhaps they need not necessarily believe that aggression should not occur.
Rather, a libertarian is someone who believes that there should be no legal possibility for aggression. A libertarian can believe that acts of aggression should occur. He just must also believe that those actions be punished by law. Is this a consistent view?
So perhaps Friedman and I can believe that someone should borrow the rifle owner’s gun to stop the madman and still be complete libertarians in the sense of accepting even this most “extreme” conclusion of libertarian principle. We can accomplish this by simultaneously believing that whoever violates the rights of the rifle owner by taking and using his gun without his permission should be punished by law. He should be made to pay restitution to the rifle owner or otherwise properly punished. Further, we must believe that the gun owner has the right to defend himself and his gun even though we believe that he should let the gun be used to stop the madman.
So yes, I think I do believe that certain actions are unjust yet moral. I do not have to reject certain conclusions of libertarian principle. I am perfectly fine with accepting that it is unjust to take the rifle owner’s rifle. Yet I still believe that someone should take his rifle to stop the madman. Any thoughts?
