David Osterfeld on natural rights

[whipitgood]

I stumbled, quite accidentally, upon one of his old JLS articles about natural rights. It seemed particularly insightful, and I could not find much to quarrel with. Has anyone read it, and if so, what do you think? Is he on to something here?

http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_5.pdf

[Amanojack]

Osterfeld is “on to something” in that he correctly points out what seems pretty obvious: natural rights have not been proven, and all attempts at proof so far have been invalid. He explains with a moderate amount of precision why this is so, and it may prove illuminating for readers who still think natural rights or natural law have been logically proven.

He then instead takes a emperico-logical approach to defending natural rights. Osterfeld is very pro-natural-rights, but he points out that the premises have not been proven. For example, he takes Rothbard’s syllogism:

@David Osterfeld

Since Rothbard argues that these two premises are prerequisite not only to man’s fulfillment of his nature, but to life itself, the Rothhardian natural rights ethic can be formulated as follows:

1. Self-ownership and property ownership are necessary means to sustain life.
2. Everyone values life more highly than death.
3. Hence, everyone ought to adopt the principles of self-ownership and property ownership.

Osterfeld says the premises 1 and 2 cannot be proven logically, but can be demonstrated emperically. He provides evidence for Premise 1, but falls short of making an emperical case to a scientific standard. Here is his support for Premise 1:

@David Osterfeld

Since the major premise is a factual statement asserting an indispensable or necessary causal connection between a particular goal, viz., life, and a particular set of means, viz., self-ownership and property ownership, the causal connection can be objectively examined and the truth of the claim ascertained. The thrust of Rothbard’s analysis lies in establishing the logical relationship between life and property rights, and in depicting the inevitable consequences of the violation of those rights.

Briefly, Rothbard has pointed out that if one denies the premise of man’s self-ownership then one must conclude that either “(1) a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B; or (2) everyone has a right to his equal quotal share of everyone else.” The first proposition is correctly dismissed since it violates the rules of formal logic. Since both group A and group B belong to the same class, “human beings,” they must possess the same essential characteristics of that class.

(1) does not violate any rules of logic as stated, and I trust the reader will note the error upon re-reading (if not, ask). Also, what if no one “owns” anyone? I can only be charitable and assume that Rothbard and Osterfeld might have meant, “‘No one being owned by anyone’ is a necessary means to sustain life.”

@David Osterfeld

Thus A cannot own both himself and B for that would negate B’s right of ownership. This means that one must either grant every individual’s right of self-ownership or adopt the second proposition that everyone has a right to an equal quotal share of everyone else. But the second proposition, as Rothbard notes, means that no one in the world could “take any action whatever without prior approval or indeed command by everyone else in society. It should be clear,” he continues, “that in that sort of ‘communist’ world, no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish.” And not only does Rothbard cogently establish this logical relationship…

We’ll take Osterfeld’s word on this and assume Rothbard does explain the possibility of no one owning anyone.

@David Osterfeld

…but there is considerable empirical support for it as well. The only concerted effort within a large society to abandon the principle of private ownership was in the “War Communism” period in the Soviet Union immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution. This effort was short-lived and was abandoned in early-1921 after the entire society had been brought to the verge of collapse and an estimated six million had died of starvation." The major premise appears, therefore, to have been satisfactorily established.

By “private ownership,” Osterfeld obviously means “private property” - not “self-ownership.” Oops, no emperical defense for half of the major premise! (No, he doesn’t offer any additional support elsewhere.)

At best, Osterfeld’s entire defence of natural law boils down to: “There exists a strong historical case for respecting property rights, therefore everyone ought to respect property rights.” I agree that the historical case is strong, but that’s all Osterfeld has for us, and he only gives two sentences of historical evidence himself. The extra logical constructions add nothing to the historical case.

[wilderness]

@AJ

Osterfeld is “on to something” in that he correctly points out what seems pretty obvious: natural rights have not been proven, and all attempts at proof so far have been invalid. He explains with a moderate amount of precision why this is so, and it may prove illuminating for readers who still think natural rights or natural law have been logically proven.

it’s proven scientifically and logically… life is, liberty is, and property is. They are knowable truths of human nature (what is).

[whipitgood]

@AJ

(1) does not violate any rules of logic as stated, and I trust the reader will note the error upon re-reading (if not, ask).

It seems like he is assuming that which he was attempting to prove,

@David Osterfeld

Since both group A and group B belong to the same class, “human beings,” they must possess the same essential characteristics of that class. Thus A cannot own both himself and B for that would negate B’s right of ownership.

If this is not the error you alluded to, perhaps you would correct me? I also noticed a long time ago that in Rothbard’s examination of possible ownership schemes with regard to people, he left out the ‘no one owns anyone’ possibility that you mentioned. If this has been explained somewhere, can someone point me in the right direction? It seems like such an obvious oversight.

I was one of those “readers who still think natural rights or natural law have been logically proven” that you mentioned, but he does make a compelling case against that notion. Where does this leave us though? Has anyone succeeded where he has failed?

[wilderness]

@whipitgood

@David Osterfeld

Since both group A and group B belong to the same class, “human beings,” they must possess the same essential characteristics of that class. Thus A cannot own both himself and B for that would negate B’s right of ownership.

If this is not the error you alluded to, perhaps you would correct me? I also noticed a long time ago that in Rothbard’s examination of possible ownership schemes with regard to people, he left out the ‘no one owns anyone’ possibility that you mentioned. If this has been explained somewhere, can someone point me in the right direction? It seems like such an obvious oversight.

I was one of those “readers who still think natural rights or natural law have been logically proven” that you mentioned, but he does make a compelling case against that notion. Where does this leave us though? Has anyone succeeded where he has failed?

Are you asking about property? If so, the human (an individual) is they themselves and not anybody else. They are being (property). That’s what property means. Somebody could own him or her. But they are owning him or her. (as slaves, but even as slaves their property, life, and liberty is still being in and of him or her self.)

[Conza]

@whipitgood

I also noticed a long time ago that in Rothbard’s examination of possible ownership schemes with regard to people, he left out the ‘no one owns anyone’ possibility that you mentioned. If this has been explained somewhere, can someone point me in the right direction? It seems like such an obvious oversight.

http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2009/lp-1-34.pdf

"a. No one owns anybody
As Feser concedes, Rothbard did eventually consider and respond to this point in The Ethics of Liberty. Rothbard wrote there,

Professor George Mavrodes … objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish. (Rothbard 1982, n45)"

And the ‘ownage’ continues, so read the whole thing. [:)]

[twistedbydsign99]

@AJ

Osterfeld says the premises 1 and 2 cannot be proven logically

But are undeniably true even without logical proof.

[wilderness]

@twistedbydsign99

@AJ

Osterfeld says the premises 1 and 2 cannot be proven logically

But are undeniably true even without logical proof.

How are they not logically proved? Life is, and by intellectually apprehending that life is, then true knowledge of its being has happened. And logic would simply state that since life is and my knowledgeable assertion that life is, then this logical statement A (life) is A (life) is logical. So it is not only scientifically true, but also doesn’t reject these logical statements that life is life: A is A.

[Amanojack]

@whipitgood

@AJ

(1) does not violate any rules of logic as stated, and I trust the reader will note the error upon re-reading (if not, ask).

It seems like he is assuming that which he was attempting to prove,

@David Osterfeld

Since both group A and group B belong to the same class, “human beings,” they must possess the same essential characteristics of that class. Thus A cannot own both himself and B for that would negate B’s right of ownership.

If this is not the error you alluded to, perhaps you would correct me?

It’s just that Osterfeld apparently made a mistake: "Briefly, Rothbard has pointed out that if one denies the premise of man’s self-ownership then one must conclude that either ‘(1) a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B; or (2) everyone has a right to his equal quotal share of everyone else.’ "

There’s nothing in (1) to indicate that Class A and Class B are the same class.

As for what it means to “own oneself,” here is the rest of what Conza88 started to quote from Gerard Casey:

@Gerard Casey

a. No one owns anybody?
As Feser concedes, Rothbard did eventually consider and respond to this point in The Ethics of Liberty. Rothbard wrote there,
Professor George Mavrodes … objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or
anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be
able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.
(Rothbard 1982, n45)
Feser, however, is unhappy with Rothbard’s treatment of this point, and he objects:
While having ownership of something does imply having a range of
control over it, having a range of control over it doesn’t imply
ownership … Animals having a range of control over their
environment, but since ownership is a moral category implying the
having of certain rights … it follows that they have no ownership of
anything. And of course, their lack of ownership of anything hasn’t
caused animals as a whole to “vanish,” “quickly” or otherwise,
which makes evident the absurdity of Rothbard’s claim that
alternative (a) (viz. that no one owns anyone, including himself)
would entail the extinction of the human race. (Feser 2006)
It would appear that Feser is accusing Rothbard of committing a formal
logical fallacy, the fallacy of affirming the consequent. From the fact that A
implies B, and A’s also being the case, B follows. However, if A implies B,
and B is the case, A does not follow.
Let’s take an example. Suppose the proposition “If it is raining, the
ground is wet” is true, and suppose it is also true that “It is raining”, then the
proposition “The ground is wet” has to be true as well. However, given the
truth of the same conditional, namely “If it is raining, the ground is wet” and,
this time, the truth of the proposition “The ground is wet”, it does not have
to be true that “It is raining”. While its being raining is a sufficient condition of
the ground’s being wet, it’s not a necessary condition. After all, the mad streetwetter
of Old London Town might have been on the rampage again with a
hosepipe, intending to lead us all astray logically, causing us to remark,
fallaciously, over our breakfast cereal: “My gosh, it must have rained heavily
last night!”
What Feser appears to be saying, applying the foregoing analysis to
Rothbard’s response to Mavrodes, is that it doesn’t follow from “If I own x,
then I have a range of control over x” and “I have a range of control over x”
that “I own x”—and this is correct. But what Rothbard actually says in the
FESER ON ROTHBARD AS A PHILOSOPHER 7
passage is not “If I own x, then I have a range of control over x” but
“[o]wnership signifies range of control” which is capable of being read either
as a single conditional (“If I own x, then I have a range of control over x”) or
as a biconditional (“If I own x, then I have a range of control over x AND if
I have a range of control over x, then I own x”). Now the principle of charity
in critical analysis is that if it is possible to interpret a passage in a plausible
way and an implausible way, then one should opt for the plausible. Let us
assume that Feser is correct in his claim that reading “Ownership signifies
range of control” as a single conditional leads to a logical fallacy; would
reading “Ownership signifies range of control” as a biconditional also lead to
a fallacy? The answer to this question is no.
Is there any reason other than exercising some critical charity to read
“ownership signifies range of control” biconditionally? Yes, I believe so, and
the clue is to be found in a closer examination of some parts of the Rothbard
passage not cited by Feser. What Rothbard does here is to tell us what the
right to self-ownership means: “the right to self-ownership asserts the absolute
right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being a human being, to ‘own’ his
own body; that is, to control that body free of coercive interference.”
(Rothbard 1973, 33–34) Meaning is definitional and definitions are bidirectional:
if a “triangle” is defined as “a plane figure bounded by three
straight lines” then a “plane figure bounded by three straight lines” can be
defined as a “triangle.”
Note also the scare-quotes around the word “own” in Rothbard’s
passage. One can only speculate as to why they are there. Here’s my guess.
One common use of such quotes is to indicate to the reader that a term is
being used in an unusual way. Whereas our paradigmatic use of the term
“own” relates to material tangible goods, all of which are intrinsically
alienable from us, to use the term “own” in connection with our own bodies
can seem somewhat idiosyncratic. After all, we can acquire and dispose of
CD players and ballpoint pens, but it is difficult to conceive of alienating
one’s own body. Hence, Rothbard is anxious to inform us that the
application of the term “own” in the context of one’s body doesn’t imply
alienability but simply the right to control one’s body free of coercive
interference.
Now, Rothbard has already made clear what owning one’s own body
means; it means to be able to control it, free of coercive interference. If I do
not own my own body then, on this understanding of what self-ownership
means, I am not able to control it, free of coercive interference; if I cannot
control my own body appropriately, then I cannot act; and if I cannot act,
then (given that all other human beings are in the same situation) I will die.

However, all Casey is really saying here is that “owning one’s self” means “controlling one’s own body free of coercive interference.”

But now, plugging this charitable interpretation of Rothbard back into his syllogism, we have two new problems:

1. Controlling one’s own body and property free of coercive interference are necessary means to sustain life.
2. Everyone values life more highly than death.
3. Hence, everyone ought to adopt the principle of [respecting a universal right to*] control over one’s own body and property free of coercive interference

*Added for charitable interpretation

The problems are: (1) is clearly untrue: I trust all the readers here are very much alive, but none of us are free of coercive interference (from States, at least). And (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) even if (1) were true, because even a man fully free of coercive interference has no need to respect others’ putative rights not to be interfered with.

[twistedbydsign99]

@wilderness

How are they not logically proved?

Well you can refute premise 2 by finding a person that would commit suicide in order to prove to you he doesnt value life more. But then hes not around to argue anymore, so 2 doesn’t have a logical proof, but is undeniably true.

[wilderness]

@twistedbydsign99

@wilderness

How are they not logically proved?

Well you can refute premise 2 by finding a person that would commit suicide in order to prove to you he doesnt value life more. But then hes not around to argue anymore, so 2 doesn’t have a logical proof, but is undeniably true.

I think I misread what this was referring to (premise 2). If premise two is: a person values life more than death that’s not a universal premise. As you state, somebody that commits suicide or thinking about doing it or even a murderer, etc… violate premise two quite possibly. But this has nothing to do with proofs and definitions of natural rights and is a tangent.[:)]

[twistedbydsign99]

@wilderness

If premise two is: a person values life more than death that’s not a universal premise.

It is a universal premise. Someone who kills themself no longer exists and is no longer represented. This is how you get objectivity from what is seemingly subjective. It wasnt a tanget because if I cant refute a premise the argument is false.

[wilderness]

@twistedbydsign99

@wilderness

If premise two is: a person values life more than death that’s not a universal premise.

It is a universal premise.

Am I missing something here? Cause I agree with the rest of what you wrote here below. When I said it’s not universal I was focused upon this statement: a person values life more than death.

Somebody in the act of killing him or her self may even have written a note stating they thought life sucked and they wanted to die. They can turn against themselves - suicide. Or kill others and not value their victims life.

But this doesn’t dampen natural rights being…

@twistedbydsign99

Someone who kills themself no longer exists and is no longer represented. This is how you get objectivity from what is seemingly subjective. It wasnt a tanget because if I cant refute a premise the argument is false.

Somebody who kills their self and is dead - is dead - and we are not talking about what they value anymore. We are not talking about their human nature anymore. I agree with what you stated here. I was focused on that statement above.

[twistedbydsign99]

I wouldn’t deny that a person can choose death over life, but it is a universal preference to value life over death. So I guess a person can value death over life, but humankind cannot. Meaning we have to choose life over death or we cease to be.

[wilderness]

@twistedbydsign99

I wouldn’t deny that a person can choose death over life, but it is a universal preference to value life over death. So I guess a person can value death over life, but humankind cannot. Meaning we have to choose life over death or we cease to be.

I see what you mean now and it follows from my initial point. I agree with your explanation, but since you qualified a universal premise in your defining that universal premise is of logic… so what you said here was false?

[Brainpolice]

@wilderness

@whipitgood

@David Osterfeld

Since both group A and group B belong to the same class, “human beings,” they must possess the same essential characteristics of that class. Thus A cannot own both himself and B for that would negate B’s right of ownership.

If this is not the error you alluded to, perhaps you would correct me? I also noticed a long time ago that in Rothbard’s examination of possible ownership schemes with regard to people, he left out the ‘no one owns anyone’ possibility that you mentioned. If this has been explained somewhere, can someone point me in the right direction? It seems like such an obvious oversight.

I was one of those “readers who still think natural rights or natural law have been logically proven” that you mentioned, but he does make a compelling case against that notion. Where does this leave us though? Has anyone succeeded where he has failed?

Are you asking about property? If so, the human (an individual) is they themselves and not anybody else. They are being (property). That’s what property means. Somebody could own him or her. But they are owning him or her. (as slaves, but even as slaves their property, life, and liberty is still being in and of him or her self.)

It seems like you’re conflating ownership with identity or existance. The fact that I am myself is not the same thing as ownership. If by “self-ownership”, one simply means “the existance of the individual with their own will” or “psychological intentionality”, then it really has nothing (directly) to do with property or normative ethics and it’s therefore being used as a misnomer for what is actually a purely descriptive claim about individual identity and conciousness.

[Brainpolice]

@Conza88

@whipitgood

I also noticed a long time ago that in Rothbard’s examination of possible ownership schemes with regard to people, he left out the ‘no one owns anyone’ possibility that you mentioned. If this has been explained somewhere, can someone point me in the right direction? It seems like such an obvious oversight.

http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2009/lp-1-34.pdf

"a. No one owns anybody
As Feser concedes, Rothbard did eventually consider and respond to this point in The Ethics of Liberty. Rothbard wrote there,

Professor George Mavrodes … objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish. (Rothbard 1982, n45)"

And the ‘ownage’ continues, so read the whole thing.

Rothbard’s very brief rebuttal here is circular. It only makes sense if we assume a certain dualism in which something is owning “the self” that is somehow “the self” at the same time. But if we don’t assume this dualism, the claim that noone would be able to do anything immediately collapses. We do not need to accept this “self-dualism” in order to have people excersize a range of control. Control is of something, and the controller is separate from what they are controlling.

[wilderness]

@Brainpolice

It seems like you’re conflating ownership with identity or existance. The fact that I am myself is not the same thing as ownership. If by “self-ownership”, one simply means “the existance of the individual with their own will” or “psychological intentionality”, then it really has nothing (directly) to do with property or normative ethics and it’s therefore being used as a misnomer for what is actually a purely descriptive claim about individual identity and conciousness.

The fact that I am this me is property. So you read me correctly, but you disagree on this definition of property.

my computer’s dictionary:

property:

• an attribute, quality, or characteristic of something

ORIGIN Middle English : from an Anglo-Norman French variant of Old French propriete, from Latin proprietas, from proprius ‘one’s own, particular’ (see proper ).

---

Property is a quiddity of me, and we define this essence of who I am to qualify a particular characteristic of me namely property. Another particular quiddity of me is liberty and life. These are of my nature as a human. Property is a quality of my being. I am myself.

Now you mention ownership. Somebody can own me, but this brings in the need for other qualifiers to assert what is in this particular situation such as I am a slave. I am still me. I still own me. I am still my property. But somebody else by coercion is applying their will upon me now. I can choose to disobey their will. I still have liberty. But I might die in the process of rebelling against their will.

[tacoface]

self ownership is so ridiculously circular.

[wilderness]

@Brainpolice

Rothbard’s very brief rebuttal here is circular. It only makes sense if we assume a certain dualism in which something is owning “the self” that is somehow “the self” at the same time. But if we don’t assume this dualism, the claim that noone would be able to do anything immediately collapses. We do not need to accept this “self-dualism” in order to have people excersize a range of control. Control is of something, and the controller is separate from what they are controlling.

You made this circular on your own. You also arbitrarily created a dualistic notion. I am this arm and fingers, but that doesn’t mean they are separated without any channel between the two. I control my body (the voluntary aspects) and the way I do this is via will (passions) and intellect. It doesn’t mean they work in absolute separation. It means they work in unison. If they were separate then that would lead into two “me’s” and I am only one person. What seems odd is you advocate sovereignty but won’t even allow yourself to experience such. You seem to conflict arbitrarily within your own self with the logic you assert.