It seems I carried a faulty definition but this clears it up thanks!
So it requires empirical evidence to find out whether a>b, b>c, c>d. But after knowing those are true a being greater than d is an a priori truth because it is implied in the very understanding of “greater than.” If a>b>c>d is true even before I would have said obviously theres no need for testing whether a>d. I’ve been using a priorism my whole life without knowing it.
Indeed. The conclusion is contained in the initial assumptions and is revealed through correct discursive reasoning. Austrian economists believe that humans, for whatever reason, posses logical minds and that this logic is universal. They do not believe that individuals, at birth, already understand concepts such as money, real numbers, ect.
The objection to Austrian economics is that it is merely tautological and is therefore superfluous; it cannot produce or yield knowledge. But this position assumes that scientific inquiry actually creates facts. I reject this position. The facts exist whether we understand them or not; the real world is given, and we may employ our reasoning abilities in order to interpret the data and understand real-world phenomena. Without reason empirical data is chaotic and ultimately useless. Austrians do no reject empirical data. This subject is actually very complicated and there are a lot of technical concepts/distinctions (such as analytical a priori and synthetic a priori, the methods employed for natural sciences vs the methods employed in social sciences, ect). But those who flatly reject a priori reasoning simply don’t know what they are talking about–they’re essentially mystics.
I’m not an expert in philosophy. This is just the way I understand it. Talk to lilburne, he has a real mastery of the subject.
I reject a priori reasoning, and I don’t count myself a mystic!
To claim that a priori reasoning is not innate but rather analytic creates even further confusion for me: what qualifies as “analytic” and is it wholly detached from empiric observation?
I’m altogether Quinean on this point: our conceptual scheme (all of it, without exception) is directly tied to observation. To quote Quine, “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections – the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether they be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.”
Yes, I read Quine, and his major argument, as I understand it, is that language is revisable. He essentially detaches language from the real world. I completely reject this (I have to admit that I didn’t understand much of his paper. It was very technical and quite obscure). Here’s an excerpt from a paper I wrote on his Two Dogmas of Empiricism:
“Andrew Sullivan agrees that language is a social art, but he doesn’t reach Quine’s conclusion. Sullivan says that “conventionalism is not the view that human agreement determines how things stand in Plato’s heaven; it is rather one of the varieties of view which eschews any appeal to Plato’s heaven” (pp. 381). Essentially, language is merely a point of reference, its fruitfulness does depend on convention, but it’s just a medium of expression… The phrase “all grandmothers have children” is true independently of language; the external world proves it (excluding any arguments put forth by language-skeptics). Nevertheless, Quine’s point is well taken as a refutation of Carnap’s Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.”
His critique, in my opinion, is really aimed at language and not apriorism. I also completely reject his nihilistic conclusion.
“Quine explicitly states that the totality of our knowledge, ranging from the most accepted to obscure, “is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges” (Two Dogmas, pp. 12). The lines are filled in by the most fruitful assumptions, where the belief in Homer’s gods is no different, in kind, to the belief in material objects, or the trustworthiness of our senses (Two Dogmas, pp. 13).”
Actually, Quine does the complete opposite of what you state: it is not that he “detaches language from the real world,” but rather that he shows that our language is entirely dependent upon observation (that is, the real world).
No, he does not deny a mind-independent reality; he is stating that our conceptual scheme (even our logics) is not immune from revision. Quine is, somewhat fairly, accused of scientism, so he is certainly not a person that denies an external world, but he proposes an ontological relativism to emphasize that our theories are always underdetermined.
To quote Quine once more, "As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries – not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer’s gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. "
Would you object to Austrian’s adopting a Quinian stance such as “The myth of ‘praxeological analysis’ is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience so that we can answer questions of economics”?
Like I’ve stated elsewhere, I actually have no oppositional stance to praxeology; I simply want its practitioners to realize that praxeology (as most clearly revealed by Rothbard) has an empiricist foundation and is revisable (hence there is no guarantee of immutable truths or certainty). Additionally, since there is an empiricist rooting, Austrians should not be so averse to alternative methodologies that more openly empirical.
To be more clear, I believe that Austrian axioms are empirical in nature and should be claimed as such. In lieu of that, praxeological deductions are not apodictically certain. And, finally, since Austrians are empiricists, if even unknowingly so, they should have less opposition to neoclassical methods.
Additionally, since there is an empiricist rooting, Austrians should not be so averse to alternative methodologies more openly empirical.
Fallacy. Your argument does not even attempt to justify the claim that theoreticians whose theories are grounded on ‘less revisable’ beliefs should not be so adverse to alternative methodologies ground on ‘more revisable, tangled, confused, and contradictary’ beliefs, simply because they are on a continuum.
nirgrahamUK, I am not stating you should unquestioningly embrace neoclassical methods; you’re right to question such a bold claim.
I am rather stating that you shouldn’t refuse them simply because they are empiricist. That’s not a reasonable critique, given my assertion that Austrian methodology is also empiricist. I believe that Austrians and neoclassicals are both premised upon the hypothetico-deductive model.
Typically, from conversations here and from articles I’ve read, Austrians openly decry empirical methods, but claiming to derive axioms from psychological self-evidence seems even shoddier than more rigorous methods that depend upon intersubjective invariance.
I’ve given some remarks regarding the relationship between theory and history and empirical observation in the thread linked to in the first post. I know it’s a lot to ask, but could you skim through it and give your opinion?
Fine, I wont reject neoclassical methods for being simply ‘empiricist’ i will reject them along Rothbardian lines for being a ‘vastly inferior empirical method.’ (if they are)
Typically, from conversations here and from articles I’ve read, Austrians openly decry empirical methods,
Well,…not if they are in the Menger-Rothbard tradition, in which case they decry inferior empirical methods to the ones that ground their causal realist analysis… i mean… this is your position ! They just reserve the word ‘empirical’ for inferior empirical methods, and brand the effective ones ‘analytic’. its semantic. but you know this already.. its your position !
I’m still trying to understand why you completely reject apriorism. Quine does not reject the existence of a mind-independent reality, he merely states that human reasoning abilities are severely limited. But from this, how does one conclude that discursive reasoning is inherently unsalvageable and useless?
Quick example: Socialism is impossible. Mises and Bohm-Bawerk reached this conclusion before Socialism was ever truly implemented, and before it collapsed. The conclusion was already contained in the initial premises.
Again, I’m trying to understand your (and Quine’s) argument. Do you agree with this assertion: A theory is either correct or incorrect.
Quine rejects what we think is apriorism; go ahead and try to describe it.
Quine was a famously skilled logician and published several books (and textbooks) on the subject; he would not necessarily deny that socialism could be theoretically undermined even before observed evidence was possible.
