Demonstrated Preferences of Worker Safety

Economics Economics Questions
1

I am having a discussion elsewhere about worker preferences for additional compensation instead of additional safety measures. I am defending the statement that they prefer the compensation if given a choice by not having stricter workplace safety laws. My opponent is asserting that they do not, and that the widespread existence of workplace safety laws is proof of this.

Of course, the existence of laws in no way demonstrates free preference, even if the laws are voted in democratically (there’s a phenomenon known as preference reversal under differing decision strategies that causes this), but that isn’t what I’m looking for.

So my question is: Does anyone have any freely available resources that discuss demonstrated worker preference for risk+compensation over safety? So far I have:

Occupational Safety and Worker Preferences: Is There a Marginal Worker? and The marginal value of job safety: A contingent valuation study, and Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal Miners, 1890-1930, however all of these are restricted content (JSTOR, Springer, and a book, respectively) and I’m looking for something they can read themselves.

As an aside, when I am done with my research and other discussion I’m going to post the results in an article format so I can finally contribute something worthwhile to the forums. :slight_smile:

2

If they do not, why are the laws needed?

3

I suppose the counter-argument would be that they are exibiting preference for safety over compensation by voting for safety regulation (which will ultimately lower their wages) instead of taking other actions in the market.

This is, I believe, a red herring. Voter preference and worker preference are not the same thing. Even voting with a unanimity rule does not produce the same results as free actions in the market. In addition, workers at, say, an oil refinery are not the only ones voting on the regulation that affects the refinery and refinery regulation is not the only thing they vote on.

My conclusion is that only voluntary exchange can show demonstrated preference (in the Rothbardian sense)