What is the name of a theory of rights that recognizes neither natural rights nor legal, but instead sees rights as what is both respected and expected to be respected by most of people in the society (similar to Schelling points)? Further, these rights are not carved in stone, and can be changed given sufficient will and effort (think abolition of slavery).
Utilitarianism in some form or another maybe? Perhaps if you could rephrase, because I don’t know if I follow.
Rule consequentialism
Rights as strategy.
moral nihilism? pragmatism (of a particular sort) ?
Perhaps if you could rephrase, because I don’t know if I follow.
I meant something like this, though could not remember the specific source until I posted the OP:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html
David D. Friedman calls this “a positive account of rights - an account which is both amoral and alegal”. I am not sure this is a standard terminology, any opinions?
It’s consequentialism I think. Or I think Danny Sanchez pointed out Hazlitt and mises called it rule utilitarianism.
‘Expected to be respected?’ Does that mean they give utility? If so, then yes, it is rule utilitarianism. But your original post is a little vague on the details, so I can’t make a full judgment.
I’d call it rights pragmatism or just plain old positivism with a lemon twist.
I’m not sure there is a standard name for it, as I think the characterization applies to various theories (e.g. some strains of natural law theory). Rule utilitarians would probably agree with the story, but I don’t think it’s exclusive to rule utilitarianism (which is a moral philosophy, after all). The problem is that many people who push this idea avoid the word ‘rights’, preferring to talk of norms, conventions, customs, rules, etc. ‘Customary law,’ or something similar, is probably the most accurate term you’ll find.
John Hasnas, however, offers the name Empirical Natural Rights.
EDIT: some changes above
I guess you could ask David Friedman if he agrees/ knows the difference of his thoughts with Hazlitt’s look at morality, or ask him if there is a technical definition he had in mind.
Or maybe even ask Danny, he seems to know the technicalities and splits of utilitariansm and consequetialism pretty well.
Thank you all for the answers, I will have to do some reading before coming to any conclusion.
“It’s consequentialism I think. Or I think Danny Sanchez pointed out Hazlitt and mises called it rule utilitarianism.”
It’s neither. Both of those are moral theories. What I offer in that essay is a positive theory–an explanation of a pattern of human behavior, not a statement about what is right or wrong.
It’s neither. Both of those are moral theories. What I offer in that essay is a positive theory–an explanation of a pattern of human behavior, not a statement about what is right or wrong.
Thank you for answering! I understand that your theory cannot be a utilitarianism or any other moral theory - myself I would amateurishly classify it closer to game theory (strategy/conflict/equilibrium/expectations). I still do not get the “positive” terminology - does it mean legal positivism or epistimological one, or both, or neither? In other words, what is the main point making it positive? Absence of any non-human source for rules?
It’s called ethical subjectivism. In legal form, it expresses itself as positivism.
It’s a collectivist or majoritarian account of ethical solipsism, which is really just sociopathy in academic form.
Unless I’m misinterpreting your example, of course.
It’s positive in that it is descriptive/value-free/wertfrei, as opposed to being normative. It is not an account of the rights that people ought to recognize and respect, but what people do in practice recognize and respect.
Game theory is certainly a tool to be used, but obviously is not in and of itself a theory of the rights which people recognize. A lot of the work is, understandably enough, done by legal scholars and anthropologists in their study of customary/common/emergent law. Lon Fuller, John Hasnas, Randy Barnett (working within the natural law and natural rights traditions), Robert Ellickson, Spencer Heath MacCallum, etc. I don’t think Stephan Kinsella has written at length about it, but talks about it in his articles concerning common law. In addition to Professor Friedman, economists with something to say on it include Hayek, Bruce Benson, Pete Leeson, Anthony de Jasay and I’m sure many others.
It’s positive in that it is descriptive/value-free/wertfrei, and not normative. It is not an account of the rights that people ought to recognize and respect, but what people do in practice recognize and respect.
In the end I don’t think this is important but it is bothering the beejezzezus out ofme; but doesn’t this technically fall under consequentialism? We are describing what is and why it is, this is still dealing with consequences, at least in a way, correct?
For what ever reason, I am having a hard time parsing and processing this one.
No. It is positive, meaning it has nothing to say about morality. It cannot be categorized under moral philosophy at all. It tells us neither what we ought to do or what we ought to value as ends. By definition, a consequentialist has some idea of the ends/consequences he wants to see realized; the “empirical natural rights” which emerge through the common law process may or may not satisfy the ends sought by the consequentialist, and so may or may not be a morally virtuous system from his point of view. And those who write about or promote this need not be consequentialists of any stripe, and I don’t know of any who are.