How about the power of contrary choice? The will is self causing or an uncaused cause, which ever you prefer, and thus it has absolute freedom of choice; this no way implies that you have the ability to actualise the end of the choice such as been able to fly a la Superman.
I suspect not having free will would be like been an animal- totally beholden to instinct.
NB I believe for libertarian freedom one needs a form of substance dualism and theism.
The words themselves, by any reasonable interpretation I can think of, do not seem prima facie coherent, so as I said I await a coherent definition.
How do you think that would feel?
The only way I could describe would be analogously: like being drunk no inhibitions just doing what you immediately desire. Obviously it can’t actually be like that because most mammal species would have died due to drowning.
All right, but note that this implies a definition for “free will” that would make it an obvious and non-controversial fact of human experience.
Even though obviously controversial I do believe it to be an obvious fact of human experience. The edifice of responsibility and subsequently law are built on it. Btw what did you make of my definition of free will?
You seem to be implicitly defining “free will” as not being drunk, not having zero inhibitions, not just doing what you immediately desire. Since this is how (most) people are, by this definition we obviously and non-controversially have free will. I certainly agree.
My point is that “free will” (and lack thereof) is either an incoherent concept or an obvious and non-controversial one, hence not really an interesting question (besides as a study of how words can induce debate over nothing).
Whatever sense in which people can be said to lack free will, it cannot be used as an excuse from moral responsibility, since anyone who does so would also excuse the people trying to act in self-defense or to exact restitution or punishment.
“Libertarian” as in politics, or as opposed to determinism?
I suppose it could be argued that having free will is something that is introspectively indistinguishable from not having free will, in the same way that being a brain-in-a-vat is indistinguishable from being a brain-in-a-body. (Although, then you might begin to question why free will is important at all.)
Mon. 10/03/22 16:34 EDT
.post #20
The player on your computer? In that case, try this tiny, cool player:
Well since I have no experience of not having free will I cannot truly describe how it feels other than by analogous reasoning, which no way implies that free will is just not being drunk. Let me put it this way- determinism cannot be justified without self refutation since it presupposes libertarian freedom (the positive definition I supplied in my earlier post). Why is this so?
Suppose I was determined then I could do no other than say determinism or free will was true which means I cannot verify the truth value of either. The only way to say that the determined could know that he was so would be if he were ontologically infallible; yet since it is possible to say that 1+1=3 which is obviously incorrect hence I cannot be ontologically infallible thus the only options are varying degrees of fallibility which wouldn’t yield a justifiable criterion for knowledge. Therefore libertarian freedom is the only foundation for true knowledge.
Given that fleshing onto my earlier definition, what say ye now?
Edit- replaced exhaustively good with infallible as it’s more precise.
As opposed to determinism. The definition for libertarian freedom was in that post.
In that post, I didn’t understand what you meant by this:
I can’t really parse this either. I’m not really following the sentence structure.
I do not understand the relevance of the question… how would you feel.
it seems like if i did not have free will i could only feel however my master or creator determined
I’ll take a stab at some of the misconceptions I’ve seen regarding this question…
Mises defines the will as follows (emphasis added):
the term will means nothing else than man’s faculty to choose between different states of affairs, to prefer one, to set aside the other, and to behave according to the decision made in aiming at the chosen state and forsaking the other.
So, is the will (the faculty to choose) “free”?
Some who say “no” err in that they seem to not really be trying to deny the freedom of the will, but its very existence, pointing to mechanistic causation in the brain. To deny the will is to deny choice, which is to deny action, which is to deny methodological dualism and all the sciences of man (geisteswissenschaften).
Some who “yes” err in that they think embracing methodological dualism is to subscribe to the positive statement that the will is in fact divorced from mechanistic events in the brain. Misesian methodological dualism does not assert that the will does not have neurobiological causes; it just asserts that since we don’t know HOW such causes produce “definite thoughts and volitions resulting in concrete acts”, science must treat will/choice/action as an unanalyzable given.
Others who say “yes” err in that they seem to want to say that a man can “control” his will. This is nonsense, because the very faculty of a man to choose, and thereby to control anything is ITSELF his will. And so such statement is tantamount to saying that a man’s will is subject to his will.
Sorry about that AJ, it’s another case of my brain working faster than my fingers. Let’s have another go:
Libertarian free will (as opposed to compatibilism) is defined as the ability to choose A or non-A.
Is libertarian free will (LFW) true?
It is necessarily true since otherwise one couldn’t evaluate the truth value of the question “Is LFW true?” because you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth
There is one exception which would be if one were ontologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism.
Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.
Therefore LFW is true.
What does this imply? (Or how can we metaphysically justify the existence of LFW)
We cannot be purely material beings since we would be determined by our neurological pathways or other laws of nature.
If we were then you are either stuck with cast iron laws of nature which results in cast ironly determined “choices”, or accept quantum randomness which implies a complete scatter gun type “choice”.
And as above this gives no foundation for truth and therefore must be rejected.
This implies then a substance dualism (trichotomy or more) of man since can provide a foundation for real choices as it can be neither random nor subject cast iron laws. At present I can’t elaborate on what this non-material substance is apart from the fact it provides the necessary metaphysical foundation for LFW.
Finally it implies that the will is basic and as such causes itself
or in Lilburne’s words: man’s will is subject only to his will.
How’s that AJ?
Edit- Thanks to I Ryan’s observation I’ve edited paragraph 6 to read assuming determinism rather than the original assuming determinism to be true.
Like Lilburne said we can be methodologic dualists but still reject spooks and understand that compatabilsm is possible. Causes determine effects. We as people are the chooses, we are the agents that enjoy whatever evitability the universe has granted.
Mises and Dennett can work together.
Like Voltron?
sure… why not
How so?
If “determinism” were “true”, the notion of truth, you claimed, would have no foundation. Is that not circular in a way?