free will and determinism

[Physiocrat]

@I. Ryan

@Physiocrat

There is one exception which would be if one were ontologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism.

Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism to be true). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.

If “determinism” were “true”, the notion of truth, you claimed, would have no foundation. Is that not circular in a way?

It may have been more precise just to say assuming determinism rather than assuming determinism to be true.

Either way it is still an incoherent concept, even self refuting, rather than circular.

Edit- I’ve edited my main post to clear that up.

[nirgrahamUK]

assuming determinism is to assume it as true.

regardless, if a being that is considering whether determinism is true is determined to analyse that its true, then thats what will happen. if the being is determined to analyse that its false, then thats what will happen. so there is no contradiction. the determined being will simply do what it will do.

[Physiocrat]

@nirgrahamUK

assuming determinism is to assume it as true.

regardless, if a being that is considering whether determinism is true is determined to analyse that its true, then thats what will happen. if the being is determined to analyse that its false, then thats what will happen. so there is no contradiction. the determined being will simply do what it will do.

But how do you ultimately evaluate the truth value? You assume that determinism allows the giving of a justifiable truth value which is question begging. In the absence of ontological infallibility there is no way of evaluating a truth value under determinism as I outlined earlier.

[nirgrahamUK]

what do you mean by ‘allows’ the giving of a justifiable truth value? Surely an agent who is bound in causal chains, yet that has the ‘power’ to determine whether a proposition is justifiably true had that power. what is it about being bound by causality that would necessarily eviscerate this power?

[wilderness]

@nirgrahamUK

Surely an agent who is bound in causal chains, yet that has the ‘power’ to determine whether a proposition is justifiably true had that power.

if they have that power to “determine whether a proposition is justifiably true”, then it is determinism working hand in hand with free will. In other words, will (determinism) is intervened upon by reason (free will).

@nirgrahamUK

what is it about being bound by causality that would necessarily eviscerate this power?

I wouldn’t say reason, ie. choice/free will, necessarily eviscerates will-power (cause-effect), but rather is a means to harmonize with it.

[Physiocrat]

@nirgrahamUK

what do you mean by ‘allows’ the giving of a justifiable truth value? Surely an agent who is bound in causal chains, yet that has the ‘power’ to determine whether a proposition is justifiably true had that power. what is it about being bound by causality that would necessarily eviscerate this power?

Since being tied up in causal chains excludes the possibility of choice which is logically prior to justification with caveat of ontological infallibility again. Without LFW one cannot weigh arguments on either sides and come to a conclusion: he merely comes to the conclusion caused by the laws of nature.

[I_Ryan]

@Physiocrat

But how do you ultimately evaluate the truth value? You assume that determinism allows the giving of a justifiable truth value which is question begging. In the absence of ontological infallibility there is no way of evaluating a truth value under determinism as I outlined earlier.

I think that this might just be a situation which displays some of the absurdities that one encounters when one starts to doubt whether “determinism” is “true”.

@Ludwig von Mises

Whatever the true nature of the universe and of reality may be, man can learn about it only what the logical structure of his mind makes comprehensible to him. Reason, the sole instrument of human science and philosophy, does not convey absolute knowledge and final wisdom. It is vain to speculate about ultimate things. What appears to man’s inquiry as an ultimate given, defying further analysis and reduction to something more fundamental, may or may not appear such to a more perfect intellect. We do not know.

Man cannot grasp either the concept of absolute nothingness or that of the genesis of something out of nothing. The very idea of creation transcends his comprehension. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whom Pascal in his Mémorial opposed to that of the “philosophes et savants,” is a living image and has a clear and definite meaning for the faithful believer. But the philosophers in their endeavors to construct a concept of God, his attributes, and his conduct of world affairs, became involved in insoluble contradictions and paradoxes. A God whose essence and ways of acting mortal man could neatly circumscribe and define would not resemble the God of the prophets, the saints, and the mystics.

The logical structure of his mind enjoins upon man determinism and the category of causality. As man sees it, whatever happens in the universe is the necessary evolution of forces, powers, and qualities which were already present in the initial stage of the X out of which all things stem. All things in the universe are interconnected, and all changes are the effects of powers inherent in things. No change occurs that would not be the necessary consequence of the preceding state. All facts are dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. No deviation from the necessary course of affairs is possible. Eternal law regulates everything.

In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis of the human search for knowledge.[1] Man cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In such a world there could not be any awareness of material things and their changes. It would appear a senseless chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished from anything else. Nothing could be expected and predicted. In the midst of such an environment man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown language. No action could be designed, still less put into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive the relation of cause and effect.

Any epistemological speculation must lead toward determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be insoluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism, there are some ideas that people have not been able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks have been directed against it because people believed that it must ultimately result in absurdity.

I think that we just have to accept determinism like we accept induction, the external world, and whatever, simply as an “ultimate given”.

[nirgrahamUK]

maybe you should say more about ontological infallability because I am not sure I know what you mean.

A being that is determined to always get correct results over a set of challenges, can be said to be infallable over that set. perhaps you are saying that humans are such.

[wilderness]

ontological infallability = realism

I might not be using it the way Physiocrat is using the term, and the question was posed to him so forgive me for stepping in.

[Physiocrat]

@nirgrahamUK

maybe you should say more about ontological infallability because I am not sure I know what you mean.

A being that is determined to always get correct results over a set of challenges, can be said to be infallable over that set. perhaps you are saying that humans are such.

Ontological infallibility- a human must be determined to get correct results over a set of all possible challenges. If it’s less than all possible sets then you’d need to LFW to determine under which set the human is acting which again presupposes LFW truth.

[nirgrahamUK]

im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness’s idea of what you mean. how is your ‘ontological infallibality’ different from ‘infallability’ which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges…?

[I_Ryan]

@Physiocrat

Ontological infallibility- a human must be determined to get correct results over a set of all possible challenges. If it’s less than all possible sets then you’d need to LFW to determine under which set the human is acting which again presupposes LFW truth.

If he is determined to do it, how is it, from your position, able to even be “correct” or not?

[Physiocrat]

@nirgrahamUK

im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness’s idea of what you mean. how is your ‘ontological infallibality’ different from ‘infallability’ which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges…?

That’s the whole point. It’s such an impossible attribute to attain or have that even the last get out clause of determinism has been truly smashed which leaves LWF as the only option.

[I_Ryan]

@Physiocrat

It may have been more precise just to say assuming determinism rather than assuming determinism to be true.

As Nir said, to “assum[e] determinism” is just to “assum[e] determinism to be true”.

[wilderness]

@Physiocrat

@nirgrahamUK

im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness’s idea of what you mean. how is your ‘ontological infallibality’ different from ‘infallability’ which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges…?

That’s the whole point. It’s such an impossible attribute to attain or have that even the last get out clause of determinism has been truly smashed which leaves LWF as the only option.

in other words, due to epistemological fallibility…?

[Physiocrat]

@I. Ryan

@Physiocrat

Ontological infallibility- a human must be determined to get correct results over a set of all possible challenges. If it’s less than all possible sets then you’d need to LFW to determine under which set the human is acting which again presupposes LFW truth.

If he is determined to do it, how is it, from your position, able to even be “correct” or not?

I’m not sure how you could actually justify yourself to be ontologically infallible, I was merely positing as the only get out avenue for determinism.

With regards the Mises quote he seems to have created a false dichotomy: either everything is determined or everything is random. I think it is possible to retain some uncaused elements without reducing the world to chaos; with man’s free will one can still give reasons why he acts as he does such as is desires but that his desires do to not cause his act.

Incidentally I believe determinism also suffers from the regression fallacy which is one of the reasons I’m a theist (Christian more precisely)

[Physiocrat]

@wilderness

@Physiocrat

@nirgrahamUK

im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness’s idea of what you mean. how is your ‘ontological infallibality’ different from ‘infallability’ which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges…?

That’s the whole point. It’s such an impossible attribute to attain or have that even the last get out clause of determinism has been truly smashed which leaves LWF as the only option.

in other words, due to epistemological fallibility…?

Determinism is finally smashed due to epistemological fallibility.

[wilderness]

@Physiocrat

Determinism is finally smashed due to epistemological fallibility.

right.

So when you were saying ontological infallibility I think, to put it into different words, you were saying: the reality of the individual is infallible. Yet, you were rejecting this, which is why you say that’s your point, because the individual is not infallible due to epistemological concerns.

[nirgrahamUK]

what are you saying? that determinism would imply fallibility or infallibility? it seems like you are switching…besides which determinish implies neither. so i must assume you are saying that one of infalabilty or fallability somehow disprove determinism, but i can’t tell which one of the two you think does it, nor how…

yours @confused ! [:|]

help a brother out [8-|]

[I_Ryan]

@Physiocrat

I’m not sure how you could actually justify yourself to be ontologically infallible, I was merely positing as the only get out avenue for determinism.

Well, I am just saying that it is not a possible “out avenue for determinism”, it is just an incoherent concept.

@Physiocrat

With regards the Mises quote he seems to have created a false dichotomy: either everything is determined or everything is random. I think it is possible to retain some uncaused elements without reducing the world to chaos; with man’s free will one can still give reasons why he acts as he does such as is desires but that his desires do to not cause his act.

If you change it to that “[m]an cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined” section of anything, I think that it becomes clearer.

@Physiocrat

Incidentally I believe determinism also suffers from the regression fallacy which is one of the reasons I’m a theist (Christian more precisely)

Why is it a fallacy?

@Ludwig von Mises

Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available.

[…]

Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover.

So I do not see why adopting a teleological view of it helps. Neither of them allows you to escape the regression.