free will and determinism

[Physiocrat]

@nirgrahamUK

what are you saying? that determinism would imply fallibility or infallibility? it seems like you are switching…besides which determinish implies neither. so i must assume you are saying that one of infalabilty or fallability somehow disprove determinism, but i can’t tell which one of the two you think does it, nor how…

yours @confused !

help a brother out

To know or justify whether a statement X is true it either requires libertarian freedom of the will or man to be epistemologically infallible to use Wilderness’s term. Now obviously, determinism is only consistent with epistemological infallibility since LWF is the antonym of determinism. Now since I can prove that I am fallible, 2+2=3, then we must throw out determinism. Therefore LFW is true.

[nirgrahamUK]

@Physiocrat

To know or justify whether a statement X is true it either requires libertarian freedom of the will or man to be epistemologically infallible to use Wilderness’s term.

no, ‘to know’ whether a statement X is true, it requires A) X to be true B) the subject to think that its true.

‘to justify’ the subjects belief we only ask that the subject have reasons, i.e. justifications. determinism doesnt get in the way of that either…

LWF is useless as Ryan says, and is not ‘freedom worth having’ (to use Dennetts terminology). We have free will in so far as there are a range of options for our determined mind-brains to choose between, and its us, i.e. our brain-minds. that are the locus wherein the calculations as to ‘what to do’ work themselves out in…

[I_Ryan]

To back-track a bit:

@Physiocrat

you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth

Why does that “giv[e] no foundation for truth”?

[Mtn_Dew]

Imagine that you could rewind your life back to when you were 5 years old. If your life restarted from that point would anything be different over the course of your life? This assumes every other thing remains the same. I’m not entirely sure a single thing would change.

[I_Ryan]

@Physiocrat

The edifice of responsibility and subsequently law are built on it.

Not fundamentally:

@Ludwig von Mises

A factor that often entered the controversies concerning determinism was misapprehension as to its practical consequences.

All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends. The moral code has no reference to human well-being and happiness, to expediency, and to the mundane striving after ends. It is heteronomous, i.e., enjoined upon man by an agency that does not depend on human ideas and does not bother about human concerns. Some believe that this agency is God, others that it is the wisdom of the forefathers, some that it is a mystical inner voice alive in every decent man’s conscience. He who violates the precepts of this code commits a sin, and his guilt makes him liable to punishment. Punishment does not serve human ends. In punishing offenders, the secular or theocratic authorities acquit themselves of a duty entrusted to them by the moral code and its author. They are bound to punish sin and guilt whatever the consequences of their action may be.

Now these metaphysical notions of guilt, sin, and retribution are incompatible with the doctrine of determinism. If all human actions are the inevitable effect of their causes, if the individual cannot help acting in the way antecedent conditions make him act, there can no longer be any question of guilt. What a haughty presumption to punish a man who simply did what the eternal laws of the universe had determined!

The philosophers and lawyers who attacked determinism on these grounds failed to see that the doctrine of an almighty and omniscient God led to the same conclusions that moved them to reject philosophical determinism. If God is almighty, nothing can happen that he does not want to happen. If he is omniscient, he knows in advance all things that will happen. In either case, man cannot be considered answerable.1 The young Benjamin Franklin argued “from the supposed attributes of God” in this manner: “That in erecting and governing the world, as he was infinitely wise, he knew what would be best; infinitely good, he must be disposed; and infinitely powerful, he must be able to execute it. Consequently all is right.”2 In fact, all attempts to justify, on metaphysical and theological grounds, society’s right to punish those whose actions jeopardize peaceful social cooperation are open to the same criticism that is leveled against philosophical determinism.

Utilitarian ethics approaches the problem of punishment from a different angle. The offender is not punished because he is bad and deserves chastisement but so that neither he nor other people will repeat the offense. Punishment is not inflicted as retribution and retaliation but as a means to prevent future crimes. Legislators and judges are not the mandataries of a metaphysical retributive justice. They are committed to the task of safeguarding the smooth operation of society against encroachments on the part of antisocial individuals. Hence it is possible to deal with the problem of determinism without being troubled by inane considerations of practical consequences concerning the penal code.

[Physiocrat]

@nirgrahamUK

@Physiocrat

To know or justify whether a statement X is true it either requires libertarian freedom of the will or man to be epistemologically infallible to use Wilderness’s term.

no, ‘to know’ whether a statement X is true, it requires A) X to be true B) the subject to think that its true.

‘to justify’ the subjects belief we only ask that the subject have reasons, i.e. justifications. determinism doesnt get in the way of that either…

LWF is useless as Ryan says, and is not ‘freedom worth having’ (to use Dennetts terminology). We have free will in so far as there are a range of options for our determined mind-brains to choose between, and its us, i.e. our brain-minds. that are the locus wherein the calculations as to ‘what to do’ work themselves out in…

I was using the terms interchangeably to avoid confusion. I failed. Render it to know instead.

Now since I’ve cleared up the confusion could you justify how determinism allows for the possibility of the knowledge of truth?

Also why is it not worth having? I would argue being morally responsible agents was quite a good thing to be.

[E_R_Olovetto]

What is LFW?

[Physiocrat]

@E. R. Olovetto

What is LFW?

Libertarian Free Will. Defined as the ability to choose A or non-A.

[E_R_Olovetto]

Why not just say FW or free will?

[I_Ryan]

@E. R. Olovetto

Why not just say FW or free will?

Or “choice”? Is there a difference between “free choice” and “choice”?

[E_R_Olovetto]

@I. Ryan

@E. R. Olovetto

Why not just say FW or free will?

Or “choice”? Is there a difference between “free choice” and “choice”?

Maybe if you are thinking in terms of Mises’ hegemonial vs. contractual society. My actual concern was with the word “libertarian” being attached to “free will”.

[Sage]

@AJ

The words themselves, by any reasonable interpretation I can think of, do not seem prima facie coherent, so as I said I await a coherent definition.

Can you elaborate on this? That is, take some common definitions and show how they’re incoherent?

[I_Ryan]

@E. R. Olovetto

Maybe if you are thinking in terms of Mises’ hegemonial vs. contractual society. My actual concern was with the word “libertarian” being attached to “free will”.

OK, well, does it suffice to call what he called “libertarian free will” just “choice”? Is it possible to be able to choose but not have “free will”? If not, I think that we should just call it “choice”.

[wilderness]

@I. Ryan

@E. R. Olovetto

Maybe if you are thinking in terms of Mises’ hegemonial vs. contractual society. My actual concern was with the word “libertarian” being attached to “free will”.

OK, well, does it suffice to call what he called “libertarian free will” just “choice”? Is it possible to be able to choose but not have “free will”? If not, I think that we should just call it “choice”.

I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin’ this way, not that way. It doesn’t matter what you call “it”, especially if “it” is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too.

edit: Now if libertarian is what keeps “it” real, then Physiocrat has a point too.

[I_Ryan]

@wilderness

OK, well, does it suffice to call what he called “libertarian free will” just “choice”? Is it possible to be able to choose but not have “free will”? If not, I think that we should just call it “choice”.

I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin’ this way, not that way. It doesn’t matter what you call “it”, especially if “it” is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too.

Well, my problem is not just with what string of graphemes that we use. My problem is that, if it is not possible to be able to choose but to not have “free will” or to not have “free will” but to choose, we should just pick one and stick with it.

[wilderness]

@I. Ryan

@wilderness

I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin’ this way, not that way. It doesn’t matter what you call “it”, especially if “it” is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too.

Well, my problem is not with what string of graphemes that we use. My problem is that, if it is not possible to be able to choose but to not have “free will”, we should stop messing up the situation and instead just adopt one of the terms.

Did you put one too many’"not’s’ in what I underlined? If it is not possible to choose but to not have free will?

I think you might be trying to say that there is choice but not free-will, maybe? I mean you haven’t necessarily concluded that. It’s a question on your part and the part of the whole discussion at hand in this thread in general. I’ll assume yes that’s what you’re bringing up.

By choose, it can be semantically inclined to define what is the nature of a mental ability. Whereas free-will, is the nature of that choice plus will (will being a base action of all biological life whereas not all biological life chooses). Free-will is defining the nature of will-power that is freed from what is external to the individual such as extortion or mechanics. Maybe it could also be said that a drunk lacks free-will too.

Example: A rock falls and pushes the person. The person’s free-will (nor choice) wasn’t involved. It was the will of the rock that exerted mechanical force upon the person that actually moved the person. Free-will is volition as opposed to nolition.

I see both terms actually existing. One is not better than the other and I can see that they overlap in their relation to reality.

[E_R_Olovetto]

Let’s stick with free will. The injection of jargon, LFW, made it even harder to follow the arguments. Ultimately, “choice” may be better, but I think “free will” keeps the proper frame of reference (the individual) clear. This was what I was talking about, from Human Action:

There are two different kinds of social cooperation: cooperation by virtue of contract and coordination, and cooperation by virtue of command and subordination or hegemony.

Where and as far as cooperation is based on contract, the logical relation between the cooperating individuals is symmetrical. They are all parties to interpersonal exchange contracts. John has the same relation to Tom as Tom has to John. Where and as far as cooperation is based on command and subordination, there is the man who commands and there are those who obey his orders. The logical relation between these two classes of men is asymmetrical. There is a director and there are people under his care. The director alone chooses and directs; the others–the wards–are mere pawns in his actions. [p. 196]

The power that calls into life and animates any social body is always ideological might, and the fact that makes an individual a member of any social compound is always his own conduct. This is no less valid with regard to a hegemonic societal bond. It is true, people are as a rule born into the most important hegemonic bonds, into the family and into the state, and this was also the case with the hegemonic bonds of older days, slavery and serfdom, which disappeared in the realm of Western civilization. But no physical violence and compulsion can possibly force a man against his will to remain in the status of the ward of a hegemonic order. What violence or the threat of violence brings about is a state of affairs in which subjection as a rule is considered more desirable than rebellion. Faced with the choice between the consequences of obedience and of disobedience, the ward prefers the former and thus integrates himself into the hegemonic bond. Every new command places this choice before him again. In yielding again and again he himself contributes his share to the continuous existence of the hegemonic societal body. Even as a ward in such a system he is an acting human being, i.e., a being not simply yielding to blind impulses, but using his reason in choosing between alternatives.

I don’t see how adding “libertarian” is anything but superfluous. I don’t like the term “anarcho-capitalist” for various reasons, and “libertarian” only has meaning in contrast to “anti-human” ideologies.

[wilderness]

@E. R. Olovetto

I don’t see how adding “libertarian” is anything but superfluous. I don’t like the term “anarcho-capitalist” for various reasons, and “libertarian” only has meaning in contrast to “anti-human” ideologies.

on libertarian: that seems true. I mean if free-will or choice, I mean we could simply just say human action, but anyways, that does seem to be the case “superfluous”. Yet, what I saw by the libertarian add-on was a criminal has free-will or choice still. They choose to murder, etc… But then that runs counter to violition and they are special pleading. Labeling it with libertarian dismisses the need to explain any further, as we know we are talking about a person that has free-will and strives to universally honor that inherent capability.

on anarcho-capitalist: that seems to be a different story because in real terms (1)anarchy: no-ruler, everybody here for the most part agrees with; (2) capitalist, everybody here again same thing. What I do see with this term is the negative connotations that have piled onto this term. It’s a grand term if the discussioners don’t demean the concept over the semantic issue. This one seems more of a preference than anything to make arguments better and not lose the other person cause 'anarch" is ringing in their ear so they miss out on the whole concept being discussed. Now if Glenn Beck and some others keep saying they are libertarian then it would drop into this negativity too and then we’d have to explain what it means in the face of another person holding all kinds of preconceptual neo-con thoughts on what libertarian now means to them.

[E_R_Olovetto]

Labeling it with libertarian dismisses the need to explain any further, as we know we are talking about a person that has free-will and strives to universally honor that inherent capability.

This is attaching Libertarian values to the epistemic fact though. All I know is how Phys. defined LFW is exactly now mountains of texts define simply “free will”.

Re: AC (sorry not much time), libertarianism or voluntarism doesn’t prohibit “voluntary government” or primitive communal societies. It is more than just the negativity attached to the words. It is separating personal values from legal doctrine.

[intplee]

In my opinion, the concept of free will is usually undefined.

The determinist argues that unless an event is uncaused, it is not freely chosen, since it was determined by its cause; but any explanation of a choice as a non-random event–and a random choice is no choice at all–must invoke some physical or mental cause. Thus, the concept of free will is simply undefined.

Of course, this does not mean that all our choices are predetermined, because the universe may yet be undeterministic.