It’s a strawman. It’s dictating to my philosopical position that it “has” to include the “should”. The premise is analytical in nature, detached from the subject at hand.
Then why don’t you answer it?
Because to do that would shift the discussion. It’s a red herring.
You’re assuming, as I’ve mentioned to you before and Lilburne countless times before, that you’re question is valid. It’s not. Why do I need to have a “should” in the conclusion pertaining to “is’s” in the first place? I told you. Why would I answer a question that is a strawman to begin with?
Because that’s what natural law is. And that’s what logic demands.
But you can’t do it. I know that you can’t. So, I understand your attempt to invalidate the question.
No. That’s not what natural is. See. Misconceptions on your part.
And if logic demanded it, then why can’t it be done? The axiom I’m starting with doesn’t entail such a demand. I guess yours does since it’s your comment on what logic demands.
I never said it could. Yet you said “logic demands it”. Your logic demands it, but mine doesn’t. And there is no polylogic so pertaining to the subject at hand one of us is red herring the discussion, and it’s you as you have yet to demonstrate what the subject under discussion is other than your “demanding” that I answer a question. This is exactly why the question is analytical and detached from the rest of the world. It is not grounded in a particular phenomena other than the fantasy that the question is.
The question is invalid because it has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. Can we get back to the current discussion please?
Isn’t logical positivism amazing? It lets people who are fanatical believers in logical positivism to magically naysay anything they want.
Do you claim to have an axiom (or series of axioms) which can all be formatted “is” and which imply a conclusion that can be formatted “should”?
No
“To clear this up I will need to know what you mean by “is” and what you mean by “ought”.”
…says the guy who frequently accuses me of semantic quibbling.
"Because to do that would shift the discussion. It’s a red herring.
You’re assuming, as I’ve mentioned to you before and Lilburne countless times before, that you’re question is valid. It’s not. Why do I need to have a “should” in the conclusion pertaining to “is’s” in the first place? I told you. Why would I answer a question that is a strawman to begin with?"
As I asked in the original post, if natural rights propositions don’t fit the deductive is/ought formula, then what inferential formula does it fit? And are you telling me that natural rights doctrine in the Aristotelean-Thomist tradition is value-free? That it implies no “oughts”/"should"s? If so, then you must be talking about a different Aristotelean-Thomist tradition than the one Rothbard squarely based his ethics on:
“The natural law, then, elucidates what is best for man – what ends man should pursue”
Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty"
Cool. You don’t believe in natural law, then.
Edit: unless you can provide a different method of deriving a “should” from a series of “is” statements. (Which you can’t do, thanks to logic. Read what I wrote about conclusions containing terms not in the premises.)
“Isn’t logical positivism amazing? It lets people who are fanatical believers in logical positivism to magically naysay anything they want.”
Who here is exhibiting a belief in logical positivism, and how so?
I really did need to know in order to avoid semantic quibbling.
Inferential is the psychological act of discovering implications. I don’t know what you’re asking.
The way you use the term “value-free” yes. Not in terms of Putnam. I needed to know what you mean before I could answer this question and to avoid answering it the way Putnam would.
No. I’m not. You can’t switch paradigms and expect the same answer. I mean I could pull out quotes of Mises saying “evil” this, or “wrong” that, or “good” this. So Mises was a religious fanatic in his economic books? Certainly not, but I’ve taken the time to know what these different paradigms mean. It’s why you need to know what the other person means before you assume. Again, you’re letting the name convolute the actual meaning. You have demonstrated nothing but that throughout this current discussion. Why not take a moment to know what is meant instead of assuming? It’s ok at first, but to repeat the same demonstration continually is not helping this become fruitful. It’s the same exact meaningful underlying event that happened in the discussion in the other thread in reference to socialist theories and debating them. This isn’t to be taken lightly. This isn’t a state of affairs that is quick and easy. Do not under-estimate the philosophical debate at hand, and all that is involved especially when at times the starting points on both sides appear to be further than nearer. Esuric wrote an excellent post concerning this same exact underlying meaning. It is especially significant here. In essence, Rothbard is using the term “should” different than you are interpreting it. He is referring to it in a praxeologic way.
From “Four Critical Replies,” Appendix to The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Kluwer, 1993)
Osterfeld’s fourth objection to my article states that my argument is an instance of ethical naturalism, but that I then seem to fall afoul of the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an “ought” from an “is.” I am willing to accept the first part of this proposition but not the second. What I offer is an entirely value-free system of ethics. I remain exclusively in the realm of is-statements and nowhere try to drive an “ought” from an “is.” The structure of my argument is this: (a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement); (b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement); (c) no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true is statement).
Thus, my refutation of all socialist ethics is a purely cognitive one. And that Rawls or other socialists may still advocate such ethics is completely beside the point. That one plus one equals two does not rule out the possibility that someone says it is three, or that one ought not attempt tomake one plus one equal three the arithmetic law of the land. But all this does not affect the fact that one plus one still is two. In strict analogy to this, I “only” claim to prove that whatever Rawls or other socialists say is false,
and can be understood as such by all intellectually competent and honest men. It does not change the fact that incompetence or dishonesty and evil still may exist and may even prevail over truth and justice.
…
ERO,
Your analogy would only work if your lazy, “But what about Argumentation Ethics?” could even be considered a “swing”. It can’t.
Again, if you want something from me, give me something concrete to respond to that you think undermines my position, even if it’s only a single paragraph, and I’ll respond.
But I don’t write monographs on cue.
…I think my post was a little more substantive than that. I actually thought I was being a bit charitable by not giving you a hard time about some of your previous posts ITT (“non-moralist libertarians”?). I feel a bit embarrased that you are so confused. Let’s read my post again.
Everyone does this [moralizing], even those who claim to be apolitical around here. Still there’s a not-so-fine line between, “I think drinking harms one’s health, therefore I choose not to drink alcohol and you ought not too”, and, “I think drinking harms one’s health, and you are 20.999 years old, therefore you are not able to rationally choose your actions, and I will compel you under the threat of violence to not drink alcohol”.
Instead of round 15 of quote battles with wilderness over “natural law”, I’d still like to see your critique of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics Lilburne. Mises isn’t god and he is wrong on some things. Wilderness is right in differentiating between the natural law Mises talked about and the “rational natural law”. I don’t find the term “natural law” useful except in this type of historical analysis.
There are actions which are either in line with voluntary cooperation (Mises’ “contractual society”) or not (Mises’ “hegemonial society”). This is the delimitation of law from praxeology. Whether Mises, Rothbard, Reinach, Hoppe, etc. had different foundations or their doctrines are seemingly at odds with one another, they are all compatible, and this utterly common-sense, simple solution to age old problems is right there before us to be expanded on.
I really don’t understand what there is to critique about you ignoring my point and saying you don’t have time to write a monograph. I mean, I could repeat myself if this isn’t punchy enough, but you are already dodging, so…
I do refer to natural law. Natural law in the Hoppean way and how I’ve read Rothbard doesn’t refer to a should the way that initial question Lilburne posted does. That’s why the question is invalid. When they do it’s within the paradigm of praxeology. They are praxeologist and some people forget this. Praxeologically natural law doesn’t include “should” the way you are using it. Remember awhile back somebody linked you to an article with Hoppe explaining this. That Kinsella article I linked you before also does this. Realism, which is Aristotelian, means, it’s all about the “is”. It answers “What is?”.
The repetition by some posters on non-issues belays fruitful discussion. It’s why I initially exchanged with you some time back because you actually did have the know-how to by-pass some webs that have been stuck in the way. I honored you for that then, and I do now too. Yet the empasse only arises when semantics takes hold, which I prefer to avoid.
If some people will get over the semantics quibble and take note of the actual meanings being discussed then there is a lot more to this than what Lilburne and you have let on to know.
It bothers me that you accuse us of semantic quibbles when you are purposefully ambiguous in your usage of the term “natural law.”
We don’t need to refer to Rothbard, Hoppe, or Kinsella, because the specifics of the theory do not matter at this point. If your (or their) theory does not result in a definitive “should” statement, then what you have proven is not natural law. It is something else. You have already admitted that you cannot prove a “should” using “is” statements. You cannot maintain that this is true along with any kind of natural law theory.
I’m sorry it bothers you but I have defined it before to you. I defined it in this thread during this same discussion. That’s being semantically clear.
No. Because I am using natural law. You are clinging to your version of what natural law means. Not what mine means and we are, according to what you say here, referring to mine, correct? Not yours.
I’m forgetful. Please define your meaning of ‘natural law’ in a sentence.
_*
Natural rights doctrine says something right? And it doesn’t just assert it, but it at least tries to derive its conclusions as implications of premises right? So then it attempts some kind of inference. I’m asking, if the inferences do not fit the is/ought deductive formula, then what formula do they fit?
_*
What, pray tell, is a praxeologic “should” as distinct from what I’m referring to?
btw, Rothbard makes it very clear in The Ethics of Liberty that natural law doctrine, as he conceives it, is distinct from praxeology.
Furthermore, Rothbard explicitly tried to defend the practice of deriving “ought” from “is” here.
It bothers me that you accuse us of semantic quibbles when you are purposefully ambiguous in your usage of the term “natural law.”
We don’t need to refer to Rothbard, Hoppe, or Kinsella, because the specifics of the theory do not matter at this point. If your (or their) theory does not result in a definitive “should” statement, then what you have proven is not natural law. It is something else. You have already admitted that you cannot prove a “should” using “is” statements. You cannot maintain that this is true along with any kind of natural law theory.
2+2 keeps equalling 4 for me. You can pretend it = 5 all you want. The point is that we call ourselves “human” in distinction to “animals” for a certain reason. Mises talked about it at length in his economic analysis. Punching people in the face as we pass them in the street (no matter how much of a dumbass they appear to be to us) isn’t in line with what Hoppe would call the “process of civilization”. I abhor the term “natural law” only because of the great history of its confused past use.
But we’ll ignore all of what I said and that there might be a rational architectonic that can grow from it. Let’s posit, arguendo, that your charges here are valid, where does that leave -whatever it is you really have to say- about ethics/morality/law in epistemic relation to what we’re saying?
You have way more patience for this than I do, Lilburne.