Jesse,
The definition I use (which is one that fits the tradition) is chalk full of assumptions and therefore meanings. I could provide papers that articulate it in further detail. But this is what I say when I simplify all the assumptions:
intellectual apprehension of reality
It is praxeological in nature, and Aristotle and Aquinas had knowledgeable possession of act.
edit: really didn’t want this to all be italized
That ethics is only possible if you make ethical assumptions.
I rest my case.
Edit: wait, does this ‘reality’ include “should” statements?
That ethics is only possible if you make ethical assumptions.
So you shouldn’t be commenting?
?
Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Argumentation implies that, at the moment of utterance, the speaker values present argumentation over present violence. It implies nothing about the speaker’s present valuations regarding future states of affairs.
A pro-aggression justification is just as much a matter of value-judgment as a libertarian justification is. Therefore, such justifications also can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Hoppe is trying to refute justifications. You cannot refute something that can be neither true nor false in the first place.
"PROPOSITIONS asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.
Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence --I prefer Beethoven to Lehar-- refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition “Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar” may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people."
Mises, Theory and History
?
Lol, poor Jesse.
Understand that natural law is simply a statement of what is. Different theories on what is exist in the world. Some theories are even grounded in the same axioms and at times, include the same deductions. The theories can be very similar at times. So I would say Aristotle’s natural deduction. Axioms, ie. self-evident. Premise-conclusions, ie. logical deductions. Ontological realism
_*
When a person wants to get an apple then they should act certain means to get that apple. If they don’t, yet their goal is the apple, then their means are false. They are not doing what they should do to get the apple. Uncontroversial.
That’s impossible if we are both referring to the axiom human action. It’s an axiom. So it depends on what you mean by praxeology. Where not talking catallitics are we? We are talking about human action I’d assumed. People do act politics, ethics, etc…
"Ethics, or more specifically political philosophy, is the second pillar
of the Rothbardian system, strictly separated from economics, but equally
grounded in the acting nature of man and complementing it to form a
unified sys tern of rationalist social philosophy." - Hoppe’s Intro. of Rothbard’s “Ethics of Liberty”
"Mises:
‘…contend that a social order in which nobody enjoys privileges at the expense of his fellow-citizens could exist without any compulsion and coercion for the prevention of action detrimental to society.’
Indeed, Rothbard wholeheartedly agreed with Mises that without resort to compulsion…" - Hoppe Intro. to Rothbard’s “Ethics of Liberty”.
1 - I wonder what Rothbard meant here. I haven’t read enough on this as there are articles that say an ought can be derived from an is. Here’s one. Putnam said everything is an ought. Everything that a person does, including practice natural sciences, involves value based action. The scientist does something because they ought to as it has so far proved fruitful. So the scientist continues to do what he or she ought to do based on hypothesis that are not even proved to show that they are (is) referring to something that exists. It’s what the discovery of science is all about. I’d have to know what Rothbard meant further on this point. If this could or couldn’t actually be done, then I would like to know. That small footnote doesn’t help explain what he might have meant. It takes more research to fully explain something. One footnote doesn’t possibly discuss the details. But it is a very interesting point. I’ll grant you that. But Rothbard does use the axiom of human action in ethics. It’s an axiom. It’s impossible to be excluded.
2 - Hoppe has shown that the is/ought gap doesn’t even need to be bridged. Hoppe has shown through argumentation ethics that ethics are presupposed in “is-ness”. The is/ought gap isn’t a question with Hoppe.
3 - These are different theories, and since I don’t know what Rothbard meant I can’t readily comment. But Hoppe didn’t find the question to be valid in the first place when it comes to what Hoppe can demonstrate. Thus is the nature of science. Different theories. I personally choose the best and most intellectually sound theory. I don’t know if I would reject Rothbard’s take on this on this point because I don’t know what he meant. But I linked an article that Rothbard had footnoted on how an ought is derived from an is. I haven’t read it. I suggest you read it before making a decision. It would only be good science to know what any one person actually means instead of making the usual ad hoc assumptions you have made throughout this current discussion.
Why did you say you rest your case?
If somebody says, “I should do this.”, then yes. There’s the statement. I wrote it.
I mean what are you really asking? Were you really just asking me to type out a should statement to show you that one exists? Couldn’t you have just done that yourself?
(Note: I added more to my previous post.)
This is where different paradigms come to different conclusions.
What I read when I see “judgments of value” and you saying they are “not existential propositions” in realist terms is not true. If judgments of value do not exist, then why are you talking about them? And my feelings are definitely real.
I said judgments of value cannot be true nor false. I did not say they do not exist.
My judgment that the music of Bach is beautiful can neither be true nor false. Yet the judgment exists.
Ok. That’s how I would say it. So what does this have to do with the current discussion?
Let me clarify: Propositions in realist terms are derived from what is abstract and empirical. The proposition isn’t necessarily only abstract nor empirical. It is both in nature. So my feelings as real terms are not names, there’s a difference. Philosophically as terms ‘my feelings’ is both an abstract and empirical category. It was the word “proposition” that had me wondering.
I’m greatly enjoying this discussion and would like to ask a quick question. I’m really interested in educating myself more on the subject of natural law. Do you guys recommend the natural law collection by Liberty Fund? I’m thinking about asking for it for a gift.
http://www.libertyfund.org/naturallaw.asp
http://www.libertyfundcatalog.com/lg_display.cfm/page/44/catalog/Spring_Summer_2010
I’m not sure. I went to the first link. It depends on what you are interested in. If you go to my profile page I have listed some books.
One book that I would highly recommend is Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s “On Human Nature”. It’s one of the best books I have ever read.
I said judgments of value cannot be true nor false. I did not say they do not exist.
I would say they are true (or false) with regard to the subject to whom they pertain, i.e. it is true (or false) that bacon is good (or, more specifically, provides a relative degree of satisfaction) with regard to the perspective of a given individual. What is neither true, nor false, is the conception that ‘bacon is good’ cosmologically speaking, or that bacon is necessarily good with regard to all subjects, or that bacon is automatically the ‘highest good’ (summum bonnum) to some set of subjects. The latter three are false because they are nonsensical, value only exists with relation to an actual valuer and along his actual scale of values (that is to say, relative to other values).
Liberte,
Exactly. A very good point, which leads right into how I define natural rights. Or better yet, the act of ethics.
This discussion hasn’t even come close to defining ethics in terms of natural law. It is a long way off, possibly. Yet what you say here did help quicken it that way. I know you don’t like natural law, but I’m referring to my ‘valuing’. That in and of itself is really an explicit sentiment to how I interpret a natural right theory.
why is everything in italics now?
Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.’
hurt–piece
Ok. Nevermind. I re-rest my case. If Grayson can’t convince you, there’s no way that I can.
Ok. Nevermind. I re-rest my case. If Grayson can’t convince you, there’s no way that I can.
Never try to convince people of moral, religious or political propostions (as though there were a difference), especially on the internet. These things are intimately bound up with socio-biological factors like heirarchical assertion, atavism and signaling: people are hard wired to resist change. They are more likely to change their opinions if everyone stops talking to them than if people actually debate them; because if people stop paying attention to them they cease to be effective signaling means.