I agree, and you are not alone. I disagree that it is a highly complicated subject however. I think people starting with a flawed premise end up having to compensate with complicated theory.
Well, the courts serve us, so couldn’t we just leave this up to us, and not some theory? Couldn’t people act within the libertarian ethic?
I think this way out of the issue of resolving conflict may only be available to subjective ethicists. An objective ethics position implies objective justice. It gets real murky for objective ethicists if any subjectivism is introduced like the family of a murdered person forgiving the murderer because I think scenarios like that are a perfect example why the two eyes for an eye system is unworkable (IMO) and simplistic.
Does this mean that we couldn’t consistently take a rights-based approach to other issues, such as property rights? It seems as though the punishment issue reveals that rights don’t ‘exist’ in any cosmic sense. Do rights turn into something completely pragmatic; something that we can adopt when we’re talking about property, and then abandon when we’re talking about punishment?
who are all (or the major) ‘natural rights-free’ Anarcho-Austrians? and the major writings on it. Seems like major ‘consequentialist Austro-libertarians’ were of the minarchist variety (Hayek, Mises). One of the only consequentialist libertarian anarchist that I know of is David Friedman, and he isn’t an Austrian.
no disrespect to Grayson, but I don’t think he fits into the ‘major’ category (YET )
this seems to be something that needs to be worked on. I am not saying that the more ‘deontological’ types don’t also have arguments that anarchy would lead to a better off situation, I just think that anarcho-austrians would have a stronger case if it was made on purely consequentialist grounds.
At the risk of stirring up more trouble, I believe that subjective ethics will be better at resolving conflicts simply because it has an ability to compromise, which objective ethics does not. A believer in brand X of objective ethics not only believes that all followers of this particular set of ethics are right in good, but that all disbelievers and non-followers are bad and evil. It’s not hard to imagine that with such a binary view of things that conflict between groups is inevitable. It’s not unlike conflicts between different religions, different ideologies, or different tribes unable to communicate with each other since they speak completely different languages.
Subjective ethics, on the other hand, sees things as they are: a spectrum, with shades between white and black, and therefore a possibility of meeting a middle ground. It acknowledges a degree of support for the other person’s position, from their own worldview. It’s the difference between a blade of grass bending and a dry stick breaking in half.
Since this is also the reality of the world that we live in today; that law varies from place to place and culture to culture; I submit that a panarchic world order would do better in respecting these differences insofar as they are voluntary, rather than using force to alter people’s behavior. Even the idea of voluntarism runs into difficulty; at what age do we start treating children as adults? When do they get the right to be free from parental authority? What if someone is intoxicated; can we restrain them by force from getting behind the wheel of a car? What if they only had a few beers? At what point are we justified in using force to invade someone’s property? There is no way to force a common set of law on a very diverse set of people, so, IMO, better to let people’s subjective preferences decide what is good and what is bad through market forces, rather than dictating it from above and saying that such and such is the only “good” system.
I agree with your observation about the efficiacy of subjective ethics. But I would go a step further. Subjective values are necessary for market exchanges to happen, and they are how law and legal outcomes will be determined and valued in a truly libertarian order.
It does make sense. Think of libertarian law (with or without government), the common objective is letting freedom bring better working society. If we have no judgement on how people should live their lives, why on law or ethics? Isn’t that what anarchic law is supposed to be about?
The term “anarchic law” doesn’t make sense. Anarchy describes a free market in law, not the content of law. Yes, in anarchy, the laws (and punishments) will reflect the norms of the individuals in society, but we can still discuss the ideal libertarian law. Think of it as the kind of law you would like to see offered on the market, for whatever reason. As libertarians, we think laws should be based off the homesteading principle and voluntary exchanges… that is the essence of what a libertarian wants. As libertarians, what principles do we think punishments should be based on? That is what this thread is about, and what is up for debate… Roderick Long, Walter Block and Stephan Kinsella all have different, nuanced opinions on this.
All this is seperate from ethics, by the way. It doesn’t matter whether you think ethics is objective or subjective… the questions in the OP are still meaningful and interesting. You support the homesteading principle, for some reason. What principle for punishment do you support? Retribution? Restitution?
Note: this is also seperate from matters of jurisprudence. “At what point…?”, “At what age…?” are matters of jurisprudence. It is a continuum issue. We cannot answer this exactly from our armchairs. This doesn’t make it a waste of time talking about the principle of when force is justified and when it is not. Likewise, we can discuss the principles of punishment without specifying precisely what punishment must be given in any set of circumstances.
Further Note: this is all just speculation, in the sense that ultimately the punishments that are delivered in an anarchic society will depend on consumer demand, i.e. social norms. But the same is true of all libertarian theory! That doesn’t stop us talking about libertarian theories and ideals.
^Re: “Austrian law”, “libertarian law”, or “praxeological law” (I ultimately prefer “human law” and I agree that “anarchic law” doesn’t make sense).
trulib makes some pretty good points, probably some things there I was going to touch on in my response I never finished. Value judgments are subjective, but anyone who contrives whatever reason for that ruling out an aprioristic doctrine of right must also deny the validity of all of Mises’ work on economics, because it uses essentially the same methodology.
From an insurer’s perspective, I’d say that it would make a lot of difference whether the aggression was perpetrated in accident or with full intent. A guy that shoots willingly, is much more likely to do it again, while accidents, especially tragic ones, almost never happen twice by the same guy. So, in terms of premium for liability insurance, I say it makes a lot of difference.
And that again, if you have to convince a relative of the victim to forgive the perpetrator against a sum of money, it’s far easier (and hence cheaper) to do so if the aggression was accidental. I really don’t see how a father could forgive the rapist-murderer of his 9-years old daughter for any sum, but vehicular manslaughter would be easier. So again, it does make quite a difference.
I’d like someone to articulate an argument that convinces me because I haven’t seen one. I’m not invested in any position except the one which makes sense, so if there is a better way to understand this topic, I am hungry for that knowledge.
Also, the appeal to Mises is a little .. sketchy. I am not afraid to challenge Mises, Rothbard, Jesus or anyone else on ideas. So I am not particularly concerned about denying the validity of something I do not believe is sound. However, it seems to be a big leap to claim that we can calculate optimal values (right) aprioristically since the very definition of right is subjective.
For other Austrian essays related to Reinach see this by Sechrest or this by Hoppe. Also on “subjective ethics” Mises’ Theory and History, Hoppe’s Four Critical Replies and at least read appendices 7-9 of this by Menger.
For how phenomenology relates to Austro-libertarianism see Gordon’s review of Prytchiko’s book here, at least pgs. 7-10 of this by Barry Smith, chapter 10 of Smith’s book on Austrian philosophy especially pgs 5, 23-33.
However, it seems to be a big leap to claim that we can calculate optimal values (right) aprioristically since the very definition of right is subjective.
This isn’t what is going on. How do we know anything about economics, since the driving force behind human action is individual, subjective valuations?
