Suppose that A points a gun at B’s head and says to B: “Kill C, otherwise I will kill you”. Suppose B kills C. Question: is B responsible for murder, and is A responsible?
To me, the answer is clearly that B is innocent and A is responsible for murder; the reason why B is innocent is that B was not acting of his own free will. Why? because he was under threat of invasive acts, so by definition he was not free.
So far I expect any libertarian who has read “The Ethics of Liberty” to agree. But now let’s change the scenario: suppose A says to B “Kill C, otherwise I will slap you in the face”. Suppose B kills C. Question: is B innocent and A responsible, just like before? In other words, is there no difference with the previous scenario?
Person A has shown that he is a psychopath by his threat. This means you should definitely not shoot C. You have simply no reason to believe anything he’s saying. His promise to not shoot you if you kill cannot be believed. Similarly, his threat to kill you can also not be believed.
and what would be the general rule? Maybe that someone is only responsible for the invasive act that he actually threatened, not for the consequences of his act in general? But this won’t work: If I steal your horse, and as a result you die, I am responsible for murder, even though I did not threaten to kill you. So what’s the general rule?
There was a really good article on this site about culpability and punishment and such. Someone who threatens to kill in order to force someone to kill is guilty of murder.
As for the horse, the person is not necessarily guilty of murder. If I steal your horse under circumstances such that one could not reasonably expect you to die, but you still die, I would hold me guilty of theft and I would have to pay damages for your death. However, if I steal your horse under circumstances such that your death was a very real possibility - say, in the middle of the desert - then I would have to pay damages for your death and your heirs would have the right to take vengeance as well.
An ethical system which accepted this would not be workable at common law. The harm envisioned must exceed or at least equal the harm caused in order to raise a defense of duress. It must also be immanent and otherwise inescapable, which would call into question B’s ability to kill C while he is allegedly incapable of otherwise defending against or evading A’s expected slap.
I’m fully in agreement with the Criminal Code of Canada. In this case, both A and B are culpable and guilty: B because he directly kills C, and A, because he uses B as an indirect means to kill C. The fact that B is having his rights violated doesn’t in somehow give him the right to to violate C. Two wrongs don’t make a right.