Inalienability of the self

[gotlucky]

@Autolykos

I thought I did address the second quote, at the very least. It seems to be a presupposition beyond the non-aggression and self-ownership principles to say that a contract is binding if and only if it involves at least one transfer of title. I don’t see how that notion can be logically derived from those principles per se. As I said before, whether the slave changes his mind doesn’t have to be relevant. If his master is considered to have any right to coerce him (i.e. use or threaten physical force against him), then such coercion cannot logically constitute aggression.

I explain how the various main concepts of libertarianism do originate from the NAP in this post. We respect other people’s claims of property so that they will respect ours. Estoppel is a very relevant and useful theory in understanding property. If A doesn’t respect B’s house, A can’t complain when B doesn’t respect A’s house in return. So, A repects B’s house and B respects A’s house. Most of society is okay with this. Fortunately, the criminals in society who do not respect others are a small percentage of society.

So, now that we have established property, we can see what titles are. Titles are the rights of ownership. Suppose A owns a house. He expects B to respect that house. Now, if A transfers the title to B, he is saying that B now has the right of ownership over the house. If A violates the house in some way, he is saying that he does not respect B’s rights of ownership to the house. So titles are very relevant to reciprocation.

If A sells his house to B, but then doesn’t actually give the house to B, he has defrauded B. A is saying that he does not respect B’s claims to either the money or the house (or both). So B has no reason to respect A’s claims either.

Titles are essential to contracts. In other words, a contract without some transfer of title is just an informal agreement. For example, A and B might agree to not insult each other, and let’s suppose they sign a document saying that they won’t insult each other. What happens when A insults B? What has A taken from B? Certainly, if we were to follow reciprocity, B can insult A, but what else can he do? Can B hit A? No.

We could assume that the title-theory of contracts is separate from the NAP, but it can be derived from it.

@Autolykos

As I said before, whether the slave changes his mind doesn’t have to be relevant. If his master is considered to have any right to coerce him (i.e. use or threaten physical force against him), then such coercion cannot logically constitute aggression.

Here is a post that I wrote in response to Papirius that I think addresses this.

@Autolykos

Regarding the first quote, presupposing body-alienability in order to prove it is indeed question-begging, but I don’t see why body-alienability has to be proven. What’s meant by “body-alienability” anyway? I think the question is really about whether a given right can be considered to contain “sub-rights”. For example, if one is considered to have the right to life, does that mean he has separate “sub-rights” to not be killed by A, B, C, etc.? And can those “sub-rights” be considered separable - that is, can the overall right to life be considered divisible in any way?

I think the main point is that when someone violates your body, that is aggression. Certainly, you can allow them to use violence, but violence does not equal violate. Rothbard and Kinsella argue for inalienability based on control, but I’m beginning to think that the best response is to refer to reciprocity, which is what the NAP is all about. Certainly, you can alienate your rights regarding your body, but that is a question of legality. Does the legal system you are in allow for this? But that is not really the question, because we are asking an ought question.

The question becomes, if A ceases to respect B’s claim to own A, then reciprocation is B ceases to respect A’s claim to own B. Papirius objected to this because what if A never claims to own B. So what? That is not the point of reciprocal justice. And this is why “voluntary” slavery has no place in a system with the NAP as a principle. There is just simply no retribution to be had. If A pokes out B’s eye, then B may poke out A’s eye. There can be retribution. But there is no retribution regarding slave contracts, insofar as we are concerned with reciprocal justice (i.e. the NAP).

So, certainly one could say that he has a right to life, but he is going to alienate that right so that another may help him commit suicide, or maybe he is going to duel with another. But these are still voluntary. There has been no crime yet.

@Autolykos

Certainly such has often been presumed for other forms of property. I see no reason why it can’t be logically extended to human beings, unless it’s simply assumed that it can’t be.

I’m goint to restate it for clarity’s sake: I think we end up assuming something like inalienability because there is just no reciprocal justice to be had if someone ceases to respect slave contracts. If we don’t take the NAP/ethic of reciprocity/golden rule as our starting point, then we could certainly assume that a body is alienable.

@Autolykos

Where is that quote from? Earlier in this thread?

Conza88 actually provided the link in this post.

@Autolykos

Basically, I don’t think a person has to commit aggression in order to alienate one or more of his rights. I think a person can do so freely as well. Furthermore, an individual can only alienate his own rights. For him to alienate someone else’s rights is just as illegitimate to me as someone trying to alienate another’s property. Note that this means I don’t consider a valid contract to be one where at least one transfer of title is stipulated. Rather, I consider a valid contract to be one where at least one assignment of right is stipulated. This includes, but is not limited to, transfers of title (unless one considers “title” to mean the same thing as “right”).

I think a better way of stating what Kinsella said is: When you commit aggression, you are stating that you believe whatever act you did to be okay. When your victim comes along and seeks retribution, you cannot complain (legally) about this, as you have already demonstrated that you believe it is rightful behavior. So you alienate your rights in the sense that you are saying that if you were acting rightfully, then someone else doing the same thing to you would be acting rightfully.