Inalienability of the self

Autolykos,

So, I’ve been thinking more about the is-ought problem and rights, so I’m going to do two things. First, I’m going to try to summarize our discussion accurately. Second, I’m going to try an answer that should satisfy both of us.

So, my argument started as this: If a certain scenario occurs, then we can say that someone is acting rightfully in this situation. This cannot occur, so we cannot say whether someone is acting rightfully. So, this is an invalid argument. It’s form is: If p, then q. Not p, therefore not q. So it’s an invalid attempt at modus ponens.

I believe your response to this has more or less been, “Let’s just assume q. There is no reason why we can’t. After all, people can have opinions.” So, I ended up responding, “If p, then q. Not p, so it’s a moot point.” (Okay, I didn’t quite say it like that, but it’s the essence of my response.)

As we have both agreed, rights are just another way of saying who is acting rightfully in any given situation. I think there is a way to refine this. If a situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully. That is what rights are. It should mean the same thing as “who is acting rightfully in any given situation”. I suppose the only difference is instead of saying, “When this situation occurs, this is who is acting rightfully,” we are saying, “If this situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully.”

So, while we can’t solve the is-ought problem, we can say that it is a moot point. Certainly we can say that if Kryptonians exist and Kryptonite is poisonous to them, then these are the rights involving such a scenario. So long as there aren’t Kryptonians and all that jazz, then it’s a moot point. No one can be acting rightfully regarding Kryptonite and Kryptonians as they don’t exist. But should they exist, then these would be the rights involved.

So, did I sum up our arguments accurately? And what do you think of this answer?