I’m sorry, what? In what way is it an unsupported claim to say that “Slavery concerns aggression”? I provided a definition of slavery. So, by definition, slavery concerns aggression. This is not unsupported.
And in what way had I not supported the claim that “the inalienability of the will has to do with ‘voluntary slavery’”? We both stipulated to the fact that the inalienability of the will has nothing to do with plain old regular slavery. And I know I quoted Rothbard’s arguments and made my own regarding the lack of transfer of title regarding “voluntary slavery”.
So, actually, it is clear that when you make this accusation that, wait for it, you did not read the thread like you claimed. Why are you lying about reading it? What do you hope to gain?
Again, it is clear that, and wait for it, you did not read the thread. I don’t understand why you felt you had to lie about reading it. It’s really strange to me.
Rothbard is saying that there is no valid contract without a transfer of title. He is also saying that once there is a transfer of title, you have a right to your title, as it is your property. I think wikipedia actually has a good explanation of what a title is:
In other words, the title demonstrates that you have property rights in whatever it is that the title is for.
Yeah, I think this get’s cleared up once you read the definition of title. Let me know if you don’t think it does.
Yeah, I think wikipedia has a good definition. I really like how wikipedia explains that there are different concepts of rights: legal, moral, and just. It uses more words, but the explanation is the same as mine.
Well, this all depends upon your definitions of these words. I’m using the standard definitions. If you look up the definitions of moral, morality, ethic, ethics, ethically, etc., you’ll see that they all have to do with right and wrong behavior. Wikipedia defines ethics as “moral philosophy”. Rothbard also uses the word “moral” to contrast it with his sense of just rights. And Rothbard is using the word “moral” in the standard way.
Anyway, there are those 3 categories of how to understand rights, whatever you want to call them.
I see what you are saying. Let me rephrase. All rights must be understood in at least one of the following categories: legal rights, moral rights, and just rights.
You can certainly categorize rights into male rights and female rights, but even those must be understood in context of the aforementioned categories. In other words, we might say that women have a right to an abortion, but in what sense? Let’s look at Ron Paul on the issue. He has made it clear that he believes that abortion as a legal right should be left in the hands of the individual states. He has also stated that he is morally against abortion. As far as I know, he has been ambiguous (perhaps purposely) about the just rights of the issue.
So yes, we can say that there are male rights and female rights, but we must still view those in context of the 3 categories above.
Well, there can be truth found in claims on legal rights. So I assume you are talking about one’s conception of just or moral rights. I’ll explain a little more of what I’m trying to say further in, but I want to address some of your other points first:
As I stated, there are certainly legal rights. So, no one had a legal right of way in the sky in Ancient Rome. Part of what I’m trying to say is that if a dispute never arises, then one’s opinions on how things ought to be are totally irrelevant.
Someone can certainly claim to have a right to whatever. I’m trying to think of another way of putting what I’m trying to say. Suppose there actually are such a thing as Kryptonians and Kryptonite, and they have a population on Earth. What could we say about people’s right to bear Kryptonite? Kryptonite is poisonous to Krypotonians, and possibly even lethal. Would we have the right to bear Kryptonite in public? Would it have to remain locked in lead at all times?
There are all sorts of rights we could derive about Kryptonians, based on the NAP or whim. But there aren’t any Kryptonians. So there are no rights regarding them. At best, we can say that should there be such beings known as Kryptonians and such a material known as Kryptonite, then we can say what their rights would be in such a situation. But these situations do not exist. We can have opinions about what we think should happen if they were to exist, but they don’t. So our opinions are about imaginary scenarios.
There is nothing inherently right or wrong about having opinions on imaginary scenarios, and some of these scenarios might be possible. But we aren’t saying that Kryptonians have a right to not be aggressed against with Kryptonite. We are saying, should Kryptonians exist, they have a right to not be aggressed against with Kryptonite.
The will cannot be transferred. At best, we can say that should the will be alienable, contracts regarding the will should be enforceable. Should the will be alienable, people would have the right to take the wills that they have title to. But the will is not alienable, so people don’t have the right.
This won’t stop someone from having an opinion, but that doesn’t mean that there are actual rights involving the will.
Sorry that I’m not responding to the rest of your post, but I think this section does address the rest of your points. Let me know what you think.
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY implies the right to make contracts about that property: to give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the property of another person. Unfortunately, many libertarians, devoted to the right to make contracts, hold the contract itself to be an absolute, and therefore maintain that anyvoluntary contract whatever must be legally enforceable in the free society. Their error is a failure to realize that the right to contract is strictly derivable from the right of private property, and therefore that the only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the sanction of legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide by the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. But this can only be true if we hold that validly enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been transferred, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means that the other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without the consent of the former (implicit theft). Hence, this proper libertarian theory of enforceable contracts has been termed the “title-transfer” theory of contracts.
I’m familiar with this passage. I support the title transfer theory of contract. What I reject is the claim that somehow a voluntary slavery contract does not involve a transfer of title. It most certainly does: namely, title to the property which is the slave’s body.
Why is it that you think that no title transfer occurs in the case of a voluntary slavery contract?
If you’re unsure about how to prove such a claim as you’ve made, you could consider comparing the case of the voluntary slavery contract with some other case of contract where you do believe title has been transferred, and identify the distinction between the two. Since I already provided a simple example of a creditor-debtor relationship and loan contract, perhaps you could compare that with the voluntary slave contract, and explain why the former involves title transfer but not the latter.
…or, alternatively, you could just keep repeating your unsupported claim while accusing me of not reading the thread. Is that working for you?
It’s like I’m talking to a fucking wall. What part about this passage don’t you understand:
Let me make this simple for you. You have completely ignored this passage at least 3 times. Now, if you believe that this is not a valid argument, you have to explain why. It is not enough for you to just ignore it. Is there a reason why you have ignored it 3 times now?
Wait, my mistake.
You ignored it 4 times. JJ also posted it. You would know this had you read the thread. You are a fucking troll.
Apparently, to your mind, disagreeing with your claims and repeatedly asking you to substantiate them equates to ignoring them. Reread this sentence for full comprehension.
There is no transfer of title in Smith’s agreement, because Smith’s control over his own body and will are inalienable. Since that control cannot be alienated, the agreement was not a valid contract, and therefore should not be enforceable. Smith’s agreement was a merepromise, which it might be held he is morally obligated to keep, but which should not be legally obligatory.
What does “control over his own body and will” mean? Does it mean the ability to will his body into motion and to willfully control the content of his own mind? If so, then that is precisely not what is being transferred in a voluntary slavery contract. You are attacking a strawman. You define slavery contrary to what slavery actually is: namely, control by one person over another’s body (which means the right to use violence against that body), not control by one person over another’s will.
Two questions:
Is the right to use violence* against a piece of matter a property right?
*N.B. To own property is to have the exclusive right to use that property, and in whatever way one pleases. To “use violence against” your own property is merely a subset of “to use” you own property.
Can this right be transferred by contract?
N.B. Does any of this sound familiar? Do you realize I’m chasing you in circles? That my original comments were entirely relevant, and you just didn’t grasp the connection?
No. You ignored this quote numerous times. When you do so, it leaves me to believe that you have not read it. Especially considering when you asked me to substantiate, this is one of the ways I did it. So, when you ignore what I use to substantiate, what do you think I’m going to think of you? I can tell you what I’m not going to think: that you are criticizing what I am using to substantiate.
Well, this is a very interesting question, “what does control over his own body and will mean”? Well, let’s look at my response to you when you brought this up before:
Now let’s look at your response:
My response:
Well, since that response didn’t work the first time, I’ll go with a different one. Controlling a body does not mean using violence to coerce someone into doing what you want. No matter how much a slave owner wants to “control” the body of his slave, he cannot. The body of the slave will only do what the slave wants it to do. Take Frederick Douglass. Not only did he actually fight with and beat up one of his overseers, he also ran away from his owner. Note how he did this against what his slave owner wanted? This is because the control of the body cannot be transferred. It’s not possible.
Remember when Clayton stated that a man can still wave his arms and legs around in self-defense, even if he “transferred” his control? This is because control was never actually transferred.
However, don’t forget that people can transfer body parts, such as a kidney. But one can alienate a kidney. You cannot alienate your body. That is not possible.
A “voluntary” slave contract entails “transferring” control of one’s body to another person. This is an impossibility. This does not mean that it cannot exist legally. After all, there are plenty of societies that have had slavery. What it means is that it is incompatible with the title-transfer theory of contracts, which is the proper NAP libertarian theory of contracts.
If you go back and read our conversation, you will note that this is actually the first time you are addressing this point by Rothbard, that there has been no transfer of title of body, as control of the body cannot be alienated. This is why I was frustrated with you. You made several posts stating that I needed to demonstrate that it was inalienable, when all you had to do was just read the thread. You are now finally quoting the passage where Rothbard claims control of one’s body cannot be transferred, and thus any contract stating such is invalid.
Perhaps I was too harsh on you, but you should really make a good faith effort to read what people have written already when asked. It took 4 times to get you to address this point when it should have only taken 1 time.
The important thing to realize is that any “voluntary slavery” contract requires constant consent from the slave. This is the result of an inalienable mind and body and will, or whatever you want to call it. When a person agrees to be a slave and do his master’s bidding, he never really transfers control of his mind or body or will or whatever you want to call it. This is Rothbard’s point. There was no actual transfer. The master still requires the slave to consent to anything. And if the slave ever rescinds his consent, then the only way to force the slave (of course, some slaves may rebel until murdered) would be through aggression. Why is it aggression and not just plain old regular violence? Because there was no transfer of title to the slaves body.
As I said before, one might be able to argue that certain body parts can be transferred as they are alienable, but something seems quite off about this. But, even if we had a successful transfer of title regarding an eye or a kidney, the body as a whole cannot be transferred. Someone could transfer control of a kidney, and maybe eye transplants will be done (perhaps they already are, though I have not heard of any), but the mind/body as a whole cannot be transferred.
I undertand that you are trying to say that a slave owner believes he owns the will of his slave, but that is not Rothbard’s point. Rothbard is just pointing out that the control has never been transferred, and that is what slavery is about: who is rightfully in control of any given body. That rightful (just) control cannot be transferred [legal control can be transferred so long as the legal system allows for it].
I understand that this is rambling, but I really have no idea how to get this point across to you if you haven’t already gotten it from reading Rothbard. Rothbard’s theory is based on title-transfer. Without an actual transfer of title to the body (remember, the owner still doesn’t control it), the contract is invalid. Enforcing such a contract would require aggression. Thus is it incompatible with the NAP and libertarianism.
So, I’ve been thinking more about the is-ought problem and rights, so I’m going to do two things. First, I’m going to try to summarize our discussion accurately. Second, I’m going to try an answer that should satisfy both of us.
So, my argument started as this: If a certain scenario occurs, then we can say that someone is acting rightfully in this situation. This cannot occur, so we cannot say whether someone is acting rightfully. So, this is an invalid argument. It’s form is: If p, then q. Not p, therefore not q. So it’s an invalid attempt at modus ponens.
I believe your response to this has more or less been, “Let’s just assume q. There is no reason why we can’t. After all, people can have opinions.” So, I ended up responding, “If p, then q. Not p, so it’s a moot point.” (Okay, I didn’t quite say it like that, but it’s the essence of my response.)
As we have both agreed, rights are just another way of saying who is acting rightfully in any given situation. I think there is a way to refine this. If a situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully. That is what rights are. It should mean the same thing as “who is acting rightfully in any given situation”. I suppose the only difference is instead of saying, “When this situation occurs, this is who is acting rightfully,” we are saying, “If this situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully.”
So, while we can’t solve the is-ought problem, we can say that it is a moot point. Certainly we can say that if Kryptonians exist and Kryptonite is poisonous to them, then these are the rights involving such a scenario. So long as there aren’t Kryptonians and all that jazz, then it’s a moot point. No one can be acting rightfully regarding Kryptonite and Kryptonians as they don’t exist. But should they exist, then these would be the rights involved.
So, did I sum up our arguments accurately? And what do you think of this answer?
Again, you are defining “control of the body of the slave” as “control of the will of the slave.” If “control of the will of the slave” were a necessary component of slavery, slavery could never have existed, because such control is impossible, correct? But, slavery obviously did exist, and therefore “control of the will of the slave” cannot possibly be a necessary component of slavery, correct? Hence I say you are defining slavery contrary to what slavery actually is, and then attacking that strawman.
You’ve expressed the following idea repeatedly:
No matter how much a slave owner wants to “control” the body of his slave, he cannot. The body of the slave will only do what the slave wants it to do. Take Frederick Douglass. Not only did he actually fight with and beat up one of his overseers, he also ran away from his owner. Note how he did this against what his slave owner wanted? This is because the control of the body cannot be transferred. It’s not possible.
And I have stated repeatedly that I agree with you: transferring control of the will of the slave to the master is impossible. But this has nothing to do with slavery (voluntary or involuntary), because slavery does not in any way involve or pretend to involve transfer of control of the will of the slave to the master.
A “voluntary” slave contract entails “transferring” control of one’s body to another person. This is an impossibility.
If by “transferring control of one’s body to another person” you mean “transferring control of one’s will to another person,” then yes, it is impossible. However, that is not what slavery actually involves.
This does not mean that it cannot exist legally. After all, there are plenty of societies that have had slavery. What it means is that it is incompatible with the title-transfer theory of contracts, which is the proper NAP libertarian theory of contracts.
If I understand you correctly, you seem to be saying that the reason voluntary slavery is illegitimate per the title transfer theory of contract is that the title supposedly being transferred (title to the will of the slave) cannot actually be transferred. Thus there is no actual transfer of title, and no legitimate contract.
Again, I press you to appreciate that title to the will of the slave is not what is supposed to be transferred in a voluntary slave contract. Title to the physical body of the slave is what is supposed to be transferred. And it can be transferred.
Consider: I buy title to your physical body. I cannot “control your body” in the sense you mean (i.e. control your will), sure, but so what? If I buy title to a horse, I am buying title to the physical body of the horse, not to its will. The fact that I cannot control the will of the horse in no way means that I didn’t obtain title to its physical body.
Finally:
However, don’t forget that people can transfer body parts, such as a kidney. But one can alienate a kidney. You cannot alienate your body. That is not possible.
Possible in what sense? Alienation is a legal concept, it has nothing to do with physical separation. It is certainly possible to alienate your body (exhibit A: slavery has existed). What is impossible is for anyone to physically separate themselves from their body: but that has nothing to do with slavery.
The important thing to realize is that any “voluntary slavery” contract requires constant consent from the slave. This is the result of an inalienable mind and body and will, or whatever you want to call it. When a person agrees to be a slave and do his master’s bidding, he never really transfers control of his mind or body or will or whatever you want to call it.
Regarding the underlined passage, that’s true. Likewise, when I sign a loan contract obligating myself to repay a certain amount to the creditor, I don’t alienate my will to him. Yet I still have an obligation to repay him, regardless of whether I change my mind later, correct? The creditor does not need my constant consent to collect the money I owe him, correct? He can collect the money I owe him without my consent, even using violence (it’s violence but not aggression because, by definition, it is legitimiate violence being used by the creditor to obtain his rightful property), correct?
There was no actual transfer.
There was no transfer of will. There was a transfer of title to the physical body of the slave.
The master still requires the slave to consent to anything. And if the slave ever rescinds his consent, then the only way to force the slave (of course, some slaves may rebel until murdered) would be through aggression. Why is it aggression and not just plain old regular violence? Because there was no transfer of title to the slaves body.
But there was a transfer of title to the slaves body. The fact that the will is inalienable, and the will was not and cannot be transferred, has absolutely nothing to do with transfer of title ot the slave’s body. His body is no different than that of a horse. And the fact that he can use his body contrary to the wishes of its new owner (the slavemaster) is no more signifcant than the fact that a horse can use its body (e.g. run away) contrary to the wishes of its owner.
Your argument, which I am criticizing, is “the will cannot be transferred, therefore a transfer of title to the body is also impossible.” Non sequitur, unless you believe that the will and body are identical.
As I said before, one might be able to argue that certain body parts can be transferred as they are alienable, but something seems quite off about this. But, even if we had a successful transfer of title regarding an eye or a kidney, the body as a whole cannot be transferred. Someone could transfer control of a kidney, and maybe eye transplants will be done (perhaps they already are, though I have not heard of any), but the mind/body as a whole cannot be transferred.
As I mentioned earlier, you seem to be confusing the idea of alienation with the idea of physical separation. Alienation concerns a transfer pof property rights: it has nothing to with physical movement/separation. That it is physically impossible for anyone to separate themselves from their body (separate their body from their will/self) in no way means that it is impossible for the physical body to be alienated from the will/self. What is physically possible has no necessary relation to whether something is ethical/legal. (Others have repeatedly made this same point to you in this thread)
I undertand that you are trying to say that a slave owner believes he owns the will of his slave
What?! Thatis the exact opposite of what I’m saying. I am saying that a slave owner DOES NOT think he controls the will of the slave (unless this slave owner happens to be insane). What he thinks he owns (and does, if he bought it through a valid contract) is the body of the slave.
Rothbard is just pointing out that the control has never been transferred, and that is what slavery is about
Control of the body as you define it (control of the will) is impossible, and that is NOT what slavery is about. It is about control of the body in the sense I mean, i.e. ownership over the physical body. You appreciate that owning something and controlling its will are entirely distinct? Do you control your dog’s will? Do you own him?
who is rightfully in control of any given body
Now, you just got done talking about how it is physically impossible to alienate the will, and here you talk about rights. Rightsd have nothing to do with physical possibility. You are again mixing up the realm of and is and the realm of ought.
I’m going to put your argument into syllogistic form:
The will is inalienable
A valid contract requires actual title transfer
Therefore: A contract pretending to transfer title to the will is invalid
(I’m with you so far…but then)
Therefore: a voluntary slavery contract is invalid.
You see: your entire argument rests on the assumption that slavery involves transfer of the will, which (as I already demonstrated) it cannot and does not.
If you define slavery as “ownership over the physical body of a person by some other person” you’re argument changes to this (my argument):
The will is inalienable
A valid contract requires actual title transfer
A voluntary slavery contract involves transfer of title to the body of the slave
Therefore: a voluntary slavery conytract is valid.
N.B. that point #1 is entirely superfluous, as I keep pionting out (inalienability has nothing to do with this issue).
In the first page of this thread, JJ posted a quote by Rothbard where he defined the will:
The most important part for you apparently is the body aspect of the will. The will is the mind and body. In other words, it is impossible to transfer control of the mind and body to another person.
Speaking of straw men, this is a good example of one. I have repeatedly stated that no slave owner believes that he is controlling the will of his slave. The point of the will is to demonstrate that controlling another person always requires aggression. If you could actually transfer control, then we’d be having a different conversation.
Slavery is involuntary servitude. It requires aggression. Voluntary servitude is an oxymoronic phrase. Once the “slave” takes back his consent, it is no longer voluntary. The point of the will (mind and body), is to show that control of the mind and control of the body cannot be transferred. I have never stated that slavery involves the actual transfer of the will. I thought I’ve been pretty clear about my belief that that is impossible. I thought I’ve also been pretty clear that slavery requires aggression for it to be slavery. I’ve repeatedly defined it as such.
This is correct. But remember, the will is control of the mind and body. You cannot transfer that control. It is physically impossible.
I think the problem here is your misunderstanding of Rothbard’s definition of “will”. You can define will however you want to, but when you critique Rothbard’s argument, you have to use his definition of will and not your own. Rothbard is saying that you cannot transfer title to the body because the control has never changed. The slave owner still requires constant consent from the slave in order for the slave to actually do anything the slave owner wants.
Well, Rothbard is a natural right’s theorist, and I am not. So I won’t throw his arguments at you for this question, and if you wanted to read his, then you could easily open any of his books. However, there is one chapter on animal rights where he makes a great point: Animals can have rights when they petition for them.
The point of this is that rights have to do with who is acting rightfully. Obviously, vegetarians and vegans believe that animals ought to have rights. I am not one of them. Anyway, rights have to do with who is acting rightfully. Humans have rights because we can actually argue as to who is acting rightfully. Animals cannot do this with either each other or us. At best they can posture and threaten. But they can never reason with each other or us. This is the source of rights (legal rights, we can conceive of whatever we think rights ought to be, but rights as they are come from argumentation).
So, we treat horses as property. But remember, just because you cannot control its will does not mean this is the same thing as voluntary slavery. The point about slavery is that it violates the NAP. Owning a horse does not violate the NAP. The analogy does not work.
Alienation is not only a legal concept. And your exhibit A demonstrates your lack of understanding of the alienation. Slavery does not alienate your body. The master does not literally control the body of the slave. The master still requires the consent (coerced though it may be) of the slave. Slavery requires aggression, not alienation.
Again, just to repeat: I do not believe, nor have I ever stated, that the alienation of the will is what is happening in slavery. The point of alienation is to demonstrate that slavery requires aggression.
Again, this is another thing I have said before: Obviously, it is possible to sell yourself into slavery legally if the law permits it. But that is not what Rothbard is talking about. He is saying that slavery, “voluntary” or involuntary (though he says that voluntary slavery is fine up until the point the slave takes back his consent), is not compatible with the NAP and thus libertarianism. Again, Rothbard makes it clear that it is possible legally, but that is not his point and it also not mine either. The point is that transfer of control of the body did not happen. It can’t be done. The title wasn’t transferred, even if they sign a piece of paper saying that control of the body has been transferred.
Again, obviously you can sign a piece of paper saying that you transfer your body to another and they can do whatever they want. But just because you sign a piece of paper doesn’t mean that you actually transferred the title of your body. Your body still remains in your control. If your master wants you to pick cotton, he still requires your consent (coerced though it may be) for this to happen. Your master requires your constant consent. This is because there has been no transfer of control, and thus no transfer of actual title.
Again, the piece of paper can say there was transfer of title. And legally it can be recognized as such. But a lot of things are legal that are incompatible with the NAP. And this is one of them.
It is now clear that our entire disagreement (or at least the most important part of it) stems from differing definitions of will and body.
You believe will and body are identical.
I do not.
I would say that the will or the self (for the purpose of law [i.e. putting aside philosophical issues]) is the owner of the physical body.
You have signed a contract regarding your alienable property.
…hence, to my mind, a voluntary slavery contract is just that: me (i.e. my self or will or soul or person or whatever you like to call it) signing a contract where I sell my alienable property, my physical body.
Going forward, we need to debate which definition of will/body is better.
The only way to do this is to consider the consequences which follow from adopting each definition.
I believe I can make a reductio ad absurdum argument against your definition equating will and body.
First, though, I’ll ask you to post a precise definition of will/body that you’d like me to use, so that we don’t have any misunderstandings.
N.B. Unless I missed it, Rothbard doesn’t give a precise definition, he just says: “a person cannot alienate his will, more particularly his control over his own mind and body.” So would one say his definition of “will” is “control over one’s own mind and body.” Do you want to use that definition or make your own?
And actually, as I read it, Rothbard does not equate will and body and mind. He says that the will controls both the body and the mind, and for one thing to control another thing suggests that the former and latter are two distinct things.
Is that your view, the will controls both body and mind? Or do you believe that the will, the body, and the mind are all identical (one thing)? That is, three names for one single thing. Or are they all integral and inseparable parts of one thing?
Sometimes I do not mention the word control, but in the post you responded to, I actually did. What I actually said was:
I do not believe so either. Here is what Rothbard said (in the first page of this thread, no less):
This seems to be a good and accurate argument. It also has a good definition of will.
That’s fine, but you cannot use the definition in critiquing Rothbard’s argument, as that would change Rothbard’s argument. You need to go with his definition if you want to critique his argument.
But that’s the point. Your body as a whole cannot be alienated from you. You can alienate your hand, if you so choose. Just chop it off. It’s no longer a part of you. But your body as a whole, while made up of parts that can be alienated, cannot itself be alienated. To say otherwise would be to commit the fallacy of composition.
Well, I see nothing wrong with using Rothbard’s definition, as his argument has been the source of our disagreement.
I believe I can make an accusation that this is a straw man of my definition.
Go with the Rothbard quote JJ provided and that I have requoted.
I am not mixing up the realm of is and ought. My argument is entirely an ought argument. Rothbard made it clear (and I agree with him) that contracts ought to be considered valid only if there is transfer of title. In other words, a contract ought to be considered valid only if there is transfer of title.
So:
There is no is-ought problem here. I am not deriving an ought from an is.
Alienation is not only a legal concept. And your exhibit A demonstrates your lack of understanding of the alienation. Slavery does not alienate your body. The master does not literally control the body of the slave. The master still requires the consent (coerced though it may be) of the slave. Slavery requires aggression, not alienation.
The underlines passage implies that you believe that controlling a unit of property is a necessary condition for owning that unit of property.
Is that your view?
Let’s assume arguendo that will and body are inseparable.
Are you saying that, for A to own B, it would be necessary for A to control both the mind and body of B?
Now, let us consider a more mundane example of property ownership.
In your view, is it necessary for A to control a tractor in order for A to own that tractor?
In other words, is control of the property a necessary condition for property ownership only when the property includes will (as with a person, per your definition which makes will and body somehow inseperable)? Or is control a necessary condition for all instances of property ownership: i.e. even when the property in question is purely body without will (e.g. a tractor)?
Again, just to repeat: I do not believe, nor have I ever stated, that the alienation of the will is what is happening in slavery.
You are saying that, in order for a voluntary slavery contract to be valid, there has to be a title transfer. Such a title transfer (of the will and body as one, per your definition) is impossible. Therefore, a voluntary slavery cannot be valid. I’m saying that your assumption that voluntary slavery would have to involve transfer of title to the will is wrong, and that it would only have to involve transfer of title to the body.
Hence our problem is how each of us defines will/body/ect.
That’s fine, but you cannot use the definition in critiquing Rothbard’s argument, as that would change Rothbard’s argument. You need to go with his definition if you want to critique his argument.
If I were claiming that his argument is invalid (i.e. conclusions don’t logically follow from premises) then you’d be right in saying that I must stick with his premises. But that’s no my claim. I’m claiming that his argument is unsound, not because it’s invalid, but because its conclusions are false (because its premises are false).