Inalienability of the self

Slavery, by definition, is involuntary servitude. Nevermind the oxymoronic term, “voluntary slavery”, the problem is that slavery requires aggression. The will being inalienable is crucial to understanding why slavery is immoral. Any contract “transferring” the will to another is invalid, as the will cannot be transferred. So, if the “slave” ever changes his mind, the only way to enforce such a contract would be to use aggression. And aggression violates the NAP, so slavery, “voluntary” or otherwise, is not compatible with libertarianism.

If you read through the thread, you’ll see that I have some posts about indentured servitude. I believe that indentured servitude is entirely compatible with the NAP and libertarianism, at least in principle. How it has manifested historically is another issue. The key difference between indentured servitude and slavery is that indentured servitude has an actual transfer of title, whereas slavery does not.

Any contract “transferring” the will to another is invalid, as the will cannot be transferred.

I agree, but no slavery contract has anything to do with “transferring the will.” I assure you, no person who ever bought a slave in the past ever expected to gain the ability to move the slave’s limbs with his mind. For you to own a slave is in fact for you to have ownership over his physical body: i.e. you can do with it what you please, as with any other property. It has nothing whatsoever to do with his will.

But suppose for the sake of argument I accept your claim that slavery involves the transference of the will. Alright, such transference is impossible, and therefore it follows that slavery has never existed. Is that your position? If so, then apparently we mean different things by the word “slavery.” Whatever it is that those fellows picking cotton in 1850 S. Carolina were doing, whatever label you would give to their condition, that existed - correct? And obviously that condition did not rest on a transference of the will, because a transference of the will is impossible. So let’s talk about the condition of those folks in S. Carolina, that’s what I mean by “slavery.” We can say that this slavery was characterized by one person’s ability to control the body of another, yes?

So your criticism of slavery cannot be “it’s impossible.”

So, if the “slave” ever changes his mind, the only way to enforce such a contract would be to use aggression.

Suppose that A and B sign a contract whereby A loans B $100, and B agrees to repay $150 in 12 months. After 12 months pass, B does not repay A. Maybe B changed his mind, and no longer wants to have the obligation to A to which he agreed by contract. Is it your contention that if A uses force to compel B to meet his contractual obligation, then A is an aggressor?

If not, then what’s the difference between this case and the case of voluntary slavery?

If so, then are any contracts enforceable in your view?

I’m not even going to bother to respond to your straw men arguments. Just read the thread. If you still have questions, then you can ask them again.

LOL…okie doke.

I’m serious. None of what you said was at all accurate of what I have written in this thread. Your response to me completely missed my point. And it’s clear that you haven’t read the thread because then you would understand this already.

I really hope you read the thread.

You wrote this:

The will being inalienable is crucial to understanding why slavery is immoral. Any contract “transferring” the will to another is invalid, as the will cannot be transferred. So, if the “slave” ever changes his mind, the only way to enforce such a contract would be to use aggression. And aggression violates the NAP, so slavery, “voluntary” or otherwise, is not compatible with libertarianism.

If you read through the thread, you’ll see that I have some posts about indentured servitude. I believe that indentured servitude is entirely compatible with the NAP and libertarianism, at least in principle. How it has manifested historically is another issue. The key difference between indentured servitude and slavery is that indentured servitude has an actual transfer of title, whereas slavery does not.

I responded.

Yes, and your response clearly missed my point. Read the thread. I don’t see why you wouldn’t want to educate yourself.

I read the thread, and your several posts. There is nothing unclear in what you said. I adressed your point.

Read it again, because I never stated that slaves necessarily transferred their will. I stated that “voluntary slave” contracts are invalid. I even wrote, and you quoted this:

What is the meaning of this statement, if not what I supposed?

The will being inalienable is crucial to understanding why slavery is immoral.

What is the significance to your mind of the inalienability of the will for the question of whether voluntary slavery is moral?

Slavery can only be enforced by aggression. There is no other possibility. And “voluntary slavery” is no different.

Slavery can only be enforced by aggression

Why? I refer you to my creditor-debtor example above (which, gee whiz, is perfectly relevant to this claim you just made, and the one you made before to which I posted that example as a response…)

Well, I’ll just conclude with this.

Inalienability of the will has no bearing whatsoever on the question of slavery, as slavery concerns the body alone.*

Voluntary slavery cannot involve aggression.

Involuntary slavery necessarily involves aggression.

  • Bringing inalienability into the discussion IMO is the source of most of the confusion and disagreement among libertarians on this issue.

You know what, I was hoping you would just read the damn thread, but for your ease, I will now go ahead and demonstrate what was wrong with your response.

This is your first straw man. I never claimed that any “person who ever bought a slave in the past ever expected to gain the ability to move the slave’s limbs with his mind”. My point was strictly about Block’s use of the term “voluntary slavery”, as I should hope that you already understand what is wrong with outright slavery.

The will cannot be transferred. Any “voluntary slave” contract necessarily involves the will, and if the slave ever decides to call it quits, the only way to enforce the contract would be through aggression. So, slavery, no matter how you slice it, “voluntary” or involuntary, is incompatible with the NAP and therefore libertarianism.

And before you go on to say that you didn’t straw man me, I will quote your very next sentence:

Guess what? I never claimed this. Period. For the entire thread, I have been saying that any contract stating this is invalid.

Guess what? This is built upon your straw man. Obviously I believe slavery has existed.

Nevermind reading the thread, how about you read my very first sentence in my first response to you:

That was tough. I don’t know how I get through the day without reading the first sentence of people’s posts.

And that condition is known as slavery. I wonder how I arrived at that conclusion. Maybe it was from the fact that slavery is involuntary servitude? But where could I have possibly stated that before? Hint: See above.

Again, based on a straw man. They were slaves because they were involuntary servants. There was aggression. I have said this many times in this thread.

No, they did not control the body. They used aggression. Surely you have heard of slaves that ran away? That fought back with the overlords? Frederick Douglass comes to mind. Owners of slaves use aggression.

Well this is the first thing you got right. My criticism of slavery is not that it’s impossible. It’s that it requires aggression, and I consider that immoral and injust.

Now, if you actually bothered to read the thread like I asked, you would have noticed that Autolykos and I had a conversation about this already. As much as I would like to requote all the things I wrote to Autolykos, I will just direct you to read Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts by Murray Rothbard. This is something that I have recommended numerous times in this thread. Something you have known had you read the thread. Needless to say, I agree with Rothbard on these issues. So if you would like to know what I think, just ask yourself, “What would Rothbard say?”


I hope you can appreciate why I asked you to just read the thread. I was hoping to avoid having to go through your entire post and respond to each point, as I have already addressed all of these in the thread. If there was something that had been unclear previously in the thread, then it would be different. But you didn’t even bother to read the thread to see what I thought. You thought you understood my position, and when I pointed out that you got it wrong and that I actually explained it in the thread, you still did not bother to read the thread.

Well this is flat out wrong. Slavery concerns aggression. The inalienability of the will has to do with “voluntary slavery”.

I have explained why this is wrong. Perhaps you are thinking of indentured servitude? This is something I already brought up with you, but I also talked about it previously in the thread. You would know this if you had actually read my post or the rest of the thread.

If you had read the thread (are you detecting a theme here? I know I have), then you would know that Rothbard used “will” to mean “mind and body”, whereas Block used will to mean “body”. Block’s argument completely misses Rothbard’s point.

Any “voluntary slave” contract necessarily involves the will

Are you making the trivial point that a voluntary slavery contract involves the will because it is voluntary? In other words, voluntary contracts are voluntary?

if the slave ever decides to call it quits, the only way to enforce the contract would be through aggression

What makes enforcement of the voluntary slavery contract aggression while enforcement of a loan contract is not aggression? Your previous statement (“any slave contract necessarily involves the will”) appears to be your grounds for this claim above, but how can that trivial statement, which amounts to “voluntary contracts are voluntary” say anything about why voluntary slavery contracts are unenforceable, while other voluntary contracts are enforceable?

No, they did not control the body. They used aggression. Surely you have heard of slaves that ran away? That fought back with the overlords? Frederick Douglass comes to mind. Owners of slaves use aggression.

To “control the body” does not mean to control the will. To “control the body” means to use violence against it for the purpose of control: e.g. beating. Slavery (of any kind) certainly involves violence. What we are debating is whether or not the violence involved in voluntary slavery is aggression.

You have thus far been unwilling and/or unable to defend your claim that the violence involved in voluntary slavery (i.e. “controlling the body”) is aggression.

Slavery concerns aggression. The inalienability of the will has to do with “voluntary slavery”.

How about an argument, or are we just making unsupported claims?

I have explained why this is wrong.

No, you have stated that it is wrong.

In the interest of clarity, I’ll add this:

if the slave ever decides to call it quits, the only way to enforce the contract would be through aggression

If you replaced “aggression” with “violence” we would be in agreement. I assume you don’t reject violence altogether? You support violence in self-defense, and violence in seeking restitution, and violence in enforcing contractual obligations? So, the question, once against, is: what is special about the voluntary slave contract that makes the violence used in its enforcement inherently aggressive, when violence used in the enforcement of other contractual obligations is not aggressive?

I largely agree with him on the material you quoted. For one thing, if the actor simply promises to appear at the theater and then fails to appear, I agree that there’s nothing they can rightfully take from him or do to him in return. His failure to appear didn’t take anything from the theater owners, and he didn’t agree in advance to allow them to take anything from him or do anything to him in the event that he didn’t appear.

For another thing, I agree that things would be different if the actor had signed a performance bond with the theater owners. However, I interpret performance bonds differently from you and Rothbard. As I see it, the performance bond gives the theater owners the right to take the specified amount of money from the actor. Whether the actor gives it to them of his own free will or not is irrelevant. Maybe this really is the same as what Rothbard calls “transfer of title”, but it seems different to me.

So basically, I see contracts as transfers of right, not merely as transfers of title. With the former, a performance bond could legitimately specify a penalty of bodily harm rather than a monetary penalty. In other words, such a performance bond would give the obligee(s) the right to physically hurt the obligor(s) in some specified way(s).

My original point about the “massage contract” was to refute the notion of contracts requiring an exchange of title. Since that notion has already been abandoned, the original point is now moot. However, I think what you wrote above hints at a deeper issue, namely the issue of what constitutes a “service”. It could be said that paying someone is a service, and that giving someone something (other than money) is also a service. Maybe a better way of analyzing these situations is in terms of rights. In the massage example, you only have the right to my money if you give me a massage. Likewise, in any purchase, the seller only has the right to the buyer’s money if the seller gives him the item he wants in exchange. Again, this might be the same thing Rothbard means by “transfer of title”, but I’m not sure yet.

By “hits the nail on the head”, are you referring to the concept that Wikipedia labels with the word “rights”?

Okay, then we’re using the same definition of “rights” and no longer need to worry about whether our definitions are different.

I’m glad you brought up the notion of “positive rights”, as those actually do fit in with our definition of “rights”. As you said, a person who believes he has e.g. a right to healthcare thus believes that it’s right (legitimate/justified) for him to e.g. take money from others if he’s in need of medical attention that he can’t afford otherwise. Our disagreement with this depends on things other than our definition of “rights”.

I wouldn’t say that it’s immoral to lie and renege on promises, as morality to me concerns coercion, and neither lying nor reneging on promises (per se) involves coercion. But I might say it’s unethical to lie and renege on promises, as ethics to me does not concern coercion. Notice that this means all rights are moral/just rights to me.

There can be male rights, female rights, old rights, young rights, big rights, small rights, etc.

That’s just it - there’s no truth in such claims. I don’t mean that they’re all false, I mean the very notion of truth is inapplicable. To speak of a “true right” makes as much sense as speaking of a “square circle”. This is the essence of the is-ought problem.

No one possesses any rights in terms of fact. Again, truth - or factuality - simply does not apply to rights. To believe/assert otherwise is to try “jumping the shark” of the is-ought problem.

But a right can be asserted without being exercised.

The fact that the will is (currently) inalienable does not necessarily prevent a person from believing otherwise, and furthermore to believe that it could be right in at least some circumstances for a person to alienate his will. That’s all I’m saying. But you’re right that, as long as it’s impossible for one to alienate his will, there will be no acts of will-alienating to judge the rightness/wrongness of (if I understand you correctly).

Again, there’s a difference between an action and a claim, or between asserting a right and exercising it. For example, I can certainly claim the right to levitate even if I’m unable to actually do so.

That’s precisely where it seems you’re trying to derive an ought from an is. The fact that an action is impossible in no way means claims can’t nevertheless be made about the rightness/wrongness of that action.

Have you still not bothered to read the thread or the link I provided many times in this thread, and at least once to you? And of course, this is after you claimed to have read the thread. What I want to know is, why did you lie about that? What did you possibly hope to gain by lying about reading the thread?

For your ease, I will quote Rothbard from the link that I provided you, a link that you obviously did not read:

And this one is a requote. In other words, I actually quoted this earlier in the thread, but you would have known this had you actually read the thread. But instead, you feel like lying:

Well, read above. But you wouldn’t have to if you just read the thread like you claimed you did, or if you read the link that I provided for you and that I recommended many times in the thread, something you would have known had you read the thread like you claimed.

Well you must be using quite a definition for control. No matter how much violence one uses against another’s body, that person never will control that body. But anyway, you would have understood my position and Rothbard’s had you actually read the thread like you said you did. But you didn’t.

See, this is funny as hell, because I actually have quoted Rothbard on these claims, and he does provide an argument. I have provided arguments as well, but I know for a fact that I quoted Rothbard’s arguments. You would know this, and wait for it, if you had read the thread like you claimed you did.

I’m curious, and I really am, why did you lie about reading the thread? What did you hope to gain by lying about it instead of actually reading it?