Interesting point.
Where did I do that?
I see the concept of property in X (objects, information, patterns, etc.) appearing within a group of human actors as an emergent incentive scheme toward production of more X. If the subjective preferences of the actors are toward more X, evolution (as a heuristic search mechanism) converges to the concept of property in X as an incentive scheme toward production of more X. IMO, this is the heuristic “is” process that produces the concept of property in X. Theoreticians (scientists) look at this result, and say: “X is property because it has attribute Y, therefore no object without attribute Y can be property.”, thus deriving an “ought” from the heuristically (evolutionarily) derived “is”. This is wrong. X is property because it simply evolved (emerged) as a successful incentive scheme for production of more X and may nothing (or very little) to do with its attribute Y. The “ought” model was built after the fact and was designed specifically to fit the “is” data (reality).
Assuming that both socialists and capitalists subjectively (and individually) prefer more (rather than less) of X, they differ in the means for achieving that end. Socialists see this as a problem of distribution of (rather abundant) X to the ones that need (want) it and away from the ones who shouldn’t complain that it’s being taken away from them as they either (1) have too much of it to care if some is being stolen from them (physical property), or (2) still get to keep what others have taken away from them (information property). Instead, capitalists (and myself) see this as a problem of production of X, and warn the socialists not to overlook the unseen: the incentive to produce X. As we know, focusing only on distribution of X while neglecting the incentives for production of X, leaves everyone poorer in X. And there are no incentives for production in X without the concept of property in X.
Z.
Z:
“Theoreticians (scientists) look at this result, and say: “X is property because it has attribute Y, therefore no object without attribute Y can be property.”, thus deriving an “ought” from the heuristically (evolutionarily) derived “is”.”
As you’ve written it, I don’t believe this derives an ought from an is. The ought-from-is derivation would run something more like this:
“X is property because it has attribute Y” [is statement], and, “thus, no object without attribute Y can be property.” [is statement]
“Therefore, person A ought not limit the production of X.” or “Therefore, person A’s limiting the production of X is unjustified.”
The “ought” or prescriptive-type derivation is that the “is” nature of two categories of objects (ideal and tangible) implies what should or ought be done with respect to the objects of these categories. I.e., the idea that if you do not do xyz with object X as you ought, you are unjustified in your actions.
“Ideal objects are not scarce” (is), “therefore, IP laws (limiting their production or duplication???) should be repealed” (ought)
(but if ideal objects are not scarce, how can IP laws limit their production or duplication, since, ideal objects are not scarce, period. ?)
Adam, given that I’m not a theoretician myself, you may as well be right. The “ought” from “is” I was implying would go as follows:
“X is property because it is (attribute) Y (scarce, tangible, rival, etc.). Hence, all property ought to have attribute Y.”
If I’m wrong, then I could easily dispense with the ought/is paradigm and stick with data-mining, or curve-fitting a model over the data (reality) without losing much of the point I was trying to make.
Z.
Interesting argument. How do you think that copyrights would play out in a free market?
To use your earlier example of the movie: when I am looking through the window and seeing the movie you’re watching, I’m not accessing your property. Since neither of us has his curtains/blinds open, light from your television screen can pass through your window, then through mine, and finally reach my eyes. Would you say that that light is also your property?
So the question here is how we’re each defining “use” and “access” with respect to (what we define as) “property”.
No one wastes your time but you.
True, but does the State possess overwhelming power with respect to any given number of its subjects taken together? Why should that question be ignored?
My point was that costs, being based on subjective valuations, are also subjective; hence there is no objective way to measure them, and hence no way to prove that X must cost more than Y.
I’ve seen that interview, actually. I know it’s the rule and not the exception. But thanks anyways for pointing it out.
Where is there an objective standard for reasonableness"? I can’t find one.
The same thing goes with rationality. One of the things that really struck me by Human Action was where Mises wrote that he considered all action to be rational. A logical corrollary to this is that schizophrenics are rational (under this definition), since their actions are guided by the goals they wish to achieve and the dissatisfactions that they wish to alleviate. The fact that some of these dissatisfactions are illusory is inconsequential here.
My point is, based on that definition of “rational”, one cannot say whether it is rational for one with “overwhelming power” to have increasing property as his (most important) goal.
I find this interesting, because the anti-IP camp argues exactly the reverse: that the absence of the IP concept will lead to larger information wealth and its presence will lead to smaller information wealth. While I agree that the ongoing explosion of information products suggests a preference for more and richer information, I don’t see how that must necessarily mean a preference for the IP concept.
I meant “physical representations” directly and “patterns” indirectly. The reason I answer it that way is because, if the physical representation is not disturbed, and the pattern is embodied by it, then the pattern is also not disturbed (by definition).
From what I understand (and Mr. Kinsella, please correct me if I’m mistaken), what he meant was scarcity is created in the idea itself. I do agree that which one is chosen makes a difference.
Yes (barring boundary conditions, as z1235 pointed out).
As far as I can discern from the portions of Human Action that I have read, Mises was conscientiously ignoring our biology. Hoppe has criticized this in a lecture where he points out that, up to now, economics has exclusively taken human nature as a fixed constant, a view that biologists have long ago discarded. Human nature is not a constant and our ends are not arbitrary. It is possible for someone not to value wealth-accumulation or reproductive success but, as a rule, every human must do so because we are not the descendants of people who did not care to amass resources to ensure survival and who did not pursue reproductive success. This “material impulse” is not the crass heartlessness of Ebenezer Scrooge but it is impossible to explain why humans generally choose these ends and not those ends without incorporating our biology into our understanding of human action. State agents are no less human than the rest of us and, assuming they are a representative biological sample of the human population, they are as driven toward wealth-accumulation and reproductive success as the rest of us.
Hoppe calls State agents who do not act like ordinary human beings “angels”. Short of positing that we are governed by angels, we must conclude that the State will seek to incite disputes with its citizens in order to resolve those disputes in its own favor.
Clayton -
He was there writing as a praxeologist, not a thymologist. I think that one of the next revolutions in our economics will have to do with taking making the thymology in our science explicit, but I don’t think that it would be fair to “criticize” him for ignoring it in his praxeology, because his praxeology of course wasn’t his thymology. He ignored our biology in his praxeology because it was irrelevant to his praxeology. If our biology were to change to the point that his praxeology isn’t applicable anymore, we wouldn’t even be “human” anymore. If you want to talk about what drives people to pick certain ends, whether those drives have to do with evolutionary biology or not, you are leaving praxeology, and entering into thymology.
I think that Mises would have said in response to this something like, well, the “content” of action might change over the course of time in accordance with our biology, so I’m not taking that as a “fixed constant”, but the “form” of action will remain the same until the logical structure of our mind changes, making us not even “human” anymore, but “subhuman” or “superhuman”, and my subject is human action.
Really? It seems self-evident to me. I’ve never read anything on the subject, so I’m sorry but I don’t know of any other arguments similar to mine. In a previous thread Jeffrey Tucker stated that Mises, Rothbard and Menger used a definition for scarcity that only included things that were limited enough to be of economic importance. I believe that is not definitional enough and allows for too much perspective in determining whether something is scarce or not. I am saying, for example, “air is scarce, we just don’t care enough on Earth to manage and trade it.” where Rothbard would say something like “air is abundant (ie non-scarce)”, but in reality his definition of scarce requires assumptions on location, perspective of those involved, and a host of other things to subsume my conditional “we just don’t care enough on Earth to manage and trade it” into his definition for scarcity.
I think unstated assumptions are a poor thing to have in a definition and should be removed when possible.
That is more in line with what I am saying - my statements assumed a discussion about IP (designs, patterns, etc) and were not an attempt at defining scarcity or property. The first example doesn’t even make sense when discussing physical objects. “I can reproduce an identical toaster without damaging the original in any way” is a completely nonsensical statement. It can’t be truly identical, because that would require the very same atoms to be in my toaster and yours! We intuitively know this can’t happen because the physical stuff that makes up each toaster is scarce. At the same time, the design can easily be identical between the two physically distinct toasters without having any negative impact on either toaster or the integrity of the design itself should it be used in the future.
That’s why designs, patterns and other modern forms of IP can’t use physical property rights and expect the same results. They aren’t scarce! I can make a toaster design and someone else can make an identical toaster design and mine is not impacted in any way. For me to claim ownership of the design itself creates a conflict where there wasn’t one at all. If, as I believe they are, property rights are founded with the subjective goal of minimizing conflict, then property rights cannot apply.
edit: I disagree with Stephen Kinsella that to use physical property rights for IP suddenly creates scarcity. It suddenly creates conflict, but those things are still non-scarce.
I knew you would write that, because you have never ever admitted you were wrong. Reductios have always been an issue for your ad hoc ideas about IP.
He seems to be speaking about the former. I cannot however answer for him.
Autolykos:
Given the distinction between direct and indirect:
“I meant “physical representations” directly and “patterns” indirectly.”
You would then agree with:
“…people intuitively perceive some things as patterns, and that those patterns are distinct from their physical representations; therefore, because the patterns can (at least often) be duplicated without disturbing the physical representations directly, and without disturbing the patterns indirectly , the patterns aren’t perceived as being rivalrous.”
“From what I understand…what he meant was scarcity is created in the idea itself.”
In other words, a situation is created where there are less ideas than before?
Or, a situation is created wherein one person’s having an idea excludes another person’s having the same idea?
I wrote:
As you see it, can the physical representations be reproduced without disturbing the original physical representation?
If I see a car in someone’s driveway, can I go to the manufacturer and ask them to make me a physical representation just like it, without disturbing the original physical representation ?
You wrote:
Yes (barring boundary conditions, as z1235 pointed out).
Given this, and given your original passage above, then to the extent physical representations (tangible objects) can be reproduced without damaging the original physical representations (tangible objects), to this extent physical representations (tangible objects) aren’t perceived to be rivalrous?
Tangible objects that can be reproduced without damaging the original tangible objects are not rivalrous?
Thx. Just a guess, but I think they would become just one aspect of information property owner’s control over what would be widely recognized by other actors as his property. The easier the demarcation (quantification of separateness) of the property, the more prevalent its recognition would become in the market.
Z.
Liberty Student:
See your post of August 28:
“You and Adam have taken the word scarce out of context of the larger argument. When we say it is not scarce, we mean it is not rivalrous.”
In Kinsella’s Against Intellectual Property, Kinsella writes on page 33:
“Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one creates scarcity where none existed before.”
It’s not clear in this passage whether the scarcity is created in the idea or in the tangible, physical representation.
If Kinsella is referring to ideas, and if scarcity in Kinsella’s argument means rivalrous, then we can write:
“Ideas are not naturally rivalrous. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one creates rivalry in ideas where none existed before.”
If, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one can make ideas rivalrous, then we can’t hold as universally valid proposition that ideas aren’t rivalrous.
In this case we have to hold that ideas can be either rivalrous or nonrivalrous.
Do you agree that this follows from the terms of Kinsella’s argument?
Yes, I believe so.
The latter is what the pro-IP person would like to believe happens. However, the reality is that a situation is created wherein one person’s use of an idea in a representation excludes another person’s use thereof (without the first person’s permission).
Yes, to this extent they aren’t perceived to be rivalrous. In creating a copy of something using a non-invasive procedure*, one is necessarily using material that does not exist within the original thing.
- Note that this assumes the original is not owned by the copier. If the original is owned by the copier, then he would be free (contractual obligations notwithstanding) to use any and all means, invasive and/or non-invasive, to create a copy. However, even with an invasive copying procedure, the material that makes up the new copy is presumably still different from that of the original (i.e. does not exist within it).
cporter:
Could you please clarify the following two points?
When you write above:
“I can reproduce an identical toaster without damaging the original in any way” is a completely nonsensical statement."
This quote comes from you (see your post of August 31).
You wrote on August 31:
“Person B can reproduce an identical toaster without damaging the original design in any way.”
Then I quoted you on September 1.
- In your post of August 31, you wrote:
“Person B can reproduce an identical toaster without damaging the original design in any way.”
Above, today, you write:
“I can reproduce an identical toaster without damaging the original in any way” is a completely nonsensical statement. It can’t be truly identical, because that would require the very same atoms to be in my toaster and yours!"
I knew I would get bit in the ass for not putting “physical” in front of every instance of “toaster”. Though I’m starting to think you’re being purposely obtuse. Also, notice the lack of “design” in your first quote of me, but the adduition of “design” in the subsequent quotes.
“I can reproduce an identical physical toaster without damaging the original in any way” is completely nonsensical when discussing only the physical object (not the design). This makes no sense; the atoms of your physical toaster are different from the atoms of my physical toaster. Only the design has truly been duplicated. We have completely distinct physical toasters that share a duplicated design.
This was in contrast to my original statement, which was only discussing (and only made sense from that perspective) IP, and the wording didn’t apply to physical objects at all.
cporter:
Here goes the name calling.
You are free to revise your formulations, conceptions, notions, etc., at any time. If you need to insert the word “physical” to make your passage consistent, please do so.
“Also, notice the lack of “design” in your first quote of me, but the adduition of “design” in the subsequent quotes.”
My first quote of you was taken from your post of August 31, 9:43 am:
“Scarcity, however, is not subjective at all. Something is either subject to reproduction without damaging the original (or even requiring the use of the original) or it isn’t, and no human thought is required for this to be true. That’s why in a previous thread I told Jeffrey Tucker that I don’t like the traditional definition of “non-scarce”, because it tends to include things that really are scarce, just not scarce enough to matter at that particular moment.”
In this passage, you don’t mention the term “design,” so in my first quote of you, I didn’t mention the term design.
You introduced the term “design” in your 1:03 PM Aug. 31 post, and then I accepted your introduction of this term and began conducting the discussion on that basis.
Did I make a mistake somewhere?
Autolykos wrote the following post at Thu, Sep 2 2010 7:39 PM:
To use your earlier example of the movie: when I am looking through the window and seeing the movie you’re watching, I’m not accessing your property. Since neither of us has his curtains/blinds open, light from your television screen can pass through your window, then through mine, and finally reach my eyes. Would you say that that light is also your property?
So the question here is how we’re each defining “use” and “access” with respect to (what we define as) “property”.
You are once again falling into the elementalist fallacy. Light is not what is or isn’t owned, anymore than atoms or molecules are owned. The object, the house, is what is owned. If you are looking inside my house, you are violating my property (a house). If you are walking across my garden, you are violating my property (a garden).
But you have just evaded the question I posed: how can it be that, in a property system where only rivalrous goods can be owned, I can be accused of trespassing on a property whose owner is not making any rival use of it? It appears that, if you cannot answer this, rivalry has nothing to do with the basis of property. Pure creation remains the basis of property, and intellectual property is therefore as valid as garden property upon which you are excluded from trespassing.
yet the owner does maintain the use of it whilst he remains the owner and does not abandon it.
in other words, you own something, if you have not abandoned it then… it is in your use.
because it is rival object, the use of it by another should it contradict the owners use, is just as rivalrous as that sounds. if the use of it by another does not contradict the owners use, then the owner consents, and there is no problem.