Intellectual Property and Normative Social Theory

This post is an attempt to present some of the problems and issues surrounding the argument against the institution of Intellectual Property as they may be seen from an analytical point of view in the Misesian sense.

Here I state the main ideas as I understand them. If this analysis mischaracterizes other people’s arguments against IP, then that can be pointed out during the course of the discussion.

The two main components of the argument against Intellectual Property are that things such as ideas and recipes are of a specific nature (1), and that this has some bearing on the laws that we are subject to (2).

If we say that there is no relationship between 1 and 2, or that 1 has no bearing on 2, then there is no reason to treat 1 and 2 in the same theory. We can simply assert that ideas and recipes are of a certain nature. Separately, in a different article or book, and with no mention of the non-scarcity of ideas and recipes, we can make the independent argument that we ought or ought not be subject to a specific law X, or, specific law X is unjustified from a libertarian point of view.

To me it is clear that the argument against IP is an argument seeking to establish or demonstrate a relationship between 1 and 2.

Here are what I consider some problems with the attempt to demonstrate such a relationship.

(in this initial post, we’ll grant for the sake of argument the objective conception of scarcity—i.e., the notion that objects are objectively scarce or non-scarce independent of the actions of individuals)

If we try to establish the universal principle that the non-scarcity of an idea or recipe implies that no laws ought be made in regard to said idea or recipe, or, that such laws are unjustified from a libertarian point of view, we have to realize the full implications of the universal application of this principle.

Ideas, or the utilization of ideas, that can easily harm other people are also not scarce. If I say to another person “look over there,” knowing that he may turn his head into a sharp object, I utilize a non-scarce idea or recipe “look over there” possibly in order to harm another person.

The universal ethical commandment that no laws be made with regard to the utilization of non-scarce ideas or recipes implies acceptance of all cases of this nature, including many we could conceivably think of which are far worse than the example above.

If an anti-IP social theorist supports or advocates laws that prevent the utilization of non-scarce ideas or recipes, even if only in exceptional cases, he acknowledges the principle that it is not the non-scarcity of the idea that is essential, but the perceived severity of the consequences of the utilization of the idea or recipe that matters.


An argument that I won’t make here could possibly be made based on the following scenario:

Person A to person B: You just killed person C.

Person B to person A: Yes. I used a non-scarce idea, the idea of killing another person. There ought be no laws preventing me from utilizing non-scarce ideas. Any such laws are unjustified.


Let’s assume that a person (A) is willing to accept the universal principle that no laws ought be made limiting the utilization of non-scarce ideas or recipes, and is willing to accept the full implications of this universal commandment. What is the consequence to the person (B) who violates this precept and nevertheless enacts and enforces laws intended to prevent the utilization of some non-scarce ideas or recipes?

What will happen to person (B) who supports, or enacts, or enforces an Intellectual Property law?

If the answer is that other people (A), libertarians or otherwise, will bring force or coercion upon B, then we are saying that B should abstain from doing X because if he doesn’t A will harm him.

This is the essence of statism. The argument from force is essentially the argument of statism.

If the answer is that B’s enacting Intellectual Property laws will lead to social decline (lowered standards of living, social unrest, etc.), then first, these consequences may not happen to B (his personal standard of living may rise), and second, this implies a “utilitarian” argument (in the pejorative sense employed by theoretical objectivists) that B should abstain from some activity for the greater good of society in general, even though he himself may gain personally from that activity.


What is the point of all this? Does this mean that Intellectual Property laws are good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral?

Here is Mises’s answer:

“The discovery of the inescapable interdependence of market phenomena overthrew this opinion. Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be–this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action.” (Human Action)

The answer lies in the science of human action, and that is what has been overlooked.

What the science of human action attempts to demonstrate is how the action person A is contemplating (X) entails a consequence or effect (Y) that he was not aware of, or that he previously believed was contingent and not necessary. By means of establishing the existence and operation of exact laws of human action, praxeology demonstrates how person A harms himself in pursuing X, in cases where X logically entails Y, and A wants to avoid Y.

In cases where praxeology can demonstrate a logically necessary connection between an act and its consequence or accompaniment, then person A may abstain from an attempt at X of his own volition in order to avoid the occurrence of Y which he wants to avoid. In this case, A abstains from self-inflicted harm, due to the praxeological demonstration that Y must occur if he is successful in attaining X. In this case, person A abstains from X entirely out of self-interest, and without the need for interpersonal threats of force, and without the need for government intervention.

As Mises tried to explain, there is no scientific standard of the just or unjust application of force or coercion (there is no such thing as a science of the ought). There are only means toward ends. However:

“..there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be–this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action.”

What has been overlooked is the fact that in addition to actions conceivable in terms of money, prices, and exchange ratios (the realm of actions studied by economics and catallactics), there are other important realms of human action, including the realm of direct personal interactions (“ethical actions” or “political actions”) and the realm of reflective or deliberative “mental actions” or “psychological actions”.

Since ethics and law concern such ethical actions or political actions, we might try to find out whether there are any laws of such actions as there are laws of economic or catallactic action. The idea would be to demonstrate necessary accompaniments to such ethical or political actions, such that people may want to abstain from certain kinds of these actions of their own volition, and out of self-interest, without the need for interpersonal threats of force and without the need for government intervention.

The precondition for an advance in the level of social interaction, and thus for a free society, is the praxeological demonstration that certain types of social interaction entail necessary accompaniments that people may want to avoid. When people (A) begin to abstain from acts they once believed were “consequence free” but which praxeology demonstrates entail harmful effects (harmful to the actor concerned), this means that people B, C, and D, are spared the interpersonal and political strife they would otherwise have to undergo to prevent A from carrying through with his planned activity. Then, A benefits from not having to face the necessary consequences of his activity, and B,C, and D benefit from not having to confront A with force or threats.

What’s missing is praxeological knowledge in the interpersonal, political realm of human social interaction. Praxeological knowledge is primarily only acknowledged to exist in the catallactic realm of human social interaction, as demonstrated by a recent statement of Bernanke:

“The issue at this stage is not whether we have the tools to help support economic activity and guard against disinflation,” Bernanke said. “We do. The issue is instead whether, at any given juncture, the benefits of each tool [policy act or action], in terms of additional stimulus, outweigh the associated costs or risks of using each tool [policy act or action].”

Source:

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Bernanke-speech-shows-effort-apf-4023531601.html?x=0&sec=topStories&pos=3&asset=&ccode=

(bracketed, bold, and italics added)

Thus, praxeological knowledge is inhibiting and constraining the activity of people and politicians such as Bernanke in the economic or catallactic realm of action. But since no similar knowledge has been brought to conceptual clarity in the interpersonal, ethical, or political realm of action, people do not know which of their interpersonal or political actions to abstain from in order to avoid the self-inflicted harm that must necessarily occur. The same kind of cost/benefits analysis Bernanke is pondering in the catallactic realm of his action, is not available to him in the same degree of scientific development in the ethical or political realm of his action, since there is no explicit praxeological science developed in this realm of action.

As I’ve argued in other articles and posts, most of Mises’s influential students such as Rothbard and Hayek at some point or other came to repudiate his essential teachings. Rothbard held that praxeology did not apply to the ethical realm of human action (The Ethics of Liberty), and Hayek argued that praxeology did not apply to the study of the market (“Economics and Knowledge” and Hayek on Hayek). In addition, Rand repudiated Mises’s praxeology and epistemology though she supported his libertarian conclusions and acknowledged Mises’s stature as a leading scholar and philosopher.

A general conclusion was reached by these influential writers that Mises’s vision was limited, his views somewhat antiquated or pedantic, and that his conception of praxeology as the formal science of all forms of human action was doomed to be ineffectual. They eventually turned away from and counseled against a strong pursuit of Mises’s analytical approach, and adopted and counseled instead objective or empirical approaches toward various fields of social study (ethics, the market, etc.) They concluded that theoretical subjectivism, methodological individualism, praxeology, and the search for exact laws of human action, were unsuitable theoretical tools for comprehending the phenomena of ethics or of the market. The students of Rothard, Hayek, and Rand, largely accepted the conclusions of their teachers.

But Mises held another view. He wrote:

“It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological a prioristic doctrine of political organization that would place a theoretical science by the size of the purely historical discipline of political science.” (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)

Thus, Mises held that praxeology (formal analysis), and not objective ethics or empirical study was the key to comprehending the political side of man.

The attempt to conceive scarcity as an objective quality of the things themselves and the attempt to arrive at a normative prescription (implicit or explicit) of what the law should be based on this conception, are both signs that the works of Mises are still not fully understood or appreciated.

Excellent post.

Whose argument is that?

It is the argument of anybody who says that we shouldn’t have copyrights, patents, and so on, because ideas aren’t “scarce”. Isn’t that trying to establish a relationship between whether we should establish those laws about them and whether they are scarce? And isn’t that what the argument against those laws is, for people such as Kinsella, Tucker, and so on?

You and Adam have taken the word scarce out of context of the larger argument. When we say it is not scarce, we mean it is not rivalrous.

Also, the issue of laws completely misses the point, as Tucker, Kinsella and myself are all libertarian anarchists. We aren’t interested in any state laws, particularly those that create anti-market protectionism and monopoly by undermining private property ownership.

So right off the bat, scrap the law aspect, because it is completely misguided.

Then replace the word scarce with rivalrous in the above, and decide if it still makes sense.

It appears you have conflated the utilization of ideas (action) with ideas themselves without showing that anyone has asserted such a connection.

Also, by claiming that the argument is normative, thats an evasion of the Austrian-inspired root inquiry of the IP issue which is, “are ideas property?”

Any critique made on positive grounds will be hollow unless that question is answered first. Kinsella et al believe they have answered it.

If you could keep your reply succint in the spirit of encouraging discourse, I would appreciate that greatly.

I want to make sure this is really clear, because I may not be able to revisit it tomorrow.

Intellectual Property is not an institution. Throughout much of human history, there was no notion of intellectual property, or at least, in nothing like the form we have seen in the last 200 years. The American conception of IP isn’t common in the rest of the world. It is a completely arbitrary system originating in constitutional, not customary law.

As I mentioned earlier, any analysis of the Kinsella/Tucker position on IP has to address the fact that intellectual property is not actually property.

That’s the argument. Is IP property?

Once we know if IP is property, then we can make our normative claims and people can theorize about outcomes.

Tucker and Kinsella do not start at the normative, but rather from definitions of ideas and property that are not contradictory. I would like to see critics attack these definitions, which are the foundation of their normative conclusions.

nice job, liberty student, also, OP’s examples where kinda bizarre…

I have always been puzzled by the fact that Kinsellaists gave absolutely no thought to the economics of IP. Apparently the explanation was so obvious I could not even contemplate it.

Thanks for bringing to light this one final fallacy.

The OP may apply to the arguments of Kinsella and others, which is why universal ethical commandments are not useful except perhaps as rhetoric.

I have advocated against IP only in the sense that I have tried to show that the traditional libertarian property rights arguments have not been coherently applied to IP. My points in those debates neither accept nor reject the notion of libertarian property rights. Rather, they constitute a line of reasoning that says, “Your reasons for supporting IP are incoherent. There may be other reasons why IP is a good idea, but none of the ones that are typically discussed fall into that category, so I remain highly skeptical.”

Adam, excellent post!

Doesn’t the argument that IP is not property beg the question? Or, could there be definitions of property which are inclusive of IP? Where is the committee that procures these definitions?

Z.

Thank you Z

I think to answer your question(s) you would need some clarification on some important aspects of Kinsella’s IP argument.

If ideas are not scarce, period, then we may assume that any and all people have all the ideas they want or need at all times. Then ideas, as ideal objects, are not the cause or source of any dissatisfaction to anyone.

In this case, and under this interpretation, something else besides ideas is made scarce by government legislation. Then, how can the proposition that ideas are not scarce, as a universally valid fact, have a bearing on the assumption that the government can make tangible objects scarce through legislation? If we assume that the government is at all times powerless to make ideas scarce, and people have all the ideas they need and want at all times, how does this provide instructions as to what the government, through legislation, should do with respect to tangible objects?

In other words, it seems as if we would be saying: “ideal objects aren’t scarce, therefore, you should not create a scarcity of tangible objects.”

Or: “it is impossible for you to make ideal objects scarce, therefore, making tangible objects scarce is unjustified.”

How do these things follow from one another ?

If ideas are not scarce, how does this assumed fact imply a given concrete course of action in regard to tangible objects?


On the other hand, if we assume that through government legislation, ideas can be made to be scarce, this changes everything.

In the case where something X is scarce, private property theory conceives that social rules must apportion or ration the use of X.

So when you ask: “could there be definitions of property which are inclusive of IP?”

I would say that this notion is indicated in the Rothbard/Hoppe/Kinsella private property theory if/when the conception is put forward that ideas can be made scarce by human acts such as legislation.

But I cannot provide you with a conclusive answer as to whether Kinsella’s theory envisions that ideas are not scarce absolutely, or, that ideas may be made scarce by legislation.

Regarding this passage which appears on page 33 of Kinsella’s Against Intellectual Property:

“Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one creates scarcity where none existed before.”

The question is whether this means, 1:

Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one makes ideas scarce when they were not scarce before.

(ideas can be both scarce or non-scarce)

Or, 2:

Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, on makes tangible objects scarce when they weren’t scarce before."

(ideas are never scarce, but tangible objects can be made scarce by human acts)

I think it might be hard to get a clear answer to this question, because there is an unresolved conflict in the notion of scarcity that goes back to Rothbard. Here is the issue:

I quote from Rothbard’s MES, page 4 (paperback version):

“In the first place, all means are scarce…For example, air in most situations is in unlimited abundance. It is therefore not a means and is not employed as means to the fulfillment of ends. It need not be allocated, as time is, to the satisfaction of more important ends, since it is sufficiently abundant for all human requirements. Air then, though indispensable,is not a means,…”

In this passage, Rothbard asserts that air in most situations, is in unlimited abundance. But he does not conclude from this that therefore, air, in most situations, is not a scarce means. Rather, he concludes that, air is not a scarce means, period (absolutely, or universally).

But what about the case where air is not in unlimited abundance? Rothbard leaves this out. He goes straight from a statement that air in most cases is in unlimited abundance, to the conclusion that air in all cases is not a means. He simply leaves out the case when air isn’t available in abundance, where by the terms of his argument, air would then become, or possibly become, a scarce means.

The form of his argument is:

Regarding abundance, 2 cases: 1: air in unlimited abundance, 2: air not in unlimited abundance

Regarding scarce means, only 1 case: 1: air not a scarce means 2: (no acknowledgement that air can be a scarce means)

So there is an unresolved conflict of conceptions. First, Rothbard asserts that air may be available in unlimited abundance (most cases), or not available in unlimited abundance (some cases). He then concludes that air is not a means, period, without addressing the question whether when air is not available in abundance to the actor concerned, air may become scarce to him, and thus a means of the actor’s action.

This form of presentation may be mirrored in Kinsella’s argument, if and to the extent that he means to imply that ideas can be made scarce by legislation. If so, then the same unresolved conflict apparent in Rothbard’s treatment would be carried over to Kinsella’s. And the form of the argument would contain two contradictory and unresolved conceptions of the nature of scarce ideas:

  1. Ideas are not naturally scarce (some cases) 2. Ideas are artificially or unjustifiably scarce (some cases)

(ideas can be both scarce and non-scarce)

And:

  1. Ideas are not scarce 2. no mention that ideas may be scarce

(ideas are only non-scarce)

So as in Rothbard, there may be an unresolved conflict of conceptions. On the one hand, ideas are not scarce, period (p.32). On the other hand, ideas may be naturally non-scarce (some cases), or, ideas may be artificially/unjustifiably scarce (some cases). (p.33)

This all depends on whether Kinsella intends to mean that ideas can never be scarce, or ideas can be both scarce and non-scarce.

Another issue with Rothbard’s conception of scarcity—aside from the structural form where the implications of non-abundance are left out of his ultimate conclusion that air is not a scarce means—is that his account is simply inaccurate on its face. Rothbard writes that air:

“…is not employed as means to the fulfillment of ends.”

But this is not accurate. Consider the following cases:

Air placed in oxygen tanks for future use, air blown through a device to stoke a fire, air used to propel an airplane or helicopter, air used to inflate a balloon, air used to blow out a candle, air used to cool a house, etc., etc.,

To state that air is not employed as means to the fulfillment of ends is a mistake.


My point is that to clarify the meaning of the argument against IP, a starting point would be to have clarification on whether ideas are always and absolutely non-scarce, or whether ideas can be both scarce and non-scarce according to the theory. If ideas cannot be made scarce, then something else is made scarce by government legislation, and what that is needs to be clearly identified, so that when scarcity is mentioned, it always refers to that thing, and not ideas, if ideas are never scarce.

I think this goes a way toward answering your questions.

If ideas are not scarce, period, then we may assume that any and all people have all the ideas they want or need at all times. Then ideas, as ideal objects, are not the cause or source of any dissatisfaction to anyone.

I’ve been saying this since the start. It goes into one ear then out the other. Eventually I concluded that it was on purpose that they ignored these contradictions, and that they held a communist agenda above all other considerations.

This post presents the challenge that analytical social science (praxeology) faces in trying to arrive at exact or praxeological laws in the realm of ethical or political action (in the realm of direct interpersonal action).

I will use the example of Intellectual Property to illustrate.

It is an accepted notion in Misesian praxeology that successful action is action in which the means selected are causally efficacious in bringing about the intended end. From the point of view of those who enact and who support Intellectual Property laws, the means utilized and the ends aimed at might appear in the following way:

The IP “client” (the person or group who seeks IP protection) seeks by means of this protection, a legally enforced wealth flow.

The IP “provider” (the State) seeks by means of granting IP protection to its clients, the loyalty and patronage of the client(s) as well as financial backing in the form of a kick-back from the clients. Since the IP client is enriched by IP wealth flows, the client’s voice and influence in society is that much larger. Since the client’s livelihood and social position is due largely to IP protection, the client in turn supports the State ideologically and financially, or, at least does not actively work against the State.

In this scenario, both parties, the client and the State, would seem to obtain that which they seek via the system of IP. The client receives a legally enforced wealth flow; a “toll” that is levied and enforced by the State, on those IP transactions conducted by the State’s citizens. The State receives continued support and backing from the clients, both financial and ideological, in the form of political contributions and expressions of approval or abstentions from expressions of disapproval.

By means of this continual IP toll, money and power is continually drained from citizens who do not apply for IP protection, and transferred to IP clients who petition and receive such protection from the State. Thus, the State continually enriches its own supporters at the same time it continually drains its opponents of both wealth and power (material status and stature in society).

From the point of view of both parties, the means chosen (the system of IP) appear to be efficacious in bringing about the ends aimed at. By means of the IP system, the clients receive material wealth, stature, and power, and by means of the IP system, the State adds to the power and wealth of its supporters thus perpetuating its existence.

This same kind of analysis, of course, can be applied to other institutions such as public education (the state educates its own supporters who in turn provide ideological support for the state) and central banking (the state provides financial advantages to its supporters—those who receive newly printed money first—while diminishing the wealth of others—those who receive the newly printed money last).


Praxeological analysis, as economics or catallactics, succeeds to some degree in demonstrating that for example, as regards central banking, there are necessary effects of central banking policy acts that those who control the central bank are eager to avoid. This goes back to Mises’s point that the most efficacious means of preventing harmful social activities, is the praxeological demonstration of how those activities harm those who undertake them. The reason no one talks of increasing the minimum wage to any substantial degree is because they are fearful of the praxeologically demonstrated consequences they know will occur should they succeed in increasing it. Thus, politicians, academics, those in media, and the public at large, are “self-constrained” in their calls for action in this case, because they want to avoid the occurrence of Y (large-scale unemployment) which they are taught by science must accompany the occurrence of X (a significant increase in the minimum wage).

The problem is that this kind of praxeological knowledge is lacking to a large degree in the realm of human action in which money prices and exchange ratios do not apply. This, is the main problem of analytical social science. The demonstration of exact or praxeological laws in realms of action that are not conceivable in terms of money prices or exchange ratios.

The question is, is there any consequence to the actions that bring about these social effects (IP law, public education, central banking, etc.) which those who would aim to bring them about may want to avoid? Is there a way to demonstrate that such consequences or accompaniments are apodictically certain, and not merely contingent or merely possible?

This notion, and this suggestion, that the political realm of human action be approached by analytical methods, is not new. Writing in his book An Essay on The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, and in consultation with Ludwig von Mises, Lionel Robbins wrote:

“So too when we turn to the question of the changes in the legal framework within which we conceive the adjustments we study to operate. There is an important sense in which the subject-matter of political science can be conceived to come within the scope of our definition of the economic. Systems of government, property relationships, and the like, can be conceived as the result of choice. It is desirable that this conception should be further explored on lines analogous to better known analysis.”(p.134)

Here, Robbins was suggesting the possibility of applying economic-style logical analysis to the political realm of human action. This is the logical analytical system with which both Mises and Hayek were familiar:

“Economic laws describe inevitable implications. If the data they postulate are given, then the consequences they predict necessarily follow…If a “given situation” conforms to a certain pattern, certain other features must also be present, for their presence is “deducible” from the pattern originally postulated. The analytic method is simply a way of discovering the necessary consequences of complex collocations of facts—consequences whose counterpart in reality is not so immediately discernible as the counterpart of the original postulates. It is an instrument for “shaking out” all the implications of given suppositions. Granted the correspondence of its original assumptions and the facts, its conclusions are inevitable and inescapable.”(p.122)

The reason this suggestion never came to fruitfulness is, in my opinion, indicated in this quote from Joerg Guido Hulsman:

“In particular, nobody has solved the problem of comparing non-extended entities like value, utility, preference ranks, etc.

Thus one is led to the second type of solution, which consists in abandoning all attempts at building welfare economics on the theory of value and to look for other foundations. This is where Hoppe’s theory of justice comes into play. Presently, that is, as long as nobody solves the problems of the value-theoretic approach, this seems to be the most promising route for welfare economics.” (The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999)

Here, Hulsman identifies the stumbling block that prevented the application of formal or praxeological analysis to the political realm of human action.

Hulsman argues here that because the value-theoretic approach (praxeology) was unable to solve the problem of multiple sets of non-extended valuing entities (the problem of other minds, or multiple minds), libertarian social science was forced to “look for other foundations.”

The result was, in the US at least, Rothbardian and Randian natural rights approaches, the related approach of the argumentation ethics, and the theory under present consideration, the argument based on the notion of the objective scarcity of natural tangible objects. These are the kinds of approaches that have been advanced owing to the inability to solve the problem of other minds within the confines of the value-theoretic approach, praxeology.

The inability to solve this problem was frankly admitted by Alfred Schutz, the leading phenomenologist of the social world according to Mises and Rothbard. In his primary work, Schutz had this to say about the problem of other minds (what Hulsman refers to as “the problem of comparing non-extended entities like value, utility, preference ranks, etc.”):

“We must, then, leave unsolved the notoriously difficult problems which surround the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience. We are not going to be asking, therefore, how the Thou is constituted in an Ego,…” (The Phenomenology of The Social World, p. 98)

Thus, this problem has remained unsolved from Schutz’s time right up until the present time, and this is the problem preventing the extension of praxeology into non-catallactic realms of human action.

The challenge of analytical social science is to solve the problem of how another mind is constituted within the reality of the actor’s individual action, thus providing praxeology with a conceptual framework for conceiving direct social interaction, not just indirect social interaction where the choices of other actors have first been translated into money prices in the mind of the acting person.

The problems of ethical action, political action, government action, etc., cannot be fruitfully approached by praxeology until a conceptual framework is constructed capable of comprehending direct personal interaction. This will require a solution to the problem of other minds.

If and when praxeology solves this problem of the value-theoretic approach (as Hulsman indicates), praxeology will be able to comprehend social phenomena other than those conceivable in terms of money prices and exchange ratios.

Then praxeology will provide a means for comprehending the actions entailed in such things as Intellectual Property laws and all other “political actions” as well.

This will finally give concrete meaning to Mises assertion that:

“It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization that would place a theoretical science by the side of the purely historical discipline of political science.”

sigh Where does Kinsella say that ideas are property at all?

If ideas are not rival, period, then we may assume that any person that uses an idea does not deprive another of the use of that idea. Therefore, for any ‘first knower’ the existence of any later knowers does not impact on their having all the ideas that they had at the earlier times. Then ideas, as ideal objects, are not the cause or source of conflict/dispute/‘incompatible and competing productive plans’ amongst any people

Except, they are. The conflict between the creators/owners of IP and the ones they perceive to be stealing IP from them occurs regularly. Why would this occur over something that is not rival? Or perhaps we’re not using the same definition of “conflict”?

no. you are wrong. what you see is conflict between people over scarce-rival tangible objects. people sue for money compensation, not for the return of mental ideas.

If I claimed to be the first dreamer of an ‘yellow dream’ and that I have a claim against your money since I have evidence that you dreamt an ‘yellow dream’ (there is evidence you told people, and you blogged about it, etc).

would that prove a conflict between dreamers over dream objects? or would it be transparently a bizarre claim over physical property wherein the intangible object is a ruse/cypher/excuse

Why wouldn’t it? Why couldn’t we create a non-tangible universe populated by non-tangible objects over which real (tangible) people have real (tangible) conflicting claims? It’s the tangibility of the claims that gives the concept of property the power to resolve them, not the tangibility of the objects, per se.

tell me what you dreamt last night and pray its not a dream i dreamt before you.

if it is i’ll see you in court and we’ll see how much of your stuff you owe me.

The fact is, you can not ‘wrestle’ an idea from my mind. it is not an object of conflict. even though I am and you can engage in war with me.

I think perhaps you have conflated an object of conflict with a ‘motive’ or ‘inspiration’ for an act of conflict.

people can be motivated or inspired to enter into ‘conflicts(acts)’ over any reason, however absurd. the question is whether we can distinguish between ‘things’ that it is in their nature to be rivalrous, and hence, to necessitate conflict when parties incorporate them into competing plans.