Liberty Student:
I don’t deny that Mises employed the terms property and private property in his writings. He also employed the term liberalism.
Since Mises’s time, social theory has changed and advanced in some respects. Now, almost no libertarians employ the term liberalism except as a term of history. You don’t refer to yourself as a liberal, but as a libertarian anarchist. As a general rule, I don’t employ the term property or private property in my writings. I believe that doing so ties one into a Lockean/Rothbardian theory of society that is based on objective concepts; concepts that have been supplanted by the insights of the Austrian school. In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard disavowed methodological subjectivism and value-free science as a valid approach to comprehending non-market social phenomena (forms of social interaction outside of market exchanges). Hoppe and Kinsella admit that they are working within and/or trying to extend or improve on the Rothbardian program. This means to some extent the abandonment of Austrian subjectivism and replacing this with objective concepts (objective value, objective scarcity, etc.) The term “private property ethic” as it is used at the Mises Institute means: Lockean/Rothbardian objective social theory.
You write that your question does not require a value judgment. But I believe it at least requires something like a normative assumption, and I believe I can demonstrate this succinctly.
The anti-IP theory is based on a distinction between tangible entities that cannot occupy the same space at the same time and ideal entities (ideas) that can be “possessed” by an unlimited number of people simultaneously. This is the foundational concept or insight being utilized.
In the course of the theory, proponents employ various concepts such as: property, intellectual property, justification, possession, crime, fraud, rights, artificial, force, ownership, aggression, trespass, etc., etc.,
What I believe may be happening, is that the proponents of the anti-IP theory are utilizing many of these subsidiary concepts, but not specifying whether these concepts are to be considered tangible objects or ideal entities. As far as I know, the anti-IP theory does not explicitly define a third category of entities. If I am wrong here, and the anti-IP theory explicitly defines a third category of entities, I will stand corrected and revise my statements. But if the anti-IP theory doesn’t explicitly define a third category of entities, then I assume that entities such as property, rights, and justification must be considered either a tangible object or an ideal entity (idea).
If I understand Stephan Kinsella correctly, he is saying that the anti-IP argument only holds for people who already share the normative assumptions of this theory. To me, this means that the anti-IP theory holds among those people who believe that the meaning of terms such as “property,” “rights,” and “justification,” and similar terms is self-evident. The meaning of these terms (property, rights, justification) must be considered self-evident to those who accept the theory, because these terms are not defined in terms of the theory’s explicit categories: tangible objects / ideal objects.
To understand what I’m saying, take the question you are asking me: “are ideas property”
And instead ask: “is property a tangible object or an idea?”
By the standard of your request of me, you should be able to answer this question precisely.
If you cannot answer this question precisely, then I may argue that you have not defined the term “property” clearly in terms of the explicit categories of the anti-IP theory: tangible objects / ideas
If no third category of entities is clearly defined in the anti-IP theory, this seems to indicate that the meaning of such terms as property, rights, justification, etc., are held to be self-evident amongst the group of people employing such terms. I understand Kinsella as generally agreeing with this, and holding that the group of people in this case is libertarians. I would take issue with the view that libertarians are those who subscribe to a Lockean/Rothbardian social theory. I think that since the advent of Austrian economics, it won’t be possible to construct a consistent social theory based on objective concepts (objective value, objective scarcity, etc.). I consider as libertarians those who hold liberty as an ideal, and this conception is a wider concept and includes non-Rothbardians such as Mises, Hayek, and many many others. In other words, it is not necessary to be a Rothbardian to be a libertarian.
One last thought about the anti-IP theory. I think at root, the anti-IP theory is still an attempt to overcome Hume’s “is-ought” gap. It is still an attempt to arrive at normative prescriptions from descriptive premises. I base this statement on Hume’s famous passage, which I will paraphrase using some of the terms from the anti-IP theory:
“I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found to be of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a tangible object, or makes observations cornering an idea; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations and propositions, is or is not a tangible object, is or is not an idea, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with a “is property” or “is a right.” This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this “is property” or “is a right” expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors to not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert al the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of “property” and “rights” is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.”