The Aztecs?
That exception negates universality, no?
Murder - Aztecs
Rape - Romans
Infidelity - Take Your Pick
Cuckoldry - essentially the same as infidelity
and so on.
This does not therefore make it a moral “good” to live in a shelter. So crude preference is irrelevant to the topic at hand.
Granted, but it seems that some of the contributors of this thread are jumping the gun in declaring some sort of “natural morality” as the causal agent.
Any examples?
What about the Pharaoh?
FIrst it is a cultural universal, not a biological universal. There are absolutely no biological universals, as their is always someone who doesn’t follow it.
Second, there was probably someone in or outside his kinship he was not allowed to fornicate with. Incest taboo doesnt mean incest = bad, it can also mean non-incest=bad.
I recommend you read Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters by Kanazawa and Miller for an introduction to evolutionary psychology. The term “culturally universal” is opposed to “culturally relative”. I don’t think anyone uses the term “biological universals” - I would think such a thing would refer to something that is universal in all species of life. DNA would probably be the only biologically universal thing.
An example of something that is culturally relative is the color red. The color red has positive or negative connotations in different cultures. But secondary sexual attributes of females that males find attractive are culturally universal - large, full breasts, red lips, smooth, light-colored eyes, skin and hair. Why does every race and culture pursue this same set of sexual attributes in their females? Evolutionary psychology provides the answer. In the ancestral environment, youth is the primary factor in determining a woman’s reproductive success and large breasts that don’t sag, red lips that haven’t yet faded, smooth light-colored skin and hair that have not yet darkened are non-counterfeitable tokens of a woman’s youth*. Those men who pursued and reproduced with women who exhibited these tokens in the ancestral environment were more reproductively successful. Hence, there is a culturally universal (biological) predisposition towards these attributes in every culture and every race.
You and Jackson are both mistaking a descriptive theory that explains identifiable patterns of human behavior for a prescriptive norm. That large, full breasts, red lips, smooth, light-colored eyes, skin and hair are culturally universal ideals of female beauty obviously does not mean that every man without exception prefers these attributes. Some men are even homosexual and are not attracted to women at all. But the pattern of preference is identifiable in every culture, so not only does it solicit explanation, it solicits an adaptive, evolutionary explanation of how this preference arose in the ancestral environment.
The same goes for moral sensibilities. There are clearly identifiable moral norms that do, in fact, transcend culture (no, the Aztecs are not an exception) and these moral norms must have evolutionary explanations in the ancestral environment. Unfortunately, Kanazawa and Miller’s book does not discuss the origins of morality so I cannot give detailed examples but Steven Pinker often identifies a number of culturally-universal mores (and I’m 100% certain he has the data to back up his claims). Research in progress.
Clayton -
*It turns out that explaining why men prefer light-colored eyes in women is more challenging… read the book.
It is wholly irrelevant if one action or another is genetically abhorrent to a majority of the human population. You are still relying on a majority to determine the truth. This is no more or less valid than simply following the ten commandments. But since Science is so much more appealing to the Humanist than a divine-revelatory ideology, it seems to be considered a much more reliable method of reckoning. Other than for personal preference, I don’t see why that is the case.
Whats silly is thinking morality should even be qualified as truth-apt. Human population is the only thing that is relevant in this case. If most people find the taste of dog meat to be revolting a chef ought not to cook with it. It doesn’t make a difference that taste cannot be proven or disproven. Same for morality.
Here’s an article debunking the Yanomamo myth. Part II. Part III. Here’s an interview of Steven Pinker where he discusses culturally universal moral sentiments.
Clayton -
I actually agree with both Clayton and Jackson.
It is certainly the case that due to evolution, all human beings share certain characteristics. We’re empathetic, we can reason, we have, at least to some extent, free will, etc. Ofc some people have more/less of certain characteristics than others. But I think it’s safe to say that people with zero empathy just like people with zero ability to reason are not … normal. Ofc that may or may not be morally relevant and this is where I agree with Jackson. It is not easy to go from “our biology is X” to “therefore we ought to do Y”. It’s pretty hard to say that because most human beings (some do NOT think this btw) think murder is wrong, we ought not to kill. That’s not morality. It’s merely a majoritarian type of ethics in which what most people think seems to have some sort of significance. It does not. And libertarians should know better. If we were to listen to what most people think in order to determine what is right and what is wrong, with respect to political philosophy, then we would have to be some kind of… centrists/statists.
I am afraid our biology is not and can not be used as a moral compass (just like it does not and can not be used as a political compass). At least in most cases it can’t be. I don’t remember Berlin’s exact quote about the crooked timber that is humanity but I agree with it.
P.S. I am sure Jackson will denounce me as a “humanist”!
P.S.2. Interesting discussion guys.
If the only reason a person can think of not to murder another human being is that most other people think murder is wrong, then something is already out of place. What most people do or don’t think about right and wrong cannot be a sufficient condition for deciding what is right and wrong. Furthermore, I think that right and wrong is more of an inborn sense (like aesthetic sense or taste) that, if not present, cannot be replaced by ethical arguments.
The purpose of looking to our biology is to try to understand the “scaffolding” in which ethical sentiments exist. While I cannot yet fully articulate my thoughts on the subject, I have reached a point where I am convinced that we can, in fact, construct a useful and meaningful framework for discussing what is, in fact, right or wrong (and I think we can do this without being ethical realists or objectivists!)
Yep. Ethical discussion is incredibly nuanced and I think it is really easy to lose one’s way in the labyrinth which explains part of the reason humanity has made so little progress in the realm of moral philosophy.
That is certainly the case.
Thanks.
Clayton -
‘No, I mean that value-free praxeology can encompass discussion of value statements… if it could not, we would have no praxeology of economic actions. I am then trying to make a direct comparison between ordinary economic value-statements and ethical value-statements to show that if value-free methods can be applied to discussion of economic valuations, then they can be applied to discussion of ethical valuations, as well.’
But how can ethical valuations be treated like economic valuations? It seems like your trying to cross the is-ought barrier by linking economics to ethics.
‘Well, let me put it this way - ethical valuations are no more nonsensical than other kinds of valuation. The absurdist might argue that everything is nonsensical but so what? I am just saying that ethics is not especially nonsensical.’
Well again to play devil’s advocate…why not?
‘Well, they’re not. That’s the whole point in characterizing ethical sentiment as a kind of aesthetic sentiment.’
But that still leaves me asking the question, how do you know that others see ethical sentiments as a type of ascetic considering that you stated that ethical sentiments are subjective.
‘Well, that’s not a problem; if you grant that any sort of valuation evolved, then it is possible for subjective valuations to evolve (including ethical ones).’
Perhaps but we are talking about ethical sentiments that are held by a vast majority of the populace. You believe it a coincidence that such widescale acceptance came from subjectivity?
‘I think this may be the key to distinguishing between merely aesthetic or economic valuations versus ethical valuations. It seems that humans have an extremely powerful set of hardwired emotions and even physiological reactions (blushing) which are triggered by feelings of shame, rejection and disapproval by peers. We refer to certain complexes of these reactions as “guilt”’
But earlier you seemed to be stating that ethical valuations are just ascetic valuations.
'Ethical assertions can be interpreted in terms of guilt, such as, “Any normal person will feel guilty if he murders someone.” This is value-free since it is really just a conditional statement, “Either you feel guilty after murdering someone or you’re not normal.” Of course, we can substitute “good” for “normal”: “Any good person would feel too guilty to attempt to murder someone” which translates roughly to the idea that, for a good person, any attempt to commit murder would result in so much anticipated guilt that he would be unable to go through with the contemplated action.
However, my primary interest in guilt is not for its own sake but, rather to see if it provides the defining distinction between ethical valuations and other kinds of valuations. In other words, what sort of fruit I buy or what sort of music I like to listen to is not likely to evoke very strong feelings within you but what sort of sexual practices I desire just might evoke a very strong feeling in you, even if you are not a party to it. Sex - like life itself - is surrounded with extremely powerful ethical sentiments.’
Well you seem to be thinking that what we do is governed by how we feel. What exactly are the ‘ethics’ of sex? Are you trying to draw the line between ascetics and ethics by how powerful the emotion we feel because you seem to be saying that buy fruit isn’t a powerful emotion so therefore it is a question of ascetics but guilt over murder is a powerful emotion therefore it is an ethical valuation.
If I am, it is the result of a conflation of issues. This thread is in regards to the prescriptive norms known as “morals”, upon which ethics is based. If we are strictly talking value-free observations, that’s a different conversation. You seem to be eager to take one (the science) to make the other (morals). I disagree with this, and have argued accordingly.
The “Ought” in this statement only makes sense if there is a definite end the chef is attempting to accomplish (best chef in town award, keeping his job, etc.). The market will determine what he “Ought” and “Ought Not” do. The simple majority consensus about “Good” and “Bad” does not adaquetly determine what actions people will take.
Why would I do that? You just stated your belief that Man is incapable as Law-Giver. That’s about as “un-Humanist” as you can get.
This statement seems inheirently contradictory to me.
I know this was for Clayton, but if I may interject…
Yes. If there were certain commonly held goals which the populations you refer to were attempting to achieve, certain actions would prove to be better at achieving them. If village unity was one, I could see how killing, raping, and looting would be discouraged. Or perhaps (at least for the Divine-Revelatory laws) those in power attempted to enact laws that they felt would keep the peasants content and generating income. Whether or not these conclusions are “true” or not really has no bearing on people’s acceptance of them.
You bring up some interesting quotes, AC. Like this one:
OK, fair enough. But then,
Hmm, so ethics can be considered equitable to aesthetics, and ethics can also be reasoned into absolutes.
So tell me Clay, what is the “right” color to paint my house next spring?
If my language has been unclear, I apologize. I rule out from the outset any possibility of deriving “ought” from “is”, including Rothbard’s, Hoppe’s, Rand’s and other attempts at this. However, I think that what we mean by "ought’ is not even well-understood and rarely discussed in a useful manner. My only contention in this thread is that ethics (the discussion of oughts) is not nonsense. That’s it. Beyond that, I’m just in exploratory mode.
Clayton -
Well, aesthetics is not as relative as people in the post-20th century art era might be led to believe. Steven Pinker discusses, in a TED lecture reviewing his book The Blank Slate, the significant blowback he received from the academic community for his observation that elite art since the 1930’s has been in decline precisely because it is no longer artistic, that is, it does not appeal to human aesthetics.
That there are human aesthetics is undeniable. Symmetry, variation on a theme, natural subjects (and even, as Pinker notes in the above lecture, the color white) are assigned an aesthetically pleasing place in every culture. Things that resemble bodily fluids, dead things and other potential disease vectors are assigned an aesthetically unpleasing place in every culture. We can identify evolutionary reasons why this should be the case. The human aesthetic is not arbitrary.
However, patterns of group behavior have never been a limitation on individual choice since the individual has plenipotentiary power over his own body and no one and nothing else can have anything but proximate power over his body (inalienable will). Individual exceptions to identifiable patterns in group behavior do not disprove the group behavior. Of course, identifiable patterns in group behavior are not normative but that’s irrelevant to my point. My point is that what people mean by “beautiful” or “ugly” is not arbitrary nor is it subject to unilateral redefinition by an aesthetic crank. Similarly, what people mean by “good” or “bad” is not arbitrary nor is it subject to unilateral redefinition by ethical nihilists or other ethical cranks.
Clayton -
Clayton,
I’m not attempting to assert that all aethetic or moral judgements are purely arbitrary, but the fact that the aggregate of humanity has overlying preferences is wholly irrelevant to the validity of normative statements, which ethics and morals are. I’ve read a couple posters here who happen to think that ethics and morals don’t have to necessarily be normative statements, but if they aren’t, I would like to know what they are. Without the normative implication, they simply become statements of preference, so to differentiate them is non-sensical. You may argue that the difference is the subject matter in which morals/ethic deals in, but I don’t understand how the line gets drawn.
Collective experience, and an attempt to be un-biased.
Merely an attempt, the nature of minds doesn’t allow complete detachment (arguably).
I don’t understand how aesthetics are relevant to ethics. Jackson is correct. Merely saying this painting is beautiful or this woman is beautiful is NOT a normative statement. You can not say to other people you SHOULD find this painting beautiful or else I will lock you up. Which is what ethics are about. If they aren’t about that, if people aren’t obliged to obey certain rules then I’m afraid ethics are as useless as aesthetics.
They are suggestions (a manual) about (precedent and experience derived) means toward an (assumed desired) end. In other words, you may paint your house whatever color you want, but painting it pink may not be the best means towards the end of selling it.
Z.