I have not read all the literature on ArgEth, but I believe that what I have in mind is different, yet is best labeled as ArgEth as well.
Standard ArgEth starts with claims that state that to have a discussion we must recognize each others’ right to existence. It then goes from there (ie, I don’t know how it goes from there).
I’ve read some convincing critiques of it (if I remember correctly), but I do not wish to address those right here.
Part of the following section will be a different color. This is so that you can safely skip it if you have read the following paragraph and agree with the conclusion:
I’d like to make the claim (though it’s surely been made before), that although morality/ethics are subjective in their nature (as many of you believe), morality/ethics must necessarily be employed in any normative argumentation.
This is obvious because while positive analysis focuses on what “is,” normative analysis focuses on what “ought” to be. What “ought” to be relies on some conception of “good.” Nothing, however, is inherently “good” (because it ought to have been good before the existence of humans as well, and that simply makes no sense). Any argument of what “ought” to be can be reduced to something which supposedly should be because it is “good.” There is some fundamental assertion about what is “good,” which acts as the basis for all decisions. Since the decision of “good” is a subjective one created by the human mind and not existing outside of it, all argumentation boils down to this subjective decision of some inherently unmeasurable attribute “good.”
One may argue that utilitarian theory tells us that you can be objectively increase the utility of society by allowing for voluntary interactions which are necessarily utility-maximizing (though I have recently come to disagree with this and will start another thread). Alright, but why is increasing the utility of society something desirable? Because it’s “good.” I can just as easily claim that it’s “bad.” Our culture and upbringing has taught us that people feeling better is a “good” thing, and people feeling worse (with no good cause), is bad.
Similarly, a natural rights approach will boil down “voluntary interactions” to an analysis of property rights. When we ask why property rights are required, we have no definition but to say that they are “good” and aggression is “bad.”
Yet we’d like to have normative arguments. We’d like to be able to say “we should do this” as opposed to “stuff happens.” Hence, we must necessarily choose some subjective value to be “good.”
Applying this to the idea of objectively maximizing utility, we argue out of intuition that people feeling better is “good.” This may in fact be a universally-acceptable assertion. However, utilitarian analysis claims that because interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, the only way to objectively increase utility is to make sure that no one’s utility is decreased. This means that we might have situations that are “immoral” where one million people would benefit greatly (in their perception), while another person suffers a minor inconvenience. Though a libertarian might not disagree with this, it is not very palatable to the public at large. They will then claim that in such cases objectively increasing overall utility is not “good.” Instead, “social justice” is good. This itself is an arbitrarily-defined term, yet being a subjective claim, we cannot objectively argue against it being “good.” We may at best scoff at it, but under the realities of a democracy, we have no way of solving this.
Thus, we see that we are reduced to “selfish” definitions of “good” which cannot be changed except through irrational appeal.
Now, this is the more important part:
In any case, any normative argument relies on subjective valuations of which we try to convince others.
The more interesting thing, however, arises out of a deeper analysis of this realization.
How do I convince others that my subjective valuation is better than theirs?
Well, assume I try to convince you in my “human right A” over your “human right B.” Assume you accept my argument and are converted.
How did you become converted?
You have judged my argument through some judgment function of yours. This is not objective, as I have said before, because morals are subjective.
However, your judgment function overcame your previous subjective assertion of “good.” That means that you had some greater, deeper idea of what is “good” or what can qualify as “good.”
Hence, your idea of “good” was in fact deeper than what we previously thought your idea of “good” was.
Unless this process of going to deeper and deeper functions can happen indefinitely (which would mean your brain has infinite capacity for valuation functions that are indefinitely deep), you have a universal valuation function. This function may be individual-specific or may be universal to everyone.
Case 1: Individual-specific and random - this could be completely random and of no consequence. Either coded genetically or acquired during brain development. In fact, it may be simply some underlying “assumption” that your brain makes or some signal that happened to have caught on at some point.
Case 2: Individual-specific and meaningful - it could in fact be meaningful and acquired during brain development. Research has shown that the structure of the brain is too complex to be encoded in DNA and must instead be built “real-time” given the input we receive. As such, our brain is putty to be molded to whatever environmental stimulus we receive. Of course, this putty is placed on some skeleton of general brain functions coded in our DNA.
What this possibility entails is that some concept of morality we are taught early on sticks. I am not eager to accept this, as it appears that children’s morality may change substantially during their lifetimes.
Case 3: Individual-specific and hereditary - this means that our genetics determine this judgment function, and these genetics are specific to different genetic heritages. This allows for nature to explore through natural selection which moral-judgment function is superior. It allows it to tinker with different levels of sociability and with respect for other members of society and for other creatures/objects. This in turn affects hunting habits and mating behaviors. Theoretically, if such a factor is important (and not overshadowed by our ability for progress through technological advance), then eventually we’d have humans which have one moral system over all others that allows for the best relation between human and environment. Of course, because environment is always changing, this function might never settle into an optimum but always be in flux, meaning we might be stuck forever with things like “war” and “theft” and “hate” that could never be solved.
Case 4: Universal to everyone - this function has therefore arisen out of evolution and incorporates some code for natural selection/evolutionary selection. Thus, our actions are not really governed by reason but by some animal instinct that has come about through evolution. This is the same across all humans, and hence there could be a “universally-acceptable ethics” that can be derived if we figure out the ethical-analysis function.
Case 5: Random, circular, and maybe an artifact - The judgment function could be an unintentional byproduct of some other brain function that is not really needed but is “there.” Note that this could, I guess, become relevant to Case 2 or 4 if evolution ever makes this random phenomenon important.
As such, the judgment function could be circular in reasoning. The brain makes some weird assumption that is not even a fully-formed concept, on which it bases a bunch of other stuff. This assumption relies on some other weak assumption. When some discourse affects these causal relationships, some new random assumption is made.
Evidence for the different cases:
We note that in being utility-maximizing, people are not always “selfish.” That means that at times they place more value on something else than on their own lives at times. There’s the example of the soldier who covered a grenade with his helmet and jumped on it to save his friends. This suggests that there may be individual judgment functions.
On the other hand, this could easily be critiqued by saying that the judgment function was not really given enough time to work its course. Of course people hold different moral beliefs at a snapshot of time, but that’s because their judgment functions could have not had enough time to explore the concepts thoroughly enough. The function may yet be universal.
On the idea that some innate belief in property exists in humans - this could very well be some entitlement mentality that caters to survival of the self. Also, stealing may be evidence of direct tampering with someone’s utility function. Note too, however, that stealing also occurs naturally. This shows that we can have utility values assigned to items that others “own.” In any case, simply because we believe in property doesn’t mean that we believe in the morality of property - just the use we derive from it.
Anyway, these are some ideas. Your thoughts?