Is ethics/morality nonsense?

Miscellaneous General
1

I have read several posters to these forums who seem to believe that ethics or morality is “nonsense.” This seems to me to be an unjustifiable position short of adopting nihilism and asserting that everything without exception is nonsense.

I’ll begin the discussion by discarding all forms of objective morality from the start. Morality is at least subjective, I think that is really beyond debate. Rothbard was wrong on this point (though, in my view, he was right that morality is important).

But “nonsense” means something more than merely “subjective”, else all discussion of subjective preferences would be nonsense and then even economics would be nonsense (and so on until we arrived at nihilism… everything’s nonsense).

So, we have the possibility of ethical relativism… there is a choice of cultural relativism or individual relativism. I reject cultural relativism for the same reason I reject any sort of collective valuation (and I think most people here would agree). So, this leaves only individual relativism. So, ethics is subjective and relative to the individual. But that doesn’t make it nonsense. Any valuation is subjective and relative to the individual. This is praxeology 101.

Ethics parts ways from Misesean human action when it goes into the realm of ranking ends. If there is an “ought”, then that means one end is better than another. Mises denied that value-free science can rank ends, it can only evaluate the effectiveness of one or another means in achieving an arbitrarily chosen end. But individuals do, in fact, valuate. This act of valuation is, itself, a ranking of one end over another. I can say “I prefer bananas to apples” without violating value-free praxeology just as much as I can say, “I prefer not killing to killing.”

The difference, of course, between plain economic valuation and ethical valuation is what we are valuating. In the former, we are valuating states of affairs that would result from consuming a particular good or service but, in the latter we are valuating states of affairs that would result from our own actions towards another person.

Now, ethical language notably does not restrict itself to valuations over the individual’s own actions. In fact, ethical language is primarily pointed away from the self and towards others. “I prefer you to not steal than to steal.” While this preference is not a praxeological end since the subject is not the actor, it is no more of a mistake than to say, “I prefer it not to rain than to rain.” There is no reason to disbelieve the expressed preference - it’s not like I’m bargaining with someone over whether it will rain or not. It will rain or not rain no matter how I feel about it because I do not control the weather. So, there is no reason for me to conceal my true feelings on the matter. My expressed preference is my true preference. Similarly, you will steal or not steal (or at least attempt it) no matter how I feel about the matter but my expressed preference regarding your actions is my true preference.

In my view, ethical valuations are a subset of aesthetic valuations (which are a subset of all valuations, obviously). Aesthetic valuation is a ranking of the hedonic pleasure of experiencing something versus not experiencing it. For example, if I say, “The sunrise is beautiful” I mean that I am deriving more pleasure from experiencing the sunrise than I would from a different (hypothetical) set of circumstances in which this sunrise did not occur as it did. Since ethical valuations are a subset of aesthetic valuations, they are of the same form. If I say, “His donation to charity was good” I mean that I derive more pleasure from his having donated than I would have from a different (hypothetical) set of circumstances in which he did not donate to charity. And since there is no reason for me to lie about my preferences (I’m not bargaining), there is every reason to believe that my expressed preferences are my true preferences.

Given this description of what ethical valuations are (I’ve never read a description of ethics in this form anywhere), I believe I can give a functional explanation for why humans engage in ethical valuation at all (essentially, evolutionary ethics).

Ethical valuation exists. Ethical valuation performs a function(s) in humans. Ethical valuations are not arbitrary (for the same reasons that aesthetic valuations are not arbitrary). Even if you dissent to any particular ethical valuation (who ever said that aesthetic valuations must correspond in the first place?), that doesn’t make ethics “nonsense.” In what way is ethics nonsense??

Clayton -

2

I don’t know which group of people I dislike more: those, who claim, that morality is nonsense (that it doesn’t exist), or those, who say that it is “purely subjective”.

I don’t believe morality is subjective, even though many people are applying it differently to different groups of people in their everyday life. Best example would be: it is ok to defend yourself from a thief in a dark alley, but when thief comes to your house with a badge or whatever to collect “taxes”, now defence becomes “immoral” and your should give to him all your money or else. Why? This sort of thing is the root of all moral nihilism and moral relativism. People (especially younger generation) see these examples and tend to believe, that’s how “morality always work” and we should abolish it.

But that’s not the case. It doesn’t mean it has to be like that. There is objective morality, or at least, how I understand it, a moral code which could apply to all people equally. Initiation of the use of force is wrong, for example. Stealing someone else’s property is wrong etc.

Almost nobody denies that, but why the very same people claim morality is “subjective” when it clearly is not the case. I think this sort of madness is growing out of misunderstanding of basic concepts.

I agree, one can make an exception is some extreme cases, even life-boat scenarios, but it doesn’t disprove usefulness and necessity of morality itself. To deny morality or claim that it is always “subjective” is the same extreme, like claiming, that everything what could be called “just” should be derived from property rights (propertarianism).

3

“I’ll begin the discussion by discarding all forms of objective morality from the start. Morality is at least subjective, I think that is really beyond debate. Rothbard was wrong on this point”

No he wasn’t. Always baseless assertions. And define “morality”, because I’m willing to bet you don’t even understand his conception of it. Nothing but strawmen.

4

But that’s not the case. It doesn’t mean it has to be like that. There is objective morality, or at least, how I understand it, a moral code which could apply to all people equally. Initiation of the use of force is wrong, for example. Stealing someone else’s property is wrong etc.

Almost nobody denies that, but why the very same people claim morality is “subjective” when it clearly is not the case. I think this sort of madness is growing out of misunderstanding of basic concepts.

Some people see Robin Hood as a grand thief, others as a hero to society…

morals/ethics on any kind of individual level are nonsense. They only start to make sense through society’s agreement on them. You know “consent of the governed” and all that.

Murder isn’t wrong just becuase it is. It is wrong becuase, through a process of trial-and-error, enough individual people have seen it as destructive as to warrant it wrong in their society. That could change tomorow; see, NAZI Germany, or USSR Russia, or the eradication of Native Americans.

5

I’ve always though of morality as differentiating good (moral) and bad (immoral) actions from each other.

But if you accept that definition “morality” becomes useless and can be easily replaced with the word “preferences.”

To Conza: What is Rothbard’s definition of morality?

I seem to remember reading something (I’m pretty sure it was Rothbard) who said that when people discovered that there was a poisonous mushroom, they have established an ethic, don’t eat poisonous mushrooms! But doesn’t this just depend on someone’s desire to live? EDIT: If ethics are just commonly held morals then I agree with this.

I think you can prove objectively if you value certain ends, then there are certain actions you must take to achieve them. This again just reverts back to individual preferences though.

To anyone: Can “wrong” and “right” actions be proven? This would be great if so!

6

I think in my last post I didn’t differentiate between ethics and morality. I just think morality is nonsense and can only be analyzed as preferences but ethics are still okay because these are just commonly held morals (see: preferences) between groups of people. Ethics are okay and only exist because many people value the same ends such as living, prospering, and so on.

7

"The morality assumption/myth: that you must obey a moral code created by someone else.

In order to become more competent (and freer) you need to strengthen your understanding of the cognitive links betweenyour actions and the consequences you produce.

Morality is basically a set of very general rules concerning what to do and what not to do, generally involving large consequences.

Blindly using someone else’s moral code, tends to reduce your competence, because it prevents the forming of proper cognitive links between actions and consequences.

To be freer you need to create your own moral code that applies only to yourself and your own actions.

Regards,onebornfree

8

Perhaps I’m not fully grasping your angle, but if ethical valuations exist in the same way that gastronomic, sport, partner, pet, and fashion valuations (preferences) exist, then what is the basis for elevating them above the rest? It can’t be the existence of functional explanations as I’m sure there are plenty of functional explanations for most other valuation/preference realms. I’d bet there’s an evolutionary explanation for why most people dislike bitter food (essentially, evolutionary gastronomics).

Since objective (agent-independent) morals/ethics clearly don’t exist, the subjective ones are a mere subset of all possible valuation/preference realms, and I can see how someone would call them “nonsense” in the same way they’d call pizza valuations/preferences nonsense. Obviously, no subjective valuation/preference is “nonsense” to the subject that’s making it.

A Praxeological Account of Law
9

If you are talking about Vichy, she uses the word “morality” to refer only to what most other people call “objective morality”, and then calls it nonsense, just to be sensational. I hold the same views on it that she does, but I still use the word “morality” in the normal way.

10

"To Conza: What is Rothbard’s definition of morality?

I seem to remember reading something (I’m pretty sure it was Rothbard) who said that when people discovered that there was a poisonous mushroom, they have established an ethic, don’t eat poisonous mushrooms! But doesn’t this just depend on someone’s desire to live? EDIT: If ethics are just commonly held morals then I agree with this."

https://forum.freecapitalists.org/t/inner-voice-or-public-logic-praxeology-and-ethics/11332/14

https://forum.freecapitalists.org/t/inner-voice-or-public-logic-praxeology-and-ethics/11332/38

11

Somebody could think that what most people call “objective morality” is nonsense, but also think that we should uniformly apply certain moral rules to everybody. Equally applying a moral code to everybody has nothing to do with the argument about whether morality is subjective or objective, in the normal sense of those terms.

12

What does it even mean for them to be “elevated above the rest”? I act in accord to my “gastronomic, sport, partner, pet, and fashion valuations” just like anyone else and I also act in accord to my ethical valuations. Ethical valuations are only different in that they primarily come to bear during disputes. This is what makes ethical valuations more “serious” than others, because the consequences (violence) are potentially very serious.

Clayton -

13

If you mean by “morality” the ordinary sense of the word - normative expressions of the form, “A person should not kill another person” then you are clearly mistaken. Something is objective if it is observer-independent. For example, the speed of light is objective since anyone can follow a procedure for measuring it and come up with the same answer as anybody else. And it is not only the laws of basic physics which are objective. Revealed preferences are objective since if you exchange something, you are showing by your actions that you preferred the thing you received in exchange to the thing you gave away in exchange.

Social norms that emerge from moral sentiments (for example, that murder is bad and deserves punishment) are objective since we can inquire into the group to see what social norms are widely held and how widely they are held. But a social norm is not an ethic. Moral sentiments - like “I believe murder is bad and should be punished” - are valuations and are, therefore, as subjective as any other valuation. Please show me where I’m going astray.

Clayton -

14

A fist-happy English football fan would beg to differ. Assigning importance to valuations is a subjective valuation in its own right.

15

What separates a praxeological preference from an “academic” one is whether it compels a man to act or not. If I see a man mugging an old lady, my ethical valuations could certainly compel me to defend her against her attacker.

A praxeological theory of the impact of ethics on society must study just that: How ethical preferences influence people’s actions. Catallitics only explains market actions of exchange. What is needed is a new branch of praxeology, devoted to the study of ethical (or, to use a more accurate term, ethically-motivated) actions.

16

Good point. I’ll have to think about that. I still feel like there must be some defining difference between ethical valuations and other kinds of valuations since I feel like I (and other humans) just have this intuitive grasp of some meaningful distinction. It’s possible that it’s an illusion but then that illusion must be an important illusion and I would want to understand that.

Clayton -

17

To be fair, and I will deal with this when I have time; while ethics may be important, and they may be nonsense in a very real way, there is nothing saying they are not important nonsense

18

@ OP Clayton,

Nice one, dude! Somewhere back in the misty past I had been claiming ethics as equivalent to aesthetics.

To humbly submit my reply to your post, I (as one probably associated with the “ethics is nonsense” camp) would like to take the liberty to clarify the position of a self-considered nihilist.

As you stated, ethics are merely statements of preference. The non-sensical begins as soon as that preference is assumed to be universally valid, and therefore universally projected. It sounds like an insignificant difference, but stating,

“Charity is good.”

as opposed to,

“I think charity is good.”

I know that the second statement is implicit in the first, but the very real difference between the two is the hypothetical aspect of the second statement.

In the first statement, there is no room for debate. It is implicitly assumed that the first statement is a truth, or a law, a statement which is perfect, applicable in any and all scenarios forever.

The second statement is much less concrete, more a theory than a law.

It is the absolute nature of the first statement which I would call “nonsense”, which is to say that “Charity is good” could possibly be a truth, but given our inability to objectively percieve reality (and therefore truth), there would be no way to find out.

Essiantially, to me the nonsense is the pretense of being privy to truth, rather than the preferential statement.

19

Intrasubjective consensus doth not a truth make.

That’s another real big stumbling block I have while attempting to communicate with those who would believe that is the case.

20

Also, I may want to object to the word “nihilism”/“nihilist” if used as a form of radical skepticism (as I am not a skeptic), or the reference to the negation of meaning. I am saying that there is no “negation” of meaning, but the word never had meaning within logical context to begin with. It is simply an entaglment and unclarity of language.