That looks right to me.
No one has made a case as to why there is a rightness or wrongness as an essential characteristic of homicide. Homicide is merely the killing of another human. That is all homicide is. Rothbard considered some homicides to be right, whereas Gandhi considered all homicides to be wrong. But the only characteristic of homicide is that it is the killing of another human. Homicide is not limited to killing another person under condition X. That extra condition might make it murder or self-defense under certain definitions. But those would still be homicide.
If we look at murder, we can see that people have all sorts of views as to what ought to constitute murder. Pinning down a useful definition of murder can be tricky. Some people like to define it as a wrongful homicide. Others as a wrongful homicide where the killer had intent to kill. We can see that the first definition is really open to interpretation - one person might say it is okay to kill another for honor, and another person might say that it is wrong. The second definition is better, but it still leaves the possibility of calling any homicide in self-defense to be a murder. Now, some people might like that outcome, but it doesn’t sit well with me (except for when the killer went overboard in the use of violence in self-defense). My definition has gotten more precise over time, and it is: Murder is an unjustified homicide where the killer had intent to kill. I use the word justified to separate the concept of legal justice from personal morality. So while any particular person might find it morally okay to kill someone who has lied to them, they would not be legally justified in doing so. Of course, they might actually be legally justified if the law system allows for it, so what I really mean is that they ought not to be legally justified. I think you know what I’m getting at, so I’m not going to continue to refine how I define murder, as it’s not really the point of the thread.
Moving on, the point is that if someone says that A murdered B, we can be almost entirely sure that person is saying that it was wrong for A to kill B. But the actual act of homicide has no inherent characteristics of rightness/wrongness. When that person calls it murder, we know that he is demonstrating that the homicide was wrong. He is saying that the homicide was done under X conditions, and homicides done under X conditions are wrong.
Like language, money is an intersubjective phenomenon. There are plenty of inherent characterists of gold, but none of those characteristics are “moneyness”. Historically, people have valued gold as money because of those characteristics. Language is intersubjective because it requires two or more subjects to agree to meanings of words. The only exception I can think of is when a person might create a language as a type of code for their own personal use. But it would almost make more sense to call it a code than a language, but maybe it would be a language.
Anyway, when people typically talk about languages, they are not referring to the remote possibility of someone creating an entire language to be used as a personal code. They are referring to the intersubjective agreements regarding the meanings of words and rules of syntax. In a language such as Latin, the form “boy ball kicks” would make sense structurally, whereas in English it would only make sense if the verb were in between the subject and object and we add an article before the word “ball”. But it really doesn’t matter where any of these words go in any absolute sense. So long as people understand what others are saying, placement isn’t important. But with language, we have rules and principles so that we don’t have to define or explain what we are trying to say everytime we communicate. There is an intersubjective agreement amongst English speakers that verbs go between the subject and object. That’s just the rule. Other languages are not necessarily like that. The speakers of those languages have different intersubjective agreements.
The dollar or euro are not money in some absolute sense. They are money because of intersubjective agreement. Social norms are also the result of intersubjective agreement. I might think that we all ought to drive on the left side of the road on a two-way street, but that would be my own personal opinion. The norm in America is that we drive on the right side. The right side of the road is not inherently good and the left side bad. People agree to one general rule and sometimes make exceptions in specific cases.
People typically have stronger feelings regarding murder. In America, we do have laws prohibiting murder, and even if we didn’t we would have norms against it (I think it actually makes sense to say that we have both norms and laws against murder, but that’s another discussion). But even if there is intersubjective agreement (norms) saying that murder is bad and murderers will be punished, that doesn’t make murder wrong in an absolute sense. It only happens to be near universal, as there are people who murder, so obviously they considered their actions to be right at least at the time.
If we say that their action is inherently wrong, what we are doing is this: The act of killing another person is the act of killing another person plus wrongness. But that isn’t the case. Homicide is homicide. It is not “homicide = homicide + wrongness”. That is adding a characteristic that is not actually part of the act of killing another. After all, murder is only us giving a meaning to the context of the action “homicide”. Someone might define murder as “murder = homicide + wrongness” or “murder = homicide + intent = wrongful homicide”. Whether or not those are accurate or useful definitions is another discussion. The point is that a root action does not have a characteristic of rightness or wrongness. We ascribe rightness and wrongness to actions in certain contexts. “It is good to give to charity”. Well, giving money to someone else is giving money to someone else. It does not have an inherent quality of goodness. We might say that in a certain context, it is good to give money to someone else. But it is entirely subjective as to what that context is or should be. Is it good to give money to a beggar on the street or to the Red Cross? Maybe the beggar is an addict who will just buy more drugs and the Red Cross has its problems too. So some people might consider the act of giving money to a beggar or the Red Cross to be classified as good, but others might not and maybe for reasons other than just being stingy.
I think I’ve rambled long enough. My main point is that actual acts per se do not have any inherent qualities other than the act itself. We ascribe extra meanings to these acts, often because of context but not necessarily. Lying is purposely telling a falsehood. Whether or not someone ascribes the extra idea of right or wrong depends upon the subject. But lying per se has not quality of rightness or wrongness.