I’ve been reading Chalmer’s What is this Thing Called Science? And he seems to advocate Popper’s methodology in regards to the natural science and I’m curious as whether or not it is applicable to the natural science.
Can anybody link any essays on this?
In its broadedst scense you only need experiments which theories either pass or fail. I think the natural sciences have the least problem of the fields of human investigation with that (but still this is not all, for example does the theory of evolution fit in this, which theories to replace when an experiment fails..).
I should get the book next week, maybe I can say more then.
How exactly does the theory of evolution not fit this?
Some very strict falsificationists don’t consider evolution by natural selection to be scientific. When you define fitness as “the ability to survive in a given environment” you can call anything “fit” after the fact if it was able to survive and pass on its genes. It is almost tautological, so it would seem that in principle you couldn’t really falsify it.
Personally I don’t think there should be different methods for natural and social science, but maybe different methods for simple and complex systems. In other words, physics and chemistry might have one method but economics and ecology another.
if evolution is the fusion of two ideas
that genetic traits can be passed on, mutate , and the like over generation, and that these can lead to physical and behavioural changes. this can be tested in experiments, and has been, animal breeders etc.
that over spans of time where animals that compete for resources succeed or fail, this can through method 1) lead to a future scene wherein descendants of one strand have survived whilst descendants of another have not. this can also be tested by setting up a closed park, introducing some red and grey squirells, and control down the food resources, for scarcity, and wait for the aggressive species to survive whilst the passive species perishes.
however, what one cant do, is say unfalsifiably, this is what happend in nature, in history; it is only a possible (super likely even!) explanation. this is because we cant go back and test different histories etc.
It’s not compatible. Hoppe has some lecture on Popper on the LVMI website, but I can’t remember which it is. Maybe someone else can.
I’ve been trying to find it all morning, no luck so far.
What methodology does Hoppe advocate for the natural sciences then and why is it not compatible?
Gah, I misread. I don’t know. The hypothetico-deductive method I guess. Popper’s methodology - alongside positivism - has fallen into disrepute within the natural sciences, because of issues raised by Quine and Duhem (underdetermination of observed data &c.) Popperianism is an improvement on positivism IMO, but still subject to similar criticisms. The worst thing is, no science actually follows that methodology, something you’ll discover reading Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution (that’s the title IIRC.)
Are Quine and Duhem worth reading then?
I know I should say “yes”, but I don’t really think so. Quine is overbearingly technical, and is horrible at communicating what he is trying to say to laymen. I don’t know about Duhem. You’re better off reading up on summaries or exegeses of their views. If you decide to study philosophy, and take an interest in their work, then yes, you should. Otherwise, no.
Ok, thanks. Chalmers mentions them and recommends further reading, so I’ll check that out in the book.
I am probably alone in that I don’t really see scientific induction as a problem. science is about formalizing causation. when we observe it in a natural context causation is merely two statistically highly correlated events.
So every time you drop a ball it hits the floor. The problem of induction says that just because it has hit the floor every time in the past isn’t enough of a justification to say for sure that it will hit the floor this time.
Yeah, so? WHat other avenue is open to a rational agent? In order to function one MUST act as if what was true in the past holds true in the future. Until a conflicting piece of evidence presents itself there is only extrapolation of the past or random guesswork.
TBH I don’t think it’s much of a problem either, in spite of Hume’s insistence that it is impossible to rationally justify inductive generalisations.
Mabye in the world surrounding Quine and Duhem, but otherwise Popper’s methodology is what’s mainstream.
No, it isn’t. Give Kuhn a read, if you dare.
Hey guys,
im currently taking a philosophy of science course at university, really a wonderful class, my professor was a student of both quine and putnam(another famous philosopher of science).
As for who to read…
In order to have any understanding of the arguments (as i have learned) you really just can’t take one guy alone like most people do, either reading just Kuhn or just Popper ect. For any serious study you really need to read all of the actual works and the arguments, not just summaries of them by the opponents, because more often than not they completely mistunderstand what the other people are saying. I would also recommend anyone interested in epistemology to give these guys a look; they are not just talking about the philosophy of the natural sciences; they are also general epistemologists, and philosophers of language, meaning, mathematics. Hayek was certainly very aware of Popper, as was Mises, who favorably quoted Popper in his “Ultimate Foundation of Economic science”.
But whatever you do, do not just read one author!
Agreed, though I do not think the layman will find Quine accessible at all.
In On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology, Hoppe actually tried to deduce the truths of natural science from the action axiom. I only listened to it in the car (it’s available in the Mises.org media library), and didn’t carefully study it, so I can’t say how successful he was. I haven’t studied Popper yet, so I can’t answer the last part of your question.
Many scientists claim that they are falsificationists but they don’t act is if they are. Kuhn shows this quite convincingly. In other words, scientists think they are Popperians, but in reality don’t practice what they preach. Modern philosopers of science have mostly rejected Popper just like they did logical positivism.
And it’s worth noting that Quine is probably not for your thoroughgoing Misesian either…
Quine I would say is definately worth reading. An very astute thinker and really an amazing mind…
This whole Chalmers discussion reminds me of university, had to read that book there and it wasn’t all that fun for me. Lakatos, Popper, Kuhn…how the heart sinks..