Libertarian Paradox

Absolute freedom of speech seems essential in an anarcho-capitalist society. But is this really the case?

In an anarcho-capitalist society not just the initiation of violence is forbidden but also the threat thereof. The state necessarily initiates violence and threatens to do so, and clearly this is not compatible with a free society.

If you then live in a free anarcho-capitalist society and at the same time advocate and campaign for say the welfare state , for example by teaching it in schools, by writing and having published articles, books and so on, then by exercising this freedom of speech you are essentially threatening the initiation of violence: ‘Once I have the chance, once I have enough sympathizers, then I will rob all you guys.’ (so I presuppose here that these advocates would not just want to establish a welfare state with like-minded people but would want to force others to live under it as well)

So the paradox is that an exercise of your freedom of speech (namely to advocate the welfare state) should be forbidden because it in fact is the threat of the initiation of violence in the long run. If this is the case then only books, articles and so on that advocate anarcho-capitalism are allowed and anything that goes against these principles should be forbidden.

This would include the works of nearly all political and social philosophers, (novelists etc. would be an exception because they can say that it is just the
characters in the book that advocate non-anarcho-capitalism, or it is the interpretation of the reader that sees non-anarcho-capitalist thoughts in the story)

Anyway, this seems pretty totalitarian and since totalitarianism is pretty much the last thing you would think about when it comes to a free society, there seems to be a paradox here, an apparent contradiction.

But where is the flaw in the argument that gives rise to the paradox? Is advocating and campaigning for a welfare state in fact a case of threatening the initiation of violence? If not, then one of the premises of the argument fails to obtain and the paradox would not arise.

There seem to be two extremes here when it comes to seeing spoken or written words as (threaths of) violence: on the one extreme there is the idea that
even indirect threats such as those used for example by political philosophers who advocate a welfare state and campaign for it are seen as wrong from tthe standpoint of he non-aggression principle. If so then their works should be forbidden, which invokes memories of book burning and so on and sounds at least at first sight wrong and paradoxical.

And on the other extreme we have the idea that we can only call something (a threat of) the initiation of violence if the person himself is directly physically
threatening the use of violence against another: but this would seem to absolve people like Hitler and George W. Bush, as well as people who pay others to murder their wives, since they likely never physically threatened anybody.

But intuitively at least they do seem to be criminals and thus letting them go free seems like an absurd conclusion as well. But at least the latter option
would prevent the paradox of anarcho-capitalist totalitarianism from arising. If we take the former, there still seems to be a way out of the paradox.

Could it be the case that the paradox arises because we are simply not yet used to seeing state violence (and the threat thereof) as in essence the same thing as the (threat of the initiation of) violence of private criminals like robbers, murderers and so on? In this case, while we would know intellectually that
there is no relevant distinction, we simply don’t experience it that way yet.

If this is the case, then it seems natural that while we would immediately agree about forbidding the threat of the initiation of violence by private criminals, we still are not used to seeing the threat of the initiation of state violence in the same way and thus to us forbidding books that advocate the welfare state sounds quite totalitarian but in fact is not.

It is the logical conclusion of our principles and we just have to take time to emotionally accept and adjust to it, to the idea that the morality of anarcho-capitalism is an Absolute one: it is the only correct morality and it is of supreme importance. If so, then the paradox disappears because once we are used to the idea it no longer sounds totalitarian.

Is it possible to threat someone without knowing it?

Usually when I discuss with some of mine friends issues like state coersion, they seem not realise what is the problem. I don’t know whethet it’s a psychological phenomena, or are they plainly dishonest, but if you advocate existence of a state you can still fail to realise, that it means immoral acts of wiolance. If so, are you threatening, or not?

A couple of points:

  1. Read Rothbard’s “The Ethics of Liberty” to see how all such “rights” as that to free speech, for instance, are derivatives of property rights.

  2. When we speak of threat of violence we mean direct threat to one’s life and property, not advocating some system in a book. Rothbard in fact specifies in TEOL that a threat must be overt and direct. As such there is no reason to ban any books or speech on one’s property.

I believe that a threat to be objectionable must be immediate and credible. If I say “I am going to kill you in a year”, then I do not think that you have a right to shoot me now. Perhaps I shall rethink before a year. Likewise if I call “I am going to shoot you”, but have no gun in my possession (and you know it), then my threat is not credible. If someone says that they wish to rob my property by instituting a system of government then the threat is neither immediate nor credible. If it happens it is likely to be sometime in the distant future, and evidence that he can do it would normally be lacking.

This is a straw man. No one has ever said that it would be illegal under anarcho-capitalism to advocate the formation of a state. That, while possibly a threat, is definitely not coercion. No one is using threats in order to influence actions.

There is no paradox, because it is not a crime.

Speech is not a crime. Only aggression is a crime. However, under pure private law, since everything is private property, you can be expelled from any community for any reason whatsoever, whether it is making threats, hate speech, supporting social democracy, whatever. If you threaten a member of the community, they can throw you out. If you do not comply, you will be guilty of trespass. That is aggression.

‘will’ implies ‘can’

If I called one of you on the phone from here in Pennsylvania and said “I’m going to reach through this phone and strangle you,” would any of you feel threatened? No? But the supposed paradox in this thread implies that you should. Now, if I were down the road from you and talking to you over the phone and said “I’m going to walk down to your house and strangle you,” would you feel threatened? Certainly you should (though chances are I couldn’t strangle you). Stating you will do something is only a threat if you have the ability to do it. Even then, common sense needs to apply. No private courts would waste their time trying people who joke about firing up their offices or committing insurance fraud.

When I become an astronaut I’ll land the space shuttle on you. Scared?

Advocating a state or a policy even a violent one isn’t really a direct threat even, if it sounds threatening. A threat must be directed against something concrete like the life or property of people. i.e. If Johnny says:“I am going to kill you, Peter”. or “I am going to trash your car”… Such statements are direct threats. Problematic are implied threats. Were an action or lack thereof can be interpreted as threat, but may mean something else as well. This kind of threat is possibly far more common then direct honest threats being made. There may however be valid for threatening people as well.

Correct, it is not a crime. However, anyone advocating a state or any other form of aggression against private property rights is involved in a preformative contradiction because one must pressupose property rights in order to engage in argumentation.

Be careful about the way you use the term “advocating”. Standing on a sidewalk and calling for the extermination of capitalists is not an argument, therefore it does not involve any performative contradiction, anymore than threatening to kill someone would.

An argument is intended to persuade any reader of its truth. That is why arguing for anything except pure liberty is a performative contradiction.

No it isn’t. one can argue for ones own claim to make arguments, with out achknowledging that others would have this liberty, too.

…However he or she would most likely make some arguments in favor om “extermination capitalists”. The question is rather how does one deal with such “calls” or “arguments”. Jail the caller, perhaps ridicule her or him or just ignore them?

One could do so, but would that pass the universalization “test”?

Under “pure private law” where everything is private property, those without ownership of land have no common right to free speech.

Today that right is fulfilled upon common right of ways to travel contained within sidewalks and roads where we also excercise our common rights to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.

I guess you replied to a statement of someone demanding rights/liberties/claims for himself, while not acknowledging this for others.
Why would it have to pass an “universalization test”?!

The right to free speech is preserved as long as property owners allow it, which is exactly the same as it is today. People have the right to free speech on government-owned property because the government allows it. If either property owners or the government stopped allowing it, free speech would be restricted. However, it is far less likely for millions of property owners to enter into a monopolistic cartel, reduce their own profits, and ban free speech than it is for government to do it.

Are you familiar with Kantian ethics?The universalization test applies when a moral agent proposes a moral rule that applies only to himself and excludes its application to other moral agents, in spite of their not differing in any morally relevant respect (e.g. I propose it is fine for me to murder, but not for anyone else.) The rule thus is arbitrary and cannot its exclusive application cannot be justified.

No. Freedom of speech, like right of ways contained within sidewalks, are common rights that are individual equal rights not collective rights.

Whatever rights you think you have are irrelevant when you are on someone else’s property, unless you are willing to use force or fraud to violate their rules. Sidewalks are not common property like air, they are state property. Freedom of speech is something the state can take away. Its not a matter of ethics, its a matter of who has physical control of the property. Ethics don’t mean much facing down the barrel of a gun.

Now, I believe people should have freedom of speech. And I believe the best way to secure this freedom is to eliminate legitimized monopolies on violence.

I’m familar with it. But still not everyone needs to have to agree with it. Kant actually did not propose universalization, but generalization.

… That’s how I would explain it as well. However does it really apply to our case? If Johnny claims the freedom to speak his mind in public for himself, he isn’t actually denying the same to anybody else. There is no obligation on him to demand it for anyone else either. This is like someone claiming wage payment from someone else. He doesn’t have to demand that all the other people get paid first.

Personally however that rules and laws in a society ought to be generalizable - This however requires some homogenity to it, since the lawmaker has a specific type of person in mind or comes to his design of social rules via introspection. Also bear in mind that not all people function like Westerners. Their are many cultures that would place a stronger grain on emotion, sensitivity, subjective compassion then on rational and objective rules.