This is a new thread that continues a discussion from “Anyone frequent any science or physics forums/groups”
Zangelbert Bingledack wrote:
'guess if you take the idea of a means to its logical end, it really could be the entire state of affairs (Mises) someone is faced with. an axe is my means to chop wood…but really so is gravity, friction, momentum, my arm, the fact that my arm is attached to my body, the fact that i am not in handcuffs, the fact that there is light for me to see by…these are all means if any of them is! why the axe any more of a means than the light?
still, all of those are necessary for me to chop the wood. there being 9 donuts in my car is not necessary for my chopping of the wood. i don’t utilize that aspect of the state of affairs as a means…but then, is it really an aspect of my state of affairs? or, in such cases, is it just an irrelevant nothing?
ok wait, i think i got something: “there are 9 donuts” has meaning to me in the present moment only as far as it is relevant to whatever action i am taking now. specifically, if i just try to collect random facts that may at some point be useful to me, and this seems a habit of most humans, “there are 9 donuts” is going to be relevant to me for chopping the wood…orrrr maybe not?
nah, this is it: eureka! (maybe). it’s really that there’s this state of affairs, whole and undifferentiated. it is state of affairs A, and it includes an unchopped block of wood, a whole slew of other things…and 9 donuts in my car. i want to change this state of affairs to a state of affairs B that includes a chopped block of wood, that same whole slew of other things…and that same 9 donuts in my car. i don’t care about the 9 donuts really, but if we look at the entire state of affairs as whole and undifferentiated, then we cannot say anything other than that i am “utilizing” or “working” or “acting on” state of affairs A to change it to state of affairs B. then all of A is the means and all of B is the end. that is with no subdividing of the two states of affairs down into specific parts like the axe or the light or my arm or the donuts. then once i reach B, it becomes my new means, and i select a new action to reach state of affairs C, my new end. and so on. or something like that?
it is as if the current instantaneous frame of your experience is your means, the entire thing, not any one part of it, and the next (or next next next…) frame of your experience that you anticipate or hope your present action to accomplish is your end, and each end achieved becomes a new means because it is now your present frame of experience that you will act on to try to get something even better, or at least less worse.
in some ways it’s a very unenlightening way to think of means and ends, but it could perhaps have its uses?
ZB:
These last two paragraphs are outstanding.
If I may add some comments and insights:
“…it’s really that there’s this state of affairs, whole and undifferentiated.”
The various parts of this whole may not have to be conceptually differentiated from each other, spatially, visually, with respect to velocity, with respect to mass, etc… We could instead conceive that the state of affairs is differentiated, in or by my consciousness, from other possible states of affairs. Or possibly better, the present state of affairs is differentiated, within or for my consciousness, from the state of affairs I am aiming at but have not yet “attained.”
In other words, the differentiation we will be referring to is not between object 1 and object 2—two objects ‘within’ my present state of affairs—but rather that between the state of affairs which presents itself to me, as distinct from the state of affairs I am aiming at. This latter ‘state’ is not a state in the same sense as my present state. Rather, it is a potentiality.
So the difference in differentiation is that between two of these: I I
And: one of these I and none of those (…)
The difference between the differentiation between two objects, and between an object and no object.
“…state of affairs A, and it includes an unchopped block of wood, a whole slew of other things…and 9 donuts in my car. i want to change this state of affairs to a state of affairs B that includes a chopped block of wood, that same whole slew of other things…and that same 9 donuts in my car. i don’t care about the 9 donuts really,…”
Consider the possibility that it may not be whether or not you formulate an explicit plan of action regarding the 9 donuts that matters. It is possible that if you are an acting being “containing” a category we refer to as “means,” then anything which appears in your “means category” is a means for you, whether or not you explicitly formulate a plan to alter that thing.
Example:
If there are 9 donuts in my car, generally we will assume that these 9 donuts appear to me as some sort of perception; perhaps a mental or visual image.
Let’s assume for a moment that ontologically, 9 donuts “really are” in my car, but someone has arranged it so that, for a short time, the mental or visual image of the 9 donuts does not appear for me.
After a period of time, this situation lapses, and now I find that I have donut crumbs and pieces all over my hands, the seat of my pants, and smashed into the seat of the car.
Not being able to “utilize” the image of the 9 donuts, I was unable to avoid placing my body and hands on top of the donuts that were “really there,” ultimately resulting in a “dissatisfactory” situation.
Now if we go back to the original scenario, we said that we were interested in chopping the wood, and that we really didn’t care about the 9 donuts. And what we meant was that, as chopping the wood was assumed as our end, then what were our “means” in this case was the axe lying beside the wood. The 9 donuts obviously were not being utilized as means toward chopping the wood, hence your statement “I don’t care about the 9 donuts really.”
But it may not be important in conceiving what constitutes a means that an actor formulate an explicit plan of action or formulate an explicit want or desire regarding the object present to him. If we assume an acting being constituted of “action categories,” then the categorization of a given entity X need not occur for the actor only after a protracted or temporally durable decision or deliberation process. The categorization of a given entity as a means by an actor, may be conceived as the very precondition of any thought or action on the part of the actor.
It may not be like this: I am now neutral, having no means or ends. In a moment, I will choose an end and a means, and then I will act.
Rather, it may be that any thought process or any “doing” already presupposes a means of such thinking or doing.
The mental or visual image of 9 donuts is used by me as means to (as an example) avoid smashed donuts on the seats of my car. I may not be consciously aware in explicit terms that “I am now using the image of 9 donuts as means to avoid sitting on 9 donuts.” I may “utilize” the image of the 9 donuts without undertaking an explicit process of categorization or explicit process of choice.
I may categorize things as means by nature if I am an acting being constituted of action categories. Things that appear for me may appear as means for me regardless of whether I bring this fact to explicit awareness.
“…then all of A is the means and all of B is the end. that is with no subdividing of the two states of affairs down into specific parts like the axe or the light or my arm or the donuts. then once i reach B, it becomes my new means, and i select a new action to reach state of affairs C, my new end. and so on. or something like that?”
In my opinion, yes, something like that. Here is the reason:
If we begin to subdivide or classify the present state of affairs (A) into specific parts, we will have to do so with respect to the differences these parts have from one another. What are some of these differences?
Spatial, visual, weight, mass, velocity, etc…
Thus, in proceeding so, we inadvertently adopt the epistemological or procedural foundations of natural science.
What we want to do is found the theory of action on the concept of or on the phenomenon of action (the idea that an actor is dissatisfied with his present state, and strives for a different state) not on the concept or phenomenon of nature (the relationships between the various states or objects that appear for us).
Thus, as indicated above, our founding distinction or conception is not that between two parts of my state of affairs, or between one of my states of affairs and another. The founding distinction is between my present state of affairs and a state of affairs not yet present or attained (in which case it is not a “state of affairs” strictly speaking, but something else).
By conceiving things this way, we may avoid setting the theory of action on a natural-scientific foundation.
“…it is as if the current instantaneous frame of your experience is your means, the entire thing, not any one part of it, and the next (or next next next…) frame of your experience that you anticipate or hope your present action to accomplish is your end, and each end achieved becomes a new means because it is now your present frame of experience that you will act on to try to get something even better, or at least less worse.”
That is excellent. Very well phrased.
Here is how Mises expressed the same general phenomenon:
As soon as people venture to question and to examine an end, they no longer look upon it as an end but deal with it as a means to attain a still higher end. The ultimate end is beyond any rational examination. All other ends are but provisional. They turn into means as soon as they are weighed against other ends or means.(Theory and History, p.14)
As soon as we start to refute by arguments an ultimate judgment of value, we look upon it as a means to attain definite ends. But then we merely shift the discussion to another plane. We no longer view the principle concerned as an ultimate value but as a means to attain an ultimate value, and we are again faced with the same problem.(Theory and History, p.23)
In fact, he who passes judgement of an alleged end, reduces it from the rank of an end to that of a means. He values it from the viewpoint of an (higher) end and asks whether it is a suitable means to attain this (higher) end.(Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.22/23)
The idea is that the end is never “present” or “attained,” and this in a fundamental sense.
There is no rational examination of ends possible because for an acting being, something “present” is something presently utilized, i.e., a means.
If you re-read your passage just above, you will see that it implies this same situation. The end is that which is fundamentally and perpetually beyond the horizon. As Mises writes:
“The ultimate end is beyond any rational examination. All other ends are but provisional. They turn into means as soon as they are weighed against other ends or means.”
Mises’s meaning is that as soon as we begin to consciously deliberate about an end, in so doing, we invariably then treat the “end” deliberated about as a means to attain something else.
But it may be more fundamental than that. It may be that even things that we previously conceived as simply “there” for us in some neutral or objective sense (such as 9 donuts), are there as means.
