This discussion convolved into the usual debate on the application of “means” and “ends” to ethics. Since I reject the means-end dichotomy, and I posted my critique of the means-end dichotomy. I hope this will clarify some misinterpretations and give additional insights in grounding ethics with science.
Without reading your critique, yet, I think this is why I was having difficulty seeing the difference between passions and reason and happiness in that thread. I tried to put my finger on it by noting that it seemed that there was some kind of “origin” statement going on. A thing had to be 1st then 2nd then 3rd. Thus if passions in human development come first before, as I stated in that thread, reason and then a more mature reason and then a more knowledgeable based reason, then it seems this development was placing the order of means and ends. But I didn’t agree with such ordering. It seemed to much like determinism instead of each component such as passions or reason can be involved in a teleological process individually. I think particulars in humans can telos. Thus why one person can be more superb in bravery whilst another more superb in fishing, or more in compassion or more in economics, etc.., etc… I understand the means-ends, but I don’t know if it has to be totally dismissed. I’ll read your critique. It may add more insight to what I’ve been trying to figure out.
thanks[:)]
Edit: But I’m definitely enjoying the other thread as well that you linked since a lot is coming up that I may not have considered before. It’s been insightful.
just because teleology and deontology are fuzzy at the edges doesn’t mean that they’re useless concepts. they’re useful because common modes of human thought can be accurately described by them.
Are you rejecting means-ends by replacing them due to what you say, “more precision”, because you use four instead of two concepts taken from your blog post:
“However, we could extend the precision further by replacing the two words “means” and “ends” with another set of words related to cognitive psychology. Instead of “means” and “ends”, we could use “desires”, “instincts”, “habits”, and “reflexes”.”
And yet desires, instincts, habits, and reflexes where known by Aristotle and there are many other descriptions of means-ends. Means-ends are not all there is. This has been known for thousands of years. Not sure what you’re trying to say. Also, I see means-ends as an analogy of biological or mental activities, which again is not anything new. If you would like to clarify, I offer my thanks ahead of time.
Yes, this is what I am basically saying. It is arbitrary to pick only two concepts when you can pick any number of concepts. I am criticizing the notion that the means-end dichotomy is a given true. I am also criticizing the theorems derived from the means-end dichotomy as given truths.
However, I am not arguing that the means-end dichotomy is logically false. I am arguing that it is arbitrary to pick the means-ends dichotomy as an axiom, and then rejecting systems greater than two concepts as false.
The means-end dichotomy is useful in describing Robinson Crusoe economics. However, it should not be a given axiom assumed to be true in all contexts. Desires, instincts, habits, and reflexes cannot be simplified to “means” and “ends” only.
you’re confusing epistemics and ethics.
Fascinating. What of it?
Why?
What’s your point?
What’s yours?
I’d love to know what the significance of it is. You reject this, you reject that for it being “simplistic” &c., but I want to know what it matters really, if the distinction is not flatly invalid… nor even confusing.
he doesnt seem to understand the difference between rejecting something as all-that-can-be-said-on-a-matter whilst still accepting that thing in itself, and on the other hand; rejecting the thing, because its wrong. All the talk of more precision, indicates that anarcho-m fully accepts means and ends distinctions. saying that you can decompose a broad category of ends down to different kinds and ditto for means, surely, enforces the mean-ends- paradigm.
also instincts either instill arbitrary ends, or where they function at the level of reflexes that you mention, they are not a part of either means-or-ends, but this does not refute the means-end analysis of human action, as they simply and quite straightforwardly do not constitute any part kind of human action, and are only as relevent to human action as any other given datum, ‘skyscrapers are heavy’ ‘the human body needs energy from food’ . reflexes certainly can inform human action in just this way,as a datum.
Forgive me if I’m being obtuse, but isn’t that why his entry is titled “Rejecting the means-end dichtomy”, & largely discusses details of what he rejects, & not “Rejecting the entire idea of the means-ends paradigm”?
Forgive me if I’m being obtuse, but isn’t that why his entry is titled “Rejecting the means-end dichtomy”, & largely discusses details of what he rejects, & not “Rejecting the entire idea of the means-ends paradigm”?
‘refining the means-ends dichotomy’ would be a better approach. but seems misguided given his false assumptions about Human Action; motivated by what he supposes praxeology lacks given the stance on instincts and reflexes.
teleology and deontology or means-ends as you call it are branches of ethics, that is, they deal with systems for placing value on actions. in your posts you’re talking about epistemics, that is, truth systems, rejecting this “false dichotomy” for not being true. That’s like me saying that the death penalty is false.
NirgrahamUK, please let me know why you believed that I confused two meanings of “rejection” and that I believed that reflexes “refute” (whatever that means) the means-end dichotomy. I feel interested in hearing your response, because the above two claims does not reflect my thoughts. I want at least 50% of my readers to accurately decipher my ambiguous writing.
As always, thanks for your feedback on my post. That will help me a lot with my ambiguous writing.
Even though Mises indeed analysed reflexes, he failed to incorporate reflexes as a thrid kind of action in addition to “means” and “ends.” Did he ever mention a “means-end-reflexes trichotomy”? No. How about other philosophers of the means-end dichotomy like David Hume? He had never analysed “reflexes” at all.
If the last paragraph happens to be ambiguous again, then you know what to do.
relfexes are involved in the means-ends framework of action, by being datum for the actioner to consider when deciding what means to employ in furtherance of his end. as such they are either completely irrelevant. like tossing in ones sleep. or relevant but merely data about the world. i.e. if it is super important one night to not toss in your sleep because you have reason to believe your life may depend on it and you wish to wake in the morning, the acting man can tie himself into his bed. the existance of ‘reflexes’ does not break the means-ends dichotomy which is unimpeachable, if the subject is Misesian ‘human action’.
In regards to my second post on this thread, when I said “we cannot simplify ‘desires’, ‘instincts’, ‘reflexes’, and ‘habits’ into means and ends only”, I had meant that "we cannot simplify ‘desires’, simplify ‘instincts’, ‘reflexes’, and ‘habits’ into ‘means’ and ‘ends’ without losing precision’.
A while ago I had realized that words such as “cannot” or “impossible” are ambiguous.
Just like when Mises claimed that “socialism cannot work”, he had really meant that "socialism cannot work as efficiently to satisfy consumer preferences.
Just like when Mises claimed that “socialism is impossible”, he had really meant that "socialism cannot work as efficiently to satisfy consumer preferences. Socialism was not “impossible” in the Soviet Union, in a sense.
Now you had confirmed my hypothesis. Keep it up! I really like the skeptics here at the Mises Community, such as Juan and NirgrahamUK. Juan practically criticizes every idea with every possible rejection.
no, i am not playing mere word games.
the fact that we cannot simplify desires, instincts, reflexes and habits, into means and ends only, does not count against means-ends analysis at all.
it is as irrelevant as our inability to simplify ‘laws of logic’ ‘the earth is roughly spherical’ etc etc into means-ends. these are things that merely form the datum of means-ends analysis,
(there is a loose sense in which they could be argued to be captured in the means, only not all that much is gained by jamming in all the esoteric ‘fact-of-the’world’ into means, because the facts are giong to be the same despite whether you choose to ride the bus or drive your car to school, the world is roughly spherical and this fills in the picture of what the means of bus riding ‘are’ but its not a substantial issue. so you can subsume all those things that you have written about under means, but this would be an act of pedantry.)