“[M]inarchist libertarians, I suggest, have not disentangled themselves from the magical picture so thoroughly as anarchist libertarians have. Instead, they often write (when discussing anarchism, though seldom when discussing any other topic) as though a government’s decreeing some desired result is equivalent to its achieving it – and then contrast this idealised picture of government with the muddling reality of anarchy, to the latter’s detriment.” - Long, p.14
In his chapter in the Long/Machan anthology Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government a Part of a Free Country?, Adam Reed writes of the steps needed to establish a minarchist government:
The first step that those who seek to maximise their own objective freedom will need to take is find each other, organise for communication and planning of subsequent stages of action, and weed out from their company any who would join them with a religious or other repressive or subjectivist agenda. …
If their company does not already include a sufficient number of members with defense and law enforcement skills, and adequate experience in using those skills, progress to the next stage will depend on the development of effective law enforcement and defense capabilities among the prospective citizens…
In the second stage, the citizens will form a new “law and defense enterprise” … Membership-citizenship in the new cooperative-enterprise-community will require a contribution of resources from each member-citizen…
For stage 3, the cooperative will need to find an entrepreneur who recognises its members’ objective right to protect all their other rights by establishing a government of objective law… After establishing its gated community, the cooperative will build a secure defense perimeter around it, and train its members to defend it…
In the next stage, the citizens of the cooperative will proceed to exercise all their rights. Their gated community being their property, they will have a recognised right to restrict access to that property… [Those] who persist in attempts to invade the community, and impose their arbitrary “laws,” will be dealt with as enemies. The new constitutional republic will take all the steops that it may need to take to bring the use of retaliatory force within its borders under objective control. … It will make treaties with existing “market law-defense agencies” only on the basis of absolute inviolability of the rights of its citizens" …
Neither voluntary organisations nor subsidiary governments can be allowed to violate individual rights, and to do its job, a federal republic will need the authority and the means to prevent such violations. … the Republic must have the authority and the means to correct (and justly punish) any resulting violations of individual human rights. Anything less would be itself a violation of individual rights and an infringement of liberty. (“Rationality, History, and Inductive Politics” p.34-36)
So these are the steps required to achieve Reed’s ideal government. But Reed has only indicated what will need to happen; he has given no indication as to how this goal will be achieved. In other words, he has fallen into exactly the fallacy described by Long: he is treating the decreeing of the desired goal as the equivalent to the achievement of that goal. But of course this is absurd. Ends cannot be achieved without means.
For instance, Reed’s government “will make treaties… only on the basis of absolute inviolability of the rights of its citizens.” Okay, how will it do this? Of course, it is an impossible task: there are no means that can achieve the end of absolute inviolability of rights.
Or this gem: “Neither voluntary organisations nor subsidiary governments can be allowed to violate individual rights”. If only rights could be secured just by writing this on a piece of paper! Like the Utopian Socialists, Reed does not seem concerned with means; what matters is the goal, not whether the goal can be achieved. Wishful thinking much?
Right on cue, Reed then contrasts this idealized government with a realistic anarchy, thereby committing the second half of the fallacy described in the Long quotation above:
Once the laws and the constitution have been adjusted to assure me of maximum protection of my rights, a subsequent reversion of legal or defense authority to men whose vision of liberty differs from the normative facts can only infringe the rights I already enjoy. What possible benefit could I, or any other rational person, derive from enabling anti-abortion Christianists, or Al Qaeda, or the Socialist Party, to operate their own “market law-defense enterprises” capable of enforcing, to whatever extent, the false beliefs of their members—and of compromising my rights in the process of doing so? (p.36)
Given that Reed’s ideal government is perfect, the answer is obviously that no rational person would choose anarchy. Why settle for less than perfection? But of course this is just the nirvana fallacy: comparing an idealized, perfect government with an imperfect, realistic anarchy. Since Reed’s perfect government is impossible, the actual relevant comparison is between imperfect anarchy and imperfect government. Once the question is put in terms of comparative institutional analysis, Reed’s minarchism turns out to be full of holes. After all, the Socialist Party and other interest groups will be a problem under minarchy as well. Since anarchy has a more extensive set of checks and balances, it can resist interest groups more effectively than minarchy, which is protected only by a weak paper constitution.
In the end, minarchism can remain a viable, consistent theory only if it can evade comparative analysis. For once realistic, imperfect anarchy is compared with realistic, imperfect minarchy, it is clear that anarchy will be the victor: the incentives generated by market competition are more reliable than the incentives generated by bureaucracy. Minarchists must show that the arguments for free markets do not apply to the legal system. Since they have failed to do so, their theory must be regarded as on a par with the Utopian socialists.