Praxeological question on dogs

Economics Political Theory
1

Upon commanding my dog, Rocky, to sit and roll over, a praxeological question came over me. “Why does his obeying of this command not constitute action?” The reason I ask is because action, in the Misesian sense of the word, is apportioned only to humans, as only conscious beings deploying logic are capable of this kind of action.

I understand that my dog has been trained to sit and roll when I tell him to do so, but somewhat often (and much to my chagrin) he ignores my command. For a better example, Rocky is quite fond of my fiance, Kylie. He appears to regard her with almost as much respect, if not the same amount, as he does me. The other day I called to him to come to me. Kylie, wanting to pet him offered him a treat. I could not offer such an enticing deal, only my love and affection. At first, one might say, “Well, there you go. It is not action because he is simply operating on his instinct to feed.”

To me, however, this conclusion is a bit overly inductive in its reasoning. Rocky’s choosing the food, thus my fiance over me does not, ipso facto, prove instinct was the impetus by which he made his decision. In fact, if one were to make the case for instinct, I think the more likely choice would have been for him to pick me. I am his “pack leader”, or at least he identifies me as such. To my knowledge, the studies done on the animal psychology of dogs stipulates that it is the pack leader who barks (no pun intended) the commands. He eats first, he picks the women first, and the rest is for the rest of the pack.

So, if instinct were the cause of his choice, it seems more likely he would have obeyed me, rather than my fiance. This seems especially true for Rocky, as he is a pit bull; a breed known for, if nothing else, their unusually loyal disposition toward their primary masters.

If action is purposeful behavior where a human acts whenever he uses means to achieve an end that he or she subjectively values, then I do not ​yet see how Rocky’s choice does not meet the qualifications of action. He used means (his attention) to achieve an end (a treat and affection) that he subjectively valued. Perhaps my affection is better, in his eyes, than my fiance’s. However, my fiance’s affection plus a treat is better than my affection alone.

I get that something living like a plant or a clam is not capable of action. Even wild animals, such as a shark, do not confuse me. Conversely, animals like dolphins and dogs continue to confuse me. They are trainable, and it appears the reason for this trainability is our ability to manipulate their choices. We can offer these animals a choice: obey me and have your most desired end (feeding or reproduction) met, or disobey us and be absent these things. The very fact that these animals not only can, but very often do, make different choices inductively seems to imply purposeful action.

Add to this that certain animals, such as the octopus in addition to dogs and dolphins, are clearly capable of learning. In one famous experiment, a shrimp was placed in a jar, and the far was then submerged in a tank of water housing an octopus. The octopus saw the prey and attacked the jar, but at first could not figure out how to access the shrimp. Eventually, it figured out how to twist the jar open and gain access to the shrimp. This experiment was performed time and time again with the same octopus, and many others as well, and each time the octopus got faster at performing the task. Eventually, the octopus needed no time at all. The shrimp was as good as dead, inside a jar or not.

After this experiment, the scientists made the obstacle even harder, but they found the same results. The octopus clearly learns and learns on its own in an incredibly didactic way (which is more than I can say for most people - jk).

If the definition of action proper also stipulated that the desired ends differed substantially from one individual to the next, I could see why dogs and dolphins might be excluded, but no such stipulation exists. SO…what am I missing. I have certainly reached the point as an Austrian where my attitude is “trust, but verify” toward the axioms of the school. If I find myself thinking in contradiction to the school’s axioms, my first assumption is that I am either missing something, or I am just wrong. It’s been awhile since I’ve read HA, and I don’t remember a specific topic close to this one being discussed.

Thanks in advance
-Texas Trigger

2

We don’t know if animals act. I think that there’s a good deal of evidence that some animals are capable of some degree of rational thought. The key word there? Some.
If we lived in a world of mentally disabled human beings then the usual praxeological rules of economics would not apply. Why? Because a market isn’t much good if you can’t understand the concept of a quantitative exchange, or do any sort of real barter/product developement.

Praxeological axioms don’t apply to humans as such, they apply to any being which rationally acts. Because most men fit this bill, praxeology can tell us much about human society.

I hope that helps.

3

Animal action is one of the few issues on which I disagree with Mises. It seems to me that animals do act, but have very limited future planning and imaginative abilities compared to those of humans.

4

I’m glad this question has been asked- I’ve been wondering the same about my dog. I know Mises’ & Rothbards’ stances on the matter, but I’m somewhat ambiguous as of right now on some animals.

5

I think I’ve posted this before, but this is the perfect thread for this:

Chimp Gathers Stones for “Premeditated” Attacks on Zoo Visitors

6

It appears to me that diminishing marginal utility would hold for animals as well…

7

WRONG!!!

Remember guys, humans are the only animals that matter. The rest of the natural world is there for the taking!

We must believe this, or risk having moral questions about factory farming and vivisection labs, which are vital to human interests.

Oh, and also humans are the only animals with an innate right not to be aggressed against, and the only animals with an innate right to possession and occupation of physical matter and space.

/THREAD BOMB

8

REMEMBER GUISE!

All the universe matters! Unless it doesn’t affect us, then it doesn’t matter! But there’s no need to make any kind of distinction when having a discussion about ecological impacts, so the universe matters after all! Except when I decide it doesn’t!

9

I don’t see why the early chapters of HA or MES couldn’t apply to non-humans. The concepts of consumption and production, costs and benefits, profits and losses, etc, apply to animals. Some animals engage in an elementary form of trade (“I’ll scratch your back, you scratch mine…”).

Does Rocky really act? Did he really choose his behavior? Or was his behavior just reflexes? I don’t think these are the right questions to be asking. After all, I am not sure that humans act. I act. But the only reason I consider any other human beings to be behaving purposefully is that it is useful for me to analyse them that way. I take the purposive perspective when it comes to analysing humans. If my analysis of humans was limited to the physical perspective or the design/function perspective, it would be difficult to understand why the people around me are behaving the way they do.

The right way to frame the question I think is to ask: ‘is it useful to analyse dogs behavior from the purposive perspective?’ I think it is, because it’s the simplest way for us to understand their behaviour, and enables us to successfully predict it and alter it.

10

@Graham Wright

Dogs certainly do act and some praxeological concepts do apply to dogs. Dogs are just very limited in the scope of their action. Their social cooperation is very limited compared to humans. As you said, understanding that dogs act is helpful to understanding dogs, but their ability to act is severly limited compared to humans, so far less can be derived from this principle regarding dog action. All animals vary in scope regarding purposeful action, so what can be logically deduced for each animal is limited to the kind of actions any given species is capable of.

Great way to put it.

11

Because… of this.

No to a lot of what has been said in this thread.

If anyone still has any questions after reading the excerpt from Hoppe’s lecture let us know.

12

Conza, none of that lecture states anywhere that animals cannot act with purpose. Hoppe states that animals are not rational in the same manner than humans are rational. Hoppe proceeds to list various differences between humans and other animals. This is what I was talking about. There are simply more premises when it comes to humans than when it comes to dogs. Every single difference Hoppe stated was an additional premise to the statement “humans act”. As Hoppe himself said:

Also, Hoppe states this:

This is in fact, false. You may note that earlier in this thread I posted a link to an article about a chimp preparing rocks to throw at humans, something that he did far in advance to seeing people. Now, the reason this article is so interesting is because it was previously thought that humans were the only animals that could prepare for the future in this manner. But, it appears that chimps can do it too. So, when we analyze the action of chimps, we have an additional premise that we do not have for animals such as dogs.

13

Dogs may not be capable of the sort of high level abstract reasoning that humans are capable of but they obviously have internal desires like people do. Their actions are purpose driven in this sense. Dogs get hungry just like people do. They’re also very social creatures, they need attention and enjoy playing. They react to scolding, they recognize hierarchical structures, they can be trained to urinate outside instead of in the house. All of these behaviors indicate their sensitivity to social norms. Everyone who’s ever had a dog knows how attached they can become to their owners. They show signs of sadness when their owner leaves and they’ll fight to protect their owner if they sense a threat. Their brains may not be as potentially capable as ours but they have hardware nonetheless.

14

Nope. I could counter-argue the points raised, but so what? For the sake of argument I’ll concede, and yet where’s this all going? You’re trying to make an argument for them having “rights” are you? If not - then why should anybody care.. why does this matter at all? Where’s the property conflict? In any case:

Part IV Application: Rights for other species? - Konrad Graf

Part I defined “interaction,” as it concerns praxeology, as those aspects of the broader concept of interrelating that can uniquely transpire among actors as opposed to mere behavers, such as animals. Certain animals might be said to interrelate in a sense, but not in a praxeological one. Propositional justification, which is the foundation of the APoA and its justification of the NAP, is a type of communication that humans do not share with animals. It is distinct from other communicative functions found in certain social animals, such as the signaling of threat and subservience in social power relationships. Propositional truth-claiming is the specific realm that, so far as we know, is unique to human beings, and this is the realm from which the APoA springs and to which it applies.

Humans remain capable of communications that are not grounded in truth claims, but in acts of social influence and social signaling. This distinction between influence-focused versus truth-focused communication is a critical one and is transmitted through culture. As Van Dun warns, “teaching children and young adults that they should not ask “Is it true?” but only “What is in it for me?” is abandoning their education in favor of preparing them for recruitment by demagogues” (2009, 5, fn14).

Consent is among the forms of proposition that is invalidated under conditions of aggression. In other words, consent is distinct from acquiescence or surrender. Force may include various “communications” (“Hands up!”), but this type of communication functions as exposed fangs do for wolves, as a threat, not as a statement in the distinctly human sense of words that are to be judged by their truth, internal consistency (lack of performative contradiction) and authenticity.

The classical ad hominem fallacy reminds us of the logical need in discourse to judge statements primarily on their content rather than on the identity of their speaker. From there, it is a short, though perhaps surprising, extension to conjecture that if some as-yet unknown animal or alien species were encountered that proved to be capable of, and actually engaged with humans in, propositional communication, such propositions would likewise logically have to be given priority in judgment over the identity of their speakers. Such a shared foundation could logically form the basis of a cross-species rights framework. This should follow if our foundation for rights does indeed rest in discourse principles and in the sphere of restrictive conditions that the nature of propositional justification entails.

In this context, the idea of a presumption of rationality could also be helpful in considering an expanded definition of personhood: “If a man proves himself an animal rationis capax [animal capable of reason] by engaging others in argumentation, then he is a person and ought to be regarded and treated as such by other persons” (Van Dun 2009, 9). Members of some newly encountered race may thus at first have to establish through actions their propensity to engage in discourse rather than violence and thereby establish a general presumption of rationality. It is even possible that certain aliens could prove more trustworthy and reliably rational as “persons,” than some fellow humans, as the Vulcans in Star Trek famously dramatized.

The concept of the presumption of rationality also links to the justification of children’s rights. In the case of children—or others who have not actually developed or who have lost through accident propositional discourse abilities—it can be presumed that during a contingentabsence of such abilities, they would want to appoint for themselves guardians to employ such abilities on their behalf in protection of their rights. The case for such a presumption is superior to the case for any alternative presumption in the absence of specific contravening evidence.

The key point in considering claims in favor of “animal rights” is that propositional communication remains among the things that we do not share with any known non-humans. Yet it is this capability that is the foundation for the justification of NAP-defined rights using the APoA. This is why, despite the possibility of having empathy for and interrelating with pets and various other animals, there is no basis for involving the concept of “rights” in relation to any known animals, except insofar as specified animals may be the property of some humans, but not of others. It is for this reason that, given our current knowledge, rights are restricted to humans.

This analysis excludes known animals from having legal “rights” of their own, and preserves a sharp legal/moral distinction. However, it says nothing about the extent to which some humans might choose to engage in ethically motivated actions with regard to animals. Concerned persons might choose to boycott products or people, run educational campaigns against what they may argue is unnecessary cruelty to various animals, buy or claim unowned animals and proceed to treat them in any way that they would like them to be treated, or develop and market new products claiming ethical alignments, such as “dolphin-safe tuna.”

15

You can always lose the attitude. You are right, you should concede these points. They are correct. I am not going to make an argument for animal rights because animals don’t have rights. Rights are a social construct, and without the ability to participate in human law, it cannot be said that animals have rights. So, why should we care? Why does it matter? I will repost what Graham Wright stated:

Where is the property conflict? Well, that is totally irrelevant to the question of whether something can be said to act purposely instead of purely instinctually. You are working backwards here. You don’t want animals to have rights so badly that you are framing arguments that have nothing to do with it around this concept. Animals can’t act because they don’t have rights? If you aren’t begging the question, then that is the biggest non sequitur I’ve seen in a while.

16

Re: “You are right, you should concede these points. They are correct.”

They’re not. Your example of the chimp is erroneous, it’s still tied to perception. He’s established a pattern, and caters to that. Just like some dogs sit and wait at the door when their owner leaves, they wait there for the return. This chimp does the same thing, he just waits with rocks.

Finally, in an eloquent passage, Mises affirms: “What distinguishes man from beasts is precisely that he adjusts his behavior deliberatively. Man is the being that has inhibitions, that can master his impulses and desires, that has the power to suppress instinctive desires and impulses.”

A pissed off old chimp still doesn’t seem to qualify, aye?

From “Human Action”:

"For man, animals are a material factor of production. It may be that one day a change in moral sentiments will induce people to treat animals more gently. Yet, as far as men do not leave the animals alone and let them go their way, they will always deal with them as mere objects of their own acting. Social cooperation can exist only between human beings because only these are able to attain insight into the meaning and the advantages of the division of labor and of peaceful cooperation.

Man subdues the animal and integrates it into his scheme of action as a material thing. In taming, domesticating, and training animals man often displays appreciation for the creature’s psychological peculiarities; he appeals, as it were, to its soul. But even then the gulf that separates man from animal remains unbridgeable. An animal can never get anything else than satisfaction of its appetites for food and sex and adequate protection against injury resulting from environmental factors. Animals are bestial and inhuman precisely because they are such as the iron law of wages imagined workers to be. As human civilization would never have emerged if men were exclusively dedicated to feeding and mating, so animals can neither consort in social bonds nor participate in human society."[p.624 of the Scholar’s Edition] XXI: Work and Wages. You will find the quotation in the last section entitled “The Work of Animals and of Slaves”

Re: " I am not going to make an argument for animal rights because animals don’t have rights. Rights are a social construct, and without the ability to participate in human law, it cannot be said that animals have rights."

That’s great to hear.

Re: “So, why should we care? Why does it matter? I will repost what Graham Wright stated:..”

Hardly a compelling argument.

‘Yet scarcity, and the possibility of conflicts, is not sufficient for the emergence of ethical problems. Obviously, one could have conflicts regarding scarce resources with an animal, yet one would not consider it possible to resolve these conflicts by means of proposing property norms. In such cases, the avoidance of conflicts is merely a technical, not an ethical, problem. For it to become an ethical problem, it is also necessary that the conflicting actors be capable, in principle, of argumentation.’
— Hoppe, Economics and ethics of private property, p. 411.

So it’s only ever going to be a technical problem. One that would seem to lessen as civilization advances, yes?

Re; “Where is the property conflict? Well, that is totally irrelevant to the question of whether something can be said to act purposely instead of purely instinctually. You are working backwards here. You don’t want animals to have rights so badly that you are framing arguments that have nothing to do with it around this concept. Animals can’t act because they don’t have rights? If you aren’t begging the question, then that is the biggest non sequitur I’ve seen in a while.”

I care about justice. You’ve admitted it isn’t about that. So I’m indicating I could care less about whether praxeology applies to dogs, or animals or not. I was moving things forward by seeking the conclusion, so I can confirm I wouldn’t waste anymore of my own, or others time in responding. I haven’t worked backwards at all. Biggest non sequitur? Mate, you just set up the biggest strawman I’ve seen in a while, so lulz to that notion. Plus, I have no problem with giving animals/other species rights at all, as soon as they ask for them.

17

No. The fact that the chimp is preparing demonstrates that it is not an impulse. From “define: impulse”: “A sudden strong urge or desire to act”. Premeditated acts are not impulses, and it hardly constitutes an instinctive reaction either.

Graham’s argument had nothing to do with ethics. This is a red herring.

So then why enter a thread that has nothing to do about justice and start accusing people of trying to assert animal rights? No one here was talking about it. Just you. As far as I’m concerned, you are the one with the fallacious arguments. You have yet to demonstrate in what manner I misrepresented you. Your argument was that animals can’t act because they don’t have rights. You literally said:

You say that it doesn’t matter if dogs can act because there is no property conflict. That is the implication of your questions there. Property is directly related to rights and the law. Rights cannot exist without law, and neither can property. Your argument was that dogs cannot act because there are no property conflicts, which can be shortened to the equivalent statement of “dogs cannot act because they don’t have rights”. That was your argument, largely done through questions meant to imply this. If you did not mean this, then perhaps you should clarify what you meant and try to not be vague. I won’t hold my breath.

18

Re: “No. The fact that the chimp is preparing demonstrates that it is not an impulse. From “define: impulse”: “A sudden strong urge or desire to act”. Premeditated acts are not impulses, and it hardly constitutes an instinctive reaction either.”

Ok, again I’ll concede for the sake of argument.. which again leads to - so what?

Re: “Graham’s argument had nothing to do with ethics. This is a red herring.”

I asked why should I care. You linked to his answer as your response. I indicated it was hardly a compelling argument. The ‘so what’ still remained. It’s not a red herring.. I indicated; ok great… so it’s only ever going to be a ‘technical’ problem if anything.. your accusation of a red herring is fallacious, it’s directly relevant to the issue I raised.

Re: “You say that it doesn’t matter if dogs can act because there is no property conflict. That is the implication of your questions there. Property is directly related to rights and the law. Rights cannot exist without law, and neither can property. Your argument was that dogs cannot act because there are no property conflicts, which can be shortened to the equivalent statement of “dogs cannot act because they don’t have rights”. That was your argument, largely done through questions meant to imply this. If you did not mean this, then perhaps you should clarify what you meant and try to not be vague. I won’t hold my breath.”

I’m saying why should I care. I asked a question.. where is the property conflict? You’ve then erected this entirely demented strawman.. and gone on several pathetic rants aiming at it.

Furthermore, you’re the one who has got it backwards.

“Property does not exist because there are laws, but laws exist because there is property.”
— Frédéric Bastiat, Property and Law.

If … an action is performed that uninvitedly invades or changes the physical integrity of another person’s body and puts this body to a use that is not to this very person’s own liking, this action … is called aggression … Next to the concept of action, property is the most basic category in the social sciences. As a matter of fact, all other concepts to be introduced in this chapter - aggression, contract, capitalism and socialism - are definable in terms of property: aggression being aggression against property, contract being a nonaggressive relationship between property owners, socialism being an institutionalized policy of aggression against property, and capitalism being an institutionalized policy of the recognition of property and contractualism.
— Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 12, 7.

Your presentation of what you think has been my ‘argument’ is comically delusional… and beyond the concept of a strawman.. because I didn’t actually attempt to make an argument or properly engage… I asked a question to attempt to get at whether you were trying to justify animal rights or not. Out of thin you spin some major league __. All in all, just laughable… assumptions are the ______ __ ___ ____ ___.

Perhaps you should ask what I mean if you’re seeking further clarification as to what my position is.. instead of making it up, aye?

19

Chimpanzees do sometimes act with purpose. There is nothing else to it.

Oh please, I know you aren’t this stupid. You quoted Hoppe, and the entire quote was about conflict, ethics, and argumentation. It had nothing to do with Graham’s point, which had nothing to do with conflict, ethics, or argumentation. Let me me clear: citing Hoppe about ethics when Graham was not talking about ethics is the red herring.

It’s quite obvious what you were implying with your questions. I’m still waiting for you to explain why your questions don’t imply that.

Bastiat was a very intelligent man, but he was not perfect. Property is legal ownership. You cannot have property without law. It is not the other way around. Property is defined in terms of law. Libertarians do take it a step further and talk about just property. Even Rothbard does this. Property rights (and therefore property) are a by-product of law. They come from resolving disputes.

Furthermore, I would like to remind you that you are continuing to make fallacious arguments through appeal to authority.

No. I’ve seen you jump in threads and just say “nope to everything in this thread” on many occassions. It’s pretty clear from your questions that you have made up your mind on what people are talking about even when you are wrong. And these questions are clearly meant to imply certain arguments, which you typically follow up with quotes from other people. It’s pretty clear what your positions and arguments are. Perhaps you might change your modus operandi in the future to something less abrasive and insulting when you jump into ongoing discussions. But I won’t hold my breath.

20

Re: “Chimpanzees do sometimes act with purpose. There is nothing else to it.”

Again, conceding for the sake of argument. Congratulations, and so what?

Re: “Oh please, I know you aren’t this stupid. You quoted Hoppe, and the entire quote was about conflict, ethics, and argumentation. It had nothing to do with Graham’s point, which had nothing to do with conflict, ethics, or argumentation. Let me me clear: citing Hoppe about ethics when Graham was not talking about ethics is the red herring.”

As I said.. I asked a question, and in the same post (two birds with one stone) I operated on the assumption that it’d probably be a “yes” to the arguing for animal rights (like the quite literally… other 99 god damn threads on this forum.. which have ALL been the same - some clown arguing for animal rights). I’ve been involved in pretty much all of them. Go check. I jumped the gun to save time. You then confirmed it wasn’t about that, and I said ok.. well great. So why should I care exactly? Still yet to receive a satisfactory answer beyond your school boy posturing.

Re: 'It’s quite obvious what you were implying with your questions. I’m still waiting for you to explain why your questions don’t imply that."

It is? So obvious… you weren’t even close? Haha.. .

Re: "Bastiat was a very intelligent man, but he was not perfect. Property is legal ownership. You cannot have property without law. It is not the other way around. Property is defined in terms of law. Libertarians do take it a step further and talk about just property. Even Rothbard does this. Property rights (and therefore property) are a by-product of law. They come from resolving disputes.

Furthermore, I would like to remind you that you are continuing to make fallacious arguments through appeal to authority."

Nope. You clearly need to go back to the basics. Think it through. Define law then as well. Property gives rise to law, it must first exist.. property in your own body being one of them.

“Only because scarcity exists is there even a problem of formulating moral laws; insofar as goods are superabundant (“free” goods) no conflict over the use of goods is possible and no action-coordination is needed. Hence, it follows that any ethic, correctly conceived, must be formulated as a theory of property, i.e., a theory of the assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means. Because only then does it become possible to avoid otherwise inescapable and unresolvable conflict.”

Property → scarce goods → possibility of conflict (needs laws i.e property rights assigned) to deal with that. The only norm that reduces conflict is private property norms.

Property comes first mate. But go on, keep on trying to deny the obvious. You’re like the Keynesians who deny Says law. As for who wrote the quote? Go look it up… and while you’re at it, take another look at what an actual appeal to authority is because you clearly don’t know.

Re: “No. I’ve seen you jump in threads and just say “nope to everything in this thread” on many occassions. It’s pretty clear from your questions that you have made up your mind on what people are talking about even when you are wrong. And these questions are clearly meant to imply certain arguments, which you typically follow up with quotes from other people. It’s pretty clear what your positions and arguments are. Perhaps you might change your modus operandi in the future to something less abrasive and insulting when you jump into ongoing discussions. But I won’t hold my breath.”

“Many”… actually being twice. Right… because asking a question means I’ve made my mind up? Get a grip.. your assumption of what what my questions were apparently “implying” was so off the wall, it wasn’t even in the ballpark. Save the lecture for when you actually have something credible worth offering.