So here’s the scenario that has me questioning the radical subjectivism adopted by a lot of Austrians. Imagine a community living on a remote island. The island has a variety of scarce resources: fish, corals, trees with fruits and vegetables, medicinal plants, fresh water, etc. It also has nearly unlimited amounts of sand and salt water. Given what we know about money, is it possible that salt water emerges as money?
Or in modified Euthyphro’s Dilemma, are the characteristics of money what they are because we value those characteristics, or do we value those characteristics because they make for better money?
It seems obvious that despite the valuations of individuals, salt water could not emerge as money in that society because of its super abundance – It would be freely available. I don’t think this undermines STV, or anything like that. Rather, I think it opens up the possibility of talking about value in non-subjective ways, which has wider ramifications in fields like ethics. If the nature of an object has an effect on its use regardless of how it is valued, then we can talk about that object as being good or bad for that purpose without reference to valuation.
For example, on that island, sand and salt water make for bad money no matter what people think otherwise. If everyone tried to use sand and salt water as money, it would fail, because you could increase your supply of money by bending over and picking up more sand.
It isn’t regardless of how it is valued. Since there is no cost to aquiring a replacement unit there is zero possibility the community in question assigns any value to any one ounce of the super-abundant sand. We know one ounce of sand may not serve as a unit of money because we already know its value for any member of the community must be zero.
The value of the item is inversely proportional to its supply, and directly proportional to its utility, and neither utility nor supply matters if it is not subjectively valued.
A person could have a glass of water on an island and decide not to drink it, then die of thirst. In principle even the most useful most scarce resource could have very little value. This is less likely to occur proportional to the size of the society, but is nonetheless true.
Since the value of a resource can be decided irrespective of supply or demand, it can be said that all value is subjective. Fortunately most people rationally act in their self interest!
Well, there is some cost, like the small effort needed to bend over and pick up sand or walk down to the shoreline to get sea water. And there is no a priori reason why a unit of sand or a unit of salt walter can’t be valued at all.
Let’s say they have. I don’t think, even if they tried though, it could function as money. It would be more like some sort of ritual where I give you a pile of sand, and you give me some fruit, then you give that sand to Bob, and he gives you some fish. I don’t see how it would be an actual exchange. I’m not denying that we all might value sand becuase we know we can give it to each other for other goods. I’m saying that since that sand is all around us, the phenemona of sand is something other than money.
I guess what I’m trying to get at is this: does the nature of certain objects precede our attitudes towards them? Is valuation a secondary determinate of what can become money?
Does the nature of sand preclude it from becoming a thirst-quencher? Is valuation (of something as a thirst-quencher) a secondary determinate of what can become a thirst-quencher?
You are basically asking, does the nature of X determine whether it is being (subjectively) valued as a means toward end Y?
Well, its an answer to my one question. Do we value certain characteristics because they make for good money, or does something make good money because we value those characteristics. The former means that the value (at least in some sense) stands outside of us, while the later means that value is entirely subjective.
If value has one foot in the subjectivism and the other in objectivism (and I think it does), then (1) the object-subject divide isn’t really a helpful dichotomy and (2) the radical subjectivism espoused by some Austrians may not be the right way to go. More than anything else, it would show that the common phrase “value is subjective” doesn’t tell us much of anything.
Where else would “valued” objects (items) stand if not outside of the subject that values them?
The valuation of (external) objects and their characteristics is, indeed, entirely subjective. None other than the perceiving subject can value things (as means toward his own ends). NO value whatsoever exists beyond the one given to an external object (item) by a subject.
Sure, both (1) a valued object and (2) a valuing subject are necessary for valuation to occur. I don’t see how this (pretty obvious) fact makes valuation anything but subjective.
Of course, it is entirely possible that there may have existed agents who have subjectively valued sand as means toward the ends of thirst-quenching and/or indirect exchange (i.e. as money), but social and natural selection has likely resulted in them not being around for too long. The fact that means vary in their usefulness/effectiveness when used (by subjects) toward certain ends, and the fact that – more often than not – subjects are ignorant about the best means toward their ends (no omniscience), does not make valuation anything but subjective, either.
Sorry, I still fail to see the significance (or even existence) of your quandary.
5 more quick thoughts for now: Nothing is concrete, I’m just trying to feel you out while putting some thoughts together. Some of the things I list, I don’t even know how much I agree with. Ignore anything that is missing the point
a) Money is an objective external thing. We define what money is, and thn it must be so. If I define money as I would a triangle, than there you have it.
b) I have heard it said that money is primarly a holder of value 1st, and a medium of exchnge second, could this be so?
c) Is it possible than that sand in this scenario, is just an externality than to the economic process?
d) Does the fact that you are setting up a stagnnt world with the rules in place, where you control the actors negate any worthwhile mening in this thought experiment? What does it say about extant process, action, and how markets develop in complexity?
e) Is it possible that this long with ever other object is being measured in constant competiton for the use of currency, but sand is - at this point in time so microscopically weak it shows no real bearing on society at large in regards to sand as currency?
I think you’re on to something, Mika. I’ve also thought that it doesn’t really make sense to say that value is subjective or objective since it’s a mediation between the two. You might even compare it to qualia, such as color. We might be tempted to say that red is an objective property of a rose. But to someone who is color “blind” the rose might appear green. So the color of the rose depends both on its objective properties and the subjective properties of the perceiver. Of course this doesn’t prevent us from narrowing our attention on the objective or subjective properties.
What would happen if there was the same amount of sand as in your example, but it was buried 10 feet underground? Could it serve as money then?
You might even compare it to qualia, such as color. We might be tempted to say that red is an objective property of a rose. But to someone who is color “blind” the rose might appear green.
It depends on the categories and context it is used in. Once again, in relation to my other post - don’t be a word Platonist
@OP: This is a good question and I think the current Austrian scholarship should give some guidance on this issue. Basically, yes, individual valuation is subjective, but we also know that this subjective valuation operates parametrically within objective boundaries. For example, “drinking battery acid” is not something that anyone, anywhere could ever value. Whence this restriction on subjective valuation? The answer is that the particulars of human nature (our physiology and psychology) establish borders within which subjective valuation operates parametrically. I disagree with Rothbard on whether we can esatblish any of the particular features of human nature a priori. I think that the particular facts of human nature must be discovered empirically. Search “evolutionary psychology” on the forum search to see the many discussions on this topic.
If by this you men something like “all bachelors are unmarried men”, how does this not becomes a gigantic “so what” type of tautology?
If you mean something along the lines of a “will to life” or something as the ultimate value in itself, this isn’t even empiraclly true. Nor would it make a good starting premise for anything
Also, I don’t think anyone would deny “borders on subjectivism” - what matters is it’s scope, how it relates to ones actions, nd what can be said of it in an academic language within the context of human action.
I mean nobody in their right mind would say “it’s all subjective” and mean that as an ultimate objective truth. However, I can talk about what all is subjective. In other words, obviously when we speak of subjectivism, we speak of it in an objective sense.
Frankly, I think the word “perspectivism” may be a better word, but that’s picking fly shit from pepper. I won’t argue this, but one may be tempted to conclude that a little cute quality about Austrianism is going through great analytical lengths to show the stupidity of people going through great analytical lengths and thinking much of it matters and the folly of “fly shit and pepper” / asburger / nuances/ nerd or whatever you want to call it styled thinking.
maybe something along theWittgenstein lines of:
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
No, I don’t mean a “will to life” nor do I mean to suggest that the empirical facts of human nature can tell us man’s ultimate end. The ultimate end of action is a priori, formal. It is satisfaction because satisfaction is the only logically possible thing that can be the end which all other ends are seeking to attain.
Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics:
Happiness, satisfaction, nirvana, ataraxia, whatever-you-want-to-call-it, it is that end which is formally entailed in any other (non-final) end. It is the final end and, therefore, the highest good (again, “good” should be understood here in a formal sense, not a moral sense).
But it is an empirical question why people will drink aspertame but never battery acid. After all, both are injurious to health. We can point out that battery acid causes painful sensations but so does running a marathon, yet people enthusiastically run marathons. So, clearly, the presence of neurological pain is not the sole criterion for deciding whether something can be a human end or not.
Also, I’m less interested in the extraordinary, individual exceptions (e.g. a sword-swallower) than I am in statements about humans qua humans, that is, humans as a population. For example, we can truly say, “Honey bees collect pollen.” This is a true fact about honey bees, even if the odd honey bee has a derangement that causes him to fly in circles and never collect a bit of pollen. It is clear that “collecting pollen” is part of honey bee nature. We can list many such facts that are also true in the same sense about humans, even if there are pathological exceptions. These facts can be called “human nature.” I think the key is to recognize that this list can only be constructed by empirical means… we have to go out and see what humans actually do in order to say what humans do or don’t do.
A quick thought-experiment shows why this is the case. It is easy to conceive of an alien race that is intelligent and, therefore, acts. But we can imagine that the physiological facts of this alien race may be extremely different from our own. It would no doubt be a non-DNA based life form (unless panspermia is the case!) It might employ means of communication, locomotion, metabolism and reproduction wholly foreign to our ability to conceive. We can set some extremely general outside limits on what kinds of facts must be the case of an alien physiology but there aren’t a lot of details we can give.
Yet human nature is intricately entwined with the particular facts of human physiology. “Humans dance” “humans create and enjoy music” are dependent on the physiological facts of our anatomy and our senses which can only be known empirically. An alien race may or may not dance or enjoy music, depending on the facts of its anatomy and not until we encountered the alien race and could observe its behavior, its anatomy, and so on, could we possibly outline the “facts of alien nature.” Hence, it is not possible to give an a priori account of the facts of human nature from the armchair. You have to actually go out and observe what humans do and the specific facts of their anatomy and environment and how these originated. There are no shortcuts.
No they don’t. Or only within a very narrow and set up context. Only in a propositional sense. A context that you set up and contextualize. The objects involved mean nothing.
Also, I’m less interested in the extraordinary, individual exceptions
Penecillian and the assasination of the Archduke Ferdinand were extrordinary exceptions- to say these things are any more or less “valuable” or worth considering, has no actual bearing on anything of an overriding sociological concern. I could just as easily call the exceptions some of the more interesting and important things. To take it one step further, to note exceptions means you are arbitrarily graphing things and calling things “normal” or “extrodinary”.
we have to go out and see what humans actually do in order to say what humans do or don’t do.
Sure, than you become a tradesmen and use whatever intellectual categories you find useful at any given time, and just perform a practiced art/ τέχνη. Frankly, there is no reason for me to even consider someone a human, or concern myslef with their nature as I could just as easily, and in practice many times do, look at something as a unique acting agent in relation to me. I’ll look at it as a human when I do something like practice medicine in a real context that is relevant to me. And this is nothing more than τέχνη as well.
“Humans dance” “humans create and enjoy music” are dependent
No, these are subjective useful narratives at a given time for a particular context. The truth is, the complexities as to what is going on where and when with a unique actor, in a unique situation, at a unique time is incalcuable and beyond us.