Rights on the view from your property

Economics Political Theory
41

Theoretically thats one way to understand property rights, but again, there’s nothing about that interpretation that is inherent to nature in itself. To make the claim that property rights serve the purpose of conflict resolution over tangible, scarce, and rival goods you must hold a number of prior assumptions, such as the primacy of individuals as the unit of social significance or that only material goods can be owned. Each of these assumptions are contestable, and if they are contested then your claim does not follow.

So your conclusion is only a function of your prior assumptions, not the nature of property itself.

Are you implying that one should not hold to the libertarian concept of property because the libertarian concept of property does not follow from the mere facts of objective reality? If so, this is self-contradictory, as it presupposes a certain ethical claim: namely, that one should not hold to an ethical proposition unless it follows from the mere facts of objective reality.

Ethics is not about finding justification for one’s valuations in the facts of objective reality, it is about scientifically determing - given the facts of objective reality - how best to obtain what one subjectively values. In other words, ethics is not about justifying ends, it is about finding means to those ends.* The subjective valuations per se do not require any justification. As I say, to imply otherwise, to imply that one should not hold to any ethics unless they follow from the facts of objective reality, is itself an ethical claim (which does not follow from the facts of objective reality - no ethical claim so follows), and is thus self-contradictory.

*Part of ethics is about compiling ends, wading through verbiage to discover what our ends really are, and distinguishing them from means (the two are often confused). But once these ends are established, then ethics becomes a science, a science of human behavior. Or, at least, what a complete ethical system is is a set of primitive (i.e. unanalyzable) valuations plus knowledge taken from the sciences describing the means by which those valuations are can best be obtained.

42

When individuals make decisions the vast majority of the content of that decision is made up of pre-existing relations, understandings and information. The actual purposive aspect constitutes a very small portion of the action. Most of it is non-purposive in terms of the agency of the individual with regard to that particular decision.

I never claimed individuals weren’t the agents. They are. However, the identity of individuals can vary considerably and the presupposition that they act as individuals is unfounded. Individuality meaning the general approximate equality of individuals as socially relevant actors (i.e. as consumers within a market, or voters within a democracy).

I am not denying the agency of individuals. I am simply making the case that there is agency and structure and that structure cannot be reduced to agency as agency cannot be independent of structure.

Concerning the agency of individuals:

For the question of whether or not libertarian ethics should be upheld (i.e. whether or not the universal adoption of libertarian ethics would yield the results one desires), it does not matter whether individuals have agency or not. The facts of the objective world are such (I think no one will contest this point) that society operates as if individuals have agency. If this is an illusion, so be it.

To think that there must be such a thing in the real world as human agency in order for the libertarian ethics to be justified makes the error of assuming that one should not hold to any given ethics unless it follows from the facts of objective reality, which as I noted in my last post is self-contradictory.

Again, ethics requires only two things: (1) primitive valuations (ends), and (2) scientific knowledge which allows one to identify the means to achieve those ends. The question of whether their is “really” human agency (or just an illusion thereof) makes no difference.

While we’re on the subject, I’ll add that the question of whether objective reality even exists makes no difference: as the illusion thereof would be sufficient for our purposes. Remember, we are not justifying ethics on the basis of objective reality, hence it makes no difference whether our ideas about objective reality are true or not. We are not making a deductive argument which begins with facts about objective reality as the premises, and yields our ethics as the conclusion. All that matters vis a vis ethics is that our ideas about objective reality allow us to achieve our ends. In other words, it just needs to “work,” the ultimate truth of it all makes no difference at all.

It might be the case that there is no human agency, and that the universe is perfectly deterministic, and at the same time it might be sufficient for libertarian ethics to work (to yield the desired results, and thus be worthy of our support) for people to believe in the fiction of human agency.

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“In other words, ethics is not about justifying ends, it is about finding means to those ends.*”

I gotta write this done or just remember it everytime somone tries to argue against objective morality. Thanks.

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By the same token, the alternative set of assumptions can also be “contested” (i.e. rejected). So where does this get us? As I see it, it just gets us talking past each other.

nirgrahamUK made the claim that there was only a single ethic that could be defended, a private property ethic. My argument was in the context of that claim. That it is the only defendable ethic follows only if you accept the assumptions within the argument. If you do not, then his claim (that there is only one defendable ethic) does not follow.

Of course, any set of assumptions can be contested, that is my point. To claim one system is inherently true requires you to reject the possibility of the validity of other sets of assumptions, a wholly metaphysical proposition.

Then you agree that property, as a mental construct, has no external nature (i.e. a nature outside of the mind).

Yes, property is a result of common understandings between actors.

Those relations exist within the actors’ minds. As I see it, they can’t exist anywhere else.

I think you are looking for something in my argument that is not there. I am not claiming that relations have an independent existence outside of human minds or that they exist in some other realm. Relations are emergent phenomena that are the result of interaction between actors. They are intersubjective and therefore are not reducible to individual agency.

Following the “script” or “plan” takes conscious effort, does it not? Hence there’s never any actual guarantee that a given “script” or “plan” will be followed by a given person. Aside from that, what do you mean by “power structure”? Also, I wouldn’t call understanding of what’s expected of someone “knowing what ‘the right thing to do’ is”. Regardless, I don’t see how any of this goes against methodological individualism. You seem to misunderstand what methodological individualism is.

Indeed, one could say that market phenomena, such as the existence of money and prices, are institutional factors. Yet Austrian-school economics uses methodological individualism as the basis for describing them and why they exist. By your reasoning, the Austrian school of economics shouldn’t even exist, because you assert that methodological individualism can’t take into account institutional factors.

Following the ‘script’ does not necessarily take conscious effort. Usually is occurs prior to conscious effort. When a person goes to make a decision they do not considered every possible option available. There is a set of options that a given situation places in front of them that they then choose from. Of course, there is no guarantee that the script will be followed. A person can consciously decide not to. However, the fact that it exists at all means there are structural factors prior to and not reducible to the agency of individuals themselves.

A power structure is the form of a relation between actors whether it is one of hierarchy, equality, subordination, etc… Don’t read ‘knowing what the right thing to do is’ as an endorsement of social expectations, note the ‘ ‘. And I can assure you that I understand what methodological individualism is. I have said that the Austrian approach recognizes a place for institutional factors, just that it does not account for the full role and effect of them. Institutions are purely instrumental in an IM framework, tools to be used by individuals as opposed to constitutive elements within a social context.

Taking something for granted is the result of a prior conscious process, is it not? Where does Austrian-school economics or even methdological individualism itself say that it’s impossible for individuals to take things for granted?

No, taking something for granted does not have to be the result of prior purposeful action. Prior actions may be the result of taking something for granted (as I believe all action must do) but the actual taking for granted is not a conscious decision.

Again, I think all of this fits quite comfortably not only within methodological individualism, but also within Austrian-school economics. You yourself implicitly concede that these institutions only “exist” inasmuch as “enough” people follow them.

Institutions, should not be thought of as aggregations of people’s actions. Their effects are prior to action, though they are affected by and even constructed by actions.

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It is entirely possible that individuals could adopt any concept of property whatsoever.

Why do I favor the libertarian concept of property? For purely consequentialist reasons. The question to be asked is: the universal adoption of which concept of property yields the kind of world in which we want to live? The universal adoption of the libertarian concept of property yields the kind of world in which I want to live. This statement has two components: (1) a subjective valuation on my part about what kind of world I prefer to live in, and (2) a non-ethical claim about objective reality, namely that the adoption of the libertarian concept of property will yield certain results (independently of how one may value those results).

It is not that the libertarian concept of property is “inherent to nature.” Rather, the libertarian concept of property is the concept of property which one should advocate if one shares my subjective valuation: i.e. agrees that the world which the universal adoption of the libertarian concept of property would yield is the preferred world.

My arguments in other posts against counting “the view” et al as property were not about proving that a concept of property which includes such things as the view is incorrect: in the sense of being objectively false. Rather, my aim was to show what the consequences of adopting such a concept of property would be, expecting that most people would share my negative valuation of those consequences: e.g. that prosecuting people as tortfeasors for causing others to experience unwelcome thoughts is unacceptable because it would in effect make social interaction itself illegal, in which case society could either (a) collapse, or (b) leave this absurd concept of property a dead letter.

There’s a lot going on here but I’ll just say fair enough. It seems we’re on the same page about ethics being “natural”, however there are some difference that I’ll address below.

Are you implying that one should not hold to the libertarian concept of property because the libertarian concept of property does not follow from the mere facts of objective reality? If so, this is self-contradictory, as it presupposes a certain ethical claim: namely, that one should not hold to an ethical proposition unless it follows from the mere facts of objective reality.

You cannot derive an ought from an is, so no I’m not imply you should reject libertarian property rights because they don’t conform to the facts of objective reality. Also, there’s no such thing as ‘facts of objective reality’ unless you are working from a passive theory of knowledge. That is, a theory of knowledge that presumes humans are capable of experience without an interpretation that imposing meaning on that experience.

Ethics is not about finding justification for one’s valuations in the facts of objective reality, it is about scientifically determing - given the facts of objective reality - how best to obtain what one subjectively values. In other words, ethics is not about justifying ends, it is about finding means to those ends.* The subjective valuations per se do not require any justification. As I say, to imply otherwise, to imply that one should not hold to any ethics unless they follow from the facts of objective reality, is itself an ethical claim (which does not follow from the facts of objective reality - no ethical claim so follows), and is thus self-contradictory.

*Part of ethics is about compiling ends, wading through verbiage to discover what our ends really are, and distinguishing them from means (the two are often confused). But once these ends are established, then ethics becomes a science, a science of human behavior. Or, at least, what a complete ethical system is is a set of primitive (i.e. unanalyzable) valuations plus knowledge taken from the sciences describing the means by which those valuations are can best be obtained.

Well, that’s an interesting definition of ethics, but a large chunk of the material out there known as ethics is about justifying normative claims. It’s good to recognize that normative claims are subjective, but the attempts to justify those subjective positions is widely known as ethics. You can take such a heterodox understanding of the field, but to what end I’m not sure.

Concerning the agency of individuals:

For the question of whether or not libertarian ethics should be upheld (i.e. whether or not the universal adoption of libertarian ethics would yield the results one desires), it does not matter whether individuals have agency or not. The facts of the objective world are such (I think no one will contest this point) that society operates as if individuals have agency. If this is an illusion, so be it.

To think that there must be such a thing in the real world as human agency in order for the libertarian ethics to be justified makes the error of assuming that one should not hold to any given ethics unless it follows from the facts of objective reality, which as I noted in my last post is self-contradictory.

Again, there is no such thing as objective facts of reality without a passive theory of knowledge, which would be in my estimation a very naive position. That said, for your subjective normative claims to be persuasive it would be helpful that they comport with some understanding of reality. Libertarianism as a system of ethics is concerned with the priority of the individual. This makes considerable sense with a MI framework of reality. If there are important social factors not reducible to the agency of individuals, the efficacy of such a system takes a considerable hit.

Again, ethics requires only two things: (1) primitive valuations (ends), and (2) scientific knowledge which allows one to identify the means to achieve those ends. The question of whether their is “really” human agency (or just an illusion thereof) makes no difference.

While we’re on the subject, I’ll add that the question of whether objective reality even exists makes no difference: as the illusion thereof would be sufficient for our purposes. Remember, we are not justifying ethics on the basis of objective reality, hence it makes no difference whether our ideas about objective reality are true or not. We are not making a deductive argument which begins with facts about objective reality as the premises, and yields our ethics as the conclusion. All that matters vis a vis ethics is that our ideas about objective reality allow us to achieve our ends. In other words, it just needs to “work,” the ultimate truth of it all makes no difference at all.

It might be the case that there is no human agency, and that the universe is perfectly deterministic, and at the same time it might be sufficient for libertarian ethics to work (to yield the desired results, and thus be worthy of our support) for people to believe in the fiction of human agency.

There’s a lot of good stuff here especially the point about our scientific knowledge coming down to belief in fictions, but even by your own definition of ethics as the scientific pursuit of subjective ends, a flawed theory of reality would presumably be detrimental to an effective pursuit of those ends.

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That last paragraph:

There’s a lot of good stuff here especially the point about our scientific knowledge coming down to belief in fictions, but even by your own definition of ethics as the scientific pursuit of subjective ends, a flawed theory of reality would presumably be detrimental to an effective pursuit of those ends.

Should not be bolded I wrote that.

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even by your own definition of ethics as the scientific pursuit of subjective ends, a flawed theory of reality would presumably be detrimental to an effective pursuit of those ends.

We’re talking about the relationship between scientific knowledge and its ontological and epistemological foundation.

For example, the relationship between a claim such as “fixing the price of a good below market-price causes shortages” and a claim such as “physical-objective reality exists.” The first claim takes the second claim as granted. So if the second claim is false, does that mean that the first claim will be unsuccessful in predicting or shaping outcomes in the world: e.g. in predicting what will result from price fixing, or preventing that from happening by preventing price fixing?

I will address this question now.

Argument #1

If it is the case that knowledge cannot be successful in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world unless it has a correct ontological and epistemological foundation, and a certain body of knowledge does in fact have success in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world, then it follows that the ontological and epistemological foundation of that body of knowledge is correct.

Argument #2

If it is the case that the ontological and epistemological foundation of a certain body of knowledge is false, and that same body of knowledge does in fact have success in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world, then it follows that whether the ontological and epistemological foundation of a body of knowledge is correct or not has no effect on whether or not that body of knowledge will have success in predicting and shaping outcomes in the word.

…conclusions

As you can see, either scientific knowledge works because it has the correct ontological and epistemological foundation, or it works in spite of having the incorrect ontological and epistemology foundation. It cannot be, since scientific knowledge does in fact work, that its foundations are false and it is necessary for it to have correct foundations in order to work,

Now, if we were in the business of seeking truth, then we would care whether the foundations of the scientific knowledge which we libertarians use to write our prescriptions for society were correct or not. But since rather our aim is achieving results, and since the truth or falsity of the foundations of the knowledge we use to achieve those result makes no difference as to the achieving of those results, we don’t need to care.

To return to your comment:

a flawed theory of reality

From the perspective of doers, the only flawed theory of reality would be one where the practical knowledge derived therefrom proves useless in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world. But provided we retain that ability, let any absurd and ridiculous ontology or epistemology be set as the foundation of our knowledge. Incidentally, I do think the crude dualism underlying all social discourse is incorrect, but that only concerns me when I’m wearing my truth-hat, as opposed to my action-hat. : )

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I think you understand that there’s no objective (i.e. external) truth in ethics. That is, ethics is subjective. So the question is whether the conclusions of a given ethical system is consistent with its premises. The premises themselves, by definition, can’t be proven or disproven.

I don’t think a particular mental construct that one calls “property” has to involve common understandings between actors. As an analogy, a person can choose to speak his own language.

I guess I’m not sure what you mean by “reducible to individual agency”. As I see it, if relations exist entirely within the mind, then they’re necessarily reducible to individual agency. There are no communal minds, only individual minds.

I fail to see how a person not considering every possible option available means that they don’t consciously choose - either right then and there or at some time in the past - to “follow the script”. Why do you think that individual agency requires considering every possible option available in every situation? Is it always possible to even quantify the available options?

First off, you didn’t put quotes around the word “knowing” in your earlier post. Second, I fail to see how social contexts exist anywhere but within the minds of individuals. If that’s the case (and obviously I believe it is), then how does methodological individualism fail to account for the full role and effect of institutional factors? Furthermore, how are institutional factors anything but purely instrumental?

Just because multiple people believe in certain institutional factors, social contexts, etc. doesn’t make them any less subjective and thus doesn’t give them any existence independent of human minds.

Well why isn’t taking something for granted a conscious decision, in your view? Please elaborate.

If they’re not aggregations of people’s actions, then how do they come about? With all due respect, you seem to be trying to have your cake and eat it too. That is, you seem to be claiming that institutions don’t have an independent existence from human minds and that they also do have an independent existence from human minds. Those are mutually exclusive claims.

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Sorry about not responding earlier, school and whatnot. You understand.

We’re talking about the relationship between scientific knowledge and its ontological and epistemological foundation.

For example, the relationship between a claim such as “fixing the price of a good below market-price causes shortages” and a claim such as “physical-objective reality exists.” The first claim takes the second claim as granted. So if the second claim is false, does that mean that the first claim will be unsuccessful in predicting or shaping outcomes in the world: e.g. in predicting what will result from price fixing, or preventing that from happening by preventing price fixing?

I will address this question now.

Argument #1

If it is the case that knowledge cannot be successful in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world unless it has a correct ontological and epistemological foundation, and a certain body of knowledge does in fact have success in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world, then it follows that the ontological and epistemological foundation of that body of knowledge is correct.

Argument #2

If it is the case that the ontological and epistemological foundation of a certain body of knowledge is false, and that same body of knowledge does in fact have success in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world, then it follows that whether the ontological and epistemological foundation of a body of knowledge is correct or not has no effect on whether or not that body of knowledge will have success in predicting and shaping outcomes in the word.

…conclusions

As you can see, either scientific knowledge works because it has the correct ontological and epistemological foundation, or it works in spite of having the incorrect ontological and epistemology foundation. It cannot be, since scientific knowledge does in fact work, that its foundations are false and it is necessary for it to have correct foundations in order to work,

Now, if we were in the business of seeking truth, then we would care whether the foundations of the scientific knowledge which we libertarians use to write our prescriptions for society were correct or not. But since rather our aim is achieving results, and since the truth or falsity of the foundations of the knowledge we use to achieve those result makes no difference as to the achieving of those results, we don’t need to care.

To return to your comment:

It’s almost certain that all scientific knowledge has a flawed ontology, to claim otherwise would be an endorsement of dogma. The extent to which our scientific understandings “work”, as you say, (the quotation marks there only to indicate that the exact metric by which science works is incredibly fuzzy, but there is some intuitive sense in which it does seem to) is a good criterion by which to evaluate scientific frameworks. So you’re correct in saying that a more accurate ontology is not necessarily desirable if, for example, it results in a decrease in the empirical content of science. The delay in scientific disciplines to accept new theories that have refined frameworks can be explained by this initial shrinkage of empirical content.

A prime example of this is the delay in the abandonment of the Ptolemaic model for the acceptance for the Copernican model. The heliocentric model initially could explain a much smaller range of empirical phenomena and only after Galileo and other Copernicans did the research to fill the holes was it accepted widely.

Therefore, it’s not necessarily wrong to resist a new ontological framework, but a less flawed ontology will almost certainly provide a richer and more expansive understanding of empirical phenomena over time than a more flawed one.

From the perspective of doers, the only flawed theory of reality would be one where the practical knowledge derived therefrom proves useless in predicting and shaping outcomes in the world. But provided we retain that ability, let any absurd and ridiculous ontology or epistemology be set as the foundation of our knowledge. Incidentally, I do think the crude dualism underlying all social discourse is incorrect, but that only concerns me when I’m wearing my truth-hat, as opposed to my action-hat. : )

I have to ask the question here: “what action?”

Is it not troublesome to you that libertarianism essentially lacks any substantive action whatsoever? Could it be that this is the case because it’s missing a huge piece of the puzzle that stunts its insights?

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I don’t think a particular mental construct that one calls “property” has to involve common understandings between actors. As an analogy, a person can choose to speak his own language.

Property is a matter of law and involves the application of some standard or rule that indicates the rightful control of something. The recognition of this rightfulness is what conveys ownership to someone. The concept of property cannot be separated from the notion of common understanding as law is inherently intersubjective. It arises from mutual recognition of some criteria of proper conduct or relation.

I guess I’m not sure what you mean by “reducible to individual agency”. As I see it, if relations exist entirely within the mind, then they’re necessarily reducible to individual agency. There are no communal minds, only individual minds.

I fail to see how a person not considering every possible option available means that they don’t consciously choose - either right then and there or at some time in the past - to “follow the script”. Why do you think that individual agency requires considering every possible option available in every situation? Is it always possible to even quantify the available options?

A person doesn’t have to consider every possible option to exercise agency. Considering every conceivable option is not possible. It’s the fact that they don’t have to consider every possible action that indicates there are factors other than their individual agency at work. My point is if the only salient factor IS agency, then they would HAVE to consider every possible action.

Following “the script” requires that a script exist in the first place. Where did this script come from? It existed prior to their own considerations and exercise of agency in a particular situation. There is some factor other than agency at play here.

Obviously this script doesn’t exist independently of human minds. It arises through mutual recognition. Purposeful, considered action by individuals and common understandings within social contexts are categorically different things. Now you can try and explain common understandings in terms of purposeful action but that requires positing a plethora of calculations that never actually occur and a resort to an infinite regress of calculations by all individuals involved in a social interaction.

First off, you didn’t put quotes around the word “knowing” in your earlier post. Second, I fail to see how social contexts exist anywhere but within the minds of individuals. If that’s the case (and obviously I believe it is), then how does methodological individualism fail to account for the full role and effect of institutional factors? Furthermore, how are institutional factors anything but purely instrumental?

Just because multiple people believe in certain institutional factors, social contexts, etc. doesn’t make them any less subjective and thus doesn’t give them any existence independent of human minds

I wasn’t trying to be devious with the misquote and it doesn’t change the intention of my post.

MI fails because it concerns itself with the purposeful action of individuals and there are other meaningful factors prior to purposeful action. Institutions can be constitutive as opposed to instrumental by creating the identities of actors and informing their preferences and interests. The actor has not employed these institutions to achieve some end. The institution was a factor in determining the end itself.

Well why isn’t taking something for granted a conscious decision, in your view? Please elaborate.

If they’re not aggregations of people’s actions, then how do they come about? With all due respect, you seem to be trying to have your cake and eat it too. That is, you seem to be claiming that institutions don’t have an independent existence from human minds and that they also do have an independent existence from human minds. Those are mutually exclusive claims.

You can take something for granted without even thinking about it. How can something you never thought about be a conscious decision?

There are factors prior to action. If it is prior to action how can an aggregation of actions create it? I don’t believe institutions are independent of human minds.

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No, “property” is just a word, i.e. a certain sequence of sounds. There is an infinite number of meanings that that word can be used to refer to.

Your use of the word “recognition” here implies that the rightfulness exists independently of any individual mind, and that it therefore exists as an objective fact. What reasoning or evidence do you have to support this notion?

The way I see it, rightfulness exists entirely within individual minds, which means it’s subjective. So there’s no recognition of rightfulness, only agreement and/or disagreement over it.

And why is that, in your view? I don’t see how it at all follows that not considering, or not having to consider, every possible action indicates that there are factors other than individual agency at work. So far, you don’t seem to have provided any logical basis for that.

Maybe we’re using different definitions of the word “agency”. What definition are you using?

The word “recognition” still implies to me an existence that’s independent of any human mind. That being said, how are purposeful, considered actions by individuals and common understandings within social contexts categorically different things, exactly? What’s your basis for making that assertion? As I see it - and I believe I may have said this before - agreement is a conscious decision. That is, a person chooses to follow a certain “script” or he doesn’t. No one makes that choice but him.

If you say so.

The laws of physics are also prior to purposeful action, are they not? Would you say that the laws of physics thus also constitute an argument against methodological individualism - i.e. that it can’t take into account how the laws of physics inform individual preferences and actions?

But regardless, I don’t see how your response explains how methodological individualism fails to account for the full role and effect of institutional factors. What exactly is your definition of “purposeful action”? I have a feeling that it’s different from the definition actually used by methodological individualism, in which case you’ve been attacking a strawman. From what little I can gather from your reasoning presented thus far, it would seem that what you call “purposeful action” is actually impossible, because there’s always some wider context within which individuals find themselves. But methodological individualism does not actually assume or argue the converse. It simply says that action is individual regardless of the wider context. That doesn’t make the wider context irrelevant, let alone non-existent.

Taking something for granted requires conscious awareness of it, does it not?

What exactly do you mean by “prior to action”? Do you mean prior to a particular action, or do you mean prior to any/all action?

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No, “property” is just a word, i.e. a certain sequence of sounds. There is an infinite number of meanings that that word can be used to refer to.

I mean, really? “Property” is just a word?

Like obviously it’s just a word, but it’s a word, like the vast majority of other words I’m aware of, that denotes some concept, which in turn when it is used allows two or more people to communicate by representing this concept.

What is your point?

Your use of the word “recognition” here implies that the rightfulness exists independently of any individual mind, and that it therefore exists as an objective fact. What reasoning or evidence do you have to support this notion?

The way I see it, rightfulness exists entirely within individual minds, which means it’s subjective. So there’s no recognition of rightfulness, only agreement and/or disagreement over it.

One more time, there’s no such thing as an objective fact and I don’t believe institutions exist independent of human minds. Now, they can’t be created by an individual mind but through the interaction of two minds (i.e. they are intersubjective). This makes them still the product of the human mind.

When an agreement is made, what is agreed to?

And why is that, in your view? I don’t see how it at all follows that not considering, or not having to consider, every possible action indicates that there are factors other than individual agency at work. So far, you don’t seem to have provided any logical basis for that.

If you don’t have to consider every possible option, where does the subset of options you actually choose from come from?

Maybe we’re using different definitions of the word “agency”. What definition are you using?

Agency is the location of the ability to act in a socially relevant manner.

The word “recognition” still implies to me an existence that’s independent of any human mind. That being said, how are purposeful, considered actions by individuals and common understandings within social contexts categorically different things, exactly? What’s your basis for making that assertion? As I see it - and I believe I may have said this before - agreement is a conscious decision. That is, a person chooses to follow a certain “script” or he doesn’t. No one makes that choice but him.

Yes, the individual makes the decision to follow the script or not. We agree here. Now, where does the script come from?

When you agree to something (when you consciously choose something) what are you agreeing to?

The laws of physics are also prior to purposeful action, are they not? Would you say that the laws of physics thus also constitute an argument against methodological individualism - i.e. that it can’t take into account how the laws of physics inform individual preferences and actions?

But regardless, I don’t see how your response explains how methodological individualism fails to account for the full role and effect of institutional factors. What exactly is your definition of “purposeful action”? I have a feeling that it’s different from the definition actually used by methodological individualism, in which case you’ve been attacking a strawman. From what little I can gather from your reasoning presented thus far, it would seem that what you call “purposeful action” is actually impossible, because there’s always some wider context within which individuals find themselves. But methodological individualism does not actually assume or argue the converse. It simply says that action is individual regardless of the wider context. That doesn’t make the wider context irrelevant, let alone non-existent.

MI is intended to explain human behavior. It cannot explain social recognition which is a major component of human behavior. Therefore, it is deficient. If there was a way to incorporate the effects of the laws of physics on human actions, yes that would be an argument against MI.

Let me be clear here, I’m well aware of what methodological individualism is. In fact, it’s very likely I’ve read far more individual methodologists (and from i far wider range of materials) than you have. So please, stop questioning my understanding of the concept.

Purposeful action is the conscious employment of means to attain chosen ends. Purposeful action is not impossible. As I’ve said several times, individuals act. As you say yourself, “It [methodological individualism] simply says that action is individual regardless of the wider context. That doesn’t make the wider context irrelevant, let alone non-existent.” This is exactly the point. All MI says is that people act. That wider context you mentioned can’t be explained by MI. That wider context, as you said, is still very important. MI therefore is insufficient for a complete explanation of social phenomena.

Taking something for granted requires conscious awareness of it, does it not?

Absolutely not.

What exactly do you mean by “prior to action”? Do you mean prior to a particular action, or do you mean prior to any/all action?

Obviously all action.

53

Yes. When I use quotes like that, I’m referring to the word itself.

Does it necessarily denote one particular concept?

My point is that there is no necessary definition for any word. All definitions are inherently arbitrary.

There’s no such thing as an objective fact? Ever? Since when? Please provide a basis for this contention.

If you really agree that institutions exist only within human minds, then you’ll agree that institutions are no more than ideas. In order for someone to believe in or otherwise agree with an idea, he first has to create the idea anew in his own mind. No one can do that for him but himself. Hence the idea exists in his mind quite independently of its existence in anyone else’s mind.

I would say an idea or set of ideas is what’s agreed to.

I would say it comes from my own mind.

Okay, what do you mean by “socially relevant”? Regardless, though, my own definition of “agency” is different, such that it has no such qualification. In other words, “agency” to me simply denotes the ability to act, period.

Speaking in terms of immediate origin, I would say it comes from his own mind.

See above.

How exactly is methodological individualism unable to explain “social recognition”?

There are ways to incorporate the effects of the laws of physics on human actions. For example, a person can’t run off a cliff without falling down (unlike in “cartoon physics”).

Excuse me, but I will question your understanding of the concept as I see fit.

You missed my point, it seems. My point wasn’t that methodological individualism ignores any wider context within which an individual finds himself. Methodological individualism, as far as I can tell, does not actually do that. Austrian-school economics, for example, uses methodological individualism as its methodological foundation, and it certainly seems able to explain all economic institutions.

How not? Could you give me an example of what you’re talking about?

So you’re asserting that one or more institutions existed before the advent of human consciousness? Or what?

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a less flawed ontology will almost certainly provide a richer and more expansive understanding of empirical phenomena over time than a more flawed one.

Presumably that’s true, but it may be the case (and I think it is) that for our purposes (organizing society) the additional knowledge of empirical phenomena that a less flawed ontology might yield are irrelevant. By way of analogy, if you’re playing billiards, Newtonian physics is just fine. It doesn’t matter that it isn’t strictly true, and to bring Einsteinian physics into your billiards game would not improve your ability to play.

I have to ask the question here: “what action?”

Knowledge can be pursued for its own sake (put on your truth hat), in which case it matters whether that knowledge is true, or knowledge can be used to achieve other ends (action hat), in which case it does not matter whether that knowledge is true, provided it works (enables one to achieve the desired ends).

…I’m not sure if that answers your question.

Is it not troublesome to you that libertarianism essentially lacks any substantive action whatsoever? Could it be that this is the case because it’s missing a huge piece of the puzzle that stunts its insights?

Libertarianism as a body of knowledge recognizes that human action exists.

Libertarianism as a political-social cause takes action.

So I don’t know what you mean when you say it “lacks any substantive action.”

Do you mean that libertarianism as a body of knowledge has an inadequate understanding of human action? If so, how?

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Yes. When I use quotes like that, I’m referring to the word itself.

Does it necessarily denote one particular concept?

My point is that there is no necessary definition for any word. All definitions are inherently arbitrary.

I understand that words can denote different concepts. My initial post made that very point. So instead of bringing up this very basic point, why not address the substance of my post?

There’s no such thing as an objective fact? Ever? Since when? Please provide a basis for this contention.

The possibility of objective facts would require that human beings are capable of objectively experiencing the world, a position I take to be difficult to defend. Observation is not possible without interpretation and therefore any experience is colored by underlying assumptions and implicit theories. In other words, facts are not separable from theory and in important respects theory actually creates facts.

Facts are not objective.

If you really agree that institutions exist only within human minds, then you’ll agree that institutions are no more than ideas. In order for someone to believe in or otherwise agree with an idea, he first has to create the idea anew in his own mind. No one can do that for him but himself. Hence the idea exists in his mind quite independently of its existence in anyone else’s mind.

I would say an idea or set of ideas is what’s agreed to.

I would say it comes from my own mind.

Speaking in terms of immediate origin, I would say it comes from his own mind.

See above.

Yes, ideas come from the individual mind, they however do not exist “quite independently” of the ideas of others, but are formed in relation and in response to the ideas of others. This interactive, or intersubjective, aspect of people’s understandings cannot be explained by actions that are the result of those understandings.

Agreement to a contract requires that the concept of a contract exists (i.e. has been created) AND is mutually recognized by (i.e. is a common understanding between) the parties to the contract. This is a layer of social structure that not only provides an instrumental function, but has constitutive effects on the social relation of the parties and creates new possibilities for socially relevant acton which did not exist previously. The concept of a contract not only facilitates cooperation and agreement but actually creates types of action that could not exist without it.

Okay, what do you mean by “socially relevant”? Regardless, though, my own definition of “agency” is different, such that it has no such qualification. In other words, “agency” to me simply denotes the ability to act, period.

Imagine that no one recognized anything you did. When you entered a store the cashier did not recognize what you did as that actions of a costumer. When you went to school you were not recognized as a student. Essentially you lacked any type of common understanding between yourself and those around you. Socially relevant action requires that you act in certain ways that have meaning to those around you, and when you act in a manner not socially relevant you lack the recognition from others that gives your actions meaning and the potential to effect the world around you. You can expunge social relevance from the agency but then it loses much of its usefulness, imo. Why not just stick with action at that point?

How exactly is methodological individualism unable to explain “social recognition”?

There are ways to incorporate the effects of the laws of physics on human actions. For example, a person can’t run off a cliff without falling down (unlike in “cartoon physics”).

MI is concerned with the actions of individuals and cannot explain the social context within which those actions take place. It can only assume their content.

Falling off a cliff does not require the laws of physics. People understood that you will fall to your death if you step off a cliff long before they understood physics or even had any conception of physics as a subject of study. Besides that is not an actual incorporation of the laws of physics as an incorporation of them would entail use of actual theories of physics on the mechanism of decision making of individuals, which as far as I am aware no such attempt has been made. Attempts at incorporating biology and chemistry, much less physics, into the explanation of human action are in their infancy.

MI is a methodology for understanding social phenomena, and its inability to provide an explanation of social recognition is a problem for it and those who use it. This doesn’t mean that MI useless, far from it, only that it is not sufficient.

Excuse me, but I will question your understanding of the concept as I see fit.

Well, your judgement sucks. Congrats.

You missed my point, it seems. My point wasn’t that methodological individualism ignores any wider context within which an individual finds himself. Methodological individualism, as far as I can tell, does not actually do that. Austrian-school economics, for example, uses methodological individualism as its methodological foundation, and it certainly seems able to explain all economic institutions.

I’m not sure if it’s actually the case that is can explain all economic institutions, and even if it could there are non-economic institutions which are more fundamental for understanding social phenomena, like the state.

How not? Could you give me an example of what you’re talking about?

Sure. Do Americans, in general, not take the reserve currency status of the dollar in the global economy for granted?

So you’re asserting that one or more institutions existed before the advent of human consciousness? Or what?

This is an interesting question. Well, I suppose that since human beings evolved from lower primates that the advent of human consciousness occurred within a context of stable social relations and understandings. So yes. Institutions did exist before the advent of human consciousness.

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Presumably that’s true, but it may be the case (and I think it is) that for our purposes (organizing society) the additional knowledge of empirical phenomena that a less flawed ontology might yield are irrelevant. By way of analogy, if you’re playing billiards, Newtonian physics is just fine. It doesn’t matter that it isn’t strictly true, and to bring Einsteinian physics into your billiards game would not improve your ability to play.

I have to say I don’t buy that the added explanatory power of a better ontology is as useless Einsteinian physics in a billiards game. Organizing society is closer to time travel than a game of eight ball.

Knowledge can be pursued for its own sake (put on your truth hat), in which case it matters whether that knowledge is true, or knowledge can be used to achieve other ends (action hat), in which case it does not matter whether that knowledge is true, provided it works (enables one to achieve the desired ends).

…I’m not sure if that answers your question.

Libertarianism as a body of knowledge recognizes that human action exists.

Libertarianism as a political-social cause takes action.

So I don’t know what you mean when you say it “lacks any substantive action.”

Do you mean that libertarianism as a body of knowledge has an inadequate understanding of human action? If so, how?

Libertarianism (the variety promoted here at least) has had very little influence on the world, and hence little substantive action.

I would say libertarianism that takes a methodological individualist stance does have an inadequate understanding of human action. For details, I’ve been discussing this with Autolykos in this thread.

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Facts are not objective.

2 + 1 = 3 is not objective or a fact? I understand the mathematical notation required to write it is subjective, though.

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2 + 1 = 3 is purely theoretical and is not a fact about the world.

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My spidey-sense is tingling that you have some kind of falsificationist criterion for determining what are proper facts about the world.

Why is it ‘purely theoretic’ that 3 countable objects can be counted as 2 objects and another object. ?

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I don’t think I have a falsificationist criterion. I’m saying that facts are not separable from the theories that inform the interpretation that makes them facts in the first place, and therefore they cannot be objective.

2 + 1 = 3 in itself says nothing about the world. It’s an abstraction. If you say there’s 2 cars on the right side of the street and 1 car on the left side, thus 3 cars on the street, that would be a fact. A fact that uses, among oter things, mathematical theory, an example of which is 2 + 1 = 3.