Once you get passed “standard microeconomics” the analysis becomes more complicated and increasingly fruitful.
- __Asymmetric Information:__The calculation argument is so powerful precisely because of the existence of asymmetric information, that is, that individuals have their own entirely subjective value scales, expectations, etc, and the price mechanism facilitates a free flow of tacit and idiosyncratic information amongst economic actors coordinating economic activity. It attempts to match entrepreneurial expectations with reality (optimal production techniques and capital combinations inline with consumer preferences).
- Externalities and Monopoly: Such phenomena are considered inefficient by those who adhere to a very broad and primitive understanding of economic efficiency, namely those that focus solely on allocative or “x-efficiency.” Allocative efficiency concerns itself with maximizing “total surplus” which is then distributed to either producers and/or consumers, i.e., it attempts to eliminate so-called “dead-weight losses.” But there is another type of efficiency, first introduced in the 17th century by Spanish economists (school of Salamanca), and it is known as “dynamic efficiency” (Schumpeter is given credit for this insight). Dynamic efficiency states that the ability to earn supernormal profits creates an incentive to innovate and elevates total investment in the long-run (firms invest and innovate in order to gain competitive advantages, create cost barriers, and capture additional market share). This, in turn, pushes the production possibilities frontier outwards. Simply put, the argument is that it’s better to be under the frontier and continuously pushing outwards than to remain on the same frontier forever, in a completely static state.
I won’t question Esuric’s knowledge of 17th century spanish economists, but I am not quite sure he is fully appreciating the full meaning of modern terms like “asymmetric information” and “externalities” in his response to EIT.
1) asymmetric information - esuric is right that you can view the subjective preferences/expectations/etc of other people as an “asymmetric information” problem. but is the insight that you can’t read other people’s minds what made asymmetric information a popular and revolutionary topics in the 1960s and 1970s? not really. more important are situations, for example, where the quality of the good being traded is known to the seller but not the buyer.
consider the popular tale of the market for lemons. in that hypothetical example, you might have someone wanting to sell their “peach of a car” for $2,000 bucks and there is a customer who would be willing to pay $2,000 if he knew it were a peach. but he would only be willing to pay $1,000 if it is a “lemon”. the problem arises when the buyer can’t know if the car is a “peach” or a “lemon” without buying it. so he essnetially has to make a gamble on the purchase. and for this gamble, suppose he knows the probability of buying a peach or a lemon are 50/50. so, if the buyer is risk neutral, the most he is willing to pay is $1,500 (0.52000 + 0.51000). but, the seller isn’t willing to sell the car for that much so the trade doesn’t take place. and if this problem is wide spread enough, the entire market for used cars collapses and the price system cannot do its job. now, there are other ways outside the price system to fix this problem, but that’s kind of exactly the point. in cases like the one outlined above, the price system alone is not enough to coordinate the decisions of buyers and sellers.
2) externalities - esuric’s dicussion on dynamic efficiency makes sense but doesn’t at all address EIT’s concern about externalities. if negative externalities are present in a particular market, then that means there are costs being incurred that are not being reflected in the price of the good being traded. and if the price doesn’t fully reflect the costs of production, i don’t see how we can expect the price system to always lead to efficient outcomes in any time frame.
now, you may want to argue that market based solutions will be found to these externalities (through introduction of new technologies or creation of new markets) and that in that sense the price system does its job by creating incentives for solving these kinds of problems. but if thats the route you want to go, i would like to see some sort. i have yet to see a rigorous essay or academic article making the case that we should always expect negative externalities stories to have happy, market-based endings (though I did create a thread asking for exactly such articles earlier this fall).
this post has gotten too long, but I wanted to address EIT’s first thought more directly. so i will follow up in a second with a quick response.